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2022 DIGILAW 1613 (GUJ)

Baroda Electro Engineering Products Private Limited v. Bank Of Baroda

2022-11-24

BHARGAV D.KARIA

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Pavan S Godiawala for the petitioners and learned advocate Ms. Nalini S Lodha for the respondent. 2. Having regard to the controversy involved in this petition which is in a narrow compass, the petition is taken up for final hearing with the consent of the learned advocates for the respective parties today. 3. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned advocate Ms. Nalini S Lodha waives service of notice on behalf of respondent no.1. 4. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have prayed for a writ of prohibition to quash and set aside the entire recovery proceedings being RP No. 75 of 2011 and consequently thereof, the order dated 22.07.2022, passed by the Recovery Officer I- DRT- II, Ahmedabad. 5. The brief facts of the case are as under: 5.1 The petitioner no.1 is a company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The petitioner no.1 is engaged in business of manufacturing of transmission line hardware upto 800kV. 5.2 The erstwhile- Dena Bank who advanced financial assistance in the year 1995 and 2005 to the petitioner no.1- Company has merged with the respondent- Bank of Baroda in the year 2019. 5.3 The petitioner no.1-Company was unable to pay the outstanding dues of the bank and therefore, the account of the petitioner no.1-Company was declared as NPA (Non-Performing Asset) in the year 2008 by the Dena Bank. 5.4 Proceedings under the The Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement Of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short the SARFAESI Act’) was initiated in the year 2009. The Original Application being OA No. 121 of 2010 was also filed before the DRT-II under the provisions of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (for short ‘RDB Act’). A settlement was arrived at between the petitioner no.1 and the Bank in the year 2010 and the same was produced before the DRT- II. The Presiding Officer of Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) passed the following order dated 10.08.2011:- “Applicant by Shri S.S. Panesar, Advocate Defendants by Shri K.H. Pachak, Advocate alongwith Shri Vipul Pranlal Vora, Defendant No. 2. The parties have jointly submitted that the matter is compromised between them and they have filed consent term with respect of payment of settlement amount. The Presiding Officer of Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) passed the following order dated 10.08.2011:- “Applicant by Shri S.S. Panesar, Advocate Defendants by Shri K.H. Pachak, Advocate alongwith Shri Vipul Pranlal Vora, Defendant No. 2. The parties have jointly submitted that the matter is compromised between them and they have filed consent term with respect of payment of settlement amount. The Defendant No. 2 is present in the Tribunal who is also the Director of Defendant No.-1. He has filed two separate authority letter in his favour drawn by Defendant No.-3 Smt. Avani Vipul Vora and Defendant No. 4 Smt. Nirmala Pranial Vora respectively. Both the authority letters are placed on record alongwith the consent term. It is submitted that the settlement amount is required to be paid by Defendants by the year 2014-2015 and on deposit of the entire compromise amount, the claim in the OA will be stands satisfied. It is prayed that in view of the said consent terms on record, the Recovery Certificate be issued as per the consent terms. In view of the fact that the Defendants have arrived at compromise with the Applicant bank as per the consent term, the Recovery Certificate be issued. The OA stands disposed of accordingly.” 5.5 It appears that the petitioner no.1 -Company did not abide by the consent terms and therefore respondent Bank was constrained to file recovery proceedings being RP No. 75 of 2011 before the Recovery Officer DRT-II. The petitioner has not disclosed with regard to the proceedings before the Recovery Officer since 2011 till date but has only referred to an order dated 25.08.2014 passed by the Recovery Officer. At Annexure- B, wherein it is observed that as per the consent terms, the settlement amount was to be paid by 2014-2015. The order dated 25.08.2014 at Annexure-B reads as under: “CH Bank advocate/officer present and filed an application (Ex. H/ 14) for issuance of attachment warrants for mortgaged immovable property mentioned in Schedule-B of the application. CDs not present. It is observed from the records that Recovery Certificate was issued as per the Consent Terms arrived between the Bank and the defendants. As per the Consent Terms (Ex. H/1). the settlement amount was to be paid ty 2014-2015. The Demand Notice has been served and CDs have appeared and filed an application vide Ex D/12. CH Bank was directed to file reply. CH Banks Ex. As per the Consent Terms (Ex. H/1). the settlement amount was to be paid ty 2014-2015. The Demand Notice has been served and CDs have appeared and filed an application vide Ex D/12. CH Bank was directed to file reply. CH Banks Ex. H/14 cannot be termed as reply to Ex. D/12. It is only an application for attachment of secured assets. Direction/order issued by the Tribunal has to be complied CH Bank was required either lo accept or reject the contents of Ex. D/12. In this situation, where the bank seeks for attachment/sale for the recovery of dues. duty cast upon the Court to act as per natural justice. In Ram Kishun & Ors vs State of UP. & Ors. Supreme Court has observed. "Undoubtedly. public money