ORDER : The present criminal petition is filed to quash the proceedings in Cr. No. 237 of 2021 pending on the file of P.S. Shahinayat Gunj. 2. Heard Ms. Naseeb Afshan, learned counsel for the Petitioners, Mr. P. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 and learned Public Prosecutor for Respondent No. 1 3. Facts of the case i) Petitioner Nos.1, 2 and 3 are respectively the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law of Respondent No.2. The Petitioner No.1 and Respondent No.2 got married on 06.06.2014 in Hyderabad. Disputes arose between the parties and Respondent No.2 alleged that she was driven out of her marital house on 20.07.2021. ii) On 26.08.2021, the Petitioner No. 1 through his counsel issued a legal notice to Respondent No. 2. In the said notice, it was stated that Respondent No. 2 can join the matrimonial company of Petitioner No. 1 only after she gets treated for her ‘quarrelsome attitude’. iii) On 27.10.2021, Respondent No. 2 had filed a complaint with the P.S. Banjara Hills alleging offences under Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The said complaint was registered as Cr. No. 787 of 2021. iv) After registration of Cr. No. 787 of 2021, on 29.10.2021, Petitioner No. 1 through his counsel sent another legal notice to Respondent No. 2. In the said notice, it was stated that Petitioner No. 1, in the presence of witnesses, had pronounced Talaq and divorced Respondent No. 2 on 27.10.2021. v) On 05.11.2021, Respondent No. 2 filed a complaint with the P.S. Shahinayat Gunj alleging that the Petitioner No. 1 conspiring with Petitioner Nos. 2 & 3, vide notice dated 29.10.2021, had pronounced triple talaq which is prohibited and punishable under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 (hereinafter ‘the Act, 2019). The said complaint dated 05.11.2021 was registered as Cr. No. 237 of 2021 and the same is challenged in the present criminal petition. 4. Contentions of the Petitioners i) Under Muslim personal law, there are three forms of divorces i.e., talaq-e-ahsan, talaq-e-hasan, and talaq-e-biddat. Section 2 (c) r/w Section 3 of the Act, 2019 only prohibit talaq-e-biddat or any other form of talaq which has an effect of irrevocable and instantaneous divorce. ii) In the legal notice dated 05.11.2021, Petitioner No. 1 had only pronounced talaq which is talaq-e-ahsan. Section 2 (c) r/w Section 3 of the Act, 2019 only prohibit talaq-e-biddat or any other form of talaq which has an effect of irrevocable and instantaneous divorce. ii) In the legal notice dated 05.11.2021, Petitioner No. 1 had only pronounced talaq which is talaq-e-ahsan. In talaq-e-ahsan, divorce can be revoked within three months if any conciliation is reached between the husband and the wife. iii) The legal notice dated 05.11.2021 pronounced a single talaq. Respondent No. 2 instead of going for a reconciliation or mediation within the iddat period had registered a criminal case against Petitioner No. 1. Therefore, the ingredients of Sections 3& 4 of the Act, 2019 are not satisfied. iv) Respondent No. 2 is a resident of Shaikpet area and received the notice dated 26.08.2021 at Shaikpet. Further, in Cr. No. 787 of 2021 she showed her addressed as Shaikpet. However, she filed Cr. No. 237 of 2021 at P.S. ShahinayatGunj. Therefore, P.S. ShahinayatGunj has no territorial jurisdiction to register the case and investigate it. v) In light of the arguments, it was prayed that in Cr. No. 237 of 2021 pending on the file of P.S. ShahinayatGunj should be quashed. 5. Contentions of Respondent No. 2 i) The notice dated 05.11.2021 clearly states that Petitioner No. 1 herein had divorced Respondent No. 2 severed all his marital ties with her. This clearly indicates that the divorce was irrevocable and instantaneous. Therefore, the ingredients of Sections 3 & 4 of the Act, 2019 are satisfied and the Petitioners are liable to be punished. ii) P.S. Shahinayat Gunj had jurisdiction to register Respondent No. 2’s complaint. She was residing at her uncle’s residence which falls within P.S. Shahinayat Gunj’s jurisdiction. iii) Further, in cases of matrimonial offences, an FIR can be registered at a place where the wife resides and the police are bound to register the FIR, irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 and Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 5 SCC 384 . iv) In light of the arguments, it was prayed that in Cr. No. 237 of 2021 should not be quashed. 6. Reliance was placed on Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728 and Rupali Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 5 SCC 384 . iv) In light of the arguments, it was prayed that in Cr. No. 237 of 2021 should not be quashed. 6. Findings of the Court i) In view of the above referred rival contentions, to decide the lis in the present criminal petition, it is relevant to discuss the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’) dealing with registration of FIRs and the same are extracted below: “154. No. 237 of 2021 should not be quashed. 6. Findings of the Court i) In view of the above referred rival contentions, to decide the lis in the present criminal petition, it is relevant to discuss the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’) dealing with registration of FIRs and the same are extracted below: “154. Information in cognizable cases.