Mahendra Kumar Singh v. Aradhana Shukla, Principal Secretary, Secondary Education, U. P. Govt.
2022-09-21
ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL
body2022
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The applicants, who are eight in numbers before this Court along with applicants of three other connected matters, approached the writ Court challenging the Government Order dated 27th October, 2016 issued by State Government as well as order dated 13th July, 2017 issued by State Government along with the individual orders against the applicants and the concerned Educational Institution. The writ petitions were classified into four categories being Group A, B, C and D. 2. The main challenge, which was put before the writ Court by the applicants, who are teachers in recognized and unaided Primary Sections attached Junior High Schools/High Schools and Intermediate Colleges; recognized and unaided Junior High School; recognized and unaided Primary Schools; and, unaided Primary Schools with unaided Junior High School, were that they had been denied benefit of protection of either the U.P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1971”) or the Uttar Pradesh Junior High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1978 (hereinafter called as “Act of 1978”). 3. All the writ petitions were clubbed together and heard by the writ Court taking Writ -A No.38992 of 2017 (Jai Ram Singh and others vs. State of U.P. and others) being the leading case. 4. The parties before the writ Court agreed that the individual facts of an Institution and its teachers need not be examined. The writ Court confined itself to the validity of the policy decisions of the State Government as embodied in the order dated 27th October, 2016 and 13th July, 2017. The writ Court after examining the issue in depth, disposed of the bunch of petitions vide judgment dated 23rd May, 2019 in terms of the following directions : “Accordingly and for the reasons aforementioned, these petitions stand disposed of on the following terms:- Clause 1 of the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 to the extent of prescribing the cut off date of 21 June 1973 as well as Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 thereof are struck down as being as arbitrary and wholly irrational. The State shall in consequence revisit and reframe the impugned Policy in light of the observations made in this judgment. The orders of 13 July 2017 insofar as they defer reconsideration for a period of five years consequentially stand set aside to that extent.
The State shall in consequence revisit and reframe the impugned Policy in light of the observations made in this judgment. The orders of 13 July 2017 insofar as they defer reconsideration for a period of five years consequentially stand set aside to that extent. Writ Petitions in Group A insofar as they relate to primary sections attached to recognised and aided high schools or intermediate colleges covered by the provisions of the 1971 Act cannot be denied the protection of that statute. The petitions in this group falling under the aforesaid class shall stand allowed. The State is consequently directed to bring teachers falling in this class within the ambit of the 1971 Act subject to the requisite exercise being undertaken to assess that they satisfy the test of composite integrality. Writ Petitions in Group A relating to primary sections attached to junior high schools are not covered under the provisions of the 1978 Act. No relief can be granted to them in light of the 2017 Amendments. The petitions preferred at their instance shall stand disposed of subject to liberty being reserved to challenge the 2017 Amendments as introduced in the 1972 and 1978 Acts, if so chosen and advised. Writ Petitions falling in Group B are allowed. The State shall in consequence reconsider their claims for grant in aid in light of the policy that may be framed in light of the directions issued herein above. While Writ Petitions falling in Group C to the extent that they assailed the Government Order dated 27 October 2016 are disposed of in light of the directions issued above, no further consequential relief can be granted presently in their favour in the absence of a challenge to the 2017 Amendments introduced in the 1972 and 1978 Acts. Their right to assail these amendments is preserved to be raised in independent proceedings. Similarly writ petitions falling in group 'D' stand disposed of insofar as the challenge to the impugned Government Orders are concerned. The unaided primary sections thereof cannot be granted any relief in the absence of a challenge to the 2017 Amending Acts. Their right to assail the same is preserved. The junior high schools in this group shall however be entitled to assert their claims afresh for grant in aid in light of the conclusions recorded in the body of the judgment.” 5.
