JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Bhadrish S. Raju with learned Advocate Mr. Dhanesh R. Patel for the petitioner and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval Dave with learned Advocate Mr. Jigar P. Raval for the respondent (caveator). 2. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Advocate Mr. Jigar P. Raval waives service of Rule on behalf of the respondent. 3. With consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties, the present petition is taken up for final hearing. 4. By way of this petition the petitioner has challenged an order dated 01.11.2022 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, under Exh. 60 in Special Civil Suit No. 407 of 2017, whereby the application preferred by the petitioner-defendant to reopen his right to file a written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction has been rejected. 5. Brief facts leading to filing of the present petition, as far as they are relevant for the present purpose are narrated herein below : 5.1 It appears that on 21.05.2013, the respondent M/s Bileshwar Corporation had filed Special Civil Suit No. 272 of 2013 before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Ahmedabad (Rural) for specific performance which came to be renumbered as Special Civil Suit No. 407 of 2017, which suit accompanied by application for interim injunction 5.2 It appears that while notice of the said suit had been issued by the learned Civil Court on 11.06.2013, and whereas it appears that after entering appearance, the present petitioner-original defendant had preferred an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "CPC") for rejection of the plaint. It also appears that from such time, for almost 8-9 years, except for certain miscellaneous applications being filed, neither the suit nor the application for interim injunction had been taken up for hearing. 5.3 It also appears that the original plaintiff had filed an application on 22.06.2022 under Exh. 51, whereby it was requested that since the defendant has not been pursuing the proceedings of the civil suit as well as the application for rejection of plaint seriously, therefore the right of the defendant for written statement and the right of the defendant for making submissions as regards application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC may be closed. It appears that vide an order of the very date, the learned Civil Court had been pleased to close the stage of the petitioner-defendant for filing of written statement and the right of the petitioner-defendant to make oral submissions with regard to application for rejection of plaint had also been closed. 5.4 It appears that thereafter, the learned Civil Court had heard the application for rejection of plaint and whereas vide order dated 06.07.2022, the learned Civil Court had been pleased to allow such application and the plaint had been rejected. It also appears that thereafter the said order had been challenged by the original plaintiff before this Court by filing First Appeal No. 2320 of 2022 on 16.07.2022. It also appears that vide an order dated 06.10.2022, Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court had allowed the first appeal and whereas the Hon'ble Division Bench had inter alia laid down a time frame for deciding the application for interim injunction below Exh.5. It also appears that a statement made by the present petitioner-defendant as regards interim arrangement, had been extended for a period of four weeks from the date of initiation of hearing of application for interim injunction by the learned Civil Court. 5.5 It appears that on 20.10.2022 the civil suit had been restored and the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, had passed an order laying down the time schedule to complete hearing of application for interim injunction. The petitioner-defendant had thereafter moved an application on 01.11.2022, whereby he had sought to reopen his right to file written statement and reply to the interim injunction application. Such application had been opposed by the present respondent-original plaintiff by filing a reply against the same on the very day. It appears that learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, after hearing both the parties, vide order dated 01.11.2022 under Exh. 60 had rejected the application preferred by the petitioner-defendant, being aggrieved by which order the petitioner has preferred this petition. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhardrish Raju for the petitioner would submit that the learned Civil Court had gravely erred in not allowing the application preferred by the petitioner for reopening his right to file written statement to the suit as well as reply to the application for interim injunction. 6. Learned Advocate Mr. Bhardrish Raju for the petitioner would submit that the learned Civil Court had gravely erred in not allowing the application preferred by the petitioner for reopening his right to file written statement to the suit as well as reply to the application for interim injunction. Learned Advocate would draw the attention of this Court to the application preferred by the present petitioner for rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, and would submit that the present petitioner was not an indolent litigant, who had not exercised his remedy within reasonable time. Learned Advocate would submit that even before 30 days of the notice of the plaint having been served upon the petitioner, the petitioner had preferred an application for rejection of plaint on 28.06.2013. Learned Advocate would further draw the attention of this Court to Paragraph No. 4 of the said application and would submit that in the said application, the petitioner-defendant had reserved liberty to file written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction, in case the needs so arise, more particularly