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2022 DIGILAW 1528 (KAR)

Andrews Education Society v. Allan Mohan Gnanakan

2022-12-01

SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. The captioned three appeals arise out of common judgment rendered in O.S.No.267/1999 and O.S.No.436/1999. All these three captioned appeals are filed by the plaintiff. RSA.No.2831/2007 arises out of judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.267/1999 and R.A.No.3/2004. RSA.No.2832/2007 is filed questioning the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.436/1999 and R.A.No.4/2004. RSA No.2833/2007 arises out of judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.267/1999 and R.A.No.84/2005. 2. For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred to as per their rank before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff is an Educational Society registered under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959. One Shri O.S.Aiman claiming to be its Chairman has filed two suits. O.S.No.267/1999 is filed seeking permanent injunction against the sole defendant. O.S.No.436/1999 is also filed by the Chairman seeking declaration to declare the act of locking the office premises of the school building by the defendants on 30/8/1999 as illegal and further to declare the power of attorney dtd. 6/12/1997 executed by defendant Nos.2 and 3 in favour of defendant No.1 as illegal and consequential relief of mandatory injunction to remove the lock of the premises. 4. The facts leading to filing of both the suits are as under: (a) The subject matter of the suit is immovable property bearing Sy.No.107 measuring 45 guntas situated in Gadag Road, Hubli. It is contended by the plaintiffs that plaintiff is duly registered Educational Society under the provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Registration Act, 1960. Under bye-laws, it is contended that its Chairman of plaintiff-Society is authorized to defend and file suit on behalf of the Society. It is further contended that plaintiff-Society is a minority Educational Society and it runs primary and secondary schools in the suit property and has a strength of around 1300 students and 42 teaching faculties and staff members. (b) The grievance of the plaintiff-Society is that defendants are highhandedly interfering with the educational affairs. It is specifically contended that defendant in O.S.No.267/1999 on 5/6/1999 entered into the premises at 7.00 a.m. and threatened the plaintiff to dispossess from the suit property and therefore, the present bare suit for injunction is filed in O.S.No.267/1999. The second suit in O.S.No.436/1999 is filed seeking relief of declaration and injunction. It is specifically contended that defendant in O.S.No.267/1999 on 5/6/1999 entered into the premises at 7.00 a.m. and threatened the plaintiff to dispossess from the suit property and therefore, the present bare suit for injunction is filed in O.S.No.267/1999. The second suit in O.S.No.436/1999 is filed seeking relief of declaration and injunction. It is alleged in the plaint in O.S.No.436/1999 that defendant Nos.4 to 13 trespassed into the suit premises on 30/8/1999 at about 1.30 p.m. and illegally attempted to dispossess the plaintiff on the strength of concocted power of attorney dtd. 6/12/1999 executed by defendant Nos.2 and 3 in favour of defendant No.1. 5. The defendants, on receipt of summons, have tendered appearance in both the suits. In both the suits, defendant No.1 has filed written statement. The defendant No.1 has contended that plaintiff-Society which is registered under the Bombay Public Trust Act does not possess any immovable property. The suit property belongs to Bombay Diocesan Trust Association (herein after referred to as 'BDTA'). The defendant No.1 has contended that plaintiff-Society is acting as an agent. Therefore, defendant No.1 contended that under authorization conferred by the BDTA, the defendant No.1 is entitled to manage the trust properties. The defendant No.1 on the contrary alleged that plaintiff-Society under the garb of running educational Society has indulged in illegally collecting heavy donations while admitting the students. The defendant No.1 further contended that the school building is in fact constructed by BDTA under the supervision of PW.1's father. Therefore, the present suit filed by the Society is one without authorization and hence, specifically contended that the suit itself is not maintainable. 6. Based on the rival contentions, the plaintiffs and defendants let in oral and documentary evidence. In fact common evidence is recorded by clubbing both the suits. 7. The trial Court having examined oral and documentary evidence let in by both parties, answered issue Nos.1 to 4 in the affirmative in a bare suit for injunction filed in O.S.No.267/1999. The trial Court while considering the claim of plaintiff-Society in a bare suit for injunction held that plaintiff-Society has succeeded in proving its actual possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The trial Court while answering issue No.2 also held that the alleged interference in the plaint is also established by the plaintiff. Consequently, suit was partly decreed. 8. The trial Court while considering the claim of plaintiff-Society in a bare suit for injunction held that plaintiff-Society has succeeded in proving its actual possession and enjoyment over the suit schedule property. The trial Court while answering issue No.2 also held that the alleged interference in the plaint is also established by the plaintiff. Consequently, suit was partly decreed. 