JUDGMENT : The appellants have called in question the validity of the order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.105239/2021 [LB-RES] disposed off on 21.04.2022, whereby the petition filed challenging the order of 28.10.2021 disqualifying the appellants from the membership of Sadalaga Town Municipal Council, passed under Section 4(2)(iii) of the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 [‘the Act’ for brevity], was dismissed. 2. The parties are referred as per their rank in the writ proceedings for the purpose of convenience. 3. The petitioners are Councilors of the Town Municipal Council, Sadalaga and were elected in the Elections held in the year 2018 and were official candidates of Bharatiya Janata Party (B.J.P.). In the Elections held for the post of ‘Adhyaksha’ and ‘Upadhyaksha’ on 02.11.2020, petitioner No.1 had contested for the post of ‘Adhyaksha’ and was elected and petitioner Nos. 2 to 4 had cast their votes in favour of petitioner No.1. 4. On 03.11.2020, it is stated that the President of Bharatiya Janata Party, Chikkodi Lok Sabha Constituency had lodged a complaint before the Deputy Commissioner, alleging that despite issuance of Whip to the Members to vote for the official candidate for the post of ‘President’ Sri Anand Devagouda Patil and for the post of ‘Vice President’ as regards the official candidate Sri Basavaraj Shankara Hanabar, the petitioners had violated the Whip in not voting for the official Party candidates and had requested for initiation of proceedings under the Act. 5. It is further made out from the facts that Sri Anand Devagouda Patil had filed a complaint before the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), TMC raising similar contentions as made by the President of B.J.P. referred to above, which was received by the CEO, TMC, on 04.11.2020. It is further submitted that another complaint is stated to have been filed on 07.11.2020 with similar contents by the President of B.J.P. Chikkodi Lok Sabha Constituency. 6. Initially, the petitioners had challenged the validity of the disqualification proceedings in W.P.No.148736/2020 and against refusal to grant interim order to stay the proceedings of disqualification, Writ Appeal came to be filed in W.P.No.100136/2021, which was disposed off by judgment dated 28.07.2021 with the following observations : “20. 6. Initially, the petitioners had challenged the validity of the disqualification proceedings in W.P.No.148736/2020 and against refusal to grant interim order to stay the proceedings of disqualification, Writ Appeal came to be filed in W.P.No.100136/2021, which was disposed off by judgment dated 28.07.2021 with the following observations : “20. Whether the filing of the complaint was within the stipulated time, whether the same have been addressed and filed before the proper authority and whether the initiation of the proceedings are in accordance with the provisions of the Act are the matters to be decided by the original authority, i.e., the Deputy Commissioner who initiated the proceedings for disqualification. To that extent, the impugned order passed by the learned single Judge has to be modified. The only contradiction in the order of the learned single Judge has to be set-aside. It is always open for the appellants to file objections to the complaint filed before the Deputy Commissioner by the 5th respondent in the proceeding initiated. It is for the Deputy Commissioner to consider all the objections including the violation of the provisions of Section 4(1) and 4(2) of the Act and to proceed and pass orders strictly in accordance with law. 21. With the above observations, the Writ Appeal is disposed off. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits and demerits of the case. It is for the Deputy Commissioner to decide the same in accordance with law, after providing sufficient opportunity to both the parties and pass appropriate orders within the time stipulated under law. All the contentions of both the parties are left open to be urged before the Deputy Commissioner.” 7. Subsequently the proceedings came to be resumed by the Deputy Commissioner and upon conclusion of proceedings, order came to be passed on 28.10.2021 allowing the petition and disqualifying the petitioners from membership of Sadalaga Town Municipal Council. As against such order passed on 28.10.2021, W.P.No.105239/2021 [LB-RES] came to be filed, which was disposed off on 21.04.2022 upholding the validity of the order of Deputy commissioner. As against such order of the learned Single Judge, present Writ Appeal has been filed. 8. As against such order passed on 28.10.2021, W.P.No.105239/2021 [LB-RES] came to be filed, which was disposed off on 21.04.2022 upholding the validity of the order of Deputy commissioner. As against such order of the learned Single Judge, present Writ Appeal has been filed. 8. It is to be observed that during the pendency of the Writ Appeal, when steps were taken to fill up the vacancies by publishing the Calendar of Events, this Court by an interim order dated 14.10.2022, granted protection and permitted the petitioners to continue by staying the order of disqualification dated 28.10.2021. 