JUDGMENT : Sanjay K. Agrawal, J. 1. This appeal under Section 21(4) of National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 has been preferred by the appellant herein feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 04/10/2021 passed by Special Judge, NIA Act, Dantewada in Sessions Trial No. 112/2021 by which the second bail application filed by the appellant under Section 439 of CrPC has been rejected. 2. Mr. Kishore Narayan, learned counsel for the appellant, would submit that learned Special Judge is absolutely unjustified in rejecting appellant's bail application ignoring the fact that he is in jail since 18/07/2019 and two star prosecution witnesses namely Yogesh Girijogi (P.W.­1) and Sanjay Yadav (P.W.­2), both have been examined on 25/11/2021 and 26/11/2021, respectively and they have turned hostile and have not examined the case of the prosecution. He would further submit that in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 , delay in trial is a valid ground to grant bail and the bar of Section 43­D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 would not apply, therefore, the appellant is entitled to be released on bail. 3. On the other hand, Mr. Sunil Otwani, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the respondent/State would submit that since charges have been framed against the appellant and his first bail application has been rejected on merits vide order dated 20/02/2020 against which he preferred Criminal Appeal No. 602/2020 before this Court and it has also been dismissed on merits vide order dated 11/01/2021, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 a prima facie case is made out against the appellant for denying bail. He would further submit that though two prosecution witnesses have been examined and they have turned hostile, but they have been examined after the first bail application filed by the appellant was rejected. Therefore, since this ground was not taken before the Court of learned Special Judge (NIA Act), it may not be considered by this Court. He would further submit that though two prosecution witnesses have been examined and they have turned hostile, but they have been examined after the first bail application filed by the appellant was rejected. Therefore, since this ground was not taken before the Court of learned Special Judge (NIA Act), it may not be considered by this Court. Even otherwise, merit of evidence of the witnesses should not be considered at the time of grant or non­grant of bail as held by the Supreme Court in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed. 4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and went through the records with utmost circumspection. 5. Admittedly and undisputedly, appellant's first bail application has been rejected by the Special Judge on merits vide order dated 20/02/2020 against which he preferred Criminal Appeal No. 602/2020 which has also been dismissed by this Court on merits vide order dated 11/01/2021. When the second bail application was preferred by the appellant, there was no change in circumstances and it has also been dismissed vide order impugned dated 04/10/2021. Now, two prosecution witnesses namely Yogesh Girijogi (P.W.­1) and Sanjay Yadav (P.W.­2) have been examined on 25/11/2021 and 26/11/2021, respectively and they have turned hostile and have not supported the case of the prosecution. 6. In the matter of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at the stage of grant or non­grant of bail and held as under :­ “24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage – of giving reasons for grant or non­grant of bail – is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.” 7. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.” 7. Likewise, in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) the Supreme Court has clearly held that Section 43­D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. It has been held in paragraphs 26 and 27 as under :­ “26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43­D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge­sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first chargesheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge­sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge­sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case. 27. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case. 27. For that, the totality of the material gathered by the investigating agency and presented along with the report and including the case diary, is required to be reckoned and not by analysing individual pieces of evidence or circumstance. In any case, the question of discarding the document at this stage, on the ground of being inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible. For, the issue of admissibility of the document/evidence would be a matter for trial. The Court must look at the contents of the document and take such document into account as it is.” 8. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that in the instant case charges have been framed against the appellant and learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any material on record to establish that prima facie case is made out for setting aside the order impugned passed by learned Special Judge rejecting the second bail application of the appellant and for granting bail to him except that two prosecution witnesses have now been examined and they have turned hostile, but in our considered opinion, the detailed examination of evidence is not required at this stage in this proceeding and it is required to be considered at the stage of trial by learned Special Judge (NIA Act). 9. The next contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is in jail since 18/07/2019 i.e. for about two years and eight months and he would rely upon the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter of K.A. Najeeb (supra) wherein it has been held that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43­D(5) of the Act of 1967 per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment state as under :­ “17. Paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment state as under :­ “17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43­D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43­D(5) of the UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial. 18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected.” 10. In our considered opinion, in the instant case, charge­sheet has been filed against the appellant and charges have been framed and he is facing trial for offences punishable under Sections 20, 38(2) and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 wherein two witnesses have also been examined. In our considered opinion, in the instant case, charge­sheet has been filed against the appellant and charges have been framed and he is facing trial for offences punishable under Sections 20, 38(2) and 39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 wherein two witnesses have also been examined. Even otherwise, the first bail application filed by the appellant herein was considered and it has been dismissed on merits vide order dated 20/02/2020 against which criminal appeal No. 602/2020 was also preferred by him before this Court but that has also been dismissed vide order dated 11/01/2021 and thereafter, his second bail application has also been considered and dismissed on merits vide impugned order dated 04/10/2021. As such, it is not a case where the appellant's fundamental right is being violated and he is not being heard while he is in detention. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the instant appeal lacks merit. 11. Accordingly, this criminal appeal deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed. However, learned trial Court will do well to dispose of the criminal case pending against the appellant expeditiously.