8. In the connected comprehensive suit, trial Court referring to the material on record answered issue Nos.1 to 4 in the affirmative. While answering issue Nos.1 to 4 in the affirmative, trial Court held that plaintiff has succeeded in proving that defendants have illegally locked the office premises of the school building. While dealing with issue No.3, trial Court answered the same in the affirmative and held that defendant No.1 has succeeded in proving that he is authorized agent of BDTA and therefore, he is authorized to manage the properties of BDTA. Issue No.4 was also answered in favour of defendants and trial Court held that defendant Nos.1 to 3 have succeeded in proving that defendant Nos.2 and 3 are Honorary Secretary and Honorary Treasurer respectively of BDTA and therefore, they are very much empowered to execute power of attorney and therefore, the power of attorney executed on 6/12/1997 in favour of defendant No.1 is valid and plaintiff cannot question the same. While examining issue No.6 which has a bearing on the very maintainability of the suit, trial Court answered the same in the negative and held that suit is maintainable. 9. The core dispute in the present case on hand is whether the plaintiff-Society is an independent entity and does not come under the management of BDTA. PW.1 who has filed the present suit claiming to be the Chairman of plaintiff-Society is asserting exclusive right over the suit property. It is the specific case that his father has established a firm and Society and building is constructed by his father. Having made a claim that the plaintiff- Society is independent and is nowhere concerned to BDTA, trial Court found that plaintiff-Society has not produced any documents. On the contrary, trial Court having examined the rebuttal evidence was of the view that the suit property is owned by BDTA and the Society which runs an Educational Society is in fact established by BDTA. 10. On the contrary, trial Court having examined the rebuttal evidence was of the view that the suit property is owned by BDTA and the Society which runs an Educational Society is in fact established by BDTA. 10. The trial Court referring to the Xerox copy of the writ petition in W.P.No.5075/1990 held that father of PW.1 has clearly admitted that suit property belongs to BDTA and there is further admission that plaintiff-Society is its agent. On examining Ex.D-4 which is the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, trial Court held that the suit property is in fact allotted to BDTA and this property is registered under the provisions of Bombay Public Trust Act. Referring to Ex.D-5 which is the list of furniture in the school, trial Court also held that the suit property stands in the name of BDTA and father of PW.1 is shown as Chairman. Further, Ex.D-1 which is in fact letter written by plaintiff's father, wherein it is clearly admitted that property belongs to BDTA. The trial Court was also of the view that Ex.D-2 would further clinch the issue which is a communication issued by the present PW.1 on behalf of his father addressed to Samyuktha Karnataka Daily Newspaper which are dtd. 7/9/1980 and 25/7/1980 stating that BDTA is the owner of the suit property and one P.Soloman is the Manager of the suit property and S.F. Aiman is the Secretary of plaintiff-Society. 11. The trial Court further referring to Ex.D-4 held that the Special Deputy Commissioner of Dharwad has granted permission to construct the school building over the suit schedule property. The permission is granted not in favour of either PW.1 or his father but it is granted in favour of the Resident Director of BDTA. The trial Court while meticulously examining the documents was of the view that all these documents are admitted by PW.1 The trial Court has also taken note of Exs.D-9, D-10, D-14 and Exs.D-23 and D-24 which are letters written by the father of the plaintiff at undisputed point of time. In all these letters, it is clearly admitted that property belongs to BDTA and not the Society. In all these letters, it is clearly admitted that property belongs to BDTA and not the Society. The trial Court referring to all these significant rebuttal evidence though dismissed O.S.No.436/1999 but, however, proceeded to decree the injunction suit filed in O.S.No.267/1999 and injunction was granted restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit schedule property without due process of law. 12. The trial Court while granting injunction in favour of plaintiff-Society was of the view that the plaintiff-Society is running a school under the supervision of PW.1 and therefore, trial Court was of the view that possession of plaintiff-Society at this juncture cannot be disturbed as it would directly affect the students who are studying in the school. The trial Court while granting injunction, at para 21, also records a finding that PW.1 cannot assert possession in his individual capacity but, however, showing concern to the students interest, the trial Court proceeds to grant injunction thereby relegating the defendants to seek possession by following due process of law. 13. The plaintiffs feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in O.S.Nos.267/1999 and 436/1999 preferred two appeals. R.A.No.3/2004 was filed by the plaintiff-Society questioning the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.267/1999. R.A.No.4/2004 was also filed by plaintiff questioning the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.436/1999. While R.A.No.84/2005 was filed by the defendants feeling aggrieved by the decree for injunction passed in O.S.No.267/1999 against the defendants. All these three appeals filed by the plaintiffs and defendants were clubbed together and Appellate Court heard the matter. 