9. The petitioners have assailed the order of the learned Single Judge by contending as follows:- a. That complaint was premature insofar as election which was held on 02.11.2020 and the complaints were made on 03.11.2020 contrary to the requirement under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, which provides that the disqualification would come into place after fifteen days. b. That there was no service of notice of Whip and assertion of such communication by way of affixture is impermissible. c. That proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner were in violation of the principles of natural justice insofar as there were irregularities in the maintenance of order sheet. d. That the procedure prescribed under the Act ought to be strictly followed, as the consequence that would follow upon conclusion of proceedings would result in removal of an elected member and accordingly, the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Ravi Yashwant Bhoir v. District Collector, Raigad and others reported in (2012) 4 SCC 407 stipulating strict compliance ought to be adhered to. 10. It is submitted that the complaint filed by the Party President was forwarded by the CEO to the Project Director in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner and such Officer could not have received it, as Section 4 of the Act stipulates that the complaint was required to be made to the CEO and to be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner. Accordingly, it is submitted that the findings to the contrary rejecting such contention by the Deputy Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge requires to be interfered with. 11. Accordingly, it is submitted that the findings to the contrary rejecting such contention by the Deputy Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge requires to be interfered with. 11. The respondents on the other hand and the learned Additional Advocate General have supported the impugned orders of the Deputy Commissioner as well as the learned Single Judge by contending as follows:- (a) That though the complaint was filed on 03.11.2020, notice was issued only on 19.11.2020 by the Deputy Commissioner after a period of fifteen days and accordingly, there is no violation of the legal mandate under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. (b) That even otherwise separate complaints were filed on 29.07.2021 which were beyond the period of fifteen days which has been taken note of by the Deputy Commissioner along with the original complaints. (c) That forwarding of the complaint by the CEO to the Project Director who in turn had forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner could not be faulted, as the Project Director was only a intermediary. (d) That the findings having been arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner and affirmed by the learned Single Judge as regards factual assertions cannot be reopened in the intra-court appeal. (e) That allegation regarding tampering of order sheet has been gone into by the learned Single Judge and negatived. If that were to be so, the said finding cannot be interfered with in the present proceedings. 12. Heard both sides. 13. It must be noted that the learned Single Judge has considered in detail all contentions made assailing the validity of the order of Deputy Commissioner. A. SERVICE/COMMUNICATION OF DIRECTION BY POLITICAL PARTY (WHIP) 14. Insofar as the contention relating to communication / service of Whip, the learned Single Judge has concluded that when an official candidate had been identified by the B.J.P., all persons in the meeting who were participating in the elections were to be taken to be aware of the official candidate and were required to vote for the official candidate and that the petitioners cannot claim that they were not informed or that Whip was not delivered and that they did not know that they were required to vote for the official candidate. (see para 28 and 29). 15. (see para 28 and 29). 15. Learned Single Judge had also found that petitioner No.1 was required to have obtained necessary approval from the Party prior to announcing his candidature for the post of ‘Adhyaksha.’ In the absence of approval by the Party, no member of a Party could contest the election against the official candidate. 16. Though we do not subscribe to the reasoning arrived at by the learned Single Judge, however, we are in consonance with the conclusion and the stand of non-interference with the order of the Deputy Commissioner on the aspect of communication of Whip. The Appellate Court could arrive at the same conclusion as that of the learned Single Judge though by assigning different reasons in arriving at the same conclusions. 17. It must be noted that the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act stipulates the consequence of disqualification on the ground of defection in case of disobedience of direction issued by the political Party. 18. Section 3(1)(b) of the Act, which is of relevance on this aspect reads as follows : “3. Disqualification on the ground of defection.