JUDGMENT : 1. The present Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the original plaintiff, being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 30.11.2004 passed by the learned Assistant Judge, Bhavnagar in Regular Civil Appeal NO.162 of 2002, whereby the First Appellate Court has set aside the judgment and decree dated 17.10.2002 passed in Regular Civil Suit No.995 of 1993 by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Bhavnagar. 2. The present appeal has been admitted for the following substantial questions of law. “1) Whether a select list can be operated qua a candidate below in the select list particularly when there is no provision of law limiting the life of the select list? (2) Whether candidates belonging to reserved category below in the select list can be appointed ignoring the candidates belonging the general category? (3) Whether any time limit as regards appointment on compassionate appointment can be prescribed and in the facts and circumstances of the present case such a time limit was prescribed?” 3. The appellant is the original plaintiff and the respondents are the original defendants. For the brevity and convenience, the parties are referred to in this judgment as per their status before the Trial Court i.e. plaintiff and defendants. 4. The plaintiff filed Regular Civil Suit No.995 of 1993 before the learned Trial Court, inter alia, contending that his father was working in the defendant and he came to be retired upon attaining the age of superannuation. It is the case of the plaintiff that there is Standing Order No.295 dated 19.12.1981 of the defendant and as per clause 9 thereof, provision was made to give service to the children of the retired employee of the defendant and there was also provisions made for age relaxation to such persons. That the plaintiff under the provisions of General Standing Order (herein after referred to as G.S.O.) applied for the post of meter reader on 24.04.1990 to the defendant and he came to be declared as successful in the interview. It is the further case of the plaintiff that waiting list was prepared of 14 successful candidates and his name was placed at Sr.No.5 therein. 4.1. It is the further case of the plaintiff that waiting list was prepared of 14 successful candidates and his name was placed at Sr.No.5 therein. 4.1. According to the plaintiff, out of 14 candidates, 9 candidates were appointed who were helper and candidates at Sr.Nos.1, 6 and 7 were appointed as meter reader in the year 1990 and thereafter candidate at Sr.No.2, namely Mr.V.K.Gohil came to be appointed in the year 1992 by the defendant. 4.2. Further, it is the case of the plaintiff that despite he was placed at Sr.No.5 in the said list, he was not given appointment and other candidates having the same category and whose names appeared below the plaintiff, were given appointment by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also contended that he had enough experience as a meter reader and despite the number of communications for appointing him, he has not been appointed as meter reader and instead on 27.12.1993, he was called for the interview by the defendant. The plaintiff has challenged this action of calling him for interview and filed a suit for declaration and injunction and prayed to declare that the selection panel dated 24.04.1990 for the post of meter reader is still in force and for directing the defendant to give appointment to the plaintiff on the post of meter reader and for ancillary reliefs. 5. It appears from the record that on service of summons, the defendant no.1 did not filed any reply, but, reply was filed on behalf of respondent no.2 at Exhibit 9. The contention of the defendant is that it has not issued G.S.O. No.295 dated 19.12.1988. It has contended that selection panel dated 24.04.1990 for the post of meter reader was prepared by the defendant and the said selection panel has life of one year as per the rules of the defendant and after expiry of period of one year, the plaintiff cannot claim any relief based on such list. It is also contended that candidates at Sr.No.1, 6 and 7 of the selection list have been given appointment under the quota of S.E.B.C. It has also contended that Mr.V.K.Gohil who was appointed has no relationship with the said list. It is also contended that the defendant no.1 in July 1990 withdrew the power to give any appointment vested in defendant no.2. It is also contended that the defendant no.1 in July 1990 withdrew the power to give any appointment vested in defendant no.2. It is further contention of the defendant that the plaintiff’s father retired in the year 1978 and G.S.O. 295 came to be implemented with effect from 19.12.1981 and therefore the same is not applicable in the case of the plaintiff. It has ultimately prayed to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff. It has also contended that though the G.S.O. 295 dated 19.12.1981 is not applicable in the case of the plaintiff on humanitarian ground, he was called for an interview on 26.12.1993. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court has framed issues at Exhibit 24 in vernacular language, which on translation in English, would run as under:- 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the acts of the defendant in not appointing him under the G.S.O.295, though he was selected in a select list dated 24.04.1990, is illegal and arbitrary? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that as he was selected in a panel list dated 24.04.1990, he has right of permanent appointment? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that though his name appeared at sr.no.5 in the list, the defendant has made an illegality in appointing other candidates whose name appears after his name? 4. Whether the defendant proves that selection list was limited for one year only? 5. Whether the defendant proves that they have not issued any G.S.O. to give service to the family members of retired employees as per Rule 9 of the G.S.O. dated 19.12.1988? 6. Whether the defendant proves that G.S.O. 295 is not applicable to the plaintiff? 7. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief as prayed for? 8. What order and decree? 7. It appears from the record that on the basis of the evidence on record and the submission of both the sides, the Trial Court has decided issue nos.1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 in negative whereas issue no.5 in affirmative and issue no.7 in partly affirmative and has ultimately partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff directing the defendant to appoint the plaintiff as meter reader within a period of one month. 8. 8. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 17.10.2002, the defendant board has preferred the Regular Civil Appeal before the District Court Bhavnagar which was registered as Regular Civil Appeal NO.162 of 2002. The same came to be heard by the learned Assistant Judge, Bhavnagar. 9. The learned Assistant Judge, Bhavnagar has heard both the learned advocates appearing for the parties and has framed following points in para no.6 of his judgment:- “(a) Whether the said Judgement and decree delivered and passed by the Trial Court in connection of Regular Civil Suit NO. 995 of 1993 it is Illegal, invalid and/or arbitrary ? If yes, how ? (b) Whether the said Judgement and decree delivered and passed by the Trial Court requires and deserves to be interfered and/or abstructed with by invoking appellate jurisdiction, invested under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code ? (c) What order and decree ?” 10. Learned Assistant Judge, Bhavnagar has decided point nos. A and B in affirmative and ultimately set aside the impugned judgment of the Trial Court and allowed the First Appeal vide his judgment and decree dated 30.11.2004. The judgment and the decree of the First Appellate Court is under challenge in this Second Appeal. 11. Heard learned advocate Mr.Chetankumar V. Darji for Mr.Ashish Dagli for the appellant-plaintiff and Ms.Lilu K. Bhaya learned advocate for the respondents-defendants at length. Perused the written submissions made on behalf of both the sides and the decisions cited at bar. 12. Learned advocate Mr.Darji has vehemently submitted the same facts which are narrated in the pleadings of the parties and the evidence on record. He has vehemently submitted that as per the G.S.O.295 of the defendant there was provisions of giving appointment to the children of the retired employees of the Board. He has submitted that as per clause 9 thereof, there is provision of age relaxation and also for giving appointment to the children of the retired employee. He has submitted that the plaintiff’s father was serving with the defendant and he retired and thereafter there was selection process conducted for the meter readers posts. He has submitted that the defendant has prepared selection panel on 24.04.1990, wherein name of the plaintiff came to be placed at sr. no.5. He has submitted that there was no provisions of any time limit for operation of the said list. He has submitted that the defendant has prepared selection panel on 24.04.1990, wherein name of the plaintiff came to be placed at sr. no.5. He has submitted that there was no provisions of any time limit for operation of the said list. He has submitted that despite the plaintiff’s name at sr.no.5, no appointment was given to him and rather appointment was given to the candidates of sr.nos.6 and 7. He has submitted that the action of the defendant in not giving appointment to the plaintiff and giving appointment to the persons, whose names appear subsequent to the name of the plaintiff in the select list, is an arbitrary and illegal action on the part of the defendant. 12.1. Mr.Darji has also submitted that before the Trial Court vide exhibit 29, G.S.O. 295 came to be produced wherein rule 9(2) clearly provides that the children of the employee shall be given preference in the employment of the board in comparison of other candidates and also provides age relaxation of 40 years. According to him, as per this clause of G.S.O.295, the children of the retired employee who apply for any post in the board will be given preference over other applicants having equal qualification/ experience and also age relaxation of 40 years. He has submitted that this provision is clearly applicable to the case of the plaintiff as his father was retired employee of the defendant Board and he has been rightly considered under G.S.O. 295 for empanelling him in selection list. 12.2. He has also submitted that the select list was produced before the Trial Court at exhibit 32 wherein name of the plaintiff appears at sr. no.5. He has stated that though his name was at sr.no.5, he was not offered an appointment and the persons whose name appears after him came to be appointed by the defendant and thus there is a discriminatory treatment meted out to the plaintiff. 