JUDGMENT Present regular second appeal is filed by the defendant being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 23.10.2009 passed in Regular Appeal in R.A.No.116/2006 on the file of Principal District Judge, Bijapur (hereinafter referred to as the 'first appellate Court'). The said Regular appeal had been filed by the plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 09.11.2006 passed in O.S.No.346/2002 on the file of the I Additional Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.), Bijapur (hereinafter referred to as the 'trial Court') which had dismissed the said suit. The first appellate court by the impugned judgment and order while dismissing the said Regular appeal and confirming the dismissal of the suit by the trial Court had however reversed the finding of the trial Court on issue Nos.1 and 3 by answering them in the affirmative. It is this portion of the impugned judgment and order that is challenged by the appellant in this case. 2. Cross Objection No.110/2009 is filed by the plaintiff/cross-objector aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order of the first appellate court to the extent dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation. 3. Parties are referred to by their original ranking before the trial Court. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE: 4. The plaintiff filed the above suit seeking relief in the nature of judgment and decree declaring that the Deed of Adoption created on 23.03.1961 by the defendant showing himself as the adopted son of the plaintiff is null and void and for consequential relief of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from alienating or transferring the house and shop properties; (i) bearing CTS No.309 measuring 18.39 sq.mts. Ward No.2 of Bijapur, (ii) CTS No.310 measuring 17.56 sq.mts. Ward No.2 of Bijapur, (iii) CTS No.121/B measuring 167.22 sq.mts. Ward No.2 of Bijapur, (iv) CTS No.771, measuring 235.78 sq.mts. ward No.3 of Bijapur (herein after referred to as the 'suit properties') contending inter alia that she is the absolute owner of the suit properties having inherited from her husband- Savalgeppa Mallappa Bagalkot, who died on 15.01.1961 leaving behind him the plaintiff as his sole legal heir. That upon his demise, name of the plaintiff was entered into the revenue records in respect of suit properties. That the defendant who is neither related to the plaintiff nor to her deceased husband had fraudulently created a Deed of Adoption, based on which claimed right over the suit properties. Hence the suit. 5. That upon his demise, name of the plaintiff was entered into the revenue records in respect of suit properties. That the defendant who is neither related to the plaintiff nor to her deceased husband had fraudulently created a Deed of Adoption, based on which claimed right over the suit properties. Hence the suit. 5. The defendant in the written statement had claimed that plaintiff and her husband had no issues. That, upon the death of her husband on 15.01.1961, plaintiff adopted him as her son. That a Deed Of Adoption was registered on 23.03.1961 in this regard. Since then the defendant as adopted son of the plaintiff has been enjoying the suit properties and his name was also entered into the revenue records in respect of the suit properties. That the plaintiff adopted the defendant in terms of Hindu law and prevailing customs and traditions in the presence of witnesses to the said Deed Of Adoption. That property bearing CTS No.96/8B+9A was sold to one Sri.Anil Kumar Pattar jointly by the plaintiff and the defendant. That during the year 1998 due to her old age plaintiff had executed a family arrangement deed in favour of the defendant. That the suit is hit by Section 15 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (herein after referred to as the Act, 1956). That the plaintiff had not challenged the registered Deed of Adoption within time as such suit is barred by limitation. Judgment and order of the Trial Court: 6. Based on the pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues; "1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the adoption deed dated:23.03.1961 that the defendant is the adopted son of plaintiff is null and void? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction? (3) Whether the suit is time barred? (4) What order or decree?" 7. The plaintiff examined herself as PW.1 and exhibited 5 documents, marked as Ex.P1 to Ex.P5. The defendant examined himself as D.W.1 and exhibited 28 documents, marked as Ex.D1 to Ex.D28A. The trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 9.11.2006 dismissed the suit by answering the Issue Nos. 1 to 3 in the negative. 8. The suit in principle had been filed by the plaintiff seeking relief of declaration to declare the Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 as null and void. The trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 9.11.2006 dismissed the suit by answering the Issue Nos. 1 to 3 in the negative. 