ORDER 1. These criminal revision petitions are connected together for disposal as the accused and the complainant are same in all the three cases. 2. The parties are henceforth referred to as per their ranking in the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. Brief facts of the case; The complainant was doing business of iron, steel and cement under the name and style as M/s. Shri Balaji Steel Traders. The accused was doing business with the complainant and he maintained a running account with the complainant. The accused in acquaintance with the complainant, had purchased steel and cement on 31.03.2008 to 21.05.2008 for a sum of Rs.5,45,003/- and also availed a loan of Rs.20,000/- in respect of the said transaction. The accused had issued three cheques drawn on Corporation Bank, Ballari, in favor of the complainant for a sum of Rs.2,65,000/- dated 28.03.2008, Rs,80,000/- dated 07.05.2008 and Rs.2,00,000/- dated 10.06.2008 respectively. In Crl.RP. No.100025/2020 4. The complainant presented a cheque bearing No.309204 dated 28.03.2008 for a sum of Rs.2,65,000/-through his banker for encashment. The said cheque was returned on 01.08.2008 as 'funds insufficient'. A notice was issued to the accused on 14.08.2008 through R.P.A.D. The accused received the notice, but, neither repaid the amount nor replied the notice. Therefore, the complainant filed a complaint on 22.09.2008. In Crl.RP. No.100026/2020 5. A cheque bearing it's No.312501 for a sum of Rs.80,000/- dated 17.05.2008 was also presented to the bank for encashment. But, this cheque returned with a shara as 'funds insufficient' on 30.07.2008. Notice was issued to the accused on 14.08.2008 and the said notice was served to him. But, he did not reply the same. Hence, a complaint came to be filed on 22.09.2008. In Crl.RP. No.100024/2020 6. In this case, the complainant presented a cheque bearing its No.325798 for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- dated 10.06.2008 for encashment. He received an endorsement dated 04.08.2008 as 'funds insufficient'. Notice was issued on 14.08.2008 and the said notice was served to him. But, he did not reply the same. Hence, a complaint came to be filed on 21.09.2008. 7. In all the three cases, the complainant examined 2 witnesses i.e., PW.1 and PW.2 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.22. On the other hand, the defence has not led any evidence in support of its contention. 8. But, he did not reply the same. Hence, a complaint came to be filed on 21.09.2008. 7. In all the three cases, the complainant examined 2 witnesses i.e., PW.1 and PW.2 and got marked Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.22. On the other hand, the defence has not led any evidence in support of its contention. 8. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court in all the three cases, the accused preferred an appeal to the Sessions Court. The Sessions Court confirmed the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court. 9. Being aggrieved by the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by both the Courts, the accused preferred these criminal revision petitions before this Court seeking to set aside the conviction passed in all the three cases. 10. Heard Smt. V. Vidya, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Y. Lakshmikant Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent. 11. Smt. V. Vidya, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Appellate Court are contrary to the facts and the law. Hence, the same is liable to be set aside. 12. It is further submitted that, the Trial Court acted upon the legal presumption. However, the said legal presumption is a rebuttable. Even though the accused during cross-examination has rebutted the presumption, the same has not been considered by both the Courts. 13. It is further submitted that, Ex.P.9 to Ex.P.15 are the cash credit bills which indicate that certain materials were supplied are produced by PW.1. However, the said bills contain no signature of the person to whom it was delivered. No material is placed before the Court regarding the purchase order placed by the accused for supply of steel and cement. 14. It is further submitted that, complainant has not produced any documents to show that the accused was due for a sum of Rs.5,45,003/-. The complainant being a trader of cement and steel, he should have maintained cash book to show the balance if the materials were supplied to the accused. Therefore, there is a doubt regarding the transaction. The Trial Court and the Appellate Court should have verified it appropriately. 15. The complainant being a trader of cement and steel, he should have maintained cash book to show the balance if the materials were supplied to the accused. Therefore, there is a doubt regarding the transaction. The Trial Court and the Appellate Court should have verified it appropriately. 15. It is further submitted that, the admissions made by the complainant regarding the supply of goods, to whom the goods were supplied and what was the amount due has not been disclosed in his evidence. The above said facts have been admitted during the cross examination of PW1. These admissions, should have been considered by the Trial Court as judicial admissions. Failing to consider judicial admissions results in miscarriage of justice. 16. In support of contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, she has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Nagindas Ramdas Vs. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and others reported in AIR 1974 SC 471 . 17. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/ complainant justifying the judgment of conviction and also confirmation order passed by the Appellate Court submits that, the issuance of the cheque and signature and also the transaction with the complainant have been categorically admitted by the petitioners-accused. 18. It is further submitted that, the documentary evidence like Ex.P.9 to Ex.P.15 clearly indicate the transactions with the accused and the materials have been supplied to the accused and in lieu of the material having been supplied, the accused issued three cheques. Therefore, mere denial of the transaction, by taking advantage of absence of signature on the delivery note would not be sufficient to deny the transaction. Unless the accused rebuts the presumption by leading cogent evidence as to how the cheques were issued to the complainant, it cannot be said that the accused is not liable to pay the amount as mentioned in the cheques. 19. It is further submitted that the accused had issued cheques in lieu of clearing the balance amount to the complainant and there is an admission regarding the signature and issuance of the cheque by the accused. Therefore, the presumption has been raised mandatorily in terms of Section 139 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the concurrent findings of conviction is appropriate and sustainable under law. Having said thus, the learned counsel for the complainant/ respondent prays to dismiss the criminal revision petitions. 