ORDER : The present Writ Petition came to be filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief:- “to issue a Writ direction or order, more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus declaring the conditional attachment order in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022 passed by respondent No.3 for conditional attachment of property belongs to the petitioner under Section 73 of A.P.C.S. Act, 1964 is arbitrary, illegal, without jurisdiction, contrary to the provisions of Sections 51, 60 and 73 of Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 and in violation of Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India, consequently set aside the order of conditional attachment of the property belongs to the petitioner, passed in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022 and to pass such other order or orders ….”. 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is : Petitioner is Chief Manager of District Cooperative Central Bank Limited, Guntur Koritepadu Branch. The said bank is having 42 branches in the District. While petitioner was working as Branch Manager of respondent No.5 bank about 300 loans were given to new members of Gorantla Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society. While so, basing on a news item published on 11.03.2022 in Eenadu Daily Newspaper regarding fake loans availed by some persons, enquiry was ordered under Section 51 of the Andhra Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act (for short ‘the APCS Act’) and vide proceedings in A.O/Estt/2021-22, dated 18.03.2022, petitioner was suspended on the ground that she has violated guidelines in disbursement of loans. Subsequently, basing on instructions of Chief Executive Officer, Administrative Office, Guntur, respondent No.3 issued notice to petitioner calling for explanation as to why immovable properties shall not be attached. Petitioner submitted her explanation, dated 10.06.2022. The action of respondent No.3 conditionally attaching the immovable property of the petitioner based on representation of respondent No.5 is impermissible and unauthorized and not in accordance with Section 73 of the APCS Act. Respondent No.3 is not competent to issue notice or orders under conditional attachment under Section 73 of the APCS Act. Therefore, challenging order in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022, the present writ petition is filed. 3. Respondent No.3 is not competent to issue notice or orders under conditional attachment under Section 73 of the APCS Act. Therefore, challenging order in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022, the present writ petition is filed. 3. Counter affidavit was filed by respondent No.3 on behalf of itself and on behalf of respondents 1, 2 and 4, wherein it is averred that petitioner violated the circulars and guidelines of the Bank while disbursing loans to its members and thereby caused loss to the bank. Basing on claim petition filed by respondent No.3 notice was issued to the petitioner. Inspite of issuance of notice calling for petitioner’s explanation to show cause as to why petitioner’s property should not be attached, petitioner neither submitted her explanation nor furnished security, as such, respondent No.3, who is competent to issue conditional attachment order, in view of G.O.Ms.34, Food & Agrl. (Coop-I), dated 18.01.1989, issued notice and conditionally attached property of the petitioner. It is further averred that there is nothing wrong in invoking Section 73 of APCS Act, 1964 and petitioner has alternative remedy of preferring appeal under Section 76 of APCS Act, 1964, as such this writ petition is not maintainable. Hence, prays to dismiss the writ petition. 4. Respondent No.5 filed counter stating that proceedings were issued against petitioner for dereliction of duty and in not conducting field enquiry before sanctioning loans. As the amount involved in fake loans is huge, respondent No.5 filed claim petition and the conditional attachment order passed by respondent No.3 is proper and as per Section 73 of the APCS Act. Hence, prays to dismiss the writ petition. 5. Petitioner filed reply affidavits denying the averments of counters filed by the respondents and submitted that attachment order passed by respondent No.3 is not permissible in view of the judgment rendered in K. Sathyanarayana vs. The A.P. Cooperative Tribunal, wherein Telangana High Court held that though the employees of bank are connected in the process of sanction of loans, as the bank itself is a society, no action can be taken against the employees of another society or bank in respect of irregularities. Hence, prays to allow the writ petition. 6. Heard both sides. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the conditional attachment order is not permissible as per the provisions of Section 73 of the APCS Act. Hence, prays to allow the writ petition. 6. Heard both sides. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that the conditional attachment order is not permissible as per the provisions of Section 73 of the APCS Act. He would contend that there is no provision under the APCS Act which confers power or authority on respondent No.3 to pass any decree or order against petitioner, who is an employee of District Cooperative Central Bank on the ground that loss was caused to the Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society. Petitioner is not employee of society. He would further submit that petitioner is not liable to furnish deposit or security and respondent No.5 failed to establish required conditions laid under clauses (a) or (b) of Section 73 of APCS Act for seeking attachment. Thus, he submits that attachment is liable to be set aside. 8. Learned Government Pleader, on the other hand would submit that basing on claim petition filed by respondent No.5 notice was issued to the petitioner. Inspite of issuance of notice calling for petitioner’s explanation to show cause as to why her property should not be attached, petitioner neither submitted her explanation nor furnished security, as such, respondent No.3, who is competent to issue conditional attachment order, in view of G.O.Ms.34, Food & Agrl. (Coop-I), dated 18.01.1989, issued notice and conditionally attached property of the petitioner. Learned Government Pleader further submits that there is dereliction of duties on the part of the petitioner in sanctioning loans without conducting field enquiry, as such Section 60 of the APCS Act would apply to the petitioner. However, he would submit that if petitioner is aggrieved by order of attachment, remedy of appeal is available to her under Section 76 of the APCS Act. However, petitioner without availing appropriate remedy, approached this Court, as such this writ petition itself is not maintainable. Hence, he prays to dismiss the writ petition. 