JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Hardik C Rawal for the petitioner and learned advocate Ms. Mamta R Vyas for the respondent. 2. By way of this petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner has prayed for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal no.1 in Reference IT No.198 of 1999 dated 31.01.2009, whereby, the industrial Tribunal Court No.1 has issued direction upon present petitioner to appoint the respondent herein, by way of compassionate appointment on the post of clerk or helper within a period of 20 days from the date of publication of award. 3. Brief facts leading to the present petition are stated as under: 3.1 It is the case of the respondent that his father was working as conductor in the petitioner Corporation and died on 13.04.1997 while he was on duty. At the time of death of father of the respondent as per the case of respondent the condition of the family was not good. And it was upon the respondent to enshoulder the responsibility of maintaining the family. As cane be seen from the award at the relevant point of time the respondent was a minor and on attaining the majority he made an application for seeking compassionate appointment vide application dated 27.05.1998. and 19.07.1998, however, as can be seen from the award the present petitioner corporation replied to him that as per the rules he was not entitled for compassionate appointment for the reason that his elder brother Shailesh Trikamji Pandya was already serving in the petitioner Corporation as Conductor and he was staying with the deceased father of the respondent and since he was given benefit of settlement, more particularly Clause 29 of the settlement upon death of the father of the deceased respondent. Therefore, the respondent is not entitled to the compassionate appointment though any order of rejection is not produced on record since the aforesaid facts are stated in the award under challenge the same has been referred in this order. 3.2 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid reply the respondent herein preferred reference IT No. 198 of 1999 seeking compassionate appointment and ultimately the Industrial Tribunal No.1. 3.2 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid reply the respondent herein preferred reference IT No. 198 of 1999 seeking compassionate appointment and ultimately the Industrial Tribunal No.1. vide award dated 31.01.2009 partly allowed the reference and directed the petitioner to appoint the respondent as Clark or helper by way of compassionate appointment within a period of 30 days from the date of publication of award, the Industrial Tribunal considered the fact that there is settlement arrived at between the petitioner and the Union as per that settlement clause no.29 is in respect of providing employment to the employees of Corporation who have completed 10 years of service, whereas clause 30 is in respect of compassionate appointment. For the purpose of this petition, what is relevant is that as per clause 29 is about providing compassion appointment and as per clause 30, if a person while performing duty found to be incapable physically to perform the duty or is died in that case the dependent of the concerned employee was held eligible for applying for compassionate appointment for a period of 5 years from the date on which the employee has died and in case of minor within a period of 1 year from the date on which he attains the majority. Minors were also permitted to apply for compassionate appointment. In Clause 30 which is reproduced in the award states that the Corporation shall make attempts to absorb the applicant considering his education qualification as well as the availability of the post. Only the employees who are in active duty and meeting with the requirement of permanent incapability, in case of death then only they will be entitled for Clause 30. 3.3 By considering the aforesaid Clause the Labour Court held that since the elder brother of the respondent was appointed in the petitioner Corporation by getting benefit of clause 29, during the life time of the deceased father of the respondent. As per Clause 29 and Clause 30, both are independent to each other, Clause 30 does not prohibit that if any person has availed the benefit of Clause 29 he shall not be considered entitled to benefit of Clause 30 the respondent was held eligible for compassionate appointment and accordingly the order directing the petitioner on compassionate basis to the post of Clark or Helper, is the subject matter challenged before this Court. 4. Learned advocate Mr. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Rawal appearing for the petitioner-Corporation has vehemently submitted that the impugned award is contrary to the settled principles of law. The learned Industrial Court has failed to appreciate the fact that the elder brother of the applicant was already appointed as a Conductor in the petitioner-Corporation during the lifetime of deceased Trikamji Pandya. He further submitted that as the brother of the present respondent was given appointment in the year 1995, who was serving at the time with the deceased-father of the respondent, therefore, it cannot be said that the family was in dire need of financial assistance. He submitted that in almost similar set of facts when the Labour Court passed and order directing petitioner- Corporation to give compassionate appointment to the concerned applicant and when the said award was confirmed by the learned Single Judge the present petitioner-Corporation preferred Letters Patent Appeal (for short LPA) NO. 12045 of 2011, before the Division Bench of this Court and vide order dated 16.03.2016 the Division Bench of this Court, while allowing the LPA quashed the order passed by the Single Judge confirming the order of Labour Court. He submitted that in paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the aforesaid order the Division Bench has elaborately discussed about Clause 29 and Clause 30 of by-party settlements arrived at between the petitioner-Corporation and Union and held that since the elder brother of the respondent of the aforesaid LPA was in employment by virtue of benefit given to him under Clause 29. The Division