Their right to assail the same is preserved. The junior high schools in this group shall however be entitled to assert their claims afresh for grant in aid in light of the conclusions recorded in the body of the judgment.” 5. The applicants before this Court are those writ petitioners whose writ petition was placed under Group-A, and their case are that they are the teachers of a recognised and unaided Primary Sections attached to Junior High Schools/High Schools and Intermediate Colleges and have been denied the benefit of provisions of Act of 1971. 6. The present contempt application has been filed by the present applicants alongwith other connected matters for punishing the opposite party for wilfully and intentionally disobeying the order of the writ Court dated 23rd May 2019 by not providing benefit of payment of salary under Act of 1971, though part of Clause 1 of the Government Order dated 27th October 2016 as well as Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 having been struck down as having been arbitrary and wholly irrational by the writ Court. 7. Sri Devendra Pratap Singh along with Sri Rajesh Kumar Singh, counsels appearing for the applicants submitted that the writ Court on 23rd May 2019 while considering the Government Order of 27th October 2016 found that Clause 1 to the extent which states that issue of grant-in-aid would only be considered with respect to 2055 identified localities where unaided Primary Education institution having been established prior to 21st June 1973, in respect of whom an order of attachment has been passed by the District Inspector of Schools before the said cut off date would only be considered was struck down by the writ Court as arbitrary. 8. Further, Clause 1.1 of the Government Order, which states that Primary School, whose permanent recognition from Classes I to VIII had been granted simultaneously and by a composite order, was also struck down. The writ Court further struck down Clause 1.2 which provided that the order of attachment of the Primary institution, which have been passed prior to 21st June 1973 was also struck down. The writ Court further required the State to revisit and reframe the policy in the light of the observation made in the judgment. 9.
The writ Court further struck down Clause 1.2 which provided that the order of attachment of the Primary institution, which have been passed prior to 21st June 1973 was also struck down. The writ Court further required the State to revisit and reframe the policy in the light of the observation made in the judgment. 9. According to learned counsel, writ Court had allowed the writ petitions of Group -A insofar as they relate to Primary Sections attached to recognised and aided High Schools or Intermediate Colleges covered by the provisions of Act of 1971 and state that benefit of Act of 1971 cannot be denied to them. The only thing required to be done by the State was to bring teachers falling in this Group within the ambit of Act of 1971 subject to requisite exercise having been undertaken by the authority to assess that they satisfy the test of composite integrality. 10. Sri Singh then contended that the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Pawan Kumar Divedi and others (2014) 9 SCC 692 has already held that schools having Junior Basic Schools and the Senior Basic Schools either separately or together are under the same Board, i.e., the Board of Basic Education. Moreover, any other view may render the provisions of Act of 1978 unconstitutional on the ground of discrimination. The Apex Court then held that Junior High School necessarily includes Classes I to V when they are opened in a Senior Basic School i.e. Classes VI to VIII, after obtaining separate recognition and for which there may not be a separate order of grant-in-aid by the Government. 11. According to learned counsel, the Constitution Bench has recognised the right of teachers of privately managed Primary Schools and Primary Sections of privately managed High Schools as being eligible to receive salaries from the State Government. 12. He then invited the attention of the Court to that part of the judgment of the writ Court where concept of “composite integrality” has been discussed elaborately and the writ Court held that an institution may be made up of various sections or compartments. This would depend upon the various tiers in the educational hierarchy that it serves.
12. He then invited the attention of the Court to that part of the judgment of the writ Court where concept of “composite integrality” has been discussed elaborately and the writ Court held that an institution may be made up of various sections or compartments. This would depend upon the various tiers in the educational hierarchy that it serves. Be it a Primary School, Junior High School, High School or Intermediate College, if it has the attributes of commonality as judicially evolved and recognised, it would be deemed to be one institution. 13. According to the counsel, when various components have been found to exist to constitute a singular institution such as common campus, functioning under the control of the common management, a singular Headmaster administering the institution and a seamless integration between different sections, would cumulatively establish its composite integrality. 14. Once the institution in which the applicants are working has teachers in Primary Section as a recognized and aided High School and Intermediate Section and the Primary Section is functioning in the same campus, they are entitled for the benefit of Act of 1971, as granted by the writ Court and the same cannot be denied. 15. He then invited the attention of the Court to that part of the judgment of the writ Court where the Court had discussed the interconnection between grant-in-aid and protection of Act of 1971 and Act of 1978. He then contended that the order dated 01st October 2020, which has been relied upon by the State Government as to laying down the policy in compliance of the writ Court’s order dated 23rd May 2019 is not a Government Order. In fact, it is departmental order and cannot be read as an order issued on behalf of Governor in exercise of power under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Reliance has been placed upon a decision of Apex Court in State of Uttaranchal and Anr. vs. Sunil Kumar Vaish 2011 AIR SCW 5486. 16. According to him, the State Government has not taken any exercise to revisit and reframe the policy complying the order of the writ Court dated 23rd May 2019. 17. Lastly, he has relied upon report of District Inspector of Schools dated 10.12.2016 and the report of Joint Director of Education dated 06.07.2017, which clearly states that the institution fulfills all the conditions for bringing under grant-in-aid.