12.3. Mr.Darji has also submitted that as per the contention of the defendant, the select list at exhibit 32 was to operate only for one year. He has submitted that this version of the defendant cannot be sustainable in the eyes of law as defendant being a statutory authority has to produce such rules before the Court, but, it has not produced any rules regarding the life of the selection list. He has submitted that this version of the defendant cannot be sustainable in the eyes of law as defendant being a statutory authority has to produce such rules before the Court, but, it has not produced any rules regarding the life of the selection list. He has submitted that though the list is of the year 1990, as per the version of the defendant, the life of the list was only one year, and yet in 1992, the defendant has appointed Mr.V.K.Gohil from the select list whose name appears at sr.no.2. According to him, this fact itself suggest that the life of the select list was not only for one year, but, it was to be remained in force till all the candidates are appointed. 12.4. He has submitted that the Trial Court, after considering all these facts, has rightly passed the decree in favour of the plaintiff. However, the appellate Court has set aside the said decree by the impugned judgment and decree, relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Harish Chandra & Ors Respondents reported in 1996 0 AIR(SC) 2173. He has submitted that the First Appellate Court has committed error by relying upon para 10 of the said judgment and has not read the entire judgment and has committed serious error of facts and law in setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court. Mr.Darji has submitted that the facts of the judgment of the Apex Court was totally different from the facts of the present case. He has submitted that as per the facts of the case before the Apex Court, the selection list in question was valid only for one year and the authority concerned has framed the rules to that effect and under that circumstances the Hon’ble Apex Court held that based upon the selection list, the candidate has no right. According to Mr.Darji, however in the facts of the present case, no such rules have been framed by the defendant authority defining the life time of the selection list. He has submitted that therefore, the decisions relied upon by the First Appellate Court is not binding to the facts of the present case. According to Mr.Darji, however in the facts of the present case, no such rules have been framed by the defendant authority defining the life time of the selection list. He has submitted that therefore, the decisions relied upon by the First Appellate Court is not binding to the facts of the present case. He has also submitted that when the defendant has appointed other persons in 1992, goes to show that there was no limit of one year as alleged by the defendant for operation of the selection list. 12.5. Mr.Darji has vehemently submitted that the First Appellate Court has committed serious error of facts and law in reversing the decree passed in favour of the plaintiff and to allow the second appeal. He has also submitted that the plaintiff is pursuing this litigation since the year 1993 and at present he is aged about 53 years and he has wrongly been denied the job by the defendant and therefore, by setting aside the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, to restore the judgment of the Trial Court and direct the board to appoint the plaintiff with all consequential relief. Mr.Darji has relied upon the judgment in case of State of U.P. (Supra). 13. Per contra, learned advocate Ms.Lilu Bhaya for the respondent-defendant has vehemently submitted that there is no dispute regarding the preparation of the select list and name of the plaintiff at sr. no.5 therein. She has submitted that as per the penal report, there were three posts of meter reader vacant in the concerned circle and two posts were meant for S.E.B.C. and accordingly, three persons from sr.nos.1, 6 and 7 from the select list came to be appointed. She has submitted that considering possibility of more vacancy of meter readers in future, 11 candidates from S.E.B.C, 11 candidates from dependents of retired employees and 19 unreserved class 4 employees according to their seniority were called for an interview on 24.04.1990. She has submitted that the plaintiff appellant has applied as per G.S.O. no.295 dated 19.12.1981. She has submitted that according to clause 9(1) thereof, in case of deceased employees, one dependent of the said employee would be employed by the Board on any vacant post for which such dependent holds necessary qualification/experience. She has submitted that as per clause 9(2), preference to the dependent of retired employees was to be given. She has submitted that according to clause 9(1) thereof, in case of deceased employees, one dependent of the said employee would be employed by the Board on any vacant post for which such dependent holds necessary qualification/experience. She has submitted that as per clause 9(2), preference to the dependent of retired employees was to be given. She has submitted