JUDGMENT 1. Appellant-plaintiff has filed this second appeal under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure assailing the judgment and decree dated 01.06.2019 passed in civil first appeal No.02/2016 by the Court of Additional District Judge, Bansur, District Alwar affirming the judgment and decree dated 27.05.2016 passed in civil suit No.35/2012 by the Court of Civil Judge, Bansur District Alwar whereby and whereunder the civil suit for specific performance and permanent injunction filed by appellant-plaintiff was dismissed. 2. Having heard learned counsel for appellant and on perusal of impugned judgments and record. 3. The relevant facts may be recapitulated as under:- '3.1 Appellant-plaintiff instituted a civil suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction on 10.10.2012, on the basis of an agreement to sale dated 02.04.1982. It means the suit has been filed after expiry of near-about 30 years. 3.2 Plaintiff averred that he was in possession of lands in question from 1968 much prior to agreement to sale dated 02.04.1982. 3.3 Plaintiff averred that he issued a legal notice dated 13.09.2012 for getting the sale deed registered in compliance of agreement dated 02.04.1982.' 4. Respondents-defendants submitted written statement and denied the agreement dated 02.04.1982 as also the possession of plaintiff over the lands in question. 5. The trial court after framing issues and recording evidence of both parties have concluded that plaintiff has measurably failed to prove the execution of agreement. 6. None of the witnesses of agreement namely Gomaram and Ram Avatar have been produced nor the stamp vendor from whom the agreement of stamp was purchased, had been produced. The trial court observed that though plaintiff stated that all three witnesses have passed away however, their death certificates have not been produced on record. The other witnesses of plaintiff could not prove the execution of agreement as their presence at the time of agreement is doubtful. Some intercolation in the agreement was also noticed. 7. On overall appreciation of evidence on record, the trial court concluded that the agreement is suspicious and further its execution is also not proved. 8. In relation to the issue of possession, the trial court has discussed the evidence while deciding the issue No.2 and has observed that plaintiff could not prove his actual and physical possession over the lands in question prior to agreement to sale. 9. 8. In relation to the issue of possession, the trial court has discussed the evidence while deciding the issue No.2 and has observed that plaintiff could not prove his actual and physical possession over the lands in question prior to agreement to sale. 9. The trial court also observed that plaintiff has instituted the suit after expiry of 30 years, prima facie it appears to be barred by limitation as much as the plaintiff is not entitled for the decree of specific performance of agreement after 30 years. Finally, the suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 27.05.2016. 10. Appellant-plaintiff preferred first appeal. 11. In the first appeal, the appellate court, having considered the findings passed by trial court, discussed the pleadings and evidence of both parties and on re-appreciation of entire evidence, decided each issue independently and separately. The first appellate court, has given re-hearing to the matter as a whole. The first appellate court, on re-appreciation has concurred with the findings of the trial court. Argument raised by plaintiff that the agreement in question is about 30 years old, therefore, its execution be treated as genuine, was turned down in the circumstances that the agreement itself was noticed to be suspicious being interpolated. The first appeal was dismissed vide judgment dated 01.06.2019 affirming the fact finding and the judgment of the trial court. 12. Against the concurrent findings of fact, the appellant-plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. 13. Learned counsel for appellant made a persuasive attempt to submit that the fact findings in relation to the execution of agreement in question as well as in relation to the possession are perverse as the evidence of plaintiff's witnesses have not been considered and has not been properly appreciated. 14. Though, learned counsel for appellant admits that no documentary evidence to show the possession of plaintiff over the lands in question have been produced on record except the agreement to sale. He argued that both judgments be quashed and plaintiff's suit for specific performance and permanent injunction be decreed. 15. This court finds that the trial court as well as the first appellate court has considered the plaintiff's evidence in detail. The statements of plaintiff and his witnesses have been taken into consideration and only thereafter findings have been recorded that the execution of agreement is not proved. 15. This court finds that the trial court as well as the first appellate court has considered the plaintiff's evidence in detail. The statements of plaintiff and his witnesses have been taken into consideration and only thereafter findings have been recorded that the execution of agreement is not proved. Both the courts have also considered the plaintiff's evidence before deciding the issue of possession. Further, both courts below have observed that there is no explanation from the side of plaintiff for delay of 30 years. Plaintiff himself issued notice dated 13.09.2012 first time seeking specific performance of agreement dated 02.04.1982. Such fact findings are based on material available on record. 