should be recovered and recovery should be made expeditiously. Bu: it does not mean that the financial institutions which are concerned only with the recovery of their loans, may be permitted to behave like property dealers and be permitted further to dispose of the secured assets in any unreasonable or arbitrary manner in fragrant violation of statutory provisions. The Apex Count further observed that A right to hold property is a constitutional right as well as a human right. A person cannot be deprived of his property except in accordance with the provisions of statue. (Vide Lachman Das vs Jagal Ram. (2007) 10 SCC 448 : and Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 2011 S.C. 1589) The Apex Court has concluded that 'Thus, the condition precedent for taking away someone's property or disposing off the secured assets, is that the authority must ensure compliance of the statutory provisions' No doubt. It is discretion of CH Bank to initiate attachment proceedings However, the fact cannot be ignored that Recovery Certificate was based on Consent Terms. which is still subsisting and in force There is no evidence on record to establish that the said Consent Terms is cancelled by CH Bank Thus. Ex. H/14 is premature It is noted that Ex. D/12 is yet o be disposed. As per jurisprudence, any application filed by either of the party is required be adjudicated before going to next step. If CH Bank intends to go for attachment/sale of mortgaged property, it has to cancel the Consent Terms notwithstanding to filing its y/reply to Ex. D/12 on next date. D/12 is yet o be disposed. As per jurisprudence, any application filed by either of the party is required be adjudicated before going to next step. If CH Bank intends to go for attachment/sale of mortgaged property, it has to cancel the Consent Terms notwithstanding to filing its y/reply to Ex. D/12 on next date. Case adjourned to 5.9.14 for further proceedings. Copy of order be given to the parties concerned.” 5.6 It appears that the Bank thereafter preferred application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and bankruptcy Act, 2016 (for short ‘IBC’) against the Company being CP(IB) No. 629/7/NCLT/AHM/2018, however, the said application was withdrawn on the ground that the matter has been settled out of Court. The National Company Law Tribunal, Ahmedabad (for short ‘NCLT’) has passed the following order on 29.09.2022 which reads thus:- “The Parties are represented through their respective Counsel(s). Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submits a withdrawal purshis stating, interalia, that the matter has been settled out of Court. The same is taken on record. Hence, the Petitioner wants to withdraw the present IB Petition. Consequently, the withdrawal purshis is allowed and present IB Petition is disposed of as withdrawn.” 5.7 The respondent- Bank has thereafter preferred IA No. 300 of 2022 in RP No. 75 of 2011 for recovery of the outstanding dues from the petitioner Company on 30.06.2022. The Recovery Officer on 22.07.2022 allowed IA No. 300 of 2022 and appointed the Court Commissioner to take the possession of the property of the petitioner-Company mortgaged with the respondent-Bank. It is stated by the petitioner that the possession was taken over on 02.10.2022. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Pavan Godiawala for the petitioner submitted that the entire recovery proceedings continued by the respondent-Bank since 2011 are bad in law and such proceedings could not have been continued for recovery of the outstanding dues of the respondent-Bank and therefore, such proceedings are required to be quashed and set aside by issuing writ of prohibition. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Pavan Godiawala for the petitioner submitted that the entire recovery proceedings continued by the respondent-Bank since 2011 are bad in law and such proceedings could not have been continued for recovery of the outstanding dues of the respondent-Bank and therefore, such proceedings are required to be quashed and set aside by issuing writ of prohibition. 6.1 It was further submitted that as the respondent- Bank filed application under Section 7 of the IBC and the same was withdrawn on the ground of settlement, the respondent -Bank is prohibited from further recovery of proceedings pursuant except prescribing the modality for payment of the amount which is agreed to be paid by the petitioners as per the settlement arrived at in the year 2010 and further as per the settlement arrived at in the year 2018. 6.2 It was submitted that as per the Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ of prohibition is required to be issued by quashing and setting aside the entire recovery proceedings continued by the respondent-Bank, as the petitioner is ready and willing to pay the amount as per the settlement as per the modalities which may be suggested by the respondent-Bank. 6.3 It was submitted that the petitioner has agreed to settle the issue at Rs. 263.92 lakhs as per the letter of Bank dated 11.10.2018, however, the petitioner requested the Bank to give them a letter in principle so as to enable to crystallise the liability as well as to approach investor/institution to avail finance. It was further submitted that the petitioner-Bank instead of prescribing modality of payment of Rs. 263.92 lakhs pursued the recovery proceedings which are pending since 2011 before the Recovery Officer -IDRT- II, Ahmedabad which could not have been continued, as such proceedings came to an end in the year 2018 itself once the respondent-Bank filed an application under section 7 of the IBC. 6.4 It was further submitted that once the application under section 7 of the IBC has been withdrawn unconditionally by the respondent-Bank on the ground of settlement, recovery proceedings could not have been continued and the same are therefore required to be quashed and set aside. 