that considering these two distinguishing features, there is no any right of an employment available to any of the dependent of the retired employee. She has submitted that though the plaintiff’s father retired in the year 1977 and G.S.O. 295 was of the year 1981, the plaintiff was called for interview and his name was included in the list. Ms.Bhaya has also submitted that the plaintiff was called for interview in the year 1993, but he has failed in the written examination. She has submitted that the First Appellate Court has rightly appreciated the facts and law and has rightly set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the Trial Court. She has submitted that merely having name in the selection list does not give any right to get appointment on the post vested in such person. She has submitted that appellate Court has rightly followed the decisions of the Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. (Supra), while referring to the oral evidence of the parties as well as the copy of the G.S.O. in the select list she has submitted that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court was not legal and valid and therefore the board has preferred the First Appeal and the first appellate Court has rightly set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 13.1. During her submissions, she has also referred to certain circulars of the Board which was not produced before the Trial Court. She has also referred to the Government Resolutions which was not referred to before the Trial Court or before the First Appellate Court. She has prayed to dismiss the present Second Appeal. 14. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides coupled with the records and proceedings of the Trial Court and the judgment of both the Courts below and the decisions cited at bar, it reveals that there is no dispute regarding the facts that the plaintiff’s father was employee of the defendant. 14. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides coupled with the records and proceedings of the Trial Court and the judgment of both the Courts below and the decisions cited at bar, it reveals that there is no dispute regarding the facts that the plaintiff’s father was employee of the defendant. It is admitted facts that the plaintiff’s father has retired prior to issuance of G.S.O.295 on 19.12.1981. It is also admitted facts that on the basis of the provisions of the G.S.O.295, the plaintiff was called for interview and he came to be selected and his name came to be included in a select list at sr.no.5 on 24.04.1990. It is also admitted facts that out of the panel, at sr.nos.1, 6 and 7 came to be appointed in the year 1991. It is undisputed that in the year 1992, one Mr.V.K.Gohil at sr.no.2 came to be appointed in the year 1992. It is also admitted facts that the plaintiff has not been appointed on the basis of the selection list and he was called for interview in the year 1993. 15. The legal questions framed for determination of the present appeal revolves upon the legal aspect as to whether there could be any time limit as regards to the appointment of compensatory appointment and whether select list can be operated qua a candidate below in the select list particularly when there is no provision of law limiting the life of the select list. At this juncture, it is worthwhile to refer the provisions made by the defendant in G.S.O. 295 dated 19.12.1981 which is at Exhibit-32, the same reads as under:- “Explanation Of Defendants 1. In case of deceased employees. In case an employee dies during service in the Board, one dependent (child or spouse) would be employed by the Board on any vacant post for which such dependent holds the necessary qualifications/experience. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/ are already employed within or outside the Board. 2. In case of retired employees. Dependent children of retired employees who apply for posts advertised by the Board, will be given preference over other applicants having equal qualifications/ experience. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/ are already employed within or outside the Board. 2. In case of retired employees. Dependent children of retired employees who apply for posts advertised by the Board, will be given preference over other applicants having equal qualifications/ experience. This benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee is/are already employed within or outside the Board. In both the above cases of recruitment, in relaxation of the maximum age prescribed, the maximum age limit would be considered to be 40 years of age. EXPLANATION Family member means a child only. Such appointment will be made with the prior approval of the Head Office.” 16. Considering the aforesaid provisions of G.S.O. 295, it clearly appears that in case of deceased employee, the dependent of such employee has been vested with right to have appointment on any vacant post for which such dependent holds necessary qualification or experience. However, there is rider that this benefit would not be available in cases where one or more members of the family of the deceased employee/is/are already employed within or outside the Board. Thus, the right of the dependent of the deceased employee is also not absolute but qualified one. At the same time, so far as the dependent children of the retired employee is concerned, the provision is made only for giving preference over other applicants having equal qualification / experience. Thus, there is no guarantee to such dependent of the retired employee to be appointed in the board. The only right available to the dependent of the retired employee is preferential treatment in selection procedure. 