8. The suit in principle had been filed by the plaintiff seeking relief of declaration to declare the Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 as null and void. The trial Court taking into consideration of evidence produced by the parties and the deposition of the plaintiff has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff adopted the defendant by conducting all the ceremonies and thereafter the Deed of Adoption at Ex- D1 was registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar on 23.03.1961 and thereby answered the issue No.1 in the negative by holding the plaintiff failed to prove that Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 as null and void. The trial Court while addressing the issue with regard to the limitation has come to the conclusion that suit of the plaintiff was filed within time on the premise of the defendant not producing any document to the contrary. Thus, the trial Court negating the case of plaintiff on the question of validity or otherwise of the adoption deed, dismissed the suit for declaration and consequent relief of injunction, even while holding the suit was one within time. 9. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff filed regular appeal in R.A. No.116/2006 on the file of the first appellate court. Considering the grounds urged by the plaintiff, the first appellate court framed the following points for its consideration. "1. Whether the adoption is contrary to section 10 conditions (iv) of the Act? 2. Whether the adoption is contrary to section 11 conditions (iv) of the Act. 3. Whether adoption is valid in law? 4. Whether the suit is barred by limitation?. 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction?. 6. What order?". 10. The first appellate court on the other hand while dealing with the Deed Of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 at Ex.D1 and taking note of the averments made in the written statement regarding the customs and usage that were prevalent in Bombay Karnataka Region held that though the defendant was aged about 22 years at the time execution of Deed of Adoption the same was not contrary to Section 10(iv) of the Act. However, while adverting to the case with reference to provisions of Section 11(iv) of the Act, the first appellate court held the defendant could not have been taken in adoption by the plaintiff in view of conditions contained thereunder, and has thus concluded that Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 is null and void, and thereby answered issue No.1 framed by the trial Court in the affirmative. 11. The first appellate court taking into consideration of the material evidence and the admissions made by the plaintiff during the trial has held that the plaintiff was aware of the adoption and that the same having been acted upon right from the date of execution of Deed of Adoption has thus held that the suit was barred by limitation and thereby answering the issue No.3 framed by the trial Court on limitation in the affirmative and dismissed the suit. 12. Thus the first appellate court answered point Nos.1, 3 and 5 in the negative and point Nos.2 and 4 in the affirmative and while confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court in dismissing the suit, however, set aside the findings of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1 and 3 and answered the same in the affirmative. It is this portion of the judgment and order impugned by the defendant/appellant before this Court. The cross-objection is filed by the plaintiff aggrieved by the judgment and order of the first appellate court to the extent answering the issue No.3 in the affirmative. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW: 13. This Court by order dated 30.03.2010 while admitting the above appeal framed the following substantial questions of law for its consideration. "1. Whether The lower appellate court after having held that the suit was barred by the limitation could render a finding as to validity of an adoption ? 2. Secondly, if the appellant has succeeded in proving the validity of adoption, whether the same could be held invalid, or cancelled, in the light of Section 15 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act?". 14. Similarly, by order dated 29.11.2019 while admitting the cross-objection framed the following substantial question of law; "Whether the finding of the first appellate court on the question of limitation is not based on admissible evidence." 15. 14. Similarly, by order dated 29.11.2019 while admitting the cross-objection framed the following substantial question of law; "Whether the finding of the first appellate court on the question of limitation is not based on admissible evidence." 15. When the matter was taken up for final hearing, Sri.Amith Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior counsel for learned counsel for the plaintiff had raised the contention regarding the very maintainability of this appeal on the premise that there is no decree passed by the first appellate court and all that the first appellate court has done is giving finding of facts by answering the issue Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative and the same therefore cannot be termed as a decree within the meaning of sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908. That no appeal could be filed on a finding of facts. 