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2022 DIGILAW 1535 (GUJ)

ASHWINKUMAR RAMNIKLAL MANIYAR v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2022-11-09

BIREN VAISHNAV

body2022
ORDER : 1. Heard Ms. Nikita Barot, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Rohan Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the State respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Premal Rachh, learned advocate for respondents Nos. 3 to 11. 2. Challenge in this petition is to an order passed by the Charity Commissioner dated 13.10.2020 by which the application filed under Section 41-A of the Gujarat Public Trusts Act, 1950, has been rejected. 3. Facts in brief would indicate that one Jayaben Jerambhai Maniyar, who was the paternal aunt of the father of the petitioner, during her lifetime, had in the year 1980 donated Rs. 75,000/- to the respondent Adarsh Education Trust. The amount so donated was, according to the petitioner conditional, inasmuch as, it was agreed by and between the Trust and Jayaben that the school that was imparting education would be named as “J.N. Maniyar Adarsh Primary School.” Secondly, it was also agreed that every year five students names that may be given by Jayaben and subsequent thereto by the father of the petitioner will be admitted and given education without charging fees. The Trust, accordingly passed a Resolution on 07.03.1979 accepting such donation. 3.1 Over a period of time, finding that the Right to Free and Compulsory Education had come into force, the Trust, on 10.03.2013 by Resolution No. 53 resolved to discontinue the practice of free education and accordingly informed the petitioner of such practice. The education society informed the petitioner by communication of 22.04.2013 and 24.05.2013 of such practice having been discontinued. 3.2 Invoking the provisions of Section 41-A of the Act, therefore, the petitioner approached the Charity Commissioner by filing an application with a prayer that the Resolution of 10.03.2013 be declared as null and void and the Trust be directed to continue imparting free education to the five students of which assurance was given by the Trust based on which the donation was so made by the grand mother of the petitioner. By the impugned order, the application was rejected by the Charity Commissioner, hence the petition. 4. The order is assailed by Ms. Barot, learned counsel for the petitioner on the following grounds: 4.1 She would submit that it was a specific and a clear understanding between the grand mother Jayaben and the Trust, based on which donation of Rs. By the impugned order, the application was rejected by the Charity Commissioner, hence the petition. 4. The order is assailed by Ms. Barot, learned counsel for the petitioner on the following grounds: 4.1 She would submit that it was a specific and a clear understanding between the grand mother Jayaben and the Trust, based on which donation of Rs. 75,000/- was made wherein it was understood that not only would the school be named as “J.N. Maniyar Adarsh Primary School” but five students each year, names of which have been supplied with the copy of the petition would be so mentioned by firstly the grand mother when she was alive then thereafter by the petitioner’s father and would be given the benefit of free education. 4.2 In the year 1990, when the grand mother passed away, she had executed a Will. The condition in the Will specifically made the petitioner’s father eligible to enforce the conditions laid down for extending the benefit of donation and that the School and the Trust therefore were bound to honour the commitment of extending free education to the students whose names were suggested firstly by the deceased grand mother and thereafter by the father of the petitioner, who died on 27.04.2001. 4.3 Ms. Barot, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that despite such an assurance and condition, the Trust passed a resolution resolving to discontinue this practice. Ms. Barot, learned counsel, would submit that, that was a clear case of mismanagement of the administration and the Trust as a result of which a legal notice was issued. The Trust nowhere mentioned that there were financial constraints as a result of which such practice should have been discontinued. The order of the Charity Commissioner was extensively read before this Court and she would submit that the finding of the Charity Commissioner that there was no condition in the Will by virtue of which such a right accrued and continued was a finding contrary to the record. 5. Mr. Premal Rachh, learned advocate for the respondents, would support the order of the Charity Commissioner. He would rely on the Resolution of the Trust dated 07.03.1979 which was placed on record which indicated that there were no conditions on which the donations were accepted. 5. Mr. Premal Rachh, learned advocate for the respondents, would support the order of the Charity Commissioner. He would rely on the Resolution of the Trust dated 07.03.1979 which was placed on record which indicated that there were no conditions on which the donations were accepted. Even otherwise, as rightly held by the Charity Commissioner, the petitioner had no locus to file an application under Section 41 of the Act and the Charity Commissioner therefore had rightly observed that the only remedy available to the petitioner was that of filing of the suit. 6. Considering the submissions made by the learned counsels for the respective parties, few things need to be noted: 6.1 The grand mother of the petitioner-Jayaben, had extended financial aid in terms of donation of Rs. 75,000/- to the Trust. That donation was accepted by the Trust and a resolution accordingly was passed. Perusal of the impugned order would indicate that the Charity Commissioner examined the conditions of the Resolution. Reading thereof indicates that the President of the Trust has acknowledged the donation of Rs. 75,000/- that the grand mother made to the Trust and has specifically stated therein that the same was accepted without any condition. 6.2 Reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the condition in fact was that the donation was for the purposes of imparting education to five students which is substantiated by the list of students annexed to the petition and the Clause in the Will which gave the petitioner’s father the right to manage the donation in light of such condition. Reading the language of Section 41-A of the Act would clearly indicate that the domain of the Charity Commissioner and the power to issue direction was only restricted to trustees and other persons. 6.3 The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner would fall within the term “other persons” is also misconceived. Section 41-A of the Act reads as under: “41A. 6.3 The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner would fall within the term “other persons” is also misconceived. Section 41-A of the Act reads as under: “41A. Power of Charity Commissioner to issue directions to trustees and other persons: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any Trustee of a Public Trust or any person connected therewith to ensure that such Trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the Trust.” 6.4 Reading simplicitor thereto would indicate that the Charity Commissioner may, from time to time, issue directions to any Trustee of a Public Trust or any person connected therewith to ensure that such Trust is properly administered and the income thereof is properly accounted for or duly appropriated and applied to the objects and for the purposes of the Trust. 7. The petitioner purely has a right out of a Will that was made by his grand mother who had donated the amount for the purposes of education and even if it was accepted that the commitment given by the Trust to the deceased was not followed by the Trust, the petitioner cannot be said to be a person connected with the Trust to enforce such an obligation under the provisions of Section 41A of the Act. 8. Reading the reasonings of the Charity Commissioner while passing the impugned order would indicate that in the opinion of this Court, no fault can be found from the reasonings and the analogy that he has made in light of language of the section. 9. The petition is accordingly dismissed. It is clarified that as observed by the Charity Commissioner, the observations made in the order of the Charity Commissioner and this order shall not preclude the petitioner if it is open for him to so do to enforce this obligation by way of a civil proceeding. Notice, if any, stands discharged.