17. At this juncture, the decision of the Apex Court upon which reliance has been placed by both the sides is to be referred to. The Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. & Ors.(Supra) in para nos.9 and 10 has observed as under:- “9. Coming to the merits of the matter, in view of the Statutory Rules contained in the Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules the conclusion is irresistible that a select list prepared under the Recruitment Rules has its life only for one year from the date of the preparation of the list and it expires thereafter. Coming to the merits of the matter, in view of the Statutory Rules contained in the Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules the conclusion is irresistible that a select list prepared under the Recruitment Rules has its life only for one year from the date of the preparation of the list and it expires thereafter. Rule 26 is extracted hereinbelow in extenso : 26. Appointment by appointing authority.- The select list referred to in Sub-rules (6) and (7) of Rule 23 shall be forwarded by the Selection Committee to the appointing authority mentioning the aggregate marks obtained at the selection by each candidates. The name of general and reserve candidates shall be arranged by the appointing authority in a common list according to the merit of the candidates and the appointment shall be offered in the order in which the names are arranged in the list shall hold good for a period of one year from the date of selection. 10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Statutory Rule and without applying the mind to the aforesaid Rule the High Court relying upon some earlier decisions of the Court came to hold that the list does not expire after a period of one year which on the face of it is erroneous. Further question that arises in this context is whether the High Court was justified in issuing the mandamus to the appellant to make recruitment of the Writ Petitioners. Under the Constitution a mandamus can be issued by the Court when the applicant establishes that he has a legal right to the performance of legal duty by the party against whom the mandamus is sought and said right was subsisting on the date of the petition. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. The duty that may be enjoined by mandamus may be one imposed by the Constitution or a Statute or by Rules or orders having the force of law. But no mandamus can be issued to direct the Government to refrain from enforcing the provisions of law or to do something which is contrary to law. This being the position and in view of the Statutory rule contained in Rule 26 of the Recruitment Rules we really fail to understand how the High Court could issue the impugned direction to recruit the respondents who were included in the select list prepared on 4.4.87 and the list no longer survived after one year and the rights, if any, of persons included in the list did not subsist. In the course of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents, no doubt have pointed out some materials which indicate that the Administrative Authorities have made the appointments from a list beyond the period of one year from its preparation. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that in some cases pursuance to the direction of the Court some appointments have been made but in some other cases it might have been done by the Appointing Authority. Even though we are persuaded to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents that on some occasion appointments have been made by the Appointing Authority from a select list even after the expiry of one year from the date of selection but such illegal action of the Appointing Authority does not confer a right on an applicant to be enforced by a Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that such appointments by the Appointing Authority have been made contrary to the provisions of the Statutory Rules for some unknown reason and we deprecate the practice adopted by the Appointing Authority in making such appointments contrary to the Statutory Rules. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4.4.87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not.” 18. Now, it is clear from the aforesaid observation of the Apex Court that in that case, there was a specific statutory rules regarding the life time of the select list for one year from the date of selection. So far as the present case is concerned, the stand of the defendant is that the select list has time limit of only one year. However, to substantiate the same, the defendant has not produced any documentary evidence before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court. However, during the course of the argument before this Court, the learned advocate for the defendant has submitted the copy of one confidential letter dated 14.08.1974, wherein it is addressed to the Superintending Engineers of the entire State from the Head Office and it pertains to intimation of selection