it was requested that the application for rejection of the plaint may be heard and decided first. Learned Advocate would submit that in the interregnum, certain other proceedings had taken place, and whereas the present petitioner had also shown his willingness to settle the dispute with the original plaintiff. Learned Advocate would further submit that as it is for approximately 10 years from the date of filing of the suit as well as the date of filing of the application under Exh. 15 for rejection of the plaint, no specific attempt to take up the matter had occurred on part of anybody concerned and suddenly out of the blue an application for closing right of the defendant for filing written statement and reply to application for interim injunction had been filed and had been decided against the petitioner by the learned Civil Court. It is submitted that while such order had been passed by the learned Civil Court on 22.06.2022, even before the present petitioner could take a decision as to whether such order was required to be challenged or not, the learned Civil Court had heard and decided the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC preferred by the present petitioner-defendant and had rejected the suit on 06.07.2022. 6.1 Learned Advocate Mr. 6.1 Learned Advocate Mr. Raju would further submit that after the suit had been rejected, there was no reason or occasion for the petitioner to have challenged the order whereby the right of the petitioner for filing written statement to the suit and reply to the interim injunction application was closed. Learned Advocate would submit that immediately upon this Court having set aside the order rejecting the suit and upon the suit being revived, the petitioner along with his written statement had moved an application for reopening the right which had been closed vide order dated 22.06.2022. 6.2 Learned Advocate would submit that as such, the legal position being that if an application under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint is preferred, then such application ought to be decided first by the learned Civil Court and whereas in the instant case, after the suit had been rejected and after the said order of the learned Civil Court had been set aside by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the position of the suit would be, as would be prevailing on the date prior to filing of the application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. Learned Advocate would further submit that since in the interregnum i.e. from the year 2013 till the year 2022, no serious attempt had been made by anybody concerned, to have either the application under Order VII Rule 11 decided or even any attempt was made for hearing the application for interim injunction, therefore, while the statute has laid down a maximum period of 120 days and the said time period is only directory in nature, in the interest of justice, the right of the petitioner for filing of written statement against the suit and reply to the application for interim injunction may be reopened by this Court. 6.3 Learned Advocate Mr. Raju would also draw the attention of this Court to the amended provisions of the CPC, more particularly Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC and would submit that while time limit for filing of the written statement of defence has been prescribed by the said provision, the time limit prescribed, according to learned Advocate, are in two parts. Raju would also draw the attention of this Court to the amended provisions of the CPC, more particularly Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC and would submit that while time limit for filing of the written statement of defence has been prescribed by the said provision, the time limit prescribed, according to learned Advocate, are in two parts. Learned Advocate would submit that insofar as a commercial suit is concerned, while the period specified, is mandatory, insofar as a noncommercial suit is concerned, the period of 120 days i.e. 30 days and further 90 days, has been stated to be directory. Learned Advocate would submit that under such circumstances and having regard to the peculiar facts of the present case and also considering the fact that the present petitioner had at the very first instance, filed an application for rejection of the plaint and had also reserved liberty to file written statement thereafter, this Court may consider setting a side the impugned order and may consider giving some short time period to the petitioner-defendant to file written statement against the civil suit and reply to the application for interim injunction. 6.4 Learned Advocate Mr. Raju would submit that along with application under Exh. 60 which had been rejected by the learned Civil Court, the petitioner had already submitted his written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction and copy of the same had already been served to the original plaintiff and hence, the granting of the said application would not entail violation of the time frame set out by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. Having regard to such submissions, learned Advocate would request this Court to set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Civil Court and would request this Court to pass appropriate orders reopening the right of the petitioner-defendant to file written statement to the suit and reply to the application for interim injunction. 6.5 In support of his submissions, learned Advocate Mr. Raju would reply upon the following judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court : (1) SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited Vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Others, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 ; (2) Saleem Bhai and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557 ; and (3) R.K. RoJa Vs. U.S. Rayudu and Another, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 275 . 7. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Others, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 ; (2) Saleem Bhai and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in (2003) 1 SCC 557 ; and (3) R.K. RoJa Vs. U.S. Rayudu and Another, reported in (2016) 14 SCC 275 . 7. This petition is vehemently opposed by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dhaval Dave for the respondent-original plaintiff. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that no error much less any error apparent on face of the impugned order has been committed by the learned Civil Court, which would warrant interference by this Court. Learned Senior Advocate would thereafter take the Court through the records of proceedings of the Civil Court and would submit that after the petitioner had filed the application for rejection of plaint, the petitioner had not taken the proceedings of the suit seriously and whereas only after approximately 09 years, the plaintiff had filed an application for closing the right of the defendant to file written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction. 7.1 Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave would submit that while it is true that the time limit set out by the statue of 120 days insofar as the noncommercial suit is directory, but at the same time, such directory nature of the statute would not entitle the present petitioner not to file his written statement for almost about 9 years. Learned Senior Advocate would also submit that while the present petitioner had filed an application for rejection of the plaint immediately, but that by itself would not be a ground for the present petitioner not to have filed a written statement of defence and reply to application of interim injunction. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that as a matter of fact, if the application of the petitioner for rejection of the plaint is perused, then it appears that the present petitioner-defendant had conferred upon himself the right not to file written statement to the suit till the application for rejection of plaint was decided. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as such, by now it is settled position that an application for rejection of plaint and filling of written statement of defence are independent proceedings and whereas merely by filing an application for rejection of the plaint would not confer any right upon the party concerned not to file written statement. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as such, by now it is settled position that an application for rejection of plaint and filling of written statement of defence are independent proceedings and whereas merely by filing an application for rejection of the plaint would not confer any right upon the party concerned not to file written statement. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that as it is, the application preferred by the petitioner for reopening the right for filing the written statement, is as vague as it can be and whereas no specific reasons have been assigned for condoning the delay which has occurred in late filing of the written statement. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave in support of his submissions would reply upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court : (1) SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited Vs. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited and Others, reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 (as relied upon by the petitioner); (2) Desh Raj Vs. Balkishan (Dead) Through Proposed Legal Representative Ms. Rohin, reported in (2020) 2 SCC 708 ; (3) Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in (1981) 1 SCC 495 ; (4) Garment Craft Vs. Prakash Chand Goel, reported in (2022) 4 SCC 181 ; (5) Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim and Others, reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 ; (6) P. Ramasubbamma Vs. V. Vijayalakshmi and Others, reported in (2022) 7 SCC 384 ; and (7) Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 . 7.2 Having regard to the above submissions and relying upon the observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the above cited case laws, learned Senior Advocate would request this Court to reject the present petition. 8. Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties who have not submitted anything further. 9. At the outset, before considering the issue raised by learned Advocates for the parties on its merits, it would be profitable to refer to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, which reads as under. 8. Heard learned Advocates for the respective parties who have not submitted anything further. 9. At the outset, before considering the issue raised by learned Advocates for the parties on its merits, it would be profitable to refer to Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC, which reads as under. "Written statement.- The defendant shall, within thirty days from the date of service of summons on him, present a written statement of his defence : Provided that where the defendant fails to file the written statement within the said period of thirty days, he shall be allowed to file the same on such other day, as may be specified by the Court, for reasons to be recorded in writing, but which shall not be later then ninety days from the date of service of summons." 