17. Lastly, he has relied upon report of District Inspector of Schools dated 10.12.2016 and the report of Joint Director of Education dated 06.07.2017, which clearly states that the institution fulfills all the conditions for bringing under grant-in-aid. According to the said report, there is no Primary Institution within 1 km. radius. 18. Sri Manish Goyal, learned Additional Advocate General along with Sri P.K. Pandey, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel representing the opposite party/State submitted that the order of the writ Court has been complied with by the State authorities and the policy decision has been taken by the State Government on 01st October 2020. In view of the policy decision, a reasoned and speaking order has been passed on 1st October 2020 considering the case of the applicants and other connected matters wherein their demand for bringing the applicants and the institution under the canopy of Act of 1971 has been rejected. Sri Goyal submitted that pursuant to the order of the writ Court, a meeting was convened on 28.02.2020 presided over by Principal Secretary, Secondary Education, wherein a decision was taken to obtain report from the Director Education, Basic as well as Secondary. Thereafter, a meeting was convened on 19th March 2020 wherein it was directed that various officers of the Education Department was to submit their report by 23rd March 2020. A report was submitted by the Director of Secondary Education to the State Government, where certain shortcomings were pointed out and fresh report were called. Thereafter on 15th September 2020, Director of Secondary Education submitted its report. On 2nd September 2020, Director of Basic Education, and on 30th September 2020 State Project Director, Samagra Shiksha submitted its report. All these reports were examined by the State Government and a proposed policy was sent for approval to the concerned Minister and approval was obtained and new policy was framed on 1st October 2020. 19. According to Additional Advocate General, office order issued on 01st October 2020 is a policy upon the subject as it has the approval of a competent authority as well as the procedure prescribed was undertaken in reference to the framing of the policy. 20. Reliance has been placed upon decision of Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 , paras 34 and 35 of which are extracted hereas under : “34.
20. Reliance has been placed upon decision of Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR 1974 SC 2192 , paras 34 and 35 of which are extracted hereas under : “34. The functions of the Governor under rules of business of Madras Government in regard to a scheme for nationalisation of certain bus routes were considered by this Court in Sanjeevi Naidu's case (supra). The validity of the scheme was challenged on the ground that it was not formed by the State Government but by the Secretary to the Government pursuant to powers conferred on him under Rule 23-A of the Madras Government Business Rules. 35. The Scheme was upheld for these reasons. The Governor makes rules under Article 166(3) for the more convenient transaction of business of the Government of the State. The Governor can not only allocate the various subjects amongst the Ministers but may go further and designate a particular official to discharge any particular function. But that could be done on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The essence of Cabinet System of Government responsible to the Legislature is that an individual Minister is responsible for every action taken or omitted to be taken in his Ministry. In every administration, decisions are taken by the civil servants. The Minister lays down the policies. The Council of Ministers settle the major policies. When a Civil Servant takes a decision, he does not do it as a delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. The officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates. Where functions are entrusted to a Minister and these are performed by an official employed in the Ministry's department, there is in law no delegation because Constitutionally the act or decision of the official is that of the Minister.” 21. Reliance has also been placed upon another Constitution Bench judgment of Apex Court in case of Dattatraya Moreshwar Pangarkar vs. State of Bombay and others AIR 1952 SC 181 . 22. He then contended that in Writ-A No.36609 of 2017 (Mahendra Kumar Singh and 7 others vs. State of U.P. and 3 others), the attached Primary Section of the institution of the applicant Moti Lal Inter College Dudhra, Gorakhpur had approached the State Government for taking the institution on grant-in-aid list.
