JUDGEMENT : Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. There are there are various tangent arguments, which have been extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which are contrary to the pleadings itself, which has been raised in the Writ Petition. 2. The petitioner in the Writ Petition, has put a challenge to the letter dated 2nd March, 2022, which was issued by respondent No. 1, for recovering the amount, which was said to be due to be paid by the petitioner in pursuance to the contact executed in his favour for running, operating and parking of Rajiv Gandhi Multipurpose Complex, which was executed on 19th December, 2015, and for which, a Memorandum of Understanding was also got executed on 1st February, 2016, which was supposed to hold good during the period of subsistence of the contract, which was for 5 years commencing from 1st March, 2016 till 28th February, 2021. 3. Clause 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding provided an arbitration clause, that in case of any dispute between the parties, who are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding, the matter would be referred to the Chief Administrator, who has to be appointed as an Arbitrator to decide the dispute, which would be binding. 4. In fact, the Writ Petition is foundationed on Clause 10, wherein, the petitioner has submitted, that in fact, the recourse to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue, is contrary because Clause 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding, would be equally binding on the respondent No.1, herein, and the said Clause has been inferred to, that in an eventuality if any amount, which is falling due to be paid by the petitioner under the terms of the contract, that could have been recovered by the respondents as per Clause 10, only after having recourse to the arbitration proceedings. Secondly, he submits that the respondent No.1, will not acquire the status of the Corporation, in order to bring the impugned action of recovery of the amount under the provisions of U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972. 5. This Court feels it necessary to deal with the first argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertaining to the implications of Clause 10. Clause 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding is extracted hereunder :- “10. 5. This Court feels it necessary to deal with the first argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertaining to the implications of Clause 10. Clause 10 of the Memorandum of Understanding is extracted hereunder :- “10. ARBITRATION In case of any dispute arising between the parties as regard to the work of operation arising from the terms and conditions of this MOU or with regard to definition of any clause or condition of the MOU, the same shall be tried to be resolved amicably by the parties and in case of failure to do so, the same shall be referred for arbitration to the sole arbitrator who shall be the Chief Administrator, UHUDA or any officer to be appointed by him in this behalf, whose decision shall be final and binding on both the parties. The parties agree to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts.” 6. If the language of Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the U.P Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, is taken into consideration, in fact, the provisions of the Act is in supersession to any of the terms and conditions of the arbitration agreement or conditions contained in it, provided under the contact between the two signatories and the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1972, would be independent to the arbitration proceedings settled between the parties in terms of the understanding or the contract. 7. 7. In that view of the matter, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the recovery resorted to is bad in the eyes of law, the recourse should have been for referring the matter to the Arbitrator under Clause 10, is not acceptable in view of the specific legislative intention of the provisions contained under Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the Act of 1972, which is extracted hereunder:- “In the case of any agreement referred to in subsection (1) between any person referred to in that subsection and the State Government or the Corporation, no arbitration proceedings shall lie at the instance of either party either for recovery of any sum claimed to be due under the said sub-section or for disputing the correctness of such claim: Provided that whenever proceedings are taken against any person for the recovery of any such sum he may pay the amount claimed under protest to the officer taking such proceedings, and upon such payment the proceedings shall be stayed and the person against whom such proceedings were taken may make a reference under or otherwise enforce an arbitration agreement in respect of the amount to be paid, and the provisions of Section 183 of the Uttar Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1901, or Section 287-A of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as the case may be, shall mutatis mutandis apply in relation to such reference or enforcement as they apply in relation to any suit in the civil court.” 8. The second argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is in the context of the language used under Section 3 of the Act, which contemplates an initiation of the recovery proceedings qua the bodies, which fall to be within the ambit and definition of the Corporation, and for that purposes, as he has drawn the attention of this Court to the definition of the Corporation provided under Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act, which is extracted hereunder:- “(a) "Corporation" means the Uttar Pradesh Financial Corporation established under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, and includes any other Corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government and specified in a notification issued in that behalf by the State Government in the Official Gazette;” 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent No. 1, will not be a Corporation within the definition of the Corporation provided under the Act of 1972, in order to justify the recovery of the amount as arrears of land revenue, under the Act of 1972. 