10. It appears that the Hon'ble Apex Court in series of decisions, has inter alia held that insofar as non-commercial suit is concerned, the period of 120 days i.e. 30 + 90 days, is not mandatory as in case of a commercial suit and whereas it is observed that the time limit is directory. In one of the first decisions where such observations had been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court i.e. in case of Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed in Paragraph Nos. 20 and 21 as thus : "20. The use of the word 'shall' in Order VIII Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules or procedure are handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice. (Emphasis Supplied) 21. In construing this provision, support can also be had from Order VIII Rule 10 which provides that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the Court, the Court shall pronounce judgment against him, or make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. On failure to file written statement under this provision, the Court has been given the discretion either to pronounce judgment against the defendant or make such other order in relation to suit as it thinks fit. In the context of the provision, despite use of the word 'shall', the court has been given the discretion to pronounce or not to pronounce the judgment against the defendant even if written statement is not filed and instead pass such order as it may think fit in relation to the suit. In construing the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 and Rule 10, the doctrine of harmonious construction is required to be applied. The effect would be that under Rule 10 of Order VIII, the court in its discretion would have power to allow the defendant to file written statement even after expiry of period of 90 days provided in Order VIII Rule 1. There is no restriction in Order VIII Rule 10 that after expiry of ninety days, further time cannot be granted. The Court has wide power to 'make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit'. Clearly, therefore, the provision of Order VIII Rule 1 providing for upper limit of 90 days to file written statement is directory. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. Having said so, we wish to make it clear that the order extending time to file written statement cannot be made in routine. The time can be extended only in exceptionally hard cases. While extending time, it has to be borne in mind that the legislature has fixed the upper time limit of 90 days. The discretion of the Court to extend the time shall not be so frequently and routinely exercised so as to nullify the period fixed by Order VIII Rule 1." (Emphasis Supplied) A perusal of the above observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court would make it abundantly clear that the time limit as stipulated, while it was construed as directory, the Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the rule in question is to advance the said cause of justice and not to defeat it. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed that rules or procedure are made to advance such cause i.e. the cause of justice and whereas construction of rule or procedure which promotes the justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also observed the guiding factor which should weigh with the Court i.e. the time limit should be extended in exceptionally hard cases and whereas order of extending time cannot be made as routine. 11. At this stage, it would also be pertinent to refer to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Siddalingayya vs Gurulingappa and others, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 447 , more particularly Para No. 12 thereof, where the Hon'ble Apex Court had quoted and relied upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in an earlier decision of the Sangram Singh Vs. Election Tribunal Kotah: "12. This case reminds us of the apt observations of a great Judge of this Court (Vivian Bose, J.). His Lordship, speaking for the Bench, in his inimitable style of writing said in Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal Kotah & Anr. ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ) as under: “16. ... a Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. ( AIR 1955 SC 425 ) as under: “16. ... a Code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. ... our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.”" 12. Having regard to the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) and in Sangram Singh relied upon in case of Siddalingayya (supra), it appears that rules of procedure, are to be intended and designed to facilitate justice and further its ends and whereas a code of procedure is not to be considered and applied as a penal enactment for punishment and penalties i.e. not a thing designed to trip the people up. Having regard to such observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court and keeping the same in mind, this Court now proceeds to decide the issue raised by the learned Advocates for the parties. 13. Insofar as the present petitioner-original defendant is concerned, while it is true that the suit was filed in the year 2013 and notice thereof had also been issued to the petitioner-defendant in the year 2013 itself, it clearly appears that the petitioner had not availed of his right to file written statement of defence or a reply to the application for interim injunction. The question is that whether the petitioner-defendant was indolent or would it appear that the lack of seriousness exhibited by the defendant was such that the case would not come into the category of "exceptionally hard case", which would be the deciding factor as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in decision of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra). 