JUDGMENT/ORDER VISHWAJITH SHETTY,J. - This intra court appeal has been filed by the unsuccessful petitioner assailing the order dtd. 24/5/2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.No.26862/2009. 2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties. 3. Brief facts of the case as revealed from the record which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal are, the appellants herein claim to be the owners in possession of the lands bearing survey No.106/3 and survey No.106/4 of Mogarahalli Village and survey No.136/1 and survey No.136/2 of Anaganahalli Village, Srirangapatna Taluk, Mandya District. The said lands were notified for acquisition by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") and preliminary notification under Sec. 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "Act of 1966") was issued on 7/12/2005 and the final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act of 1966 was issued on 31/8/2006 in respect of 168 acres 26 1/2 guntas of land in Mogarahalli Village and 22 acres 19 guntas of land in Anaganahalli Village and thereby totally land measuring 191 acres 5 1/2 guntas, which included the lands in dispute were notified by the Board for the purpose of acquisition. The respondent No.2 was allotted an extent of 109 acres of land out of notified lands. W.P.No.26826/2009 and 30235-30237 of 2009 were filed by the appellants challenging the final notification issued by the Board insofar it relates to the aforesaid four items of lands in dispute. The Board had filed its statement of objections and opposed the prayer made in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge vide the order impugned has dismissed the writ petition and being aggrieved by the same, the appellants are before this Court. 4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that major chunk of the acquired land has been allotted to respondent No.2 and therefore, the acquisition ought to have been made as an industrial estate and not as an industrial area. He also submits that the possession of the lands in question still remains with the appellants and the respondents have failed to pass an award till date and therefore, the acquisition has lapsed. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.6819/2017 (the Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Sri K.B Lingaraju) which was disposed of on 28/9/2022. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.6819/2017 (the Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Sri K.B Lingaraju) which was disposed of on 28/9/2022. He submits that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay as the writ petition is filed in the year 2009 challenging the final notification which was issued in the year 2006. He also submits that the lands in question are not required for the purpose for which they were acquired and therefore, the acquisition in respect of the lands in question is required to be quashed. He further submits that in the event this Court is not inclined to quash the acquisition notification, a direction may be issued to the Board to grant compensation to the appellants under the provision of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 2013'). He submits that the respondents have not passed any award nor they have taken possession of the lands in question and there was a recurring cause of action to the appellants and therefore, the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the writ petition is hit by delay and latches. 5. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Board submits that acquisition even for a single industry is permissible and in support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the this Court in the case of SOMASHEKAR AND OTHERS V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS - 1997 SCC ONLINE KAR 653 : (1997) 7 KANT LJ 410. He also submits that the appellants are the owners of the land measuring only about 4 acres, which is not even 5% of the total extent of land acquired and when the rest of the land owners have accepted the compensation, challenge to the acquisition by the appellants who are minority of the land owners cannot be entertained. He submits that merely for the reason that the lands in question are not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it does not confer any right on the appellant to seek restitution of the lands. He submits that merely for the reason that the lands in question are not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it does not confer any right on the appellant to seek restitution of the lands. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES V. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS - (2003) 1 SCC 335 . He submits that competent authority has now passed an award in the year 2018 even in respect of lands in question and the award amount has been deposited before the Reference Court on 15/9/2019. 6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 submits that respondent No.2 is a registered company which has paid over 10 crores of rupees to the Board and because of the pending litigation, it could not develop the land allotted to it. She submits that the ground of lapsing of acquisition was not raised in the writ petition and therefore, it is not open to the appellants to raise such a ground in the writ appeal. She further submits that Sec. 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would not be applicable for the acquisition under the Act of 1966 and in support of her contention, she has relied upon the judgment of this Court in K SRINIVASAMURTHY AND ANR. V. STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES & ORS. reported in ILR 2020 KARNATAKA 4195. 