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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 154 (HP)

Sukh Dass, Son of Sh. Harisingh v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2022-04-01

SATYEN VAIDYA

body2022
ORDER : Petitioner has approached this Court for grant of pre-arrest bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. in complaint case No. 4 of 2021, under Sections 18-A and 18-C of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, pending before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. 2. The case of the petitioner is that FIR No. 89 of 2018, was registered at Police Station, Paonta Sahib on 05.07.2018 under Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘ND&PS Act’). Petitioner was arrayed as accused in the said FIR and was arrested on 05.07.2018. Petitioner was enlarged on bail by learned Special Judge-II, Sirmaur District at Nahan vide order dated 06.09.2018 in bail application No. 143 of 2018. 3. As per petitioner, both the cases i.e. FIR No. 89/2018 and complaint case No.4/2021 have arisen out of the same incident. It is alleged against petitioner that he was found in possession of huge quantity of medicines for sale without any licence. The said illegal activity of petitioner culminated in initiation of proceedings under the ND&PS Act as well as Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 4. Petitioner is apprehending his arrest in complaint case No. 4/2021. The learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonta Sahib is stated to have issued process against the petitioner after taking cognizance in the complaint. Petitioner has contended that his implication is totally false and he was not involved in any offence. Petitioner has already co-operated with the Investigating Agency as well as the Drug Inspector. He is permanent resident of village Mehmoodpur, P.O. Raipur, Tehsil Behat, District Saharanpur, U.P. presently residing in Village Kolar, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. and there is no likelihood of his absconding or fleeing from the course of justice. 5. In response, the respondent has filed status report. It is stated that the petitioner had already appeared before the Drug Inspector and joined the investigation. No apprehension of his obstructing the course of justice has been expressed. On 8.3.2022, this Court ordered the production of entire record of investigation alongwith presence of the Drug Inspector. On 25.03.2022, the Drug Inspector remained present with the record. It transpired from the record that there was no allegation of the medicines being allegedly sold by the petitioner to be spurious or adulterated. 6. On 8.3.2022, this Court ordered the production of entire record of investigation alongwith presence of the Drug Inspector. On 25.03.2022, the Drug Inspector remained present with the record. It transpired from the record that there was no allegation of the medicines being allegedly sold by the petitioner to be spurious or adulterated. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General for the State and also have gone through the records. 7. In Bharat Chaudhary and another vs. State of Bihar and another (2003) 8 SCC 77 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “7. From the perusal of this part of Section 438 of the Crl.P.C., we find no restriction in regard to exercise of this power in a suitable case either by the Court of Sessions, High Court or this Court even when cognizance is taken or charge sheet is filed. The object of Section 438 is to prevent undue harassment of the accused persons by pre-trial arrest and detention. The fact, that a Court has either taken cognizance of the complaint or the investigating agency has filed a chargesheet, would not by itself, in our opinion, prevent the concerned courts from granting anticipatory bail in appropriate cases. The gravity of the offence is an important factor to be taken into consideration while granting such anticipatory bail so also the need for custodial interrogation, but these are only factors that must be borne in mind by the concerned courts while entertaining a petition for grant of anticipatory bail and the fact of taking cognizance or filing of charge sheet cannot by themselves be construed as a prohibition against the grant of anticipatory bail. In our opinion, the courts i.e. the Court of Sessions, High Court or this Court has the necessary power vested in them to grant anticipatory bail in non-bailable offences under Section 438 of the Crl. P.C. even when cognizance is taken or charge sheet is filed provided the facts of the case require the Court to do so. 8. In Ravindra Saxena vs. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. 8. In Ravindra Saxena vs. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 1 SCC 684 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 7. We are of the considered opinion that the approach adopted by the High Court is wholly erroneous. The application for anticipatory bail has been rejected without considering the case of the appellant solely on the ground that the challan has now been presented. 8. We may notice here that the provision with regard to the grant of anticipatory bail was introduced on the recommendations of the Law Commission of India in his 41st Report dated 24.09.1969. The recommendations were considered by this Court in a Constitution Bench decision in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and others vs. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 . Upon consideration of the entire issue this Court laid down certain salutary principles to be followed in exercise of the power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. by the Sessions Court and the High Court. It is clearly held that the anticipatory bail can be granted at any time so long as the applicant has not been arrested. When the application is made to the High Court or Court of Sessions it must apply its own mind on the question and decide when the case is made out for granting such relief. 9. In our opinion, the High Court ought not to have left the matter to the Magistrate only on the ground that the challan has now been presented. There is also no reason to deny anticipatory bail merely because the allegation in this case pertains to cheating or forgery of a valuable security. The merits of these issues shall have to be assessed at the time of the trial of the accused persons and denial of anticipatory bail only on the ground that the challan has been presented would not satisfy the requirements of Sections 437 and 438 Cr.P.C. 10. In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of law in not applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. The High Court is required to exercise its discretion upon examination of the facts and circumstances and to grant anticipatory bail "if it thinks fit". In our opinion, the High Court committed a serious error of law in not applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of this case. The High Court is required to exercise its discretion upon examination of the facts and circumstances and to grant anticipatory bail "if it thinks fit". The aforesaid expression has been explained by this Court in Gurbaksh Singh's case (supra) as follows: "18……..The expression "if it thinks fit", which occurs in Section 438(1) in relation to the power of the High Court or the Court of Session, is conspicuously absent in Section 437(1). We see no valid reason for rewriting Section 438 with a view, not to expanding the scope and ambit of the discretion conferred on the High Court and the Court of Session but, for the purpose of limiting it. Accordingly, we are unable to endorse the view of the High Court that anticipatory bail cannot be granted in respect of offences like criminal breach of trust for the mere reason that the punishment provided therefor is imprisonment for life. Circumstances may broadly justify the grant of bail in such cases too, though of course, the court is free to refuse anticipatory bail in any case if there is material before it justifying such refusal." 