JUDGMENT : DEVASHIS BARUAH, J. 1. Heard Mr. S. Temjen, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Moa Imchen, learned Sr. Government Advocate for respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as well as Mr. C.T. Jamir, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 4, assisted by Mr. I. Imchen, learned counsel. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the appointment order bearing No. DHFW-3/117/EXTENSION/2012/6364-65 dated 16.09.2013 whereby, the respondent No. 4 was appointed as Mali at Longkhum Primary Health Center, Mokokchung. The petitioner further sought for a direction to the respondent authorities to give equal opportunity of employment to the rightful land owners if any vacancy arises in the said health centre. The said writ petition, as would appear from the records, was filed on 20.01.2014 and the said writ petition was supported by an affidavit wherein the age of the petitioner was shown as 58 years, as on 20.01.2014. 3. Before further going into the question of merit, it may be relevant to take note of that the employment in respect to which the petitioner is seeking would be a ‘public employment’ within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Nagaland Retirement From Public Employment Act, 1991 and in terms with Section 3(1), the age of retirement would be either holding office for 35 years or attaining the age of 60 years, whichever is earlier. Under such circumstances, as on today, the petitioner has himself crossed the period for seeking an appointment to the Grade-IV posts on the basis of the policy of the Government of Nagaland for appointment to Grade-IV post on land ownership basis. 4. From a perusal of the relief sought for it would be apparent that the petitioner is seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the appointment of the respondent No. 4 and a writ of mandamus that the equal opportunities should be given to the rightful land owners. Now the question is whether the petitioner is a person aggrieved for initiating instant writ proceedings. This aspect of the matter is no longer res integra in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2013) 4 SCC 465 , wherein it was observed that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls within the category of aggrieved person. Only a person who is suffering or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act or action or order etc. in a Court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of maintaining statutory or legal right or when there is a complaint that there is any breach of statutory duty on the part of the authorities, and therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such a right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Courts and it is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. In fact, the existence of such legal right is foundation of the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by the Court. In Para 10 of the said judgment the term of ‘legal right’ has been defined and the same for the sake of convenience is quoted herein-below: “10. A “legal right” means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved” does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised.” 5. In another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Jasbai Motibai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and Others, (1976) 1 SCC 671 , the Supreme Court had in Para 34, 37, 39 held as under: “34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions that in order to have the locus-standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the application, though in the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words, as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner is necessary to give him a locus-standi in the matter. 37. It will be seen that in the context of locus-standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) person aggrieved; (ii) stranger; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spooking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold. 39. To distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’ among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the stature, in the context of which the scope of the words “person aggrieved” is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?” 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Anand Sharadchandra Oka vs. University of Mumbai and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 217 observed that if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or selection of other persons. 7. As already stated herein above, as it would be seen that as the petitioner as on date, is not eligible for being appointed in Grade-IV post he cannot be considered to be a person aggrieved for invoking the jurisdiction of this Court more so to seek a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the appointment of the respondent No. 4. As regards the second relief as sought for by the petitioner in the writ petition is that the respondent authorities should give equal opportunities of employment to the land owners if any vacancy arises in the said health center is too vague a relief as sought for and more so, in view of the policy so adopted by the respondent authorities as can be seen from the Notification bearing No. LR/6-81/181/LIT/2015 dated 05.03.2018, there is no necessity for issuance of writ as sought for. 8. Now, coming to the merits, it would be seen that the petitioner have sought for setting aside the order dated 16.09.2013, whereby the respondent No. 4 was appointed as Mali at Longkhum Primary Health Center, Mokokchung. The basis on which the petitioner has sought for the said relief can be seen from Para 6 of the writ petition, wherein it has been mentioned that the respondent No. 4 is not a land owner and as such he ought not to have been granted or given the appointment. The basis on which the petitioner has sought for the said relief can be seen from Para 6 of the writ petition, wherein it has been mentioned that the respondent No. 4 is not a land owner and as such he ought not to have been granted or given the appointment. This aspect of the matter has not only been denied by the respondent No. 4 in his affidavit-in-opposition but also placed on record the decision of the Longkhum Village Council dated 07.02.2015 as well as the certificate issued by the Chairman, Longkhum Village Council on 17.02.2015. Be that as it may, it may also be relevant to mention that the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 have in Para 5 of their affidavit-in-opposition have categorically stated that the respondent No. 4 was appointed to the post of Mali at Longkhum Primary Health Center under CMO, Mokokchung on land ownership basis as she belongs to Mongro clan and the land wherein the Longkhum Primary Health Center is situated was donated by various clans including the Mongro clan as can be seen from Para 4 of the said affidavit-in-opposition. In that view of the matter, the entire edifice of the case of the petitioner as regards the appointment of the respondent No. 4 was done without taking into consideration