14. The Appellate Court being final fact finding authority has independently assessed the entire evidence on record. The Appellate Court however, did not concur with the findings recorded by the trial Court in O.S.No.267/1999 which was one for injunction simplicitor. Appellate Court took a divergent view. The Appellate Court held that if trial Court held that bare suit for injunction passed in O.S.No.267/1999 was held to be not maintainable and if issue No.4 in O.S.No.267/1999 was answered in the affirmative, then trial Court grossly erred in decreeing the suit in part granting injunction in favour of plaintiff-Society. The Appellate Court having independently re-assessed Exs.D-1 and D-2 held that the suit property admittedly is owned by BDTA. The Appellate Court having independently re-assessed Exs.D-1 and D-2 held that the suit property admittedly is owned by BDTA. The contention of plaintiff that Ex.D-1 which is the letter written by plaintiff wherein father of PW.1 has admitted that suit property belongs to BDTA, was tendered under compulsion and misunderstanding, is not corroborated and substantiated by the plaintiff. The said contention was also not accepted as PW.1 was found to be a practicing Advocate and therefore, he cannot retract and get away from the contents of Exs.D-1, D-2 and D-3. 15. The Appellate Court has also examined the controversy relating to the authority of defendant No.1 to defend the present suit. The Appellate Court was also of the view that defendant No.10 in O.S.No.436/1999 which is the BDTA has not disputed the status of defendant No.1. Appellate Court has further meticulously examined the averments made in para 10 of the plaint in O.S.No.436/1999. The plaintiff has in fact unequivocally admitted that defendant Nos.10 to 13 were kind enough to help plaintiff-Society in its educational activities. It is in this context, Appellate Court was not inclined to accede to the arguments advanced by the plaintiff in both the suits. Appellate Court was of the view that plaintiff-Society has no locus to question the general power of attorney executed in favour of defendant No.1. Therefore, the suit filed in O.S.No.436/1999 by the plaintiff-Society which is only acting as an agent to BDTA have no locus to file O.S.No.436/1999. 16. The alternate narrative of the plaintiff-Society that father of PW.1 was founder and chairman of plaintiff- Society and sanad was issued by the competent authority to his father was out-rightly declined by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court has drawn adverse inference since plaintiff-Society though has asserted independent title in the suit property on the basis of sanad, the said sanad is not produced. Appellate Court has also recorded a categorical finding that plaintiff-Society has failed to establish that father of PW.1 was the founder of plaintiff- Society. The said allegations are not substantiated by producing cogent evidence. Appellate Court also held that there is no evidence indicating that PW.1's father has constructed building through his own funds. Appellate Court has also recorded a categorical finding that plaintiff-Society has failed to establish that father of PW.1 was the founder of plaintiff- Society. The said allegations are not substantiated by producing cogent evidence. Appellate Court also held that there is no evidence indicating that PW.1's father has constructed building through his own funds. An adverse inference is drawn against the plaintiff-Society as they have failed to place on record the building permission, approved plan, completion certificate to substantiate their claim that school building was constructed by PW.1's father through his independent earnings. The Appellate Court has concurred with the reasons and conclusions recorded by the trial Court. Appellate Court referring to the correspondences made by father of PW.1, also held that suit property is owned by BDTA/defendant No.10 in O.S.No.436/1999 and it is defendant No.10 which is in lawful possession. 17. Referring to rebuttal clinching evidence, Appellate Court was also of the view that suit property belongs to BDTA and the educational institution is also being run under the control of BDTA and therefore, PW.1 cannot maintain the suits against the Trust. Questioning the locus of PW.1, Appellate Court was also of the view that PW.1 had no authorization to institute the suits. Therefore, the Appellate Court on independent assessment of oral and documentary evidence, reversed the findings of the trial Court in granting injunction in O.S.No.267/1999. Appellate Court held that the trial Court had answered issue No.4 in affirmative in O.S.No.267/1999 and held that suit is not maintainable. Therefore, trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant injunction against the defendants. Therefore, Appellate Court held that plaintiffs are not at all entitled for any relief in both the suits. Consequently, allowed the appeal filed by the defendants in R.A.No.84/2005 and dismissed R.A.Nos.3/2004 and 4/2004 filed by the plaintiffs. These common judgments rendered in three appeals are under challenge at the instance of the plaintiff. 18. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal memo would vehemently argue and contend that suit is not filed against BDTA and it is in fact filed against an individual who has no concern and is not authorized by BDTA. Learned counsel would further emphasis on the fact that plaintiff is not asserting ownership over the suit property. He would contend that Appellate Court has virtually misread and misunderstood the relief sought in the suit. Learned counsel would further emphasis on the fact that plaintiff is not asserting ownership over the suit property. He would contend that Appellate Court has virtually misread and misunderstood the relief sought in the suit. He would vehemently argue and contend that management and school is not all under BDTA though property may be owned by the BDTA. He would further contend that BDTA is not part of management of plaintiff-Society. The plaintiff- Society is registered under the provisions of Karnataka Co- operative Societies Registration Act and it is running a school in its individual capacity and therefore, contends that BDTA is no where concerned with the school affairs. Relying on Ex.D-25, learned counsel would contend that PTR extract does not indicate existence of school. He would further point out that plaintiff-Society is not at all under the control of BDTA. Therefore, he would contend that documents produced by plaintiff clearly establishes that Society is being independently run with permissive possession and therefore, he would contend that trial Court was justified in granting injunction. 19. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff has also placed reliance on the additional evidence in RSA.No.2831/2007. By way of additional evidence, a copy of plaint in O.S.No.231/2004 is placed on record and this document is relied on by the plaintiff to demonstrate that suit filed by BDTA through defendant No.1 and general power of attorney is dismissed for non-prosecution. It is also stated that miscellaneous application seeking restoration of suit is also dismissed and consequently miscellaneous appeal is dismissed. Therefore, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would contend that if suit for possession filed by BDTA in O.S.No.231/2004 is dismissed, plaintiff-Society is entitled for injunction. 20. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendants repelling the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff would take this Court to Ex.P-2 which is a certificate of registration dtd. 21/7/1979. He would then place reliance on Ex.D-4 which is order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner on 16/2/1981. He would contend that these documents would clinch the entire controversy. He would contend that Ex.D-4 would clearly establish that permission was granted to BDTA to run a school. He would vehemently argue and contend that this communication is addressed to BDTA and not to plaintiff-Society. He would contend that these documents would clinch the entire controversy. He would contend that Ex.D-4 would clearly establish that permission was granted to BDTA to run a school. He would vehemently argue and contend that this communication is addressed to BDTA and not to plaintiff-Society. He would also bring to the notice of this Court that this permission is granted subsequent to registration of plaintiff-Society which was registered in 1979. He has also placed reliance on Ex.D-5. Placing reliance on Ex.D-5 which is extract from register of Trust. Learned counsel has placed reliance on 7th column and placing reliance on this document, he would contend that there is a declaration that the trust owns 150 desks and 50 benches. 21. Learned counsel would further place reliance on Ex.D-9. Placing reliance on last two paragraphs, he would bring to the notice of this Court that it is admitted that suit property is admittedly owned by BDTA. The contention of plaintiff-Society that school does not come under the control and management of BDTA, he would counter the said claim by relying on Exs.D-10 and D-11. Referring to these two documents, he would contend that letter is addressed by agent to BDTA and progress report is submitted. Under Ex.D-12, he would point out that a communication is addressed by the agent to BDTA by furnishing the expenses incurred by the plaintiff-Society. Referring to Ex.D-13, he would contend that the letter is addressed to the Town Planning officer and in the said communication, it is admitted that suit property is owned by BDTA. 22. Learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on Ex.D-14 which is the order passed in W.P.No.8886/1984. Referring to page 2 of the writ petition, he would point out that PW.1 has clearly asserted to be an agent. Referring to these voluminous documents, learned counsel appearing for the defendants would contend that PW.1 is neither a lessee nor a licensee and therefore, he cannot claim that he is tenant at sufferance. Reliance is placed on para 19 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Jayantilal Modi vs. Vadilal Bapalal Modi and Others, (1989) 2 SCC 630 . Reliance is placed on para 19 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Jayantilal Modi vs. Vadilal Bapalal Modi and Others, (1989) 2 SCC 630 . Placing reliance on the principles laid down in the above cited judgment, he would contend that if there are materials indicating that plaintiff-Society is acting as a agent, the plaintiff-Society is not entitled for injunction and question of BDTA seeking possession by due process of law would be unwarranted. He has countered the claim of plaintiff-Society in regard to BDTA filing a suit for possession. Learned counsel for the defendants, however,contended that filing of suit for possession by BDTA is of no consequence. 23. Placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes and Others vs. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370 . at para 70, learned counsel would contend that party has to disclose his nature of possession. He would then point out that plaintiff-Society has miserably failed to disclose under what capacity it claims possession. He would submit that clinching rebuttal evidence clearly establishes that all the acts done by the PW.1's father were in capacity of an agent and therefore, the plaintiff-Society's possession is in fact possession held on behalf of principal. He has placed reliance on the judgment rendered in Narendra Jayantilal Modi (supra). Referring to the dictum laid down by the Apex Court, he would contend that the possession held by an agent is possession on behalf of principal. Referring to these significant details, he would contend that injunction granted by the trial Court in O.S.No.267/1999 having answered issue No.4 in the affirmative, by holding that suit is not maintainable, erred in granting injunction. The decree for injunction granted by the trial Court after having recorded a finding that suit itself is not maintainable is patently erroneous and therefore, the decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.267/1999 suffers from serious perversity. 24. The Appellate Court being final fact finding authority has rightly re-assessed the entire evidence on record independently. The conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Court is based on sound principles of law and the Appellate Court has rightly dealt with the maintainability of the suit. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court in all the three appeals is in accordance with law and would not warrant interference. The conclusion arrived at by the Appellate Court is based on sound principles of law and the Appellate Court has rightly dealt with the maintainability of the suit. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court in all the three appeals is in accordance with law and would not warrant interference. He would conclude his arguments by contending that in all the three appeals, the grounds urged would not lead to any substantial question of law and therefore, he would request this Court to dismiss all the three appeals. 25. Heard learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and learned counsel appearing for the defendants. I have examined the judgments cited by the learned counsel. I have also given my anxious consideration to the reasons assigned by both the Courts. 26. In both the suits, the plaintiff-Society is seeking relief of injunction and the GPA executed in favour of the sole defendant in O.S.No.267/1999 is also challenged in the connected suit bearing O.S.No.436/1999. The entire basis to institute the present suit is based on an allegation that sole defendant in O.S.No.267/1999 is unnecessarily interfering with the affairs of the plaintiff-Society. PW.1 claims to be the Chairman of plaintiff-Society and it is his specific case that plaintiff-Society is the owner of the suit property and the building situated in the suit property is in fact constructed by his father from his own funds. PW.1 also asserts that his father who is the founder of plaintiff- Society was conferred with a Sanad and therefore, plaintiff- Society claims that neither the defendant in O.S.No.267/1999 nor defendant No.10 in the connected suit have any semblance of right and title over the suit property. 27. Now let me advert to the material on record. Both the Courts referring to the rebuttal evidence let in by the defendants have come to conclusion that the suit property is admittedly owned by BDTA. Now these findings and conclusions are based on the rebuttal evidence adduced by the defendants. Ex.D-4 is the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad. The contents of the said order would clinch the entire controversy. Ex.D-4 reads as under: "Subject: Permission to change the purpose of land granted for a specific purpose. Dharwad Dt: 16/2/1981. READ 1) The papers ending with endorsement of Tahsildar, Hubli's No. LND. SR. 108 dtd. 15/12/1980. 2) Photostat copy of Sanad No.8412 executed on 8/7/1898. The contents of the said order would clinch the entire controversy. Ex.D-4 reads as under: "Subject: Permission to change the purpose of land granted for a specific purpose. Dharwad Dt: 16/2/1981. READ 1) The papers ending with endorsement of Tahsildar, Hubli's No. LND. SR. 108 dtd. 15/12/1980. 2) Photostat copy of Sanad No.8412 executed on 8/7/1898. ORDER The Resident Director, the Bombay Diocesan Trust Assocation Private Limited, Poona has put in an application requesting to permit them to use the land S.No.107 of Keswapur within the Corporation limits of Hubli-Dharwad for the purpose of construction of English School. On enquiry it is learnt that the land S.No.107 of Keswapur was granted to the above Association for constructing a protestant Church in the year 1898 with the condition that the authorities should not use the land without the consent of Government. Now the Association intends to run an English School for which they desire to construct a school building and hence they request for permission. In view of the above, the Special Deputy Commissioner Dharwad is pleased to accord permission to use the land S.No.107 of Keshwapur for construction of building for running an English School with the same conditions as enumerated in Saned No.8412 dated 8-7- 1898. Sd/- Special Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad. Copy w.c.s. to Shri J. Lazarus, Resident Director, The Bombay Diocesan Trust Association Private Ltd, 12, Castellino Road, Poona-1 for information. Copy w.c.s.. to Sri.R.A.Patil (Retd. Asst. Commr) Hon'ble Secretary, St. Andrew's Education Society, Keshwapur, Road, Hubli-23. Sd/- for Spi. Deputy Commissioner Dharwad." 