16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Ramathal vs. Maruthathal & ors. reported in [ (2018) 18 SCC 303 ] while deciding the case relating to the specific performance has observed that in absence of material irregularities and perversities in the fact findings recorded by two courts below, the High Court is not required to interfere with. The re-appreciation of evidence as a whole at the stage of second appeal to draw a different conclusion and findings than recorded by two courts below have been held to be impermissible. 17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Gurnam Singh & ors. vs. Lehna Singh reported in [ (2019) 7 SCC 641 ], following dictum of the previous judgment in case of Narayanan Rajendran & Anr. vs. Lekshmy Sarojini & Ors. reported in [ (2009) 5 SCC 264 ] has observed that if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffered from an error either of law or of procedure which requires interference in the second appeal. It has been categorically observed that it is no more res integra that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 CPC is strictly confined to the case, involving substantial question of law. 18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Damodar Lal vs. Sohan Devi & Ors. reported in [ (2016) 3 SCC 78 ] has observed that even if finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out of a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. reported in [ (2016) 3 SCC 78 ] has observed that even if finding of fact is wrong, that by itself will not constitute a question of law. The wrong finding should stem out of a complete misreading of evidence or it should be based only on conjectures and surmises. The safest approach on perversity is the classic approach on the reasonable man's inference on the facts. To him, if the conclusion on the facts in evidence made by the court below is possible, there is no perversity. If not, the findings is perverse. Inadequacy of evidence or a different reading of evidence is not perversity. 19. Otherwise also the present appeal arises out of a civil suit for specific performance. Though, both courts below have disbelieved the execution of agreement and have noticed that agreement in question is suspicious, however, even if the agreement to sale is treated as genuine and proved, the plaintiff cannot be held entitled for specific performance of agreement considering his conduct of delay of 30 years and other attending circumstances. The law in relation to the grant/refusal of the decree for specific performance is well settled. 20. At the stage of second appeal, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the discretion exercised by two Court below against plaintiff. The relief of specific performance is discretionary and equitable in nature and as per proposition of law propounded in case of Her Highness Maharani Shantidevi P.Gaikwad Vs. Savjibhai Haribhai Patel [ (2001) 5 SCC 101 ], where the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held as under:- 59. The grant of decree for specific performance is a matter of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so but the discretion is not required to be exercised arbitrarily. It is to be exercised on sound and settled judicial principles. One of the grounds on which the Court may decline to decree specific performance is where it would be inequitable to enforce specific performance. The present is clearly such a case. It is to be exercised on sound and settled judicial principles. One of the grounds on which the Court may decline to decree specific performance is where it would be inequitable to enforce specific performance. The present is clearly such a case. It would be wholly inequitable to enforce specific performance for (i) residential houses for weaker sections of the society cannot be constructed in view of the existing master plan and, thus, no benefit can be given to the said section of the society; (ii) In any case, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to continuously supervise and monitor the construction and thereafter allotment of such houses; (iii) the decree is likely to result in uncalled for bonanza to the plaintiff; (iv) patent illegality of order dated 20th June, 1998; (v) absence of law or any authority to determine excess vacant land after construction of 4356 dwelling units; and (vi) agreement does not contemplate the transfer of nearly 600 acres of land in favour of the plaintiff for construction of 4356 units for which land required is about 65 acres. The object of the act was to prevent concentration of urban land in hands of few and also to prevent speculation and profiteering therein. The object of Section 21 is to benefit weaker sections of the society and not the owners. If none of these objects can be achieved, which is the factual position, it would be inequitable to still maintain decree for specific performance. 21. In case of K.Narendra Vs. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. [ (1999) 5 SCC 77 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- "29. Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant any relief merely because it is lawful to do so;" 22. In view of discussions made hereinabove, this Court finds that no substantial question of law is involved in the present second appeal. The involvement/formulation of substantial question of law is sine qua non to entertain the second appeal. In absence of the same, the second appeal is not liable to be entertained as such the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. 23. All pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. 24. Record of both courts below is sent back.