JUDGMENT : 1. These cases are taken up through video conferencing. 2. W.P.(C) No.1025 of 2021 has been filed for quashing the order dated 08.02.2021 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi-cum-The Revisional Authority under the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act, 2011’) in JBC Revision Case No.14 of 2020, whereby the revision preferred by M/s Maya Printers & Stationeries (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the tenant’) against the order dated 13.11.2020 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sadar Ranchi (in short ‘HRC’) in JBC No.22 of 2018 has been rejected. Further prayer has been made for quashing the order dated 13.11.2020 passed by the HRC in JBC No.22 of 2018 in terms of which the defence of the tenant against the eviction case has been struck off. 3. W.P.(C) No.994 of 2020 has been filed by Vinay Goenka (hereinafter referred as the ‘landlord’) for issuance of direction upon the HRC to expeditiously decide JBC No.22 of 2018 filed by him for eviction of the tenants (respondent nos.2 and 3). 4. The factual background of the case, as stated in the writ petitions, is that the landlord instituted JBC No.22 of 2018 for eviction of the tenants under section 19(1)(a)(c)(d) of the Act, 2011 before HRC claiming that they violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed and defaulted in making payment of rent since April 2017. It was also averred in the said case that the premises was required by the landlord for own use and occupation. The tenant appeared and filed written statement and denied violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed or any default in payment of rent. It was submitted that the landlord did not have requirement of the suit premises and, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit. During pendency of the said proceeding, the landlord filed a petition on 02.11.2018 under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 for issuance of direction upon the tenants to make payment of arrears of rent since April, 2017 as well as to deposit the current rent @ Rs.30,000/- per month. During pendency of the said proceeding, the landlord filed a petition on 02.11.2018 under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 for issuance of direction upon the tenants to make payment of arrears of rent since April, 2017 as well as to deposit the current rent @ Rs.30,000/- per month. The said petition was contested by the tenant denying its liability for payment of arrears of rent, however, vide order dated 18.12.2018 the HRC directed the tenant to deposit arrears of rent due to the landlord before the Court of HRC from March 2018 @ Rs.15,000/- per month as also the current rent within first week of each succeeding month. It was also ordered that since one of the tenants i.e. M/s. Maya Intelligence and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. had not been appearing regularly, the case was declared ex-Parte against the said tenant and hence it was not possible to order the said tenant to make payment of its part of rent @ Rs.15,000/- per month. In compliance of the said order dated 18.12.2018, the tenant deposited a sum of Rs.1,65,000/- on 25.01.2019 and a sum of Rs.75,000/- on 02.08.2019 before the Court of HRC, which were duly received by the landlord without any objection or demur. The tenant further deposited a sum of Rs.30,000/- through cheque, however, the landlord did not encash the said cheque deliberately in order to get it dishonoured, therefore, apprehending mischief the tenant filed a petition on 01.11.2019 before the HRC informing the said authority about the said mischief of the landlord. Thereafter, the landlord presented the said cheque for clearance which was honoured on 11.12.2019. The tenant had the intention to comply the order dated 18.12.2018 passed by the HRC, however, unfortunately the youngest son of the tenant, namely, Ujjwal Prakash Tiwari met with an accident on 27.10.2019 and the tenant and other family members were busy towards treatment of her youngest son and were out of station. In the meantime, the landlord filed a petition dated 04.02.2020 for striking-off the defence against eviction of the tenant under section 27(1) of the Act, 2011 for alleged non-compliance of the order dated 18.12.2018. A rejoinder was filed on behalf of the tenant on 10.11.2020, opposing the petition dated 04.02.2020. It was stated in the said rejoinder that entire events occurring since October, 2019 were beyond her control, causing great difficulty to her firm. A rejoinder was filed on behalf of the tenant on 10.11.2020, opposing the petition dated 04.02.2020. It was stated in the said rejoinder that entire events occurring since October, 2019 were beyond her control, causing great difficulty to her firm. However, the learned HRC vide order dated 13.11.2020 passed an order striking off the defence of the tenant. The tenant preferred revision before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, which was registered as JBC Revision No.14 of 2020 and was finally dismissed by the impugned order dated 08.02.2021. Hence the present writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the tenant [petitioner of W.P.