28. If Ex.D-4 is examined, this Court would find that the entire claim of plaintiff stands falsified. The agricultural land bearing Sy.No.107 situated at Keshwapur, Hubli was in fact granted to BDTA. An application was moved before the Special Deputy Commissioner seeking permission to construct a building so as to run an English School. The Special Deputy Commissioner, Dharwad has accorded permission to use the land for construction of building so as to run an English School. The permission granted by the Special Deputy Commissioner also indicates the grant of Sanad in favour of BDTA in Sanad No.8412 dtd. 8/7/1898. Therefore, the plaintiff-Society's contention that the building was constructed by PW.1's father from his independent earnings is found to be totally false and the same is not substantiated by any documents. 29. The permission granted by the Special Deputy Commissioner also indicates the grant of Sanad in favour of BDTA in Sanad No.8412 dtd. 8/7/1898. Therefore, the plaintiff-Society's contention that the building was constructed by PW.1's father from his independent earnings is found to be totally false and the same is not substantiated by any documents. 29. The next documents which have been dealt with by both the Courts are Exs.D-9, D-10, D-11 and D-12. These are the correspondences made by PW.1's father at different point of time. Under Ex.D-9, the father of PW.1 i.e., S.F.Aiman has addressed a letter to the Secretary, Town Planning. In the said letter, he has admitted in unequivocal terms that the property bearing Sy.No.107 is owned by Bombay Diocesan Trust Association Private Limited, Bombay. Ex.D-9 also depicts that the trustees from Bombay visited the office of Town Planning. In the very letter at second concluding paragraph, father of PW.1 has also expressed that the trustees are pressing the management to construct a building. What can be gathered from this document is that PW.1's father was acting on behalf of the Trust and therefore, PW.1 cannot assert ownership over the suit property nor he can claim that the school building was constructed by his father from his own funds. 30. Ex.D-10 is a communication which is addressed to the Secretary of BDTA. Under this communication, PW.1's father requested the trustees of BDTA to visit Hubli and lay down a foundation stone before 15/8/1987. This Court deems it fit to cull out the relevant paragraph: "I, therefore, want the B.D.T.A. Trustees to visit Hubli and lay the foundation stone before 15/8/1987. Because this school building in St. Andrews Church Compound will stand as a permanent monument in the Name of B.D.T.A and a Proud torch of learning as it is the only Protest School in the midst of Catholic Secondary Schools." 31. On examining the relevant portion, what emerges is that PW.1's father has expressed that the structure that is being put up in the above said land would be a monument in the name of BDTA. PW.1's contention that his father has spent money to construct a school building is also successfully refuted by the defendants. 32. Exs.D-11 and D-12 would clinch the said controversy as to who has invested the money for the construction of school building. PW.1's contention that his father has spent money to construct a school building is also successfully refuted by the defendants. 32. Exs.D-11 and D-12 would clinch the said controversy as to who has invested the money for the construction of school building. Under Ex.D-11, father of PW.1 has sent a communication to the Secretary of BDTA requesting the release of fund of Rs.10,00,000.00 towards school construction. He has requested the Secretary to get loan sanctioned by the committee at an early date. Followed by this communication, one more communication is sent by PW.1's father at Ex.D-12. Under Ex.D-12, PW.1's father has apprised the Secretary of BDTA in regard to the escalation of cost of construction and he has made a further request to arrange Rs.10,00,000.00 to facilitate the construction of school building. Under Ex.D-13, PW.1's father while addressing the letter has clearly stated that BDTA is the owner pursuant to Sanad No.8412 dtd. 8/7/1898 and has admitted that BDTA are the trustees of the property bearing Sy.No.107. This communication is addressed to the Town Planning Authority requesting for sanctioning building permission. 33. The plaintiff's father had filed a writ petition before this Court in W.P.No.8886/1984. Though objections are raised before the trial Court that this document is Xerox copy, the said objections was over-ruled by trial Court as plaintiff-Society has not disputed the filing of writ petition. Therefore, the trial Court was of the view that admitted facts need not be proved and therefore, cognizance was taken by the Court of first instance in regard to the stand taken by the plaintiff's father while presenting the writ petition before this Court. The relevant paragraph would be useful for this Court to refer and the same is culled out as under: "The petitioner's society has been formed and registered in the year 1979 with the concurrence and guidance of the Bombay Trust and the petitioner has been acting as Agent of the Bombay Trust and the petitioner has been acting as Agent of the Bombay Trust. This fact is amply borne out by the Bombay Trust letter dt. 27/5/1981 addressed to the Joint Director of Public Instruction, Belgaum Dn. Belgaum, true copy or which is produced.. herewith at Annexure 'D'." 34. This fact is amply borne out by the Bombay Trust letter dt. 27/5/1981 addressed to the Joint Director of Public Instruction, Belgaum Dn. Belgaum, true copy or which is produced.. herewith at Annexure 'D'." 