7. On the other hand learned advocate Ms. 6.4 It was further submitted that once the application under section 7 of the IBC has been withdrawn unconditionally by the respondent-Bank on the ground of settlement, recovery proceedings could not have been continued and the same are therefore required to be quashed and set aside. 7. On the other hand learned advocate Ms. Nalini Lodha on caveat for the respondent-Bank submitted that there is nothing on record to show that the settlement was arrived at in the year 2018 between the petitioner and the respondent- Bank. It was further submitted that after the consent terms which were arrived at between the parties in the year 2010 and the Original Application was disposed of by the Debt Recovery Tribunal (for short ‘DRT’) by the order passed in the year 2011, the petitioners have failed to pay the outstanding dues as per the consent terms and therefore, the consent terms can not continue to operate. 7.1 It was submitted that the Recovery Officer has passed the order under the provisions of RDB Act and against such order an alternative efficacious remedy by preferring appeal under section 30 of the RDB Act before the Presiding Officer of the DRT is provided. Therefore, the petition is not required to be entertained. 7.2 It was further submitted that after the order dated 22.07.2022, the Recovery Officer has passed several orders which are not placed on record by the petitioner and now the properties which are mortgaged with the respondent- Bank are already scheduled to be auctioned in the month of December 2022. 8. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having perused the materials placed on record, at the outset, it is required to be noted that as per section 30 of the RDB Act an alternative efficacious remedy is available to the petitioner to challenge the order dated 22.07.2022, passed by the Recovery Officer in RP No. 75 of 2011. 9. 9. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner to issue writ of prohibition to quash and set aside the entire recovery proceedings is not tenable as the fact of the case reveals that petitioners have not abided by the consent terms which were arrived at between the parties in the year 2011, the decree passed by the DRT has achieved finality, therefore, as a necessary consequence, recovery proceedings are required to be continued as per the provisions of the RDB Act. If the petitioner is aggrieved by any of order passed by the recovery officer, the appropriate Forum to challenge such order, is the Presiding Officer of DRT under section 30 of the RDB Act. 10. The contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the respondent-Bank has preferred an application under section 7 of the IBC, which was later on withdrawn in the year 2020, the respondent-Bank cannot pursue the recovery proceedings are concerned, merely because the respondent Bank has availed remedy under the provisions of IBC, which was not pursued later on, it cannot be said that the right of the respondent-Bank is abandoned to recover the outstanding dues as per the order dated 11.08.2011 passed by the DRT, whereby the Recovery Certificate is issued as per the consent terms. 11. It is for the Recovery Officer to execute the order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal in the original proceedings No. 121 of 2010 filed by the erstwhile Dena Bank and ultimately, recovery is required to be made as per the provisions of the RDB Act. If the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are accepted it would stall the recovery proceedings and therefore the same cannot be entertained in this petition on the pretext of issuance of writ of prohibition. 12. Learned advocate for the petitioner has failed to point out as to how and why the Recovery Officer has no jurisdiction to continue the recovery proceedings pursuant to the order passed by the DRT, except the contention that as the respondent-Bank preferred application under the IBC which has withdrawn by the respondent-Bank and hence the recovery officer cannot recover the outstanding dues. 12.1 Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ of prohibition is issued primarily supervisory and the object of that writ is to restrain Court or inferior tribunals from exercising jurisdiction, which they do not possess or else to prevent them from exceeding the limits of their jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of S. Govinda Menon vs The Union Of India & Anr reported in AIR 1967 SC 1274 held that the writ of prohibition cannot be issued to inferior Court for an error of law unless, the error made is outside its jurisdiction. The petitioner cannot sustain any claim for writ of prohibition. Considering the facts of the instant case, the respondent-Bank has exercised in accordance with law. Hence, if the petitioner is aggrieved by any order passed by the Recovery Officer, appropriate remedy is available by preferring an appeal before the Presiding Officer of DRT under Section 30 of the RDB Act. It cannot be said that the proceedings before the Recovery Officer are without jurisdiction only because, the respondent-Bank preferred application under Section 7 of the IBC, which was withdrawn later, on the ground of settlement. 13. In view of the foregoing reasons, the petition is devoid of any merits. Rule is discharged. No order as to cost.