—(1) Every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf: Provided that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 326A, section 326B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded, by a woman police officer or any woman officer: Provided further that- (a) in the event that the person against whom an offence under section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 376, section 376A, section 376B, section 376C, section 376D, section 376E or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is alleged to have been committed or attempted, is temporarily or permanently mentally or physically disabled, then such information shall be recorded by a police officer, at the residence of the person seeking to report such offence or at a convenient place of such person’s choice, in the presence of an interpreter or a special educator, as the case may be; (b) the recording of such information shall be videographed; (c) the police officer shall get the statement of the person recorded by a Judicial Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (5A) of section 164 as soon as possible. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (2) A copy of the information as recorded under sub-section (1) shall be given forthwith, free of cost, to the informant. (3) Any person aggrieved by a refusal on the part of an officer in charge of a police station to record the information referred to in subsection (1) may send the substance of such information, in writing and by post, to the Superintendent of Police concerned who, if satisfied that such information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, shall either investigate the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by any police officer subordinate to him, in the manner provided by this Code, and such officer shall have all the powers of an officer in charge of the police station in relation to that offence.” “155. Information as to non-cognizable cases and investigation of such cases.—(1) When information is given to an officer in charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter or cause to be entered the substance of the information in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf, and refer the informant to the Magistrate. (2) No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate having power to try such case or commit the case for trial. (3) Any police officer receiving such order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer in charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case. (4) Where a case relates to two or more offences of which at least one is cognizable, the case shall be deemed to be a cognizable case, notwithstanding that the other offences are non-cognizable.” “156. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. Police officer’s power to investigate cognizable case.—(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII. (2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. (3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above-mentioned.” ii) It is relevant to note that Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. provides for the registration of FIR where the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. Whereas Section 155 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the registration of FIR where the information received discloses a non-cognizable offence. iii) A bare reading and comparing of Section 154(1) of the Cr.P.C. and Section 155(1) of the Cr.P.C. indicates that the phrase ‘within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence’ is absent in the former section. That is to say that, a non-cognizable offence can be registered only by an officer of the police station having territorial jurisdiction. In other words, in cases of non-cognizable offences, the police can register the FIR only if such offences were committed within its jurisdiction. iv) On the other hand, according to Section 154(1) of the Cr.P.C., any police station which receives information regarding commission of a cognizable offence shall register the FIR. The requirement of territorial jurisdiction is not applicable to police officers where the information discloses commission of cognizable offences. v) Further, Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. deals with the powers of police officers to investigate cases where cognizable offences are said to be committed. Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. clearly states that the investigation of a cognizable offence by a police officer cannot be called into question on the ground that he is not empowered. This means that police officer’s investigation cannot be called into question on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. vi) A co-joint reading of Section 154(1) and Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. indicates that any police officer, irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction, can register an FIR and investigate, if information regarding commission of cognizable offence is received. This means that police officer’s investigation cannot be called into question on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. vi) A co-joint reading of Section 154(1) and Section 156(2) of the Cr.P.C. indicates that any police officer, irrespective of the territorial jurisdiction, can register an FIR and investigate, if information regarding commission of cognizable offence is received. In Rasiklal Dalpatram Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 1 SCC 1 , the Supreme Court held that the investigation into a cognizable offence cannot be called into question on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. “25. The various decisions cited by Mr. Syed, and in particular the decision in Satvinder Kaur's case (supra) provide an insight into the views held by the Supreme Court on the accepted position that the Investigating Officer was entitled to transfer an investigation to a Police Station having jurisdiction to conduct the same. The said question is not in issue before us and as indicated hereinbefore, we are only required to consider whether the Investigating Officer in respect of an investigation undertaken under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can file a report stating that he had no jurisdiction to investigate into the complaint as the entire cause of action had arisen outside his jurisdiction despite there being material available to the contrary. The answer, in our view, is in the negative and we are of the firm view that the powers vested in the Investigating Authorities, under Section 156(1) Cr.P.C., did not restrict the jurisdiction of the Investigating Agency to investigate into a complaint even if it did not have territorial jurisdiction to do so. Unlike as in other cases, it was for the Court to decide whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as and when the entire facts were placed before it. (emphasis supplied)” vii) In the present case, Section 7 of the Act, 2019 clearly states that offences under the Act, 2019 are cognizable. Therefore, P.S. ShahinayatGunj was duty bound to register Respondent No.2’s complaint under Section 154(1) of the Cr.P.C. and investigate the same under Section 156 of the Cr.P.C. P.S. Shahiniyat Gunj during the course of the investigation may decide whether they had territorial jurisdiction or not and refer the complaint to police station having jurisdiction. viii) Therefore, according to this Court, P.S. Shahinayat Gunj had jurisdiction to register Cr. No. 237 of 2021. viii) Therefore, according to this Court, P.S. Shahinayat Gunj had jurisdiction to register Cr. No. 237 of 2021. The contention of the Petitioners that P.S. Shahinayat Gunj has no territorial jurisdiction is unsustainable. 7. The next question falls for consideration is as to whether contents of the complaint constitute the offence under Section - 4 of the Act, 2019? i) To decide the same, it is necessary to decide whether Petitioner No. 1 had pronounced talaq-e-biddat which is punishable under the Act, 2019. Before deciding the issue involved, it is pertinent to discuss the types of divorces which can be pronounced by a husband under Muslim Personal law. According to Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law, divorce under the Muslim Personal law is classified as talaq-e-sunnat and talaq-e-biddat. talaq-e-suunat is further classified as talaq-e-ahasan and talaq-e-hasan. The same was referred in Shayara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1 . ii) In talaq-e-hasan, the husband has to pronounce talaq during three successive tuhrs(period between two menstrual cycles). The first talaq is pronounced during a tuhr, followed by a second pronouncement during the successive tuhr and finally, the third pronounced during the third successive tuhr. During the periods of three tuhrs, for the divorce to operate, the parties should refrain from marital intercourse. This type of divorce can be revoked at any time before the third pronouncement is made. Revocation can be done by resuming conjugal relations like cohabitation, marital relations, etc. Once the third pronouncement is made, the divorce becomes absolute and irrevocable. iii) Talaq-e-ahsan consists of single pronouncement of divorce during a tuhr. After this single pronouncement, the iddat period (90 days period or three menstrual cycles) starts to run during which the parties shall not have any marital intercourse. This type of divorce or talaq is revocable and is revoked when the parties have resumed cohabitation or intimacy or settled their marital differences during the iddat period. If the parties fail to cohabit or settle their differences during the subsistence of the iddat period, the divorce becomes absolute, final and irrevocable. iv) In talaq-e-biddat, three pronouncements of divorce are made during a single tuhr. These three pronouncements are made at once. Once the three pronouncements are made, the divorce instantly becomes final, absolute and irrevocable. In talaq-e-biddat, the parties have no chance of reaching a settlement or reconciliation. iv) In talaq-e-biddat, three pronouncements of divorce are made during a single tuhr. These three pronouncements are made at once. Once the three pronouncements are made, the divorce instantly becomes