JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri Shyam Mohan Pradhan, learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Pritish Kumar, Advocate put in appearance on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and filed Vakatalatnama, which is taken on record and Sri Shailendra Singh Rajawat, learned counsel for the Caveator. 2. Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 are proforma parties, as such, considering the order proposed to be passed at this stage of admission notice to respondent No.3 and 4 is dispensed with. 3. This appeal has been filed by defendant in suit. 4. Present appeal has been filed under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of CPC assailing the order dated 13.09.2022 passed on the application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC bearing Application No.C-6 preferred in Regular Suit No.451 of 2019, CNR No. UPLKO5000851-2019 (Sankalp Mishra & Another vs. Ram Babu Dubey & Others) by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Malihabad, Lucknow. 5. It is stated that after presenting the plaint, the suit was registered as Regular Suit No. 451 of 2009 and the notice was issued to the defendants. On coming to know about the pendency of the suit the defendant-appellant appeared and filed his written statements as also the objection to the application for temporary injunction preferred under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC. 6. The case of the plaintiffs-respondents before the Trial Court is based upon the registered sale deed of Plot No.96 situated over Khasra No. 315 executed on 28.10.1983 having area 1800 Sqr Feet at Ravindra Garden, Aliganj, Lucknow. 7. In the affidavit filed in support of objection as also the written statement filed by the present appellant, the case of the appellant in brief is based upon sale letter dated 10.03.1983, which is unregistered. In the objection defendant also stated that the person who executed the sale deed in favour plaintiffs-respondents was not having any authority/right to execute the sale deed, as such, plaintiffs-respondents have no right or title in regard to property in suit. 8. In addition, the case of the present appellant before the Trial Court is to the effect that he is in possession of Plot No. 97 and not in possession of Plot No. 96 on which plaintiffs-respondents are claiming their rights. 8. In addition, the case of the present appellant before the Trial Court is to the effect that he is in possession of Plot No. 97 and not in possession of Plot No. 96 on which plaintiffs-respondents are claiming their rights. The boundaries of the plot in dispute in fact the boundaries indicated in the unregistered sale letter dated 10.03.1983 in favour of the defendant-appellant. 9. Based upon the aforesaid, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Trial Court committed error of fact and law both in allowing the application for temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents, as such, the interference of this Court in the order under appeal is required. 10. Opposing the prayer, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-respondents submitted that the rights of the plaintiffs-respondents in relation to plot in issue i.e. Plot No. 96, based upon the registered document i.e. sale deed executed on 20.10.1983, would prevail over the rights of the defendant-appellant which are based upon unregistered document that too of Plot No 97. Moreover, based upon the unregistered sale letter no claim is entertainable nor maintainable. 11. It is also stated that prior to passing of the order impugned herein, the Trial Court directed an Advocate Commissioner to submit a report. In compliance of the order of the Trial Court, the Advocate Commissioner submitted his report. This report shows the boundaries of property in issue on which, plaintiffs-respondents are claiming their rights under the sale deed, are correct. As such, the Trial Court rightly exercised its discretion in allowing the application for temporary injunction. 12. In support of his submission, at this stage, Sri Pritish Kumar, Advocate placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Suraj Lamp And Industries Private Ltd (2) Through Director vs. State of Harayana And Another reported in (2012) 1 SCC 656 . The relevant para 18 of the same is as under:- "18. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred." 13. It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred." 13. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Rambhau Namdeo Gajre vs. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (Dead) Through LRS. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 614 . The relevant para 13 of the same is as under:- "13. The agreement to sell does not create an interest of the proposed vendee in the suit property. As per Section 54 of the Act, the title in immovable property valued at more than Rs 100 can be conveyed only by executing a registered sale deed. Section 54 specifically provides that a contract for sale of immovable property is a contract evidencing the fact that the sale of such property shall take place on the terms settled between the parties, but does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. It is not disputed before us that the suit land sought to be conveyed is of the value of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of Pishorrilal (the proposed transferee) the title of the suit land continued to vest in Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (original plaintiff) and remain in his ownership. This point was examined in detail by this Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge [ (1997) 1 SCC 496 ] and it was held thus : (SCC pp. 499-500, para 7) “7. Having given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions we find that the High Court with respect had patently erred in taking the view that because of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act the proposed transferees of the land had acquired an interest in the lands which would result in exclusion of these lands from the computation of the holding of the tenure-holder transferor on the appointed day. It is obvious that an agreement to sell creates no interest in land. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property in the land gets conveyed only by registered sale deed. It is obvious that an agreement to sell creates no interest in land. As per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, the property in the land gets conveyed only by registered sale deed. It is not in dispute that the lands sought to be covered were having value of more than Rs 100. Therefore, unless there was a registered document of sale in favour of the proposed transferee agreement-holders, the title of the lands would not get divested from the vendor and would remain in his ownership. There is no dispute on this aspect. However, strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for Respondent 3 on Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. We fail to appreciate how that section can at all be relevant against the third party like the appellant State. That section provides for a shield of protection to the proposed transferee to remain in possession against the original owner who has agreed to sell these lands to the transferee if the proposed transferee satisfies other conditions of Section 53-A. That protection is available as a shield only against the transferor, the proposed vendor, and would disentitle him from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferees who are put in possession pursuant to such an agreement. But that has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the said lands till they are legally conveyed by sale deed to the proposed transferees. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party like the appellant State when it seeks to enforce the provisions of the Act against the tenure-holder, proposed transferor of these lands.” (emphasis supplied) There was no agreement between the appellant and the respondent in connection with the suit land. The doctrine of part-performance could have been availed of by Pishorrilal against his proposed vendor subject, of course, to the fulfilment of the conditions mentioned above. It could not be availed of by the appellant against the respondent with whom he has no privity of contract. The appellant has been put in possession of the suit land on the basis of an agreement of sale not by the respondent but by Pishorrilal, therefore, the privity of contract is between Pishorrilal and the appellant and not between the appellant and the respondent. The appellant has been put in possession of the suit land on the basis of an agreement of sale not by the respondent but by Pishorrilal, therefore, the privity of contract is between Pishorrilal and the appellant and not between the appellant and the respondent. The doctrine of part-performance as contemplated in Section 53-A can be availed of by the proposed transferee against his transferor or any person claiming under him and not against a third person with whom he does not have a privity of contract." 14. He also stated that based upon the unregistered sale deed the defendant-appellant is not entitled to benefit of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act. 15. He also stated that granting or refusing the prayer for injunction is discretionary power of the Trial Court and as per settled principle of law, the discretion if exercised judicially then it should not be interfered with by the Appellate Court. Also stated that the discretion exercised by the Trial Court while allowing the temporary injunction based upon the material evidence available before it is not liable to be interfered with by the Appellate Court. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer And Others vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai And Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 282 . Relevant para 32 of the same is as under:- "32. Where the lower court acts arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely in the exercise of its discretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise of discretion by granting a temporary injunction when there is “no material”, or refusing to grant a temporary injunction by ignoring the relevant documents produced, are instances of action which are termed as arbitrary, capricious or perverse. When we refer to acting on “no material” (similar to “no evidence”), we refer not only to cases where there is total dearth of material, but also to cases where there is no relevant material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of discretion. In this case, there was “no material” to make out a prima facie case and therefore, the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court." 16. In this case, there was “no material” to make out a prima facie case and therefore, the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in the matter and vacating the temporary injunction granted by the trial court." 16. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Wander Ltd. & Anr. vs. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in 1990 SCC 727 . The relevant para 14 of the same reads as under:- 14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph [ (1960) 3 SCR 713 : AIR 1960 SC 1156 ] : (SCR 721) “... These principles are well established, but as has been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton & Co. v. Jhanaton [1942 AC 130] ‘...the law as to the reversal by a court of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that arises is due only to the application of well settled principles in an individual case’. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 17. The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to this principle." 17. Learned counsel for plaintiffs-respondents also placed reliance on the judgment passed in the case of Ashok Kumar and Others vs. Pramil Kumar and Others reported in 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 855. The relevant para of the same reads as under:- "2. Grant of temporary injunction is discretionary and the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of court of first instance except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. This aspect has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Esha Ekta Appartments CHS Limited v. Municipal Corporation of Mumbai reported in (2012) 4 SCC 689 . Para 19 & 20 of the said judgment are reproduced below : "19. We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The scope of the appellate Court's power to interfere with an interim order passed by the Court of first instance has been considered by this Court in several cases. In Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 1990 Supp SCC 727, the Court was called upon to consider the correctness of an order of injunction passed by the Division Bench of the High Court which had reversed the order of the learned Single Judge declining the respondent's prayer for interim relief. This Court set aside the order of the Division Bench and made the following observations: "In such appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion." 20. In Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani, (2010) 2 SCC 142 , the 3-Judge Bench considered a somewhat similar question in the context of the refusal of the trial Court and the High Court to pass an order of temporary injunction, referred to the judgments in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. (supra), N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn., (1996) 5 SCC 714 and observed : "The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity."" 18. In response, Sri Shyam Mohan Pradhan based upon the judgment of this Court passed in the case of (Smt.) Savitri And Others vs. Surendra Mohan Mohana reported in 1987 (5) LCD 137; stated that the plaintiffs- respondents can succeed on the strength of their case and not on the weaknesses of the defense and in this case plaintiffs-respondents have failed to prove the possession over the property in issue. The present appellant, who is contesting defendant in the suit can resist the possession based upon the unregistered document. The present appellant, who is contesting defendant in the suit can resist the possession based upon the unregistered document. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Prem Singh & Ors. vs. Birbal & Ors. reported in 2006 AIR SCW 3595. 19. He further submitted that in view of aforesaid background of the case, the order allowing the application for temporary injunction of the plaintiffs-respondents under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC is liable to be interfered with by this Court. 20. Considered the submissions of the counsel for the parties and perused the record. 21. It is trite law that the Appellate Court should not interfered with in the discretion exercised judicially by the Trial Court in granting or refusing to grant the relief of temporary injunction if the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons. 22. It is also trite law that the person in possession can resist the possession if there is privity of contract between the parties and not otherwise and in the instant case, it is apparent that there is no privity of contract between the defendant-appellant and plaintiffs-respondents. 23. Further, it is apparent that the case of plaintiffs-respondents over plot No. 96, property in suit, is based upon the registered document and the boundaries indicated therein were found correct by the Advocate Commissioner and the case of the defendant-appellant is based on an unregistered letter of sale regarding plot No. 97. As such, prima facie, case regarding plot No. 96 is in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents and if the property in issue is not protected then in that event plaintiffs-respondents would suffer irreparable loss. 24. Considering the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the Trial Court has rightly exercised its discretion in allowing the application for temporary injunction of plaintiffs-respondents under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC by a reasoned and speaking order. 25. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the present appeal lacks merit and being so the appeal is dismissed. 26. It is expected that the Trial Court would conclude the proceedings as early as possible.