9. Learned standing counsel for respondent No.5 bank adopted the arguments of learned Government Pleader. 1. Whether the attachment order in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022 passed under Section 73 of the APCS Act is in accordance with Section 73 of the APCS Act? If not, the order is liable to be set aside. 2. Whether the petitioner can be termed as employee of co-operative society to invoke sec 73 of the Act? 3. 1. Whether the attachment order in claim No.386/2022-C, dated 03.06.2022 passed under Section 73 of the APCS Act is in accordance with Section 73 of the APCS Act? If not, the order is liable to be set aside. 2. Whether the petitioner can be termed as employee of co-operative society to invoke sec 73 of the Act? 3. Whether the writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy? 10. The contention of learned Government Pleader is that Section 60 of the APCS Act applies to the petitioner and there is nothing wrong in attaching petitioner’s property. It is apt to have a look at Section 60 of the APCS Act, which reads thus: “60. Surcharge. 10. The contention of learned Government Pleader is that Section 60 of the APCS Act applies to the petitioner and there is nothing wrong in attaching petitioner’s property. It is apt to have a look at Section 60 of the APCS Act, which reads thus: “60. Surcharge. - (1) [Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force] where in the course of an audit under Section 50 or an inquiry under Section 51 or an inspection under Section 52 or Section 53, or the winding up of a society, it appears that any person who is or was entrusted with the organisation, affairs or management of the society or any past or present officer or servant of the society has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property or has been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust or wilful negligence or has made any payment contrary to the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws, the Registrar himself, or any person specially authorised by him in this behalf, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor or contributor, may inquire into the conduct of such person or officer or servant and make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such rate as the Registrar or the person authorised as aforesaid thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in respect of the misappropriation, misapplication of funds, fraudulent retention, breach of trust, or wilful negligence as the Registrar or the person authorised as aforesaid thinks just: Provided that no order shall be passed against any person referred to in this sub-section unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making his representation. (2) Any sum ordered under this section to be repaid to a society or recovered as a contribution to its assets may be recovered on a requisition being made in this behalf by the Registrar to the Collector in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. (3) This section shall apply notwithstanding that such person or officer or servant may have incurred criminal liability by his act. 11. (3) This section shall apply notwithstanding that such person or officer or servant may have incurred criminal liability by his act. 11. No doubt “breach of trust” and willful negligence” occurring in the above Section 60 are related to the conduct of the employees of the Co-operative Society. Though the job of employees of Cooperative Central Bank includes scrutiny of loan applications submitted by the Society, any failure in discharge of such duties would not attract any action under Section 60 of the APCS Act. The employees of Co-operative Bank are governed by settlement entered with the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Banks Association. Though employees are connected in the process of sanction of loans, the bank itself is a society, as such no action can be taken against employees of another society/bank in respect of any irregularities committed in a society. Even if sections 59 and 60 are read together it is clear that the surcharge proceedings cannot be taken against non employees or non office bearers or non members of the society. Therefore, the contention raised by learned Government Pleader that Section 60 of the APCS Act applies to the petitioner falls to ground. 12. Now before proceeding further, it is also apt to extract Section 73 of the Act. Section 73 of the APCS Act reads thus: “Attachment of property before decision or order:- If the Registrar is satisfied on application, report, inquiry or otherwise, that any person with intent to delay or obstruct the enforcement of any decision or order that may be made against him under the provisions of this Act: a) is about to dispose of the whole or any part of his property; or b) is about to remove whole or any part of his property from the jurisdiction of the Registrar, the arbitrator or liquidator, as the case may be, he may, unless adequate security is furnished, direct attachment of the said property and such attachment shall have the same effect as if made by competent Civil Court. 13. A plain reading of the above Section would indicate that Registrar must satisfy that the person is intending to delay or obstruct the enforcement of decision or order and is about to dispose of whole or part of the property or about to remove whole or any part of the property from his jurisdiction, then attachment can be ordered unless adequate security is furnished. Thus, sine-qua non for attachment is satisfaction of the Registrar that the person is about to dispose or remove whole or part of the property to delay or obstruct enforcement of the decision to be made, should exist. 14. In the case on hand, as can be seen from the record no material is putforth to show that petitioner is about to dispose of whole or any part of the property or about to remove whole or any part of the property from the jurisdiction of the Registrar in order to delay or to obstruct enforcement of the decision. 