22. He then contended that in Writ-A No.36609 of 2017 (Mahendra Kumar Singh and 7 others vs. State of U.P. and 3 others), the attached Primary Section of the institution of the applicant Moti Lal Inter College Dudhra, Gorakhpur had approached the State Government for taking the institution on grant-in-aid list. In this regard, a factual reports was submitted by Director, Secondary Education dated 18.11.2019 and Director of Basic Education dated 08.09.2020 and District Inspector of Schools dated 24.10.2019. From the report it is evident that basic infrastructure in the institution was not available as standardized classroom, boundary wall, kitchen shed, playground is not available. Further, within a distance of 500 meters, a primary school run by Basic Shiksha Parishad exist and is known as “Parishadiya Prathamik Vidyalaya, Dudhra, Gorakhpur”. 23. Now coming to Contempt Application No.8032 of 2019 filed by Jai Ram Singh and 11 others, it was contented that it arises out of writ petition filed by Sri Gandhi Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Chichor, District Mau. The Director of Education (Secondary), Director, Basic Education and District Inspector of Schools submitted their report on 08.01.2020, 08.09.2020 and 06.01.2020 respectively. In the said report it was stated that number of students are very low and the building is not meeting the required standard. Further, within the radius of 1 kilometer, there is a Primary institution run by Basic Shiksha Parishad i.e. Prathamik Vidyalaya, Chichor, Mau and a recognized primary institution known as Kamaakchha Bal Niketan Bairaich is also running. Thus, in view of the order dated 01.10.2020, there was no justification for bringing the institution under grant-in-aid list. 24. In Contempt Application No.504 of 2020 arising out of Writ Petition No. 8590 of 2019, the reports of Director of Education (Secondary) was submitted on 08.09.2020 and District Inspector of Schools submitted report on 28.10.2020, wherein it is stated that there is no order for attachment of Primary School to Secondary School. Moreover, there is no document available with regard to appointment of teachers in the school in question and within the radius of 1 km., one school of Basic Shiksha Parishad in the name of Prathmik Vidyalaya Pachpokhari, Sant Kabir Nagar exist. Further, at the distance of 100 meters from there, another school namely Junior High School Pachpokhari, Sant Kabir Nagar is situated. Thus, the institution cannot be brought under grant-in-aid list. 25.
Further, at the distance of 100 meters from there, another school namely Junior High School Pachpokhari, Sant Kabir Nagar is situated. Thus, the institution cannot be brought under grant-in-aid list. 25. As far as Contempt Application No.8248 of 2019 is concerned, which arises out of Writ-A No.34979 of 1992, learned State counsel submitted that the report of Director of Education (Secondary) dated 28.01.2020 and report of District Inspector of Schools dated 08.9.2020 reveals that number of students are not sufficient and only one teacher is working in the institution who does not possess requisite qualification. Further, within the radius of one kilometer, one school which is run by Basic Shiksha Parishad namely Prathmik Vidyalaya Sadwan Kalan is situated. 26. Sri Goyal then invited the attention of the Court to the report of the Director of Education, Secondary, submitted to the State Government on 08.09.20020 filed along with personal affidavit of opposite party, which clearly reveals details of each and every institution, which had moved application for bringing the institution under grant-in-aid list. The said report is Annexure 1 to the personal affidavit. 27. Then he invited the attention of the Court to the affidavit of compliance filed on 21.10.2020 wherein it has been mentioned that the decision has been taken by the opposite party and the policy has been revisited pursuant to the direction of the writ Court dated 23.05.2019 and the Government Order dated 27.10.2016 and it was found that as the Basic Education Department of the State since the year 2009 has established 10364 new Primary Section and 1052 new upper Primary School complying the mandate of Uttar Pradesh Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Rules, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 2011”) for providing free education to the children between the age of 6-14 years. The State Government was not in a situation to bear additional financial burden in bringing unaided primary schools under the grant-in-aid. Further, by order dated 01.10.2020, the applications moved by each of the writ petitioners were dealt with by the authorities and it was found that the institutions, which do not adhere to the norms set out, cannot be taken under grant-in-aid. Both the orders have been brought on record as Annexures 1 and 2 to the affidavit of compliance. 28.