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sections 3A, 3B and 4, a councillor or a member, belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified for being such councillor or member; (a) …….. (b) if he votes or abstains from voting in, or intentionally remains absent from any meeting of the Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Town Panchayat, Zilla Panchayat or Taluk Panchayat, contrary to any direction Issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by it in this behalf without obtaining the prior permission of such party, person or authority and such voting, abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence.” 19. It is clear that disqualification would be incurred where a Member votes contrary to any direction issued by the political Party to which he belongs which in common parlance is referred to as “Whip”. It is necessary if the same is to be established that there has to be communication of such direction issued by the political Party. 20. Insofar as the statutory framework of the Act, the procedure of communication of Whip is not stipulated nor there are any Rules framed in that regard. 21. It is necessary if the same is to be established that there has to be communication of such direction issued by the political Party. 20. Insofar as the statutory framework of the Act, the procedure of communication of Whip is not stipulated nor there are any Rules framed in that regard. 21. In the present case, it is the assertion by the petitioners that one line Whip was issued on 01.11.2020 and the same was sought to be served at 9.00 a.m. on all the Members and as the petitioners had refused to accept the Whip, the President – Dr. Rajesh R. Nerli, Sri. Sanjeev Krishnagouda Patil, went to the house of petitioners and sought to serve the Whip and on refusal, the same was pasted on the outer door of the house and photograph of the same was taken. (See Para 5 of the affidavit filed by way of examination-in-chief by the District President of B.J.P.). In support of the said assertion, the said District President has produced copy of the Whip issued (referred in para-9(iv) of affidavit) and photographs evidencing pasting of Whip on the outer door of the house of respondent Nos. 1 to 4 [Referred to in para No.9(vi)]. 22. The affidavit of Sri. Sanjeev S/o. Krishnagouda Patil, BJP President of Chikkodi Sadalaga Mandal, is filed with identical assertion on 07.09.2021. The said material has been relied upon by the Deputy Commissioner in concluding that Whip has been served. 23. There are no Rules governing conduct of enquiry relating to disqualification and in the absence of which, the only legal requirement is adherence to the principles of natural justice. In a summary enquiry, material above referred and relied upon could be held to be sufficient for arriving at a conclusion regarding service of Whip. The aforesaid assertions have not been subjected to cross-examination. 24. Though the learned Single Judge has opined that evidence regarding meeting of 01.11.2020 is not corroborated and cannot be accepted in light of petitioners denying attending the meeting, it must be noted that the conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner regarding communication and service of Whip was on the basis of affixture having been resorted on 02.11.2020 at 9.00 a.m. 25. As pointed out above as regards such affixture, evidence has been placed in the proceedings and the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner is correct and not open for interference. As pointed out above as regards such affixture, evidence has been placed in the proceedings and the conclusion arrived at by the Deputy Commissioner is correct and not open for interference. As regards such aspect, learned Single Judge has not disagreed with resort to such procedure nor has the learned Single Judge discredited evidence led in by the respondents. 26. Though the Deputy Commissioner also records a finding regarding service of Whip in the meeting on 01.11.2020 and the learned Single Judge has disbelieved such service, however, service by way of affixture could still be stated to be sufficient. 27. Accordingly, the conclusion of the Deputy Commissioner on the aspect of service of Whip, not having been interfered with, requires acceptance. 28. We are consciously adverting to the requirement of service of Whip while disagreeing with the observation of the learned Single Judge who in effect takes a view that there is constructive notice of the Whip by stating that (i) all Members aware of the official candidate are obliged to vote for the official candidate; (ii) that the petitioner No.1 ought to have obtained necessary approval from the Party prior to announcing his candidature for the post of ‘Adhyaksha’ and in the absence of approval, no Member could contest election as a Party Member. 29. There is a distinction between an act of indiscipline that may be committed against the direction of the Party which would expose the Member for disciplinary action taken by the Party and as regards disobedience of a direction by a political Party to vote in a particular manner as contemplated under Section 3 of the Act which would lead to disqualification. In the former case, the act of indiscipline is one between the Member and his Party and such act of indiscipline could be by voting against an officially declared candidate of his own Party or by standing for a post without approval of the parent Party as against an official sponsored candidate which scenario is contemplated by the learned Single Judge. 