16. In response to the said contention, Sri. Ashok R. Kalyan Shetty, learned counsel for the defendant/appellant contended that the impugned Judgment and order though is in the nature of answering the issue Nos. 1 and 3 in the affirmative, indeed is a decree and is not a mere finding of facts. In view of this contention raised at the time of hearing of the appeal, this Court by order dated 31.10.2022 framed the following additional substantial question of law; "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the matter the judgment and order passed by the first appellate court amounts to a decree or it is mere finding of facts and consequently whether the appeal is maintainable?" SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT/ DEFENDANT: 17. Sri. Ashok R. Kalyan Shetty, learned counsel appearing for the appellant reiterating the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal submitted that the first appellate court grossly erred in holding that the Deed Of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 was null and void even while dismissing the suit of the plaintiff as having barred by limitation. He submits that the first appellate Court which has answered issue No.3 in the affirmative by holding the plaintiff was not entitled for declaration and permanent injunction as the suit itself was barred by limitation, ought not to have given its finding in the affirmative on issue No.1 by holding that the Deed Of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 as null and void. Hence, he submits that the substantial questions of law have to be answered in the negative in favour of the defendant. 18. He further submits that the trial Court and first appellate court have on consideration of material evidence, more particularly, the categoric admission made by the plaintiff in the cross-examination have rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was completely aware of the execution of Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 and also the plaintiff and the defendant representing themselves to be the mother and the adopted son respectively had even alienated certain property in favour of third party. That the name of the defendant was also mutated in the revenue records, sufficient to uphold the Adoption as claimed by the defendant. Hence, seeks for allowing of the appeal by answering the substantial question of law in favour of the defendant. SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT/ PLAINTIFF: 19. Sri. Amith Kumar Deshpande, learned Senior counsel appearing for the plaintiff submits that the appeal itself is not maintainable in view of the fact that there is no decree passed by the first appellate court and that appeal being creature of law cannot be filed without there being a decree. He submits that a perusal of operative portion of the impugned order does not in any event satisfy the definition of a decree as provided under Sub-Section (2) of Section 2 of Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, he seeks for dismissal of the very appeal on maintainability. He relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of GANGA BAI VS. VIJAY KUMAR AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1974 SC 1126 in support of his contention. 20. Learned Senior counsel further submits that it is the bounden duty of the first appellate court to answer on the issues/points raised in the matter and any finding given on the issues would not become a "decree" as defined under Sub-Section(2) of Section 2 of CPC, 1908. 21. He further submits though the second appeal filed by the defendant was not maintainable as there is no decree passed by the first appellate court, same would not cause any impediment to the plaintiff in filing cross- objection and the same can be considered and determined independent of the present regular second appeal. 21. He further submits though the second appeal filed by the defendant was not maintainable as there is no decree passed by the first appellate court, same would not cause any impediment to the plaintiff in filing cross- objection and the same can be considered and determined independent of the present regular second appeal. In support of his submission, he relies upon the judgment of this Court in the case of ANNASAHEB BALESHA WAGHE AND OTHERS vs. APPASAHEB DADA POMMAI AND OTHERS reported in 2007 (5) Kar. LJ. 424. 22. Alternatively, in furtherance to the grounds urged in the cross-objections, he submits that the plaintiff got the knowledge of the adoption for the first time in the month of September, 2002 and not on 23.03.1961. The first appellate court was not justified in holding that the adoption by the respondent was not hit by Section 10 (iv) of the Hindu Adoptions And Maintenance Act 1956, particularly, in the absence of specific pleadings and proof with this regard to the customs and traditions. 23. In response to the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiff with regard to maintainability of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the effect of the impugned order passed by the first appellate court is that it has rendered the Deed Of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 as null and void adversely affecting legal rights and status of the defendant which amounts to a decree. Hence, the appeal is very much maintainable. Analysis: 24. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. Re: Additional Substantial Question of Law: 25. Since the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has raised the issue of maintainability of the appeal on the premise of the impugned order not being a decree and as noted above, this Court had framed the additional substantial question of law. Before answering the substantial questions of law framed by this court on 30.03.2010 and on 29.11.2019 while admitting appeal and cross objection respectively, it is appropriate to advert to the additional substantial question of law. Before answering the substantial questions of law framed by this court on 30.03.2010 and on 29.11.2019 while admitting appeal and cross objection respectively, it is appropriate to advert to the additional substantial question of law. It is necessary in this regard to refer to the definition of the term ‘Decree’, as defined under sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Civil Procedure Code 1908, which as under: "2) "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint and the determination of any question within 2*** section 144, but shall not include- (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default. Explanation.- A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final;" 26. It is appropriate at this juncture also to refer to Order 20 Rules 5 and 6 of CPC which are as under; "5.Court to state its decision on each issue.- In Suits in which issues have been framed, the court shall state its finding or decision, with the reasons there for, upon each separate issue, unless the finding upon any one or more of the issue is, sufficient for the decision of the Suit 6. Contents of decree.- (1) The decree shall agree with the judgment; it shall contain the number of the suit, (the names and descriptions of the parties, their registered addresses,) and particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of the suit. (2) xxxxxxxx (3) xxxxxxxx" 27. The Apex Court in the case of S.SATNAM SINGH AND OTHERS Vs. SURENDER KAUR AND ANOTHER reported in (2009) 2 SCC 562 while dealing with issue regarding "decree" ingredients of and test to be applied to ascertain whether an "order" is decree or not at paragraphs 15 and 16 has held as under: "15. A `decree' is defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean: "2.2...... SURENDER KAUR AND ANOTHER reported in (2009) 2 SCC 562 while dealing with issue regarding "decree" ingredients of and test to be applied to ascertain whether an "order" is decree or not at paragraphs 15 and 16 has held as under: "15. A `decree' is defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean: "2.2...... the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards, the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. It may either be preliminary or final. It may partly be preliminary and partly be final. The court with a view to determine whether an order passed by it is a decree or not must take into consideration the pleadings of the parties and the proceedings leading upto the passing of an order. The circumstances under which an order had been made would also be relevant. 16. For determining the question as to whether an order passed by a court is a decree or not, it must satisfy the following tests : "(i) There must be an adjudication; (ii) Such adjudication must have been given in a suit; (iii) It must have determined the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit; (iv) Such determination must be of a conclusive nature; and (v) There must be a formal expression of such adjudication." 28. The impugned order of the first appellate court needs to be determined in the light of the aforesaid definition of the term ‘decree’, the provisions requiring decision of the court on each issue and the contents of decree, and the law laid down by the Apex Court, as seen above, the first appellate court had framed points for its consideration regarding the validity of Adoption and also point with regard to if the suit was barred by limitation. While, the first appellate court having held that the suit of the Plaintiff was not brought within the period of limitation as prescribed under Article 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has however at paragraphs 30 to 42 of its Judgment extensively discussed the question with regard to the legality and validity of the Deed of Adoption at Ex.D.1 and after detailed adjudication of the same at paragraph 43 of the impugned judgment has held as under: “43. From the above discussion, I hold that, the Plaintiff has proved that, the Adoption Deed dated 23.03.1961 is null and void and I answer issue-1 in the affirmative. I also hold that the suit is barred by time and I answer issue.3 in the affirmative. As the suit is barred by time, the Plaintiff is not entitled for declaration and permanent injunction and I answer issue -2 in the negative. Hence, I pass the following: ORDER The appeal is dismissed with costs. While, confirming the judgment and decree dated 09.11.2006, passed by the First Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Dn) Bijapur, in O.S 346/2003 on his file dismissing the suit, the findings of the Trial Court on issues -1 to 3 are set aside and issues -1 and 3 are answered in the affirmative.” 