Further, by order dated 01.10.2020, the applications moved by each of the writ petitioners were dealt with by the authorities and it was found that the institutions, which do not adhere to the norms set out, cannot be taken under grant-in-aid. Both the orders have been brought on record as Annexures 1 and 2 to the affidavit of compliance. 28. Lastly, Sri Goyal placed reliance upon counter affidavit filed by the opposite party dated 30.8.2022 wherein it has been stated that the judgment rendered by the writ Court on 23.05.2019 has throughout observed that order which was issued on 27.10.2016 was referred as a policy decision in the judgment itself. The applicant never challenged the order dated 27.10.2016 that it is not a policy, as required to be issued under Article 166 of the Constitution of India, and since policy decision dated 01.10.2020 has been issued after revisiting the policy dated 27.10.2016, the applicants cannot raise such argument as it would amount to challenge the policy in contempt proceedings, which is not permissible under law. He has placed reliance upon Gazette notification dated 25.04.2022 wherein an amendment has been made in the “Uttar Pradesh Authentication (Order and other Instruments) (Second Amendment) Rules 2022” (hereinafter referred to as “Authentication Rules of 2022”). 29. According to the said amendment made in the Authentication Rules of 2022, the order passed by the Additional Chief Secretary has been brought under the Officer empowered by the Governor. 30. I have heard counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 31. The issue before this Court is, as to whether the order passed by the writ Court on 23.05.2019 requiring the State to revisit and reframe the policy, which was impugned in the bunch of writ petitioners leading being Writ -A No.38992 of 2017 (Jai Ram Singh and 11 others vs. State of U.P. and 3 others) has been complied with by the State Government, pursuant to part of Clause 1 of Government Order dated 27.10.2016 to the extent of prescribing the cut off date of 21.06.1973 as well as Clauses 1.1 and 12 having been struck down, has been complied with or not. 32.
32. The applicants before the contempt court are those individual teachers imparting education in the Primary Section of the recognized and unaided Primary Section attached to junior High School/High School and Intermediate College, kept in Group-A by the writ Court after broadly classifying the writ petitions into four categories. The challenge put by applicants before the writ Court either in the individual capacity or through the Committee of Management of the concerned Educational Institution was broadly for extending the benefit of protection of either the Act of 1971 or Act of 1978. The writ Court while considering the Government Order dated 27.10.2016 observed that the State had opened 26,459 new primary institution under the aegis of Sarv Shiksha Abhiyan. Moreover, approximately 1,13,000 primary institutions are being run in the entire State under the Management of Board of Education. It was pursuant to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Paripurna Nand Tripathi and Another vs. State of U.P. and others, 2015 (3) ADJ 567 that the State Government came out with a Government Order dated 27.10.2016, which records the fact that as per the provision of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as “Act of 2009”), and Rules of 2011 framed by the State thereunder, there are 2055 localities in which Primary Institutions were left to be established. 33. According to the State, it is these 2055 localities alone which remain unserviced and in which no primary educational institution is established by the Board. The Government Order further recorded that in the annual working plan and budgetary allocation for 2016-17, the State had earmarked 1652 localities in which primary Institutions were liable to be established. On the basis of these figures, the Order provided for extending the benefit of grant-in-aid to private unaided primary section only in respect of 2055 identified localities in which no primary education Institution is established by the Board. 34. Further, private and unaided Institution, which are present in these 2055 localities and had been established prior to 21 June 1973 alone would be considered for being taken under grant-in-aid scheme. The primary school must be one whose permanent recognition for class I to VIII had been granted simultaneously and by a composite order.
34. Further, private and unaided Institution, which are present in these 2055 localities and had been established prior to 21 June 1973 alone would be considered for being taken under grant-in-aid scheme. The primary school must be one whose permanent recognition for class I to VIII had been granted simultaneously and by a composite order. The order further records that primary Institution must be such in respect of whom an order of attachment had been passed by the District Inspector of School prior to 21st June 1973. The attached Primary Section must be one which is under the management and control of one Head Master. The Primary Section must be operating from common premises along with Junior High School/High School or Intermediate College to which it is attached and should be controlled by common management. Further, it must be found that upon passing Class V, the child migrates to Class VI without issuing Transfer Certificate, and, lastly Primary Section must be an integral part of higher secondary school and intermediate college. 35. Similarly, order of 13th July 2017 takes note of the following significant facts, firstly, it discloses that upon promulgation of Act of 2009, 10364 new primary schools and 1052 new upper primary schools were established in unserviced localities. It refers to the impetus conferred and proactive steps taken by the State under the umbrella of Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan as a consequence of which 1,13,247 primary schools, 45,590 upper primary schools have been established and are being administered by the Board. 36. It also refers to the fact that approximately 3100 primary and upper primary schools are being run in the State to whom aid has been provided. It further refers to the fact that the State bears the salary burden of 5,63,275 Teachers/Shiksha Mitras/Instructors employed in the schools administered by the Board. In para 4 of the order, it was stated that in last five years enrollment in institutions established and administered by Board has fallen by 23.62 lakhs. As a consequence of fall in enrollments it states that the teacher-student ratio at the primary level has fallen to 1:29 and the upper primary level to 1:21 against the norm of 1:30 and 1:35 as mandated under Act of 2009. Order further states that the decision and policy statement shall be reviewed after five years. 37.