34. These averments made in the writ petition would further strengthen the defendants' claim that PW.1 has no semblance of right over the suit schedule property, more particularly the management of school. If these averments are looked into, this Court would also find that PW.1's father has admitted in unequivocal terms that plaintiff- Society was registered in 1979 with concurrence and guidance of BDTA. PW.1's father has further claimed that he is acting as an agent of said Trust and to assert his status, he has placed reliance on the letter dtd. 27/5/1981 addressed to the Joint Director of Public Instructions. 35. If all these significant details are looked into, firstly, this Court would find that PW.1 has failed to establish his status as Chairman of plaintiff-Society. The Court of first instance has dealt with the status of PW.1 and was not inclined to accept the claim made by the plaintiff that PW.1 is the Chairman of plaintiff-Society. The Court of first instance having examined the material on record has in fact drawn adverse inference against PW.1. 36. The Courts below have recorded a finding that PW.1 without calling for Annual General Body Meeting has himself unilaterally declared as Chairman. Both the Courts have held that present PW.1 is shown to be unanimously declared as a Chairman. Both the Courts have declined to accept the status of Chairman of plaintiff-Society. While both the Courts have concurrently held that school building is in fact constructed by BDTA and the school was being run under the management of BDTA. The material on record also indicate that PW.1's father was acting as an agent and has only facilitated in assisting the BDTA in establishing the school building. That in itself will not create a right in favour of PW.1's father. 37. In the light of the discussion made supra, the question that needs consideration at the hands of this Court is whether PW.1 whose status is not established can seek injunction against a true owner. 38. The trial Court having negatived the claim made by the alleged Chairman of plaintiff-Society erred in granting injunction on the premise that the students' interest would be affected. 38. The trial Court having negatived the claim made by the alleged Chairman of plaintiff-Society erred in granting injunction on the premise that the students' interest would be affected. There is absolutely no material placed on record indicating that BDTA is intending to close the school. If PW.1's father has admitted in earlier round of litigation that he was acting as a agent on behalf of BDTA, then the present alleged Chairman i.e., PW.1 cannot assert exclusive possession and he cannot seek injunction against the Trust which holds the property as owner of the school building. Even if PW.1's father was acting as an agent, then he received the property for his principal. 39. It is trite law that an agent who receives property from his principal, obtains no interest for himself in the property. As an agent, he obtains no interest for himself in the subject matter and he is dealing through out for another. Out of this practice, there has emerged a rule, which is a normal incident of agency, that an agent cannot deny principal's title to property nor he can convert it into his own property. The possession of an agent is the possession of principal for all purposes, including the acquisition of title. 40. The judgment cited by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Chembur Service Station, (2011) 3 SCC 710 . is squarely applicable to the present case on hand. Even if PW.1's status is not established and if there is no evidence to substantiate his claim that he is the Chairman, he is to be treated only as an agent and he would not gain better right or title than his father who was also admittedly acting as an agent. 41. Though a feeble attempt is made by PW.1 by contending that the school building was constructed and the cost was borne by his father, the said fact is not substantiated. Even if PW.1 had succeeded in establishing that his father's authority to act as an agent was coupled with an interest as envisaged under Sec. 202 of Contract Act, agent's remedy squarely falls under Sec. 205 of Indian Contract Act and he has to claim compensation. Therefore, under the garb of agency, PW.1 could not have asserted right and title. PW.1 could not have denied the trust title to the property. Therefore, under the garb of agency, PW.1 could not have asserted right and title. PW.1 could not have denied the trust title to the property. If the principle that possession by an agent is the possession of principal for all purposes, then trial Court misread the evidence on record and granted injunction. If there is threat to revocation of the agency of PW.1, he cannot seek injunction against the Trust which is in fact running the school. There is no material placed on record indicating that BDTA are intending to close the school on account of dispute between PW.1 and the Trust. Therefore, the trial Court having held that plaintiff has failed to substantiate his claim erred in injuncting the defendants. The finding of the trial Court that plaintiff has to seek possession from PW.1 is perverse, palpably erroneous and contrary to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Jayantilal Modi (supra). Para 19 of the judgment cited supra has laid down principles indicating that possession of an agent is possession of a principal and in view of fiduciary relationship, an agent cannot claim his own possession. Therefore, the finding of the trial Court that defendants are entitled to recover possession is patently erroneous and contrary to the settled principles. Therefore, looking to the fiduciary character in the light of the rebuttal evidence let in by the defendants, if PW.1 is running the school and even if he is found to be in-charge of the management, that in itself will not give a right to seek perpetual injunction against the principal. 