14. While as noted hereinabove, the present petitioner had not filed his written statement within the time limited stipulated, but it also clearly appears that the present petitioner was not an indolent litigant who had taken things absolutely casually. This Court is persuaded to take such a view on account of the fact that the present petitioner - defendant, within less than 30 days of having been served with the copy of the suit, had filed an application for rejection of the plaint. This Court has also perused the such application, whereas though the merits of such application not being the subject matter of the present petition and whereas it also clearly appears that the application preferred, was not a routine run of the mill application preferred for rejection of the plaint. The present petitioner had laid down elaborate grounds in the application for rejection of the plaint. It also appears that in the said application, the petitioner had reserved his right to file written statement of defence after the application for rejection of the plaint was decided by the learned Civil Court and while as stated by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave for the respondent - original plaintiff, it may appear that the present petitioner had conferred upon himself the right to file written statement- reply after the application for rejection of the plaint was decided, nonetheless, what would be required to be noted is that the petitioner had given a very clear reason i.e. in case the application for rejection of plaint is decided first and is allowed and then it would save the time of the Court if the present petitioner did not file his written statement and reply in the interregnum. 15. 15. Having stated as thus, it also requires to be mentioned that while the present petitioner had attempted to file/filed his written statement after considerable long period of time, but on the other hand it also appears that the civil suit had never been attempted to be proceeded in the right earnest by any of the parties concerned. From a perusal of the records of proceedings and as the facts stand, it appears that after the suit had been filed in the year 2013, and the application for rejection of the plaint had been filed immediately thereafter, neither any attempt was made to take up hearing of the application for rejection of the plaint nor any attempt was made even for taking up the application under Exh. 5 for interim injunction for hearing. It also appears that approximately 09 years after the suit had been filed, the original plaintiff on 22.06.2022, had moved an application for closing of the right of the present petitioner- defendant of filing of his written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction and whereas the same had been decided in favour of the plaintiff on the very day. It thus appears that, for almost 9-10 years, all the parties, were ad idem insofar as the aspect of conducting suit was concerned and whereas approximately after a decade of filing of the suit, all the parties, had suddenly found reasons for going ahead with the suit and filing appropriate application for closing right of the defendant or filing written statement, as the case may be. 16. Thus, it would appear that while the present petitioner had not filed his written statement within the time limited stipulated as per the statute, though directory, but at the same time it also appears that no serious attempt had been made at any stage for proceeding ahead with the suit and whereas thus for the said reason also it would appear that the present petitioner could not be faulted much, more particularly on account of his application for rejection of plaint, which was pending consideration from within around a month of the suit having been filed. 17. 17. Insofar as the order dated 22.06.2022, whereby the right of the present petitioner- defendant to file written statement of defence and reply to application for interim injunction had been closed is concerned, it would appear that the present petitioner did not have adequate time to either file an application for reopening the right which was closed or file an appeal against such order, more particularly considering that within less than a fortnight, the learned Civil Court vide an order dated 06.07.2022 had rejected the suit itself. It would appear that upon the suit being rejected, there would not be any reason whatsoever for the present petitioner to have even considered filing an application for recall of the said order or file an appeal against the said order and whereas it appears that immediately upon the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court having set aside the order rejecting the plaint, the present petitioner had moved the application for reopening of his right to file written statement and whereas it also appears that along with such application, the petitioner had also tendered his written statement and reply to the application for interim injunction which have been received by the original plaintiff. Thus, it appears that after the suit had been revived by the order of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, within reasonable period of time rather immediately, the petitioner had preferred the application for reopening his right to file written statement. 18. Insofar as the application for reopening the right to file written statement is concerned, while it is true that the said application is not as elaborate and not containing as sufficient reasons as it ought to be and whereas it has been sought to be contended by learned Advocate Mr. 18. Insofar as the application for reopening the right to file written statement is concerned, while it is true that the said application is not as elaborate and not containing as sufficient reasons as it ought to be and whereas it has been sought to be contended by learned Advocate Mr. Raju that considering the powers available with this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 151 of the CPC, this Court could also consider setting aside the impugned order and directing the present petitioner to file an appropriate application with adequate reasons for condoning the delay in filing the application for reopening the right for filing written statement and whereas in the considered opinion of this Court, as far as the powers available with this Court is concerned, such a submission may hold good but considering the fact that the civil suit itself is of the year 2013, and further considering that the parties are under an embargo/time limit as directed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, in the interest of justice, this Court would take up hearing of the present petition rather than adding one more round to the proceedings by remanding the issue back to the learned Trial Court. In this regard, it is also required to be stated that having perused the impugned order passed by the learned Civil Court, it also appears that while the application does not contain elaborate reasoning, but at the same time, oral submissions of the learned of the learned Counsel had been taken into consideration by the learned Civil Court, beyond what appears in the application, albeit such submissions having been rejected by the learned Civil Court. 