As a consequence of fall in enrollments it states that the teacher-student ratio at the primary level has fallen to 1:29 and the upper primary level to 1:21 against the norm of 1:30 and 1:35 as mandated under Act of 2009. Order further states that the decision and policy statement shall be reviewed after five years. 37. The writ Court, after taking note both the orders dated 27th October 2016 and 13th July 2017 as well as after in depth consideration of various judgments of this Court and Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Pawan Kumar Dwivedi (supra) found that teachers of primary section cannot be denied protection of Act of 1971 but as far as Act of 1978 is concerned, protection cannot be granted. The writ Court on 23rd May 2019 disposed of the writ petition by striking down Clause 1 of Government Order dated 27th October 2016 to the extent of prescribing the cut-off date of 21st June 1973 as well as Clauses 1.1 and 1.2 thereof. 38. The writ Court further held that the State was to revisit and reframe the Policy, which was impugned, in the light of observation made in the judgment. The order of 13th July 2017 was also set aside insofar as writ petitioners of Group -A are concerned and state that they cannot be denied benefit of provisions of Act of 1971 and the State was directed to bring teachers falling in Group – A within the ambit of Act of 1971 subject to the requisite exercise being undertaken to assess that they satisfy the test of composite integrality. 39. Thus, the decision/ direction of the writ Court was clear and unambiguous while extending benefit to the writ petitioners of Group-A, that benefit of Act of 1971 having been extended, but the same was made subject to qualifying the test of composite integrality which the State was to undertake by assessing and satisfying itself after deep and thorough examination. Thus, the judgment extending benefit to the petitioners of Group-A was subject to fulfillment of certain conditions and assessment being made by the State Government, which was to satisfy the test of composite integrality. 40.
Thus, the judgment extending benefit to the petitioners of Group-A was subject to fulfillment of certain conditions and assessment being made by the State Government, which was to satisfy the test of composite integrality. 40. The argument raised from the applicants’ side has to be tested in two parts, as the judgment requires, firstly, that after clause 1 of Government Order dated 27th October 2016 was partially struck down along with Clauses 1.1 and 1.2, the State was required to revisit and reframe the policy. From the material brought on record from State side, the opposite party i.e. Additional Chief Secretary sought report from the various officials of the educational department i.e. Director of Secondary Education, Director of Basic Education and District Inspector of Schools. After submission of report, the State came out with a policy on 01st October 2020 where it denied to extend the benefit of bringing the Primary Sections of unaided Institution within the grant-in-aid on the ground that since 2009, number of new primary and upper primary schools have been opened in the State keeping in mind Rules of 2011 for providing free and compulsory education to children between the age of 6-14 years. Further, the State was not ready to bear the additional financial burden by bringing in more institutions under the canopy of grant-in-aid. 41. The second part of the judgment, which relates to writ petitioners of Group-A to whom benefit of provisions of Act of 1971 was extended with a rider that State was to carry out an exercise that each of the Institution, who had applied being recognised Primary Section to be brought under grant-in-aid scheme was to be assessed by the Government as to whether it satisfies the test of composite integrality or not, the exercise was carried out by the State and on submission of report by the various authorities, decision was taken on 01st October 2020 wherein individual case of each and every writ petitioners was considered and on the basis of the report, it was found that they did not adhere to the policy which has been laid down by the State Government and does not satisfy the test of composite integrality and their applications for bringing them under grant-in-aid were rejected. 42.