20. Therefore, the presumption has been raised mandatorily in terms of Section 139 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, the concurrent findings of conviction is appropriate and sustainable under law. Having said thus, the learned counsel for the complainant/ respondent prays to dismiss the criminal revision petitions. 20. My anxious and thoughtful consideration are given upon the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and also on the documents available on record. The points that arise for my consideration are as under; a. Whether the concurrent findings of conviction recorded by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court are justifiable ? b. Whether the petitioner has made out grounds to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court ? 21. It is an admitted fact that the complainant and the accused have been doing business transaction with respect to iron, steel and cement. The complainant being the retail trader used to supply materials to the accused and the accused was placing the orders for supply of goods. According to the complainant-PW.1, the accused placed orders for supply of iron, steel and cement during 31.03.2008 to 21.05.2008, for a sum of Rs.5,45,003/- and also including hand loan of Rs.20,000/-. 22. It is also stated by the complainant that in lieu of the above said transactions, the accused had issued three cheques as follows:- SL.No. Cheque Number Amount DATE 1. 309204 2,65,000/- 28.03.2008 2. 312501 80,000/- 17.05.2008 3. 325798 2,00,000/- 10.06.2008 TOTAL 5,45,000/- 23. Before adverting to other facts of the case, it is relevant to refer Section 139 of Negotiable Instrument Act (for short N. I. Act) which reads thus; '139. Presumption in favour of holder:- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability'. 24. The above said provision makes it clear that the presumption mandated in favor of the holder of the cheques that the cheques have been issued by the drawer to the drawee for legally enforceable debt or liability for the whole or part. The presumption cannot be rebutted unless the contrary is proved by the drawer of the cheque. 24. The above said provision makes it clear that the presumption mandated in favor of the holder of the cheques that the cheques have been issued by the drawer to the drawee for legally enforceable debt or liability for the whole or part. The presumption cannot be rebutted unless the contrary is proved by the drawer of the cheque. It is also settled law that, mere denial is not sufficient to rebut the presumption which is raised under Section 139 of the N. I. Act. 25. The complainant has produced some cash credit bills which are marked as Ex.P.9 to Ex.P.15, which are relevant to refer regarding the transaction. The said credit bills are from the complainant shop dated 31.03.2008, 04.04.2008, 10.04.2008, 17.04.2008, 10.05.2008, 18.05.2008 and 21.05.2008 in the name of the accused for a sum of Rs.46,600/-, Rs.45,600/-, Rs.82,078/-, Rs.54,718/-, Rs.47,597/- and Rs.23,000/- for having supplied the cement to Shri. M.C. Subramanyam Reddy, i.e., the accused. 26. In addition to the above said documents, the complainant has produced Ex.P.16 and Ex.P.17, which are the income tax returns verification form for the year 2008-09 and 2009-10 pertaining to the complainant which indicates about the transaction held between him and the accused. 27. The evidence of PW.1 which clearly indicates that, the accused was due for a sum of Rs.5,45,000/- and in lieu of the arrears, he has issued three cheques. In addition to his evidence, he also got examined PW.2 as his witness. PW.2 is a Charted Accountant, and working for the complainant. He also supported the said transaction of the accused with the complainant by producing Ex.P.16 and Ex.P.17, which are the assessment reports pertaining to the complainant, which indicates that, the accused has to pay a balance as stated in the assessment order. 28. It is relevant to refer the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagindas Vs. Dalpatram (stated supra). Para 26 of judgment reads as follows:- '226. 28. It is relevant to refer the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nagindas Vs. Dalpatram (stated supra). Para 26 of judgment reads as follows:- '226. From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction, though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself, Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and 553. constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the. foundation of the rights of the parties On the other hand evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves, not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong. 29. On careful reading of the above judgment, it makes clear that the judicial admissions admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act made by the parties or their agents at or before hearing of the case stand on higher footing than the evidentiary admission. In the present case, it is noticed that, the accused cross-examined the complainant and the complainant has admitted certain admissions regarding Ex.P.8, which PW.1 has admitted that, there is no mention about the accused placing the order of supply of cement and there is one more admission in the notice that, he has not stated regarding the goods having been supplied to the accused and further PW.1 admitted that, he has not mentioned in the complaint about the details of the balance amount. It is also an admitted fact that the complainant has not produced any other documents except Ex.P.9 to Ex.P.15 to show that the said goods have been delivered to the accused. This Court is of the considered opinion that, the above admissions are not sufficient to rebut the presumption as envisaged under Section 139 of N. I. Act. The loan transaction between the complainant and the accused has been mentioned in the income tax returns filed by the complainant. Therefore, it is conclusive proof regarding the loan transaction. The accused has not produced any documents to show that he has cleared the said debt. 30. On careful perusal of the judgment of the Trial Court and also confirmation order passed by the Appellate Court appears to be appropriate and do not deserves to be interfered and it is noticed that there is no illegality or perversity in appreciating the evidence and also the application of law in arriving at a conclusion that the accused is held guilty of offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. 31. In the light of the observation made above, the points which arose for my consideration are answered as:- (a) Point No.1 in the 'affirmative' (b) Point No.2 in the 'negative'. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following:- ORDER (i) The Criminal Revision Petitions are dismissed. (ii) The judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Trial Court and its confirmation order passed by the Sessions Court in all these three cases are confirmed.