of the candidates. It is also conveyed to the concerned officers that the list would be valid only for one year from the date of selection. This letter has been titled as confidential. However, considering the judicial matter, the defendant ought to have placed this letter before the Trial Court or before the First Appellate Court by way of filing the appropriate application or by production thereof. In absence thereof, the Trial Court has presumed that the selection list is operative beyond one year. The observations of the Trial Court for operation of the select list is on the ground that one Mr.V.K.Gohil who stands at sr.no.2 in the select list has been appointed in the year 1992. In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that it is the consistent stand of the defendant that the appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil in the year 1992 is not based upon the said select list but it was due to the order of the Head Office. In this regard, it is pertinent to observe that it is the consistent stand of the defendant that the appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil in the year 1992 is not based upon the said select list but it was due to the order of the Head Office. On perusal of the oral evidence produced on record, it transpires that the case as put up by the defendant during the cross-examination of the plaintiff in respect of the appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil is to the effect that father of Mr.V.K.Gohil died during the service as an employee of G.E.B. and therefore on that compensate ground he was appointed. This fact has been put to a plaintiff in his cross-examination but the plaintiff has stated that he has no such knowledge in respect of death of the father of Mr.V.K.Gohil during his continuous service as an employee of the jail. At this juncture it is pertinent to note that during the course of argument on behalf of defendant Ms.Bhaya has relied upon the correspondence entered into between the defendants for appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil on that ground. But no such documentary evidence has been placed on record before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court by way of documentary evidence. Therefore, those documents cannot be taken into consideration without being executed in evidence. The present matter is the Second Appeal under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code and therefore, each party has to follow the procedures laid down in the Civil Procedure Code for production of the document in proper manner. However, it is pertinent to note that even if defendant has appointed a person from the select list after one year, that does not give any absolute right to the plaintiff to that appointment merely because his name stands in a select list. 19. At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that name of Mr.V.K.Gohil appears prior to the plaintiff as the name of Mr.V.K.Gohil is at sr.no.2 now it is not the case of the plaintiff that after appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil the defendant has also given an appointment to the candidate at sr.no.3 and 4 whose name appears prior to the name of plaintiff. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that the other persons whose names appears in select list at sr.nos.8 to 14, were appointed after the year 1992 or prior to the filing of the suit. It is also not the case of the plaintiff that the other persons whose names appears in select list at sr.nos.8 to 14, were appointed after the year 1992 or prior to the filing of the suit. Even any action of appointment of Mr.V.K.Gohil is made by the authority in the year 1992 does not confirm a right of the plaintiff to get appointment merely on the basis of his name in select list, there is no vested right in the plaintiff for getting appointment on the basis of his name in the selection list. 20. It also appears from the record that the appointment to the candidate at sr.nos.6 and 7 whose name appears below the name of the plaintiff were made due to the roster policy of the Government as candidate at sr.nos.6 and 7 belong to S.E.B.C. Therefore, when the authority follows the resolution and policy of the Government then in doing so, appointment is given to the reserved candidate whose name appears below the name of the unreserved candidate does not ipso facto be termed as an illegal one. 21. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the substantial questions raised in the present appeal deserved to be decided as under:- (i) In negative. (ii) In affirmative. (iii) Time limit as regards appointment or compensate appointment can be prescribed. In the present case, the case of the plaintiff does not fall under the category of compensate appointment and his case falls only for a preferential treatment in selection. 22. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. Hence, I pass the following final order in the interest of justice. ORDER (i) The present Second Appeal stands dismissed. (ii) Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear respective cost of this appeal. (iii) The amount of Rs.2,000/- deposit by the appellant be refunded to him. (iv) Decree to be drawn accordingly in this appeal. (v) Along with the copy of this judgment and decree, Records and Proceedings be sent back to the Trial Court.