19. Thus, in this view of the matter, while the original application i.e. application under Exh. 60, would not contain adequate reasons for condoning the delay, yet considering that such reasons have been submitted in the present petition and adequate opportunity having been given to the respondent - original plaintiff to make submissions against the same, this Court deems it appropriate to decide the issue itself rather than remanding the issue back to the learned Trial Court. 20. Insofar the aspect of condoning delay, learned Senior Advocate Mr. 20. Insofar the aspect of condoning delay, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave for the respondent-original plaintiff has principally relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Desh Raj (supra), where the Hon'ble Apex Court inter alia has observed in Para No. 15 as under : "15. However, it would be gainsaid that although the unamended Order VIII Rule 1 of CPC is directory, it cannot be interpreted to bestow a free hand to on any litigant or lawyer to file written statement at their own sweet will and/or to prolong the lis. The legislative objective behind prescription of timelines under the CPC must be given due weightage so that the disputes are resolved in a timebound manner. Inherent discretion of Courts, like the ability to condone delays under Order VIII Rule 1 is a fairly defined concept and its contours have been shaped through judicial decisions over the ages. Illustratively, extreme hardship or delays occurring due to factors beyond control of parties despite proactive diligence, may be just and equitable instances for condonation of delay." This Court also deems it appropriate to rely upon the Para 13 of the said decision where the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as thus "the unamended Order 8 Rule 1 CPC continues to be directory and does not do away with the inherent discretion of courts to condone certain delays". While the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated as regards the aspect of the powers of the Courts to condone the delay, the question herein as to whether the delay is required to be condoned or as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Desh Raj (supra), the party cannot be permitted to file written statement at their own sweet will and prolong the lis. In the instant case as against the facts before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Desh Raj (supra), it does not appear that the present petitioner, had either been given any deadline or the present petitioner, did not have any reasonable cause not to have filed his written statement within the time limit stipulated. In the instant case as against the facts before the Hon'ble Apex Court in Desh Raj (supra), it does not appear that the present petitioner, had either been given any deadline or the present petitioner, did not have any reasonable cause not to have filed his written statement within the time limit stipulated. As it appears in case of Desh Raj (supra), the defendant before the Hon'ble Apex Court, had been given numerous opportunities by the learned Civil Court concerned to file his written statement, and including a final opportunity to file reply subject to payment of costs, yet all those deadlines had been completely ignored by the defendant therein and whereas such indolent attitude of the defendant, had led to the Hon'ble Apex Court observing that such delays, ought not to be condoned by the Courts concerned. As referred to hereinabove, in the instant case, the present petitioner had, within less then 30 days of having been served with copy of the suit, filed his application for rejection of the plaint and whereas the present petitioner had also sought for liberty to file his written statement after the said application had been decided. It also appears that as noted hereinabove that the civil suit for almost 9-10 years had remained in a state of suspended animation, more particularly, none of the party concerned, having attempted to take up the proceedings in right earnest. Considering such a situation, in the thoughtful opinion of this Court, the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court, insofar as not condoning of the delay, may not be applicable to the case on hand, more particularly in view of the dissimilar facts. 