29. Though as seen above, the first appellate court dismissed the regular appeal confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on the grounds of suit having been barred by limitation, has however reversed the finding of the Trial Court with regards to validity of the Deed of Adoption. In other words, the first appellate court has held that the Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 was not valid as the same is contrary to Section 11 (iv) of the Act. 30. The findings at paragraphs 30 to 43 of the judgment and the operative portion of the impugned order indeed amounts to determination of rights and status of the parties with regard to issues at controversy. In that the first appellate court has held that the Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 is not valid in view of the same being contrary to Section 11(iv) of the Act. In that the first appellate court has held that the Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961 is not valid in view of the same being contrary to Section 11(iv) of the Act. The effect of the said finding and consequent order is that the claim of Plaintiff that the defendant is not her adopted son and consequent invalidity of the Deed of Adoption has been upheld and the claim of the defendant to the contrary has been negated. The defendant in view of the above determination of issues in controversy has been rendered as a person not being adopted by the plaintiff in terms of Deed of Adoption dated 23.03.1961. Ex.D1, thus the defendant can no longer represent and claim himself to be the adopted son of the plaintiff. 31. Though, the suit is dismissed on the question of limitation, the first appellate court indeed has granted a larger and substantive relief of declaration as sought for by the Plaintiff, though merely making a mention in the operative portion of the order as stated above. It is also settled position of law that in order to determine if it's a decree, it is not only the precise language in which the decree is couched but the substance of the decree and the entire circumstances of the case has to be considered. The impugned order read as such is in consonance with definition of decree as provided under Section 2(2) of CPC and the contents are in consonance with sub- rule (1) of Rule 6 of order XX of CPC. 32. It is necessary also to note that the Plaintiff, who has filed cross-objection, challenging the decree of dismissal of the suit on the question of limitation, has not disputed the nature of the impugned order to be a decree. 33. There is yet another view of the matter. In that it may not be out of place to refer to the observation made by the Apex Court in the case of Smt.Ganga Bai (supra) relied upon by learned Senior counsel for respondent/cross objector. In the said Judgment, Apex Court at paragraphs 24 and 25 has held as under: "24. In Harchandra Das v. Bholanath, (1935) ILR 62 Cal 701 on which the learned counsel for the respondents relies in support of this submission, a suit for preemption was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of limitation. In the said Judgment, Apex Court at paragraphs 24 and 25 has held as under: "24. In Harchandra Das v. Bholanath, (1935) ILR 62 Cal 701 on which the learned counsel for the respondents relies in support of this submission, a suit for preemption was dismissed by the trial court on the ground of limitation. In an appeal filed by the plaintiff, the District Court reversed that finding but confirmed the decree dismissing the suit on the ground that the sale effected by defendants 4 and 5 in favour of defendants 1, 2 and 3 was not validly registered and there being no "sale", there can be no right of preemption. Defendants 1 to 3 preferred an appeal to the High Court against the finding recorded by the District Court that the sale effected in their favour by defendants 4 and 5 was not valid as it was not lawfully registered. On a preliminary objection raised by the plaintiffs to the maintainability of the appeal, the High Court of Calcutta, held that though under the Code of Civil Procedure there can be no appeal as against a mere finding, "it may be taken to be the view of courts in India generally, that a party to the suit adversely affected by a finding contained in a judgment, on which a decree, is based, may appeal; and the test applied in some of the cases for the purpose of determining whether a party has been aggrieved or not was whether the finding would be res judicata in other proceedings". The High Court, however, upheld the preliminary objection on the ground that the issue regarding validity of the sale which was decided against defendants 1 to 3 would not operate as res judicata in any subsequent proceeding and therefore the appeal which was solely directed against the finding on that issue was not maintainable. 25. The position here is similar to that in the Calcutta case. The trial court decreed the mortgagee’s suit only as against defendant 1, the father, and directed the sale of his one half interest in the mortgaged property on the ground that part of the consideration for the mortgage was not supported by legal necessity, the remaining part of the consideration was tainted with immorality and therefore the mortgage was not binding on the interest of the sons, defendants 2 and 3. Whether the partition between the father and sons was sham or real had no impact on the judgment of the trial court and made no material difference to the decree passed by it. The finding recorded by the trial court that the partition was a colourable transaction was unnecessary for the decision of the suit because even if the court were to find that the partition was genuine, the mortgage would only have bound the interest of the father as