(C) No.1025 of 2021] submits that the HRC while passing the order dated 13.11.2020 committed an error of record by holding that no rejoinder was filed against the petition dated 04.02.2020 and proceeded wholly on erroneous presumption. It is further submitted that the learned HRC as well as the revisional authority, both, failed to appreciate that the tenant had bona fide intention of complying the order dated 18.12.2018, but due to the reasons beyond its control, there was some delay in depositing the rent though substantial portion of arrears of rent was deposited. It is further submitted that the HRC and the Commissioner failed to appreciate that the tenant was prevented from depositing the entire rent in pursuance of the order dated 18.12.2018 for the reason beyond its control. The HRC and the revisional authority have failed to appreciate that there has been no deliberate disobedience of the order dated 18.12.2018 by the tenant. The tenant was also deprived of cross-examining the landlord who had filed his evidence on oath, due to which serious prejudice was caused to the tenant. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the landlord [respondent of W.P.(C) No.1025 of 2021] submits that M/s. Maya Printers & Stationeries and Maya Intelligence & Security Services Private Ltd. were jointly inducted as tenants for fixed term of 11 months by virtue of deed of lease dated 4th June 2016 on a monthly rent of Rs.30,000/- for the entire premises. It is further submitted that in accordance with the agreement, lease period was to start from 1st June, 2016 and to end on 30th April 2017. It was also agreed by the tenants that they would pay electricity charges as well as building maintenance charges to the society. It is further submitted that in accordance with the agreement, lease period was to start from 1st June, 2016 and to end on 30th April 2017. It was also agreed by the tenants that they would pay electricity charges as well as building maintenance charges to the society. The tenants were, however, irregular in making payment of electricity bill and building maintenance charges and, accordingly, both of them were liable to be evicted from the premises in terms with the provision of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act, 2011. Since the tenants were neither paying rent nor were remitting the same through money order, they committed default in making payment of rent. As such, the landlord filed a suit for eviction before the HRC vide J.B.C No.22/2018. During pendency of the said case, the landlord filed application under Section 27 of the Act, 2011 for realization of outstanding rent lying against the tenants and after hearing both the parties, the HRC passed the order dated 18.12.2018 directing the tenant to make payment of Rs.15,000/- since March, 2018 including payment of monthly rent till disposal of the case. It was also observed in the said order that the rent for the period from April, 2017 to February, 2018 would be looked into at the time of disposal of the case. The tenants were irregular in making payment of rent and, therefore, the landlord filed an application dated 10.05.2019 before the HRC to "struck off" the right of defence of the tenants. The tenant had merely paid arrears of rent of Rs.1,65,000/- on 25.01.2019 through demand draft and further deposited Rs.15,000/- as well as Rs.60,000/- through two demand drafts on 02.08.2019 in favour of the landlord. The tenants further made payment of Rs.30,000/-, but failed to deposit outstanding dues which was lying against them till February, 2020. The landlord preferred an application dated 04.02.2020 for "strucking off" the defence of the tenant, but the tenant did not bother to file its reply and when the matter was listed on 27.10.2020, it filed a time petition which was not entertained and, accordingly, the matter was listed on 10.11.2020 for “Order”. However, on 10.11.2020 the tenant tactfully filed rejoinder against the petition dated 04.02.2020, which was rejected by the learned court below vide order dated 13.11.2020, striking off the right of defence of the tenant in JBC No.22/2018. However, on 10.11.2020 the tenant tactfully filed rejoinder against the petition dated 04.02.2020, which was rejected by the learned court below vide order dated 13.11.2020, striking off the right of defence of the tenant in JBC No.22/2018. The tenant then challenged the said order by filing a revision being JBC Revision Case No.14/2020 before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, which was also rejected vide order dated 08.02.2021. It is further submitted that ample time and opportunities were given to the tenant, but no reply to the petition of the landlord dated 04.02.2020 was filed till 27.10.2020, however, the same was filed on 10.11.2020 when the matter was fixed for "Orders". It is also submitted that the tenant had intended to get rid of the liability on the pretext of pandemic and lockdown, though there was no such situation, moreover it was not regular in making payment of rent. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials placed on record. 8. The learned counsel for the tenant puts reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Kamla Devi v. Vasdev, reported in (1995) 1 SCC 356 , wherein it has been held that it is not obligatory for the Rent Controller to strike out the defence of the tenant under Section 15(7) of the Delhi Act, if the tenant fails to make payment as per an order passed under Section 15(1). The discretion of the Controller whether such a drastic order should or should not be passed must depend upon the facts of the case. The power to strike out the defence against eviction is discretionary and must not be mechanically exercised without applying mind to the facts of the case. 9. Learned counsel for the tenant puts further reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Bimal Chand Jain Vs. Gopal Agarwal, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 486 , wherein it has been held as under:- “6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order 