final, absolute and irrevocable. In talaq-e-biddat, the parties have no chance of reaching a settlement or reconciliation. v) It is relevant to note that the practice of talaq-e-biddat was before the Supreme Court in Shayara Bano (supra) . The Supreme Court with 3:2 majority set aside the practice of talaq-e-biddat, inter alia, on the ground of manifest arbitrariness. Subsequently, the Act, 2019 was enacted making the pronouncement of talaq-e-biddat punishable. vi) At this juncture, it is relevant to discuss the provisions of the Act, 2019 which punish the practice of talaq-e-biddat. The relevant provisions are extracted below: “Section 2(c) "talaq" means talaq-e-biddat or any other similar form of talaq having the effect of instantaneous and irrevocable divorce pronounced by a Muslim husband. Section 3 - Talaq to be void and illegal. Any pronouncement of talaq by a Muslim husband upon his wife, by words, either spoken or written or in electronic form or in any other manner whatsoever, shall be void and illegal. Section 4 - Punishment for pronouncing talaq. Any Muslim husband who pronounces talaq referred to in section 3 upon his wife shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine.” vii) A bare perusal of the above provisions indicates that talaq-e-biddat along with any other form of talaq having instantaneous and irrevocable pronounced by a husband under Muslim Personal Law is illegal and void. It is necessary that such divorce has to be instantaneous and irrevocable. Further, Section 3 covers pronouncement in any manner which includes serving notice, as is seen in the present case. viii) Therefore, to decide the issue at hand this Court has to see whether the legal notice dated 29.10.2021 had an effect of instantaneous and irrevocable divorce. The relevant portion of the legal notice dated 29.10.2021, relied and interpreted by the counsels, is extracted below: “Now my client is totally vexed with your behavior and actions and has pronounced Single Talaq/ One time to you in the presence of two competent witnesses on 27th of October, 2021. The relevant portion of the legal notice dated 29.10.2021, relied and interpreted by the counsels, is extracted below: “Now my client is totally vexed with your behavior and actions and has pronounced Single Talaq/ One time to you in the presence of two competent witnesses on 27th of October, 2021. (emphasis added) Hence take notice that you have been divorce by your husband by the pronouncing Talaq for one time and severed all his marital ties with you. (emphasis added) The Mahar amount of Rs 51, 000/ (Rupees Fifty One Thousand Only) is being sent to you by way of money order. An amount of RS 15, 000/- (Rupees Fifteen Thousand Only) is sent to you through money order as Iddat period maintenance.” ix) Referring to the above portion of the notice dated 29.10.2021, it was contended on behalf of Respondent No. 2 that the notice stated that the Petitioner No. 1 had ‘severed all his marital ties’, this has an instantaneous and irrevocable effect of divorce. Therefore, it falls within the scope of Section 2(c) r/w Section 3 of the Act, 2019. x) However, learned counsel for the Petitioners contended that the notice clearly stated that only single talaq was pronounced which is nothing but talaqe-ahsan. Further, it was contended that the Petitioner No. 1 had severed all his marital ties under talaq-e-ahsan. However, the divorce could be revoked before the expiry of iddat period. xi) This Court agrees with the arguments advanced by the Petitioners and cannot accept the contention of respondent No.2 that Petitioner No. 1 had pronounced talaq-e-biddat. As mentioned above, the difference between talaq-e-ahsan and talaq-e-biddat is that, in the former the divorce can be revoked and is not final till the completion of iddat period, in the latter the divorce is instant and irrevocable. xii) The notice dated 29.10.2021 clearly mentioned that Petitioner No. 1 pronounced a single talaq. Though severing of marital ties had an instantaneous effect, it did not have an irrevocable effect. Ties were severed by Petitioner No. 1 as it is a requirement under talaq-e-ahsan to not have any conjugal relations till the iddat period. The divorce was revocable as the parties could have mended the marital ties or reconcile their differences or resume normal marital life by resuming their conjugal relationship before the expiry of iddat period. Therefore, no irrevocable talaq was pronounced by Petitioner No. 1. The divorce was revocable as the parties could have mended the marital ties or reconcile their differences or resume normal marital life by resuming their conjugal relationship before the expiry of iddat period. Therefore, no irrevocable talaq was pronounced by Petitioner No. 1. Therefore, the contents of the complaint lacks the ingredients of the offence under Section - 4 of the Act, 2019. xiii) Since no talaq-e-biddat was pronounced, no question of conspiracy of Petitioner Nos. 2 & 3 arises. 8. Conclusion In light of the aforesaid, the proceedings in Cr. No. 237 of 2021 are quashed. The present Criminal Petition is accordingly allowed. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the criminal petition shall stand closed.