7. In reply, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submits that the award has been allegedly passed during the pendency of the appeal and the appellants have no notice about passing of such an award and he also submits that requirement of Sec. 30 of Act of 1966 has not been complied while passing the award. 8. We have carefully considered the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the available material on record. 9. The appellants who are the legal representatives of the late Siddegowda had contended in the writ petition that they are the owners in possession of the 4 items of the lands which were in dispute. 8. We have carefully considered the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the available material on record. 9. The appellants who are the legal representatives of the late Siddegowda had contended in the writ petition that they are the owners in possession of the 4 items of the lands which were in dispute. The learned Single Judge after scrutiny of the material available on record has recorded a finding that the appellants are not the owners of the property bearing survey No.136/2 of Anaganahalli village and survey No.106/4 of Mogarahalli Village and one Ningegowda S/o Kempegowda was the owner of the said land and he had accepted the acquisition proceedings and also received the compensation in respect of aforesaid lands. This finding recorded by the learned Single Judge has not been questioned by the appellants in this appeal and therefore, the appellants are only the owners of the remaining 2 items of the lands bearing survey No.136/1 measuring 2 acres 9 guntas of Anaganahalli village and survey No.106/3 measuring 1 acre of Mogarahalli Village. 10. It is not in dispute that after publication of preliminary notification, the appellants were heard by the competent authority under Sec. 28(3) of the Act of 1966 before proceeding to issue final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act of 1966 and this aspect has been fairly admitted by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the learned Single Judge after perusal of the original records relating to the acquisition has recorded a finding that the possession of the lands in question was taken by the State Government on 21/10/2006 and thereafter the State Government has transferred the same to the Board for development and in turn the Board has developed the lands in question along with other lands and 109 acres of the land was allotted in favour of the respondent No.2 " " Company on 29/3/2007. The appellants have not produced any material before this Court to dislodge such a finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 11. The appellants have not produced any material before this Court to dislodge such a finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 11. Mere assertion by the appellants, that they are still in possession of lands in question, when the records prove otherwise and when the learned Single Judge after scrutiny of the original records has recorded a categorical finding that possession of the lands in question has been taken and the lands were allotted to respondent No.2 would not be sufficient to hold that the appellants are still in possession of the lands in question. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the major chunk of the land measuring 109 acres out of the acquired land has been allotted to respondent No.2 and therefore, the acquisition ought to have been for the purpose of industrial estate and not industrial area is liable to be rejected in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.S.P.L. LIMITED V. STATE OF KARNATAKA AND OTHERS - 2022 SCC ONLINE SC 1380, wherein at paragraph Nos.37, 38 and 39 it has been observed as follows: "37. Sec. 28(1) of the KIAD Act is reproduced below: "28. Acquisition of land.- (1) if at any time, in the opinion of the State Government, any land is required for the purpose of development by the Board, or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Government may by notification, given notice of its intention to acquire such land." [Emphasis Provided] 38. The words for the purpose of development by the Board, and or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act make it amply clear that the intention to acquire land in the opinion of the State Government could be not only for the purpose of development by the Board but for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act. This gives power to acquire land beyond development by KIADB. This gives power to acquire land beyond development by KIADB. Further, the regulations framed by the Board under Sec. 41 particularly deal with this aspect in Regulation 13 which reads as under; "Allotment of Plots in Special Cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in these regulations, the Board in consultation with the State Government may allot any plot or area other than those in respect of which applications are called for under Regulation 7 to any individual or company for the establishment of an industry or for the provision of any amenity required in the Industrial area." [Emphasis Provided] 39. Under the above regulations, the Board is empowered to allot any plot or area to any individual or company for establishment of an industry in consultation with the State Government. This provision also contemplates acquiring land for the purpose of allotment to a single company to set up an industry. In the present case, the allotment by the Board is duly approved by the State Government." 