10. He further submits that when the employer under the terms of agreement has not reserved his rights to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue, the provisions of the Act of 1972, would not be attracted, to be made applicable in the case at hand for recovering the alleged defaulted amount, which the petitioner was otherwise liable to remit for the work assigned to him for running, operating and parking at Rajiv Gandhi Multipurpose Complex. 11. This argument could very well be answered by the provisions contained under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act, which reads as under:- “(5) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the proviso to sub-section (4) of this section or in Section 183 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 or Section 287-A of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 every certificate sent to the Collector under sub-section (1) shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application (including any application under the Arbitration Act, 1940) or in any reference to arbitration and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or intended to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.” 12. In fact, if the language used therein is taken into consideration, it is more or less an incorporation of the provisions by way of a saving clause, attracting the proviso to Sub-Section (4) of Section 183 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, or Section 287-A of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 13. Meaning thereby, the exercise of powers of recovering the amount as an arrears of land revenue even for the dues falling under the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, has held to be not overridden by the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, or the provision of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 14. 13. Meaning thereby, the exercise of powers of recovering the amount as an arrears of land revenue even for the dues falling under the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972, has held to be not overridden by the provisions of the Land Revenue Act, or the provision of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 14. The process of recovery under the Act of 1972, is an independent to the process of recovery, which is correspondingly, provided under Section 183 of the Land Revenue Act, and under Section 287-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act. 15. Hence, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to, that the provisions of the Act, would not apply because the respondent No.1 is not a Corporation, with all due reverence at my command, this is not a foundation of the pleadings even in the Writ Petition and hence, the Writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be ventured by the Court to answer an argument, which is otherwise not pleaded or proved by evidence on record, as to what was the status of respondent No.1! Whether it falls to be a Corporation under Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act! All these issues would always be a subject, which could be decided by the evidence to be placed by the petitioner, when he was intending to place his case outside the ambit of Act of 1972, by drawing the distinction qua the definition of the Corporation provided under Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act. All these issues would always be a subject, which could be decided by the evidence to be placed by the petitioner, when he was intending to place his case outside the ambit of Act of 1972, by drawing the distinction qua the definition of the Corporation provided under Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of the Act. The interpretation of Sub-section (a) of Section 2 of Act of 1972, cannot be isolatedly left to be established without any evidence being led in relation thereto, as to what would be the legal status of respondent No.1, so far as in the context of the recovery, which has been sought to be made against the petitioner by attracting the provisions contained under Sub-section (4) to be read with Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act, for recovering the amount as arrears of land revenue for the reason being, that once Sub-Section (5) of Section 3 of the Act, its inception is with the saving clause, saving a proceeding under the Land Revenue Act under Section 287-A of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, and if that saving Clause is provided, in that eventuality, the applicability of the Act of 1972, for recovering the amount as arrears of land revenue will not be excluded to be made applicable in the case at hand, where admittedly, the amount is being sought to be recovered by the respondents by issuance of the citation for recovering the amount. 16. In that eventuality, once the Act itself has given a wider scope of applicability of the provisions of the Land Revenue Act and U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, which is not being a part to be not made applicable by the Act of 1972, or by the terms of the agreement or even by the pleadings in the Writ Petition, the recovery resorted to by the respondents cannot be held to be bad and in contravention to the Act of 1972, for the reason, which is hereby reiterated by way of a reiteration of the provisions contained under Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act of 1972. 17. In that eventuality, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner since being even beyond the pleadings and rather in contradiction to the pleadings raised in the Writ Petition, is not acceptable by this Court. 17. In that eventuality, the argument extended by the learned counsel for the petitioner since being even beyond the pleadings and rather in contradiction to the pleadings raised in the Writ Petition, is not acceptable by this Court. Hence, the Writ Petition lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.