the debt was not of a character which, under the Hindu law, would bind the interest of the sons. There is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the sons that if the partition was held to be genuine, the property would have been wholly freed from the mortgage encumbrance. The validity or the binding nature of an alienation cannot depend on a partition effected after the alienation; or else, a sale or a mortgage effected by the Karta of a joint-Hindu family can easily be avoided by effecting a partition amongst the members of the joint family. As the matter relating to the partition was not directly and substantially in issue in the suit, the finding that the partition was sham cannot operate as res judicata. Therefore, the appeal filed by defendants 2 and 3 against that finding was not maintainable, even on the assumption that the High Court of Calcutta is right in its view that though under the Code there could be no appeal against a finding, yet "On grounds of justice" an appeal may lie against a finding provided that it would operate as res judicata so as to preclude a party aggrieved by the finding from agitating the question covered by the finding in any other proceeding. It is not necessary here to determine whether the view of the Calcutta High Court is correct". 34. Relying upon the aforesaid Judgment of the Apex Court, this court in its Judgment passed in N.Hanumanth Rao Vs Corporation City of Bengaluru reported in AIR 1996 (KAR) 296 specifically taking note of the view of the Apex Court on the Judgment of Calcutta High Court in Harachandra Das (which was referred to by the Apex Court in paragraph 24 and 25 above) at paragraphs 16 and 17 has held as under: "16. The above decision is quite distinguishable as the maintainability of the appeal held against the appellant as the half interest in the mortgaged property as it relates to the father as a manager was conclusive and therefore, a finding recorded by the trial Court that the partition was a colourable transaction was unnecessary for the decision of the suit because even if the court were to find that the partition was genuine, the mortgage would only have bound the interest of the father as the debt was not of a character which, under the Hindu Law, would bind the interest of the sons. While deciding this question, the Supreme Court has not disturbed the position of Law enunciated in Harchandra Das v. Bholanath Das, ILR (1935) 62 Cal 701, where the view taken was that though under the Code there could be no appeal against a finding, yet "On grounds of justice" an appeal may lie against a finding provided that it would operate as res judicata so as to preclude a party aggrieved by the finding from agitating the question covered by the finding in any other proceedings. 17. I fully endorse the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court and hold that the appeal is maintainable". 35. Relying upon the said Judgment of the Calcutta High Court, similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of SMT.K.PONNALAGU AMMAL Vs. STATE OF MADRAS reported in 1953 Madras 485 wherein at paragraph 13 the court has held as under: "13. Mr. Kesava Aiyangar concedes that every party to a suit is not entitled as of right to file an appeal against the decree in the suit. The party must be aggrieved. While it has been held that a party who is not aggrieved is not entitled to appeal, it has also been held that even a successful party in a suit can file an appeal against a finding of the Court on one of the issues which is adverse to him, though the final decision is in his favour: 'Vide - 'Venkateswaralu v. B. Lingayya', AIR 1924 Mad 689 (J) and - 'Hara Chandra Das v. Bhola Nath Das', 62 Cal 701 (K). It was laid down in these cases that the test to be applied in each case is whether the finding sought to be appealed against is one to which the rule of res judicata may be held to be applicable so as to disentitle the aggrieved party to agitate the question covered by the finding in any other proceeding. This rule is certainly an extension of the principle that it is only a party adversely affected by the decree that is entitled to appeal (Vide Varadachariar, J., at page 42 in - ' AIR 1941 FC 16 (D)'.) This extension is evidently based on grounds of justice. Guha, J., in - 62 Cal 701' (K) says: "....... The Code of Civil Procedure, by the provisions relating to the right of appeal, as they now stand, does not provide for an appeal against a finding contained in a judgment; the appellants in this Court have, therefore, no right of appeal, under the law. On grounds of justice and recognising that, on that ground, the implication of suitable exception or qualification may be justifiable and even necessary, we are prepared to follow the rule engrafted on the statute by a current of decisions by High Courts in this country, that an aggrieved party may have a right of appeal, and that the test to be applied in such a case is whether the finding sought to be appealed against is one to which the rule of 'res judicata' may be held to be applicable, so as to disentitle the aggrieved party to agitate the question covered by the finding in any other proceedings". 