11. The salutary provision contained in Section 438 Cr.P.C. was introduced to enable the Court to prevent the deprivation of personal liberty. It cannot be permitted to be jettisoned on technicalities such as "the challan having been presented anticipatory bail cannot be granted". We may notice here some more observations made by this Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh (supra) : "We find a great deal of substance in Mr Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to deprivation of personal liberty, the court should lean against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the scope of Section 438, especially when no such restrictions have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence since he is not, on the date of his application for anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. An overgenerous infusion of constraints and conditions which are not to be found in Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be made to depend on compliance with unreasonable restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section 438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger after the decision in Maneka Gandhi, that in order to meet the challenge of Article 21 of the Constitution, the procedure established by law for depriving a person of his liberty must be fair, just and reasonable. Section 438, in the form in which it is conceived by the legislature, is open to no exception on the ground that it prescribes a procedure which is unjust or unfair. We ought, at all costs, to avoid throwing it open to a Constitutional challenge by reading words in it which are not to be found therein." 9. Thus, there is no embargo on filing of and maintaining the petition for pre-arrest bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. even after presentation of challan. In the instant case, the prosecution of petitioner has been initiated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act on the complaint filed by the Drug Inspector. 10. The fact that the complaint has already been filed is sufficient to infer that the investigation was complete. It is not the case of respondent nor has the Drug Inspector submitted that further investigation was required in the case and petitioner was required for that purpose. No recovery is required to be effected from the petitioner. It is not a case where the petitioner may abscond from the course of justice. Petitioner is already on bail in case FIR No. 89 of 2018 and there is no allegation that he has misused the liberty granted to him. 11. There is nothing on record to suggest that the grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in the instant case shall affect the proceedings of complaint case No. 4 of 2021 adversely. 12. Petitioner is already on bail in case FIR No. 89 of 2018 and there is no allegation that he has misused the liberty granted to him. 11. There is nothing on record to suggest that the grant of pre-arrest bail to the petitioner in the instant case shall affect the proceedings of complaint case No. 4 of 2021 adversely. 12. In Siddharth vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2022) 1 SCC 676 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view of the High Courts and would like to give our imprimatur to the said judicial view. It has rightly been observed on consideration of Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. that it does not impose an obligation on the Officer-in-charge to arrest each and every accused at the time of filing of the chargesheet. We have, in fact, come across cases where the accused has cooperated with the investigation throughout and yet on the chargesheet being filed non-bailable warrants have been issued for his production premised on the requirement that there is an obligation to arrest the accused and produce him before the court. We are of the view that if the Investigating Officer does not believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons he/she is not required to be produced in custody. The word “custody” appearing in Section 170 of the Cr.P.C. does not contemplate either police or judicial custody but it merely connotes the presentation of the accused by the Investigating Officer before the court while filing the chargesheet. 10. We may note that personal liberty is an important aspect of our constitutional mandate. The occasion to arrest an accused during investigation arises when custodial investigation becomes necessary or it is a heinous crime or where there is a possibility of influencing the witnesses or accused may abscond. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it. If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. Merely because an arrest can be made because it is lawful does not mandate that arrest must be made. A distinction must be made between the existence of the power to arrest and the justification for exercise of it. If arrest is made routine, it can cause incalculable harm to the reputation and self-esteem of a person. If the Investigating Officer has no reason to believe that the accused will abscond or disobey summons and has, in fact, throughout cooperated with the investigation we fail to appreciate why there should be a compulsion on the officer to arrest the accused.” 13. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the application is allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the event of his arrest in complaint case No. 04 of 2021, registered under Sections 18-A and 18-C of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, on his furnishing personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P. This order, however, is subject to following conditions: - i) he shall make himself available for the purpose of investigation, if so required and regularly attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; (ii) he shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever; (iii) he shall not make any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer; and (iv) he shall not leave India without prior permission of the Court. 14. Any observation made hereinabove shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the trial Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by any observation made hereinabove. Petition stands disposed of.