30. 30. The Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987 provides for a mechanism whereby irrespective of the Party taking any action for an act of indiscipline by a Party Member, the Authorities under the Act are obliged to act and initiate proceedings against a Member where there is voting, abstaining from voting or remaining absent; contrary to any direction by the political party to which he belongs. It is only in such case when established can the consequence of disqualification be imposed as penalty under the Act. Keeping in mind the principle that an act if required to be done by way of a certain procedure must be done in that manner alone or not at all, it is clear that there must be strict adherence to legal requirements to result in the consequence of disqualification under the Act. While an act of indiscipline may result in the Party taking action against the Member, the consequence of disqualification as envisaged under the Act can follow only if the requirement under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act is established. In fact, the power of disqualification is not available with the Party which illustrates the distinction between disciplinary action by the Party in contradistinction to proceeding under the Karnataka Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1987. Accordingly, the conclusion of constructive notice being sufficient for communication of Whip as held by the learned Single Judge is not a correct reasoning, though learned Single Judge has correctly refused to interfere with the finding regarding communication of Whip, which we approve. B. PREMATURE COMPLAINT 31. Learned Single Judge has concluded that the assertion of complaint being premature was liable to be rejected, as complaint was filed on 03.11.2020, but action was taken on 19.11.2020 by the Deputy Commissioner by issuing notice to the petitioners. It is observed that the complaint might have been ‘premature but the action of the case was taken only after the period of fifteen days’. The learned Single Judge has construed that the period of fifteen days as provided for under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act is only in the nature of cooling of period, where any action taken by the Member of the Party contrary to the instructions of the Party or authorized representative could be condoned by the Party or authorized representative. 32. The learned Single Judge has construed that the period of fifteen days as provided for under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act is only in the nature of cooling of period, where any action taken by the Member of the Party contrary to the instructions of the Party or authorized representative could be condoned by the Party or authorized representative. 32. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that a complaint may be made asserting that a Member or Councilor has become subject to disqualification under Section 3 and such complaint is to be made to the CEO. If Section 4 is to be read as providing for filing of the complaint, Section 3(1)(b) of the Act further provides that disqualification would ensue where the Member has acted contrary to the direction issued by the political Party to which he belongs when his voting, his abstention or absence has not been condoned by such political Party within fifteen days from the date of voting or such abstention or absence, the proper reading of Section 4 read with Section 3(1)(b) would indicate that complaint could be filed only after fifteen days and that would be the procedure to be followed. However, in the present case, the learned Single Judge has condoned the lapse, if any, by observing that though the complaint was filed on 03.11.2020, the notice itself was issued on 19.11.2020 by the Deputy Commissioner, which is after the period of fifteen days. While noticing so, the contention of premature complaint was rejected. We concur with such conclusion and approve the non-interference by the learned Single Judge, while clarifying that such a conclusion is in the particular facts of the case and stand of the Court should not be read as declaring that the requirement of filing a complaint after fifteen days is merely directory and not mandatory. 33. In fact, fifteen days’ period requires to be adhered to, to permit the concerned Member to make efforts to have his act committed in contravention of the direction of the Party to be condoned and such right of a Member cannot be abridged by treating the period of fifteen days to be a mere directory provision. Accordingly, on this point, we agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge though on a different reasoning. C. TAMPERING OF ORDER SHEET 34. Accordingly, on this point, we agree with the conclusion of the learned Single Judge though on a different reasoning. C. TAMPERING OF ORDER SHEET 34. Insofar as the contention regarding tampering of the order sheet relating to certain entries made, we do not intend to re-appreciate the material on record as we do not find any jurisdictional error calling for interference in the conclusion arrived at para Nos.38, 39, 40 and 41 by the learned Single Judge. The appreciation and conclusion being a plausible conclusion would be sufficient to let such conclusion