36. Thus, assuming as contended by the learned Senior counsel for the respondent that the issue involved in this matter is merely finding of fact and not a decree, the aforesaid enunciation of law by the Apex Court, followed, reiterated and clarified by this Court in N.Hanumanth Rao (supra), even if it is a mere finding, if such finding operates as res judicata so as to preclude a party aggrieved by that finding from agitating the question covered by the finding in any other proceedings, an appeal may lie against such finding. 37. In that view of the matter, this court is of the considered view that the judgment and order passed by the first appellate court is a 'decree' and as such the present appeal is maintainable. 37. In that view of the matter, this court is of the considered view that the judgment and order passed by the first appellate court is a 'decree' and as such the present appeal is maintainable. Thus, the additional substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law Nos.1 and 2: 38. Adverting to the other substantial question of law as to whether the Lower Appellate Court having held that it was barred by limitation could render a finding as to validity of adoption, it is a settled position of law that law of limitation is a valid substantive law, which extinguishes the right to sue and or right to appeal. Once, a suit is found to be barred by limitation, there can be no question or any obligation on the part of the court to consider the merit of the case. If the Court despite finding suit having barred by limitation proceeds on other questions of law, the aggrieved party is within his rights to have the same set aside. 39. The apex court in the case of ITTYAVIRA MATHAI VS. VARKEY VARKEY AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1964 SC 907 has made the observation as follows: "8..... If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject- matter and it had the jurisdiction over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. Learned counsel, however, referred us to the decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmed v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1935 PC 85 and contended that since the court is bound under the provisions of Section 3 of the Limitation Act to ascertain for itself whether the suit before it was within time, it would act without jurisdiction if it fails to do so. All that the decision relied upon says that section 3 of the Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. The privy council has not said that where the court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity." 40. The Trial Court while answering the issue No.3 framed by it on the question of limitation in the negative, at paragraph 10 of its judgment has not adverted to the material evidence made available on record and has merely held that the defendant did not produce material evidence to prove that the suit of the plaintiff was time barred. The first appellate court while reversing the said finding of the trial Court has adverted in detail to material evidence placed on record. The first appellate court while reversing the said finding of the trial Court has adverted in detail to material evidence placed on record. The first appellate court has taken into consideration the evidence in the nature of admissions made by the Plaintiff during the cross-examination with regard to execution of Deed of Adoption at exhibit D1 and photographs at Ex.D2, the entries in revenue records dated 03.10.1961 and other entries in the property register card at exhibit P1 to P4 and exhibit D6 to D16 and D26 wherein the defendant has been described as ‘Channappa Savalagappa Bagalkot, Mrutana Dattaka Maga’, and also taking into consideration of sale of one of the properties by the plaintiff and the defendant jointly as per sale deed dated 09.07.1968 at exhibit D3 wherein, the Plaintiff admitted of she having affixed her signature, has come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was aware of the adoption of the defendant and that the plaintiff not having filed a suit within the period of limitation, the first appellate court held that the suit was barred by limitation. 41. Thus, the first appellate court having dismissed the suit on the ground of limitation, ought not to have adverted to validity or otherwise of the Deed of Adoption. 42. As held by the Apex Court in the case of ITTYAVIRA MATHAI VS. VARKEY VARKEY AND ANOTHER reported in AIR 1964 SC 907 (supra), since the first appellate court despite having found the suit to have barred by limitation, proceeded on the other questions, the defendant/appellant being aggrieved party is within his rights to have the same, set aside. Therefore the second substantial question of law needs to be answered in the light of the said Judgment of the Apex Court. 