42. These significant details are rightly dealt with by the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court having concurred with the findings of the trial Court insofar as PW.1's right in managing the school affairs is concerned, however, was justified in reversing the findings of the trial Court in relegating the defendants to seek possession. The said finding of the trial Court and consequent grant of injunction till plaintiff-Society is evicted under due process of law was rightly reversed by the Appellate Court. The registration of plaintiff-Society does not in itself create an independent right in favour of PW.1. The plaintiff-Society was registered with concurrence of BDTA and the same is evident from the correspondence vide Ex.D-18. The rebuttal evidence clearly indicates that it is the BDTA which has secured permission to run a school. The registration of plaintiff-Society does not in itself create an independent right in favour of PW.1. The plaintiff-Society was registered with concurrence of BDTA and the same is evident from the correspondence vide Ex.D-18. The rebuttal evidence clearly indicates that it is the BDTA which has secured permission to run a school. The permission is sought from the Special Deputy Commissioner to use land for educational purposes. Permission to run an English Medium School is also secured on behalf of BDTA and the school building is constructed by utilizing the funds of BDTA. Findings on application seeking production of additional documents. 43. The plaintiff by way of additional evidence intends to produce the copy of the plaint filed in O.S.No.234/2004, wherein, it is alleged that trust has filed a suit for possession against the plaintiff. Placing reliance on these documents relating to suit for possession by the trust, it is contended by the plaintiff - Society that since possession is admitted, the findings recorded by the trial Court that plaintiff - Society has to be evicted by due process of law has to be confirmed. 44. This Court has exhaustively dealt with the right of PW.1 and his power to manage the school, which is being run in the suit schedule property. This Court in preceding paragraphs has exhaustively dealt with the right of the plaintiff - Society in seeking relief of injunction against the trust. This Court has meticulously referred to these exhibits and has come to the conclusion that PW.1's father was acting as an agent on behalf of the trust. The school is infact being run on behalf of the trust. The construction of building was done with the trust money and permission has been granted by the competent authorities to run a school on behalf of BDTA and not in favour of the plaintiff -Society. This Court in the preceding paragraphs has also dealt with the right of an agent against the principal. This Court has held that agent cannot deny the principal's title to the property nor it can convert into its own property. This Court has also categorically held that possession of agent is the possession of principal for all purposes including acquisition of title. Therefore, the additional evidence, which is now sought to be produced by the plaintiff - Society is of no consequence. This Court has also categorically held that possession of agent is the possession of principal for all purposes including acquisition of title. Therefore, the additional evidence, which is now sought to be produced by the plaintiff - Society is of no consequence. This Court has to be also cautious and slow in entertaining the additional evidence in an appeal under Sec. 100 of CPC. Therefore, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff - Society is not entitled to rely upon additional evidence, which has no relevancy to the actual lis between the parties nor this Court is bound under the facts and circumstances of the case to entertain additional evidence. This Court is of the view that the additional evidence in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Narendra Jayantilal Modi (Supra) has no bearing in the present case on hand. The contention of the plaintiff - Society that additional evidence would have a direct bearing on the decision and conclusion, is found to be misconceived. If plaintiff - Society had filed a suit for possession and same is dismissed for default is of no consequence and same would not come to the aid of plaintiff - Society, as the plaintiff - Society has failed to prove that it has got independent right in the suit property. If the plaintiff - Society cannot maintain a bare suit for injunction against BDTA which happens to be the principal, the application for production of additional evidence cannot be entertained under Sec. 100 of CPC. Therefore, I do not find any valid ground to entertain the said application. Accordingly, the same is rejected. 45. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court reversing the grant of injunction is in accordance with law. The Appellate Court was also justified in reversing the findings of the trial Court in relegating the defendants to seek possession. No substantial question of law arises for consideration. 46. For the foregoing reasons, I pass the following: ORDER The appeals are dismissed. The pending interlocutory application, if any, does not survive for consideration.