that he was not a land owner being incorrect, the said relief cannot also be granted. Under such circumstances, the instant writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. Before parting with the record, it is relevant to take note of certain developments that took place in the instant writ proceedings. Initially, when the instant writ petition was filed, this Court, by the order dated 21.01.2014, disposed of the same even without issuing notice upon the respondent No. 4 and directing that the respondent should consider the case of the petitioner. Thereupon, a review application was filed which was registered and numbered as Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014, wherein this Court reviewed the earlier order, again without issuing any notice upon the respondent No. 4, by passing certain directions to the respondents. Thereupon, a review application was filed which was registered and numbered as Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014, wherein this Court reviewed the earlier order, again without issuing any notice upon the respondent No. 4, by passing certain directions to the respondents. The relevant portion is quoted herein-below: “Since prima-facie, it appears that the Government policy in matter of appointment in Grade-IV post was not followed and since the relevant Recruitment Rules seem to have been violated in the case order consideration in appointment of private respondent, I am of the consideration in appointment of private respondent, I am of the opinion that this proceeding may be disposed of with the following directions: 1. The petitioner would file a copy of this order along with the representation filed earlier to the respondent No. 2 within a period of 7 days from today. 2. On the receipt of the copy of this order as well as the representation, aforesaid, the respondent No. 2 shall dispose of with the representation in accordance with relevant Service Rules relating to the appointment to the Grade-IV post in the State of Nagaland and also taking into account the policy in the notification at Annexure-5 to the writ petition. 3. The appointment of the private respondent shall be subject to the outcome of the representation. The entire process needs to be completed within a period of 3 months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order. Needless to say that the petitioner may approach this Court once again if the outcome of the representation does not satisfy him. With the aforesaid observations and directions, this proceeding is disposed of. No costs.” 10. In the above quoted order dated 21.10.2014, it would be relevant to take note of that there was a direction that the appointment of respondent No. 4 shall be subject to the outcome of the representation which was directed to be considered. Consequent to the said order being passed in Review Petition dated 21.10.2014, the Principal Director, Health and Family Welfare, Nagaland, who is the respondent No. 3 herein, had issued an order dated 20.01.2015, whereby the respondent No. 4’s ad-hoc services were terminated with immediate effect in as much as a perusal of the order dated 21.01.2015 shows that in pursuance to this Court’s order such termination order was passed. However, it may be relevant at this stage, to mention that neither in the original order dated 21.01.2014 nor in the review order dated 21.10.2014, there was any direction that the services of the respondent No. 4 should be terminated. It also does not appear on record as to whether there was any consideration to the representation which was directed to be considered as per the order dated 21.01.2014 and 21.10.2014. 11. The respondent No. 4 thereafter challenged the order dated 21.01.2015, passed by the respondent No. 3 herein by filing a writ petition which was registered and numbered as W.P. (C) No. 72(K)/2015. In the said affidavit-in-opposition to the said writ petition, the official respondents at paragraph No. 8, mentioned that in view of the directions passed in W.P. (C) No. 3(K)/2014 to dispose of the representation of the petitioner in accordance with the relevant service rules within a period of 3 (three) months and also as the appointment of the private respondent, i.e. respondent No. 4 herein shall be subject to the outcome of the representation, the official respondents had, in compliance with the order of this Court had issued the order dated 20.01.2015, whereby the respondent No. 4 was terminated with immediate effect. It was also mentioned in the said paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-opposition that it was not a case where the department had terminated the petitioner without proper verification relating to land ownership or the department had illegally and arbitrarily terminated the petitioner, the action of the Department was purely in compliance to the order of this Court. 12. On the basis of the said averments made in the affidavit-in-opposition, the respondent No. 4 herein, thus, withdrew the said writ petition vide an order dated 20.08.2015, with liberty to file an appropriate petition before the appropriate forum which was duly permitted by this Court. Thereupon, the petitioner filed a writ challenging the orders dated 21.01.2014 passed in the instant writ petition as well as the order dated 21.10.2014, passed in Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014. The said appeal was registered and numbered as W.A. No. 1/2020. Vide an order dated 25.01.2021, both orders dated 21.01.2014, passed in this petition and 21.10.2014, passed in the Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014 were set aside and the matter was remitted to this Court for denovo adjudication of the instant matter. The said appeal was registered and numbered as W.A. No. 1/2020. Vide an order dated 25.01.2021, both orders dated 21.01.2014, passed in this petition and 21.10.2014, passed in the Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014 were set aside and the matter was remitted to this Court for denovo adjudication of the instant matter. It was also mentioned that since the respondent No. 4 was terminated pursuant to the directions passed in W.P. (C) No. 3(K)/2014 as well as Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014 her termination shall be reconsidered by the respondent authorities but subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 13. Thereupon, the instant matter has come before this Court. As already held herein above, the instant writ petition is devoid of any merits and accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that as the entire basis on which the order dated 20.01.2015 was passed thereby terminating the respondent No. 4 have ceased to exist; as the order dated 21.01.2014 passed in the writ petition, the order dated 21.10.2014 passed in Civil Review Petition No. 7(K)/2014 and the instant writ petition stands dismissed, the respondent authorities shall take into consideration the said aspect of the matter and pass consequential orders in respect to the reinstatement of the respondent No. 4 to the post she held before. 14. With the above observations, the writ petition stands dismissed.