12. In the case of SOMASHEKAR (supra), it has been held by this Court that, so long as the acquisition under the Act is meant to encourage setting up of an industrial unit within an area declared by the State Government as an industrial are, the very fact that the acquisition would eventually benefit only one industrial Company or unit may not be enough for the Court to declare that the power of acquisition vested in the respondents under the Act has been fraudulently invoked. It is also held that the scheme and the provisions of the Act do not, suggest that area can be deemed to be an industrial area or an industrial estate only if more than one industrial units are established within the same. 13. In the present case, not only the respondent No.2, even other industries have been allotted industrial sites in the industrial area formed by the Board. Therefore, merely for the reason that major chunk of the acquired land has been allotted to one company, the acquisition cannot be held to be bad. 14. 13. In the present case, not only the respondent No.2, even other industries have been allotted industrial sites in the industrial area formed by the Board. Therefore, merely for the reason that major chunk of the acquired land has been allotted to one company, the acquisition cannot be held to be bad. 14. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the lands in question are at the periphery and the same has not been utilized by the Board for the purpose for which it was acquired and therefore, the acquisition in respect of lands in question is required to be quashed is also liable to be rejected for the reason that the learned Single Judge has recorded a specific finding that the possession of the said lands has already taken and the same is handed over to respondent No.2 " " company. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES (supra) at paragraph No.12 has observed as follows: "12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land. As already noticed, the State Government in this regard has already initiated proceedings for resumption of the land. In our view, there arises no question of any unjust enrichment to the appellant Company." 15. Further, undisputedly except the appellants other land owners of the lands which were the subject matter of the acquisition have accepted the acquisition proceedings and received compensation awarded to them. The appellants are the owners of lands in question measuring 3 acres 9 guntas, out of the total extent of 191 acres and 5 1/2 guntas of land which were notified for acquisition. Therefore, undisputedly, the appellants are a minority of land owners. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.S.P.L. LIMITED (supra) at paragraph No.48 has observed as follows: "48. It is admitted position that the challenge to the acquisition of more than a thousand acres was made by a small fraction of land owners having land less than 10% of the total acquisition. Compensation for rest of the 90% land acquired had been accepted by their respective land owners. It is admitted position that the challenge to the acquisition of more than a thousand acres was made by a small fraction of land owners having land less than 10% of the total acquisition. Compensation for rest of the 90% land acquired had been accepted by their respective land owners. The Division Bench has quashed the entire acquisition of more than a thousand acres at the instance of such a small fraction. This aspect has been dealt with by this Court in the case of Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2010) 10 SCC 43 and Om Prakash v. State of U.P. reported in (1998) 6 SCC 1 . The learned Single Judge had placed reliance on the judgment of Om Prakash (supra). It is also worthwhile to mention that out of approx 110 acres of land acquires for MSPL, only one land owner possessing only 4.34 acres of land, had filed the writ appeal before the Division Bench. Quashing the entire acquisition at the instance of one land owner having 4.34 acres of land out of total acquisition for MSPL of 110 acres, would be against the public policy and public interest. The MSPL alone provides employment to 292 persons with a substantial investment of Rs.200.00 crores. The employment to approximately 300 persons by MSPL is also alleged to be double of the number of employees as projected in the proposal. Further, in the case of AISL acquisition of 914 acres is challenged by a fraction of less than 10% land owners. The estimated project of AISL is approx Rs.2092.00 crores and would employment to at least one thousand persons." 16. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that no award has been passed by the competent authority for a considerable period of time and since the award is not passed within a reasonable period, the acquisition is required to be declared as lapsed and in this regard he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in W.A.6819/2017 disposed of on 28/9/2022. In the present case, the final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act was issued on 31/8/2006. The writ petition is filed challenging the acquisition proceedings on 26/8/2009. Therefore, within a period of 3 years from the date of final notification, the appellants have preferred a writ petition before this Court challenging the acquisition proceedings. 17. In the present case, the final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act was issued on 31/8/2006. The writ petition is filed challenging the acquisition proceedings on 26/8/2009. Therefore, within a period of 3 years from the date of final notification, the appellants have preferred a writ petition before this Court challenging the acquisition proceedings. 