stay, as interference is not warranted merely where a different conclusion could be arrived at on the same set of facts, while we admit that there was nothing wrong with the conclusion arrived at. D. ALLEGATION OF BIAS AND VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE 35. The petitioners have contended that there has been violation of principles of natural justice and in their objection statement before the Deputy Commissioner have specifically asserted that the proceedings are politically motivated, suffer from judicial malice and hence arbitrary. It is specifically asserted that the quasi-judicial authority has acted at the instance of Sri Annasab Jolle and Smt. Shashikala Jolle, who being Member of Parliament and State Minister respectively, have exercised their influence on the proceedings. 36. The allegations are vague and general in nature and not supported by sufficient material to uphold such contention. The nature of personal allegations require that they are to be arrayed by name, if such allegations are to be adjudicated. In effect, the petitioners are alleging bias and such allegations by their very nature no doubt are difficult to prove, but there has to be some material that would necessitate and substantiate such allegations. There is no such material forthcoming and the repeated allegations made in the objection statement before the Deputy Commissioner in the Writ Petition before the learned Single Judge and in the present proceedings by itself are not sufficient to be taken judicial note of. The allegation of tampering of order sheet not having been proved, the allegation of bias is liable to be rejected. 37. Insofar as allegation relating to violation of principles of natural justice against such legal contention ought to be backed by legally sufficient evidence. 38. The allegation of tampering of order sheet not having been proved, the allegation of bias is liable to be rejected. 37. Insofar as allegation relating to violation of principles of natural justice against such legal contention ought to be backed by legally sufficient evidence. 38. Though petitioners have specifically asserted in their memo dated 07.09.2021 that they would not be in a position to file objections if the specified documents are not furnished, objections are filed on 12.10.2021 and thereafter memo is filed 12.10.2021 submitting that the objection statement and evidence may be treated as arguments. Nowhere there is a whisper regarding non-furnishing of documents as on date of filing their statement of objections, nor is there any written request seeking for affording an opportunity of cross-examining the specific witnesses. In a summary enquiry, unless a request is made specifically seeking the right to cross-examine, the Enquiring Authority is not obliged to afford such opportunity. In the absence of such specific stand, vague allegations of violation of principles of natural justice cannot be legally sustained. Further, the memo dated 12.10.2021 wherein, specifically it is submitted that the statement of objections filed and evidence led could be considered as arguments has the effect of waiving legal objection if any relating to procedural infractions, if any. 39. As regards alleged manipulation of the order sheet reflecting bias and leading to violation of principles of natural justice, the learned Single Judge at paras-38 to 41 has arrived at a conclusion which warrants no interference. 40. In the passing, it would be necessary to observe that though legally no ground is made out in the present case relating to violation of principles of natural justice, nevertheless, quasi-judicial authorities ought to function in a manner that confidence of litigants in such authorities is retained by following transparent functioning procedures so as to dispel the commonly held notion that quasi-judicial authorities act at the dictates of political Party in power, more so, in enquiries relating to disqualification. The Apex Court in Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India and Others reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 has recorded a similar observation at paras-28 and 33 as follows:- “28. Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. The Apex Court in Oryx Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India and Others reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 has recorded a similar observation at paras-28 and 33 as follows:- “28. Justice is rooted in confidence and justice is the goal of a quasi-judicial proceeding also. If the functioning of a quasi-judicial authority has to inspire confidence in the minds of those subjected to its jurisdiction, such authority must act with utmost fairness. Its fairness is obviously to be manifested by the language in which charges are couched and conveyed to the person proceeded against. 33. The principle that justice must not only be done but it must eminently appear to be done as well is equally applicable to quasi-judicial proceeding if such a proceeding has to inspire confidence in the mind of those who are subject to it.” 41. Consequently the Writ Appeal is dismissed and the Authority concerned are at liberty to initiate appropriate action afresh for filling up the vacancies in accordance with applicable procedure.