15 that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Gopal Agarwal, reported in (1981) 3 SCC 486 , wherein it has been held as under:- “6. It seems to us on a comprehensive understanding of Rule 5 of Order 15 that the true construction of the Rule should be thus. Sub-rule (1) obliges the defendant to deposit, at or before the first hearing of the suit, the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and further, whether or not he admits any amount to be due, to deposit regularly throughout the continuation of the suit the monthly amount due within a week from the date of its accrual. In the event of any default in making any deposit, “the court may subject to the provisions of subrule (2) strike off his defence”. We shall presently come to what this means. Sub-rule (2) obliges the court, before making an order for striking off the defence to consider any representation made by the defendant in that behalf. In other words, the defendant has been vested with a statutory right to make a representation to the court against his defence being struck off. If a representation is made the court must consider it on its merits, and then decide whether the defence should or should not be struck off. This is a right expressly vested in the defendant and enables him to show by bringing material on the record that he has not been guilty of the default alleged or if the default has occurred there is good reason for it. Now, it is not impossible that the record may contain such material already. In that event, can it be said that sub-rule (1) obliges the court to strike off the defence? We must remember that an order under sub-rule (1) striking off the defence is in the nature of a penalty. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. A serious responsibility rests on the court in the matter and the power is not to be exercised mechanically. There is a reserve of discretion vested in the court entitling it not to strike off the defence if on the facts and circumstances already existing on the record it finds good reason for not doing so. It will always be a matter for the judgment of the court to decide whether on the material before it, notwithstanding the absence of a representation under sub-rule (2), the defence should or should not be struck off. The word “may” in sub-rule (1) merely vested power in the court to strike off the defence. It does not oblige it to do so in every case of default. To that extent, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Court in Puran Chand [ Civil Revision No. 356 of 1978, decided on October 30, 1980]. We are of opinion that the High Court has placed an unduly narrow construction on the provisions of clause (1) of Rule 5 of Order 15.” 10. In the case of Manmohan Kaur Vs. Surya Kant Bhagwandi, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 698 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “6. In the case of Manju Choudhary v. Dulal Kumar Chandra [ (1988) 1 SCC 363 ] it was held that if there was ‘unexplained delay’ then the court is bound to strike off the defence. There was observation that there is a duty cast on the court to strike off the defence if there is failure to deposit the rent in terms of the order of Section 13 of the Act. The said observations would apply to the facts of this case and, therefore, the court must from a proper perspective judge the question whether the delay or failure to deposit the rent in terms of order under Section 13 of the Act has been properly explained and if that delay has been properly explained, then the court has a discretion to excuse the delay, but if the delay has not been properly explained then the court has no discretion. In our opinion, such a construction would be a harmonious rendering of the language of Section 13 to the claim for justice in each particular case. Therefore, the court should consider whether the delay has been reasonably explained or not. In our opinion, such a construction would be a harmonious rendering of the language of Section 13 to the claim for justice in each particular case. Therefore, the court should consider whether the delay has been reasonably explained or not. In construing that question the court in the scheme of the administration of justice must take a constructive and purpose-oriented approach. If it does, then the element of discretion comes into play though not in the form of directory or mandatory provision but in considering whether the delay was property explained or not. In the facts of this case, we find that there is good deal of justification for the delay and the delay has been properly explained in the background of the facts and the circumstances of the case. If that is the position, the court should consider the question in that light. The trial court did not look at it from that perspective. The court, therefore, committed an error resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court in not interfering with this miscarriage of justice too committed an error of jurisdiction. 8. Therefore, the interest of justice which is the paramount justification of the administration of justice with the purpose of the Act, compels us to hold that if the delay is explained then there is no delay and the court in such a case cannot strike off the defence. If, on the other hand, the delay is not explained or the explanation is one which is not acceptable to the court, then the court must strike out the defence and there is no discretion. Read in that light, in our opinion, the learned trial Judge of the High Court committed an error in exercising his jurisdiction. The orders of the High Court and the trial court are set aside. The defence of the appellant is restored since all the rents have been deposited. In view of the delay due to interruption in the prosecution of the case, it is desirable, if possible, to dispose of the trial within six months from today, particularly since the case has been pending since 1975. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of accordingly. The defence of the appellant is restored since all the rents have been deposited. In view of the delay due to interruption in the prosecution of the case, it is desirable, if possible, to dispose of the trial within six months from today, particularly since the case has been pending since 1975. The appeal is, therefore, disposed of accordingly. In the facts and the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the appellant in taking an incorrect defence leading to subsequent proceedings, the appellant is directed to pay all costs of this appeal which are assessed as Rs 500.” 11. In the case in hand, it appears that the learned HRC in its order dated 13.11.2020 had observed that the tenant did not pay rent to the landlord since January 2019 and the said attitude of the tenant suggested that it was not complying the order of the court dated 18.12.2018. It was further observed that the tenant did not file any rejoinder to the application of the landlord filed under section 27(1) of the Act, 2011. 12. The learned Commissioner while dismissing the revision of the tenant also put much emphasis on the observation of the HRC that the tenant did not file reply to the landlord’s application filed under section 27(1) of the Act, 2011. The Commissioner in the impugned order dated 08.02.2021 observed that it was appropriate for the tenant to file an appeal against the order dated 13.11.2020 and that the intention of the tenant/petitioner, was to keep the matter pending in different forums. 13. The tenant has brought on record copy of order sheet of HRC. To appreciate the contention of the learned counsel for the parties, I perused the said order sheet. It reveals that on 27.10.2020 a time petition for payment of due rent was rejected and the case was fixed for orders on 10.11.2020. On the next date i.e. on 10.11.2020 the tenant filed rejoinder and no order was passed on that date as the HRC was busy in law and order duty. On the next date i.e. on 13.11.2020 rejoinder of the petitioner was rejected and an order striking off the defence of the tenant was passed in a separate order sheet. On the next date i.e. on 10.11.2020 the tenant filed rejoinder and no order was passed on that date as the HRC was busy in law and order duty. On the next date i.e. on 13.11.2020 rejoinder of the petitioner was rejected and an order striking off the defence of the tenant was passed in a separate order sheet. The HRC while allowing the application of the landlord for striking off the defence of the tenant observed that the rejoinder was not filed by the tenant which was not factually correct. It was obligatory for the HRC to record the reason as to why the rejoinder filed by the petitioner could not be considered before passing the order dated 13.11.2020. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bimal Chand Jain (Supra.) has held that mere non-payment of rent cannot be a ground for mechanically passing the order striking off the defence of the tenant if it shows reasonable ground for such default and the same appears to be bona fide. Though the power to order for striking off the defence of the tenant is a discretionary one, yet the same should be exercised judiciously not mechanically or in a routine manner. 14. I am of the view that the rejoinder filed by the petitioner was required to be examined by the learned HRC to see as to whether the delay in payment of due rent was properly explained. However the HRC as well as the Commissioner ignored the said legal aspect and thereby committed procedural irregularity. That apart, the learned HRC appears to have made wrong factual assessment while observing that the tenant did not make payment of rent since January 2019 whereas he further recorded that payment of dues rent was made on 25.01.2019 and 02.08.2019. The said factual error in the order of the HRC dated 13.11.2020 was also not appreciated by the Commissioner while dismissing the revision preferred by the tenant. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 08.02.2021 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi-cum- Revisional Authority under the Act, 2011 in JBC Revision No.14 of 2020 as well as the order dated 13.11.2020 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ranchi in JBC No.22 of 2018 are hereby quashed. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the impugned order dated 08.02.2021 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi-cum- Revisional Authority under the Act, 2011 in JBC Revision No.14 of 2020 as well as the order dated 13.11.2020 passed by the House Rent Controller-cum-Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ranchi in JBC No.22 of 2018 are hereby quashed. Since the tenant was not allowed to cross-examine the landlord, in the ends of justice, the HRC is directed to reopen the case from the stage of cross-examination of the landlord. The HRC is further directed to expedite the proceeding of the case and to make all possible endeavor to decide the same within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. The tenant-petitioner is directed to pay arrears from September, 2019 to January, 2022 and keep on paying due rent in terms with the order dated 18.12.2018 passed by the HRC. 16. These writ petitions are, accordingly, disposed of.