21. Insofar as the decisions in case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Postmaster General (supra), which have been relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave for the respondent, are concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia observed that the sufficient cause for not filing of the concerned litigation within the period of limitation, would have to take place during the period of limitation and whereas any circumstances arising after the expiry of period of limitation cannot constitute a sufficient cause, being the relevant observations as relied upon. 22. It also requires to be stated that the delay, according to the learned Senior Advocate Mr. 22. It also requires to be stated that the delay, according to the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave, ought to have been explained elaborately and whereas no such explanation appears to be coming forth. In the considered opinion of this Court, while the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court insofar as the explanation with regard to the sufficient cause for condoning delay and the requirement of explaining the delay elaborately, would be binding on this Court, but at the same time, in the instant case, the fact appear to be in a slightly different compass, more particularly since it appears that the directory part of the statue, only requires the party concerned to file his written statement within the stipulated time limit and whereas it does not appear that there is any penalty provided in case the party does not file the same within the stipulated time. In the considered opinion of this Court while the time limit as stipulated in Order VIII Rule 1 of the CPC with regard to a non-commercial suit, would not and cannot be equated with a period of limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act, more particularly since it clearly appears that the period as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court is period as found in the statute is directory. Thus, in cases of the like nature as against the requirement of explaining delay elaborately as in case where the statute lays down a mandatory period of limitation, what would be required of the applicant is to make out a 'sufficient cause' for the delay. It also requires to be mentioned here that the sufficient cause/reason for condoning the delay, as it appeals to this Court is the fact, which has been observed by this Court hereinabove and which would be reiterated that the present petitioner - defendant, was not or does not appear to be a litigant, who has taken things very casually. It also requires to be mentioned here that the sufficient cause/reason for condoning the delay, as it appeals to this Court is the fact, which has been observed by this Court hereinabove and which would be reiterated that the present petitioner - defendant, was not or does not appear to be a litigant, who has taken things very casually. As it appears and as noted hereinabove the fact of the present petitioner having preferred an elaborate application for rejection of the plaint, within a period of 30 days from the date of being served with the copy of the civil suit, would clearly reflect the intent of the present petitioner to contest the suit in question and while the present petitioner, had chosen not to file his written statement till the application for rejection of the plaint was considered and whereas as submitted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave that while both the aspects are required to be considered independently, but the fact remains that the present petitioner had in fact in the said application clearly mentioned that as soon as the application for rejection of the plaint is decided, he would file his written statement of defence and reply to the application of interim injunction. 23. It would be required to be noted that the underlying consideration for condoning the delay or not condoning the same, would be the fact as to whether the party concerned had tried to act in a casual manner while not filing his written statement and reply or he had in any way benefited by not doing the same, that is, the party being benefited by delaying final decision of the suit or the application for rejection of the plaint. On the other hand, preliminary consideration for condoning the delay in addition to the requirement of showing sufficient cause, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) being that the circumstances should reflect "exceptionally hard case". On the other hand, preliminary consideration for condoning the delay in addition to the requirement of showing sufficient cause, as observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of Salem Advocate Bar Association (supra) being that the circumstances should reflect "exceptionally hard case". As noted hereinabove, in the considered opinion of this Court, it appears that the petitioner having shown sufficient cause, more particularly having regard to the fact of the petitioner having preferred the application of rejection of the plaint within 30 days of having notice of the suit served upon the petitioner and also considering the fact that along with the application for reopening the stage for filing the written statement, the petitioner had also tendered his written statement, more particularly copy thereof have already been given to the original plaintiff. On the other hand, the peculiar facts as elaborately narrated hereinabove, including the fact of the petitioner having filed application for rejection of plaint within less than 30 days of service of notice of the suit and the fact of the suit having not proceeded for almost 9 years and the fact that the suit itself was rejected within a short time of the right of the petitioner to file written statement being closed and the fact that the petitioner having filed his written statement along with application to reopen stage of defence would go to show that the present is an exceptional case, where interference is warranted. 24. Insofar as the decision of the Apex Court in case of Garment Craft (supra) is concerned, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave for the respondent has sought to contend that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 is to be exercised sparingly in appropriate case and such jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is justified or can be supported. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court while observing as above, has also inter alia held that "It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice". In the considered opinion of this Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court while observing as above, has also inter alia held that "It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice". To this Court it appears that the finding of the Trial Court of not permitting the petitioner-defendant to file his written statement of defence and reply to the interim injunction application is not justifiable and whereas in the considered opinion of this Court, on broad technicalities such rejection, would result in gross miscarriage of justice, more particularly if considered from the view point of the fact that if the application were to be allowed even after imposing appropriate costs, then at the most the defendant would be able to put-forward his defence before the Court concerned which ought not to prejudice the plaintiff and if the same were not taken into consideration, then on technical ground, the plaintiff would get a walkover even though the defendant may have a good case on merits. This, in the considered opinion of this Court, would be nothing else but the miscarriage of justice. Thus, it appears that the decision in case of Garment Craft (supra) relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dave would also not advance the cause. 25. On the other hand, this Court is inclined to refer and rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.K. RoJa (supra), more particularly the Hon'ble Apex Court having observed at Para No. 5 that the defendant is entitled to file the application for rejection (of the plaint) before filing his written statement and in case application is rejected, the defendant is entitled to file his written statement thereafter. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court would cover the issue on hand, more particularly since the petitioner even in his application for rejection of the plaint, as noted hereinabove, has clearly requested that he may be permitted not to file written statement and reply till the application is decided. From the said judgment, it also appears that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the exception to such consideration being that liberty to file an application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity to file the written statement. From the said judgment, it also appears that the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the exception to such consideration being that liberty to file an application for rejection under Order VII Rule 11 cannot be made as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity to file the written statement. In the considered opinion of this Court, having regard to the fact as elaborately narrated hereinabove about the petitioner having preferred the application for rejection of the plaint within less than 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice of the suit concerned, it could not be held that the said application was in any manner preferred as a ruse for retrieving the lost opportunity. It appears that rather the proposition of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as noted in the preceding part of this paragraph, would hold good in favour of the present petitioner. 26. Thus, this Court is inclined to hold, more particularly relying upon the observations made at Para No. 8 by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.K. RoJa (supra), that the learned Trial Court ought not to have closed the stage of the present petitioner-defendant for filing of the written statement, even before application for rejection of plaint preferred by the present petitioner was pending consideration. The observations made at Para No. 8 is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit. "8. The procedure adopted by the court is not warranted under law. Without disposing of an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the court cannot proceed with the trial. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is only to be set aside. Ordered accordingly." 27. Having regard to the discussion, reasoning and conclusion as arrived at hereinabove, in the considered opinion of this Court, the present petition is required to be allowed and hence, the following order is passed : (A) The impugned order dated 01.11.2022 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, under Exh. 60 in Special Civil Suit No. 407 of 2017 is hereby quashed and set aside. (B) The written statement of defence and reply to the application for interim injunction - Exh.5 are directed to be taken on record of the Civil Court concerned. At the request of learned Advocate Mr. 60 in Special Civil Suit No. 407 of 2017 is hereby quashed and set aside. (B) The written statement of defence and reply to the application for interim injunction - Exh.5 are directed to be taken on record of the Civil Court concerned. At the request of learned Advocate Mr. Raju, additional written statement, if any, is directed to be filed by the 17.11.2022 with advance copy to the learned Advocate for the plaintiff. (C) The learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Sanand, is directed to fix an appropriate time line for deciding the application for interim injunction - Exh. 5 within a period of three weeks from the date of presentation of this order before it. (D) On the other hand, in view of the peculiar fact and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is directed to pay cost of Rs. 50,000/-, for the late submission of written statement and reply to the interim injunction application, to the present respondent within a period of three weeks from today. (E) Interim arrangement as noted by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 19.10.2022 shall continue for a period of three weeks from the date this order is submitted to the learned Civil Judge concerned. 28. With the above observations and directions, the present petition is disposed of as allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Direct service is permitted.