17. The original records relating to the acquisition proceedings were summoned before the Court by the learned Single Judge as well as by this Court. Therefore, the authorities cannot be found at fault for not passing an award within a reasonable period. It is at the instance of the appellants, the records relating to the acquisition proceedings were secured before this Court in the writ petition and writ appeal proceedings and therefore, it cannot be but said, that the authorities had a reasonable excuse for not passing the award within a reasonable period. In W.A.No.6819/2017, this Court taking into consideration that the award was not passed without there being any justification for a period of more than 7 years, had refused to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. However, in the present case during pendency of this appeal, the competent authority has passed an award and the compensation amount is also deposited before the Reference Court and therefore, even though there is a delay in passing the award, the same cannot be solely attributed to the concerned authorities for the reasons aforesaid by us. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of KALUMIYA KARIMMIYA VS. THE STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS - (1977) 1 SCC 715 has held that allegation of delay cannot be gone into, without there being any clear statement of the responsibility for delay which may be attributed to the Government. 18. Admittedly, the ground with regard to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings was not raised by the appellants in the writ petition. 18. Admittedly, the ground with regard to lapsing of the acquisition proceedings was not raised by the appellants in the writ petition. In the case of K SRINIVASMURTHY (supra), where final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act of 1966 was issued on 30/5/2001 and general award was awarded belatedly on 31/12/2014, the division bench of this Court has held that there is no time limit prescribed under the KIAD Act for passing the award and therefore, no relief can be granted under Sec. 24(2) of the Act of 2013 in respect of a acquisition in KIAD Act on the ground that no award has been passed, no compensation is paid and possession is not taken. More so, when the Board has already created third party interest in the acquired land. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant has made a alternative prayer that in the event this Court is not inclined to interfere with the acquisition proceedings, the respondents may be directed to award compensation under the provision of the Act of 2013. Since the concerned authorities have already passed an award in the month of December, 2018 and the compensation amount is already deposited before the Reference Court on 15/9/2019, the prayer made by the appellants to direct the respondents to award compensation under the Act of 2013 cannot be acceded to in this appeal. 20. The learned counsel for the Board has submitted that the writ petition was filed belatedly and by that time, possession was taken and handed over to respondent No.2 and therefore, learned Single Judge was fully justified in dismissing the writ petition. Though the learned counsel for the appellants has sought to explain the delay contending that since the possession of the land was not taken and no award was passed, there was s recurring cause of action available to the appellants and therefore, there is no delay in filing the appeal, such an explanation cannot be accepted, more so, for the reason that the appellants had notice of acquisition and this objections were considered and rejected under Sec. 28(3) of the Act of 1966 before the authorities issued final notification under Sec. 28(4) of the Act of 1966. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES (supra) at paragraph No.21 has observed as follows: "21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of NORTHERN INDIAN GLASS INDUSTRIES (supra) at paragraph No.21 has observed as follows: "21. This Court has repeatedly held that writ petition challenging the notifications issued under Ss. 4 and 6 of the Act is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches if challenge is not made within a reasonable time. This Court has said that the petitioner cannot sit on the fence and allow the State to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that notification under Sec. 4 and the declaration under Sec. 6 were valid and then to attack the notifications on the grounds which were available to him at the time when these were published as otherwise it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. Writ petition (SCA No. 5149 of 1989) is thus barred by laches as well." 21. Learned Single Judge after scrutiny of original documents, having found that the appellants had participated in the proceedings under Sec. 28(3) of the Act has held that there was no justification on the part of the appellants to approach this Court after a delay of 3 years from the date of issuance of final notification. The learned Single Judge on appreciation of overall material on record has dismissed the writ petition not only on the grounds of delay and latches but also on merits. We do not find any irregularity or infirmity in the said order, which calls for our interference in this intra court appeal. Therefore, the appeal is devoid of merits. Accordingly, the same is dismissed.