42. Learned Additional Advocate General had demonstrated the said fact by pointing out from Annexure-1 of the personal affidavit of opposite party wherein each case has been dealt with individually by the educational authorities and it has been found that they do not match to the standard laid by the Government for bringing them under the canopy of grant-in-aid, thus, they failed to qualify the test of composite integrality as set out by the writ Court. 43. A feeble attempt has been made by Sri Singh, counsel for the applicants that there were certain reports of the District Inspector of the Schools of the years 2016 and 2017 which does not deny that the applicants did not qualify the test as laid down. 44. This Court finds that once assessment was made by the authorities pursuant to the direction of the writ Court on 01st October 2020 and it was found that applicants before this Court had failed to qualify the test of composite integrality and required basic infrastructure is missing from the institutions which are claiming to be brought under the canopy of grant-in-aid, this Court exercising power under the contempt jurisdiction cannot adjudicate the disputed questions of fact. Under the contempt jurisdiction, the Court is only to see whether the order of writ Court has been complied with by the authorities or not. 45. In the present case, a detail report has been brought on record through personal affidavit of the officer concerned which was directed by this Court on 08th October 2021 to file personal affidavit giving details as to whether applicant-Institution fall in those area or not. Once the affidavit is on record, with entire details, and assessment having been made on the basis of the report, this Court cannot do roving enquiry and adjudicate the matter on merit. 46. Recently the Apex Court in Dr. U.N. Bora, Ex. Chief Executive Officer and others Vs. Assam Roller Flour Mills Association and another 2022 (1) SCC 101 has held that the while dealing with a contempt application, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry. Relevant para 8 of the judgment is extracted here as under : “8. We are dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a willful disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant is the “willful” disobedience.
Relevant para 8 of the judgment is extracted here as under : “8. We are dealing with a civil contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 explains a civil contempt to mean a willful disobedience of a decision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant is the “willful” disobedience. Knowledge acquires substantial importance qua a contempt order. Merely because a subordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by the Court, a liability cannot be fastened on a higher official in the absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the element of willfulness vanishes as it involves a mental element. It is a deliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is a proof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Similarly, when a distinct mechanism is provided and that too, in the same judgment alleged to have been violated, a party has to exhaust the same before approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party to contend that the benefit of the order passed has not been actually given, through separate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief but certainly not by way of a contempt proceeding. While dealing with a contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct a roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly violated. The said principle has to be applied with more vigor when disputed questions of facts are involved and they were raised earlier but consciously not dealt with by creating a specific forum to decide the original proceedings.” 47. Now, coming to the question raised by the applicants that the order of writ Court has not been complied with and opposite party has not revisited and reframed the policy, as mandated by the Court on 23rd May 2019, this Court finds that the order dated 01st October 2020 was in fact the policy decision taken by the State Government pursuant to the direction of the writ Court. 48. From reading of the order, it is clear that the State had revisited and reframed the policy pursuant to the direction dated 23rd May 2019. Reliance placed by the applicant in case of State of Uttaranchal and Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Vaisya and others (supra) is of no help to him.
48. From reading of the order, it is clear that the State had revisited and reframed the policy pursuant to the direction dated 23rd May 2019. Reliance placed by the applicant in case of State of Uttaranchal and Anr. v. Sunil Kumar Vaisya and others (supra) is of no help to him. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case of Samsher Singh (supra) had clearly held that when a civil servant takes decision, he does not do it as delegate of his Minister, he does it on behalf of the Government. The officers are limbs of the Government and not its delegates. The argument raised on behalf of applicants have no force. Moreover, the Uttar Pradesh Authentication (Orders and Other Instruments) (Second Amendment) Rules, 2022, substitutes the words “Additional Chief Secretary”, which provide that every order or instrument of the Government of the State shall be signed by an Additional Chief Secretary, Principal Secretary, Secretary, Special Secretary, Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary to the Government of Uttar Pradesh. 49. The writ Court had only required the State Government to revisit and reframe the policy pursuant striking down partially Clauses 1, 1.1 and 1.2, the State Government having reframed the policy on 01.10.2020, thus the order having been complied with, no case for contempt is made out. 50. So far as second part of the order, which relates to the applicants is concerned, assessment having been undertaken by the State so as to satisfy the test of composite integrality, and finding having been recorded that applicants do not qualify the test, no case for contempt as to the second part of the judgment is made out. 51. The contempt applicants are misconceived and are hereby dismissed. 52. Contempt notice stand discharged. 53. However, it is open to the applicants to challenge the policy so framed by the State Government as well as the order passed rejecting their application for grant in aid, if so advised, before the appropriate Forum.