43. While the Trial Court and the first appellate court based on the material evidence and admissions made by the Plaintiff during the cross- examination have held that the Plaintiff failed to prove that the Deed of Adoption was invalid and null and void. 43. While the Trial Court and the first appellate court based on the material evidence and admissions made by the Plaintiff during the cross- examination have held that the Plaintiff failed to prove that the Deed of Adoption was invalid and null and void. The first appellate court, more particularly taking note of the averments in the written statement regarding the customs that were prevailing in the Bombay-Karnataka region, with regard to usage and custom to adopt a person who had completed the age of fifteen years, had come to the conclusion that the Adoption Deed in exhibit D1 was not contrary to Section 10 (iv) of the Act, thus the first appellate court having upheld the adoption as it was not contrary to Section 10 (iv) of the Act, however, held the Deed of Adoption exhibit D1 to be contrary to Section 11 (iv) of the Act. The first appellate court came to the said conclusion on the premise that in terms of Section 11(iv) of the Act, if the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted is a male, the adoptive mother should have been at least 21 years older than the person adopted. The first appellate court also noted that there is no exemption given any customs to the contrary relying upon provisions of Section 5 and 6 of the Act, the first appellate court held that the Deed of Adoption is contrary to terms of Section 11(iv) of the Act. 44. As already noted above, the first appellate court having held the suit is barred by limitation and consequently dismissing the suit accordingly, it was not open to advert to validity or otherwise of the Deed of Adoption in the manner adopted by the first appellate court. The invalidity of the adoption even on the ground of violation of Section 11 (iv) of the Act could be adjudicated only if the suit had been brought within the period of limitation as provided under Article 57 of the Limitation Act. 45. It is also necessary to note that the very suit filed by the plaintiff is one for a relief for declaration, namely, the Adoption Deed dated 23.03.1961, showing that the defendant as an adoptive son of the plaintiff was created and was thus null and void and also for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the defendant for alienating the suit property. Thus the suit of the Plaintiff is primarily one for declaration of validity of the Adoption Deed, it would fall within the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The said relief sought for in the plaint is the only substantive relief and the same is not incidental or ancillary to any other relief. In that view of the matter, Article 57 of the Limitation Act will apply with full vigour. Both the Trial Court and the first appellate court having categorically found that the Plaintiff was aware of the execution of the Deed of Adoption, and subsequent transactions in the nature of entries in the Revenue records and joint alienation by the Plaintiff and Defendant of one of the properties wherein, the Defendant was described as the adoptive son of the Plaintiff, and the suit not having brought within the time stipulated under Article 57 of the Limitation Act, it was not open for the first appellate court to have adjudicated the said matter. Needless to mention that there is a statutory presumption under Section 16 of the Act, whenever there is a registered deed of partition regarding the adoption having been made in compliance with the provisions of the Act unless and until it is proved to the contrary. Thus, the suit instituted to establish that the adoption was contrary to the provisions of law ought to have been filed within the stipulated period provided under article 57 of the Limitation Act. Section 15 of the Act, provides for the irrevocability of validity of adoption. Both the Trial Court and the first appellate court having held that the adoption was valid and the first appellate court particularly referring to the written statement wherein the Defendant had pleaded the prevalent customs in the Bombay-Karnataka region and having held the same not being contrary to Section 10 (iv) of the Act, could not have resorted to Section 11 (iv) to hold otherwise, particularly having already adverted to the issue of limitation. 46. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis the substantial question of law Nos.1 and 2 are answered accordingly. Re: Substantial question of law framed in Cross Objection: 47. The first appellate court as already noted, has taken into consideration both oral and documentary evidence while dealing with the issue of limitation. 46. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis the substantial question of law Nos.1 and 2 are answered accordingly. Re: Substantial question of law framed in Cross Objection: 47. The first appellate court as already noted, has taken into consideration both oral and documentary evidence while dealing with the issue of limitation. The learned Senior counsel for the Plaintiff could not point out anything regarding inadmissibility of the said evidence. Admissions made by the plaintiff are with reference to registered documents. The admissions are unequivocal and unambiguous. No error therefore can be found in the reasoning and the finding arrived at by the first appellate court on the issue of limitation. The substantial question of law framed in the cross -objection is thus answered accordingly. 48. For the aforesaid reasons and analysis, following; ORDER (i) The appeal is RSA No.7305/2009 is allowed. (ii) The judgment and order dated 23.10.2009 passed in R.A.No.116/2006 on the file of Principal District Judge, to the extent answering the issue No.1 framed by the trial Court in affirmative is set aside and the dismissal of the suit is confirmed. (iii) Consequently, the Cross -objection No.101/2010 filed by the cross-objector is dismissed.