15. The language employed under Section 73 of the APCS Act is almost apposite to the language employed under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC. 16. In Ram Tech and Processing Engineering Company 2008 (2) SCC 302 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the power under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC held as under: “the power under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5 of CPC is a drastic and extraordinary power and that such power should not be exercised mechanically or merely for asking.” It was also held that the power should be used sparingly, strictly in accordance with the Rule and the purpose of the said Order is not to convert an unsercured debt into secured debt. It was further held that a defendant is not debarred from dealing with his property merely because a suit is filed or about to be filed against him and that the plaintiff should show, prima facie, that his claim is bonafide and valid and also satisfy the Court that the defendant is about to remove or dispose of the whole or part of his property with an intention of obstructing or delaying the execution of any decree that may be passed against him, before power is exercised under Order XXXVIII, Rule 5 of CPC.” 17. In Surender Sing Bajaj v. Kitty Steels Limited and another, 2002 (3) ALD 191 (DB), Division Bench of erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as under: “the satisfaction of the Court that the defendant with an intention to obstruct or delay the execution of the decree that may be passed by it, is about to dispose of the whole or part of his property, or is about to remove the whole or any part of his property from the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court, is sine-qua non for exercising the power under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 of CPC. …” 18. In Premraj Mundra v. Md. Maneck Gazi, AIR 1951 Cal 156 , Calcutta High Court held as under: “17. The fact which was taken into consideration in the impugned order that the defendant in spite of notice did not appear in the Court, is not sufficient for passing any order of attachment before judgment. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that materials being available on record, it is not important that necessary reasons have not been state in the impugned order, does not appear to be correct as the satisfaction of the Court has to be indicated in the order itself.” 19. Thus, a conspectus of above authorities would indicate that attachment of property being drastic should be used sparingly. The authority should assign reasons while passing the order of attachment. 20. In the case on hand, as observed supra the order doesn’t indicate the requirement for grant of attachment as mandated under Section 73 of the APCS Act. Since attachment of the property is a very harsh remedy it cannot be resorted to in a routine manner. Since the order is not in consonance with Section 73 of the Act, the same is liable to be set aside. 21. As far as the submission of learned Government Pleader that remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner under Section 76 of the Act and Writ Petition is not proper remedy, this Court is of the opinion that the same is a self-imposed restriction. In case of gross violation of law or of a statutory provision, the existence of alternative remedy, however, will not preclude this Court from entertaining the writ petition. 22. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. In case of gross violation of law or of a statutory provision, the existence of alternative remedy, however, will not preclude this Court from entertaining the writ petition. 22. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under; “So far as the view taken by the High Court that the remedy by way of recourse to arbitration clause was available to the appellants and therefore the writ petition filed by the appellants was liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice it to observe that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.” 23. In Radha Krishna Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh and Others, 2021 (6) SCC) 771 , the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “16. The High Court held that a writ is ordinarily not maintainable when there exists an alternative remedy. The exceptions to this rule are where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the legislation; or acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure or where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The High Court held that it would not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, if an efficacious remedy is available to the aggrieved person or where the statute under which the action complained of has been taken contains a mechanism for redressal of grievances. The High Court held that when a statutory forum of appeal exists, an appeal should “not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation”. 24. As the notice impugned in the writ petition, as discussed supra, neither contains reasons nor in accordance with the language employed under Section 73 of the APCS Act, this writ petition is maintainable. 25. The High Court held that when a statutory forum of appeal exists, an appeal should “not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation”. 24. As the notice impugned in the writ petition, as discussed supra, neither contains reasons nor in accordance with the language employed under Section 73 of the APCS Act, this writ petition is maintainable. 25. As discussed supra, the attachment order passed by respondent No.3 does not indicate primary requirement regarding intention of petitioner for disposing or removing of whole or any part of the property to delay or obstruct enforcement of any decision. Apart from that petitioner neither is employee nor member of society. Authorities cannot apply rigor of section 60 against the petitioner and hence invocation of Sec 73 does not arise. 26. In view of the above discussion, the impugned order, dated 03.06.2022 passed in claim No.386/2022-C is liable to be set aside. 27. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed setting aside the order of attachment, dated 03.06.2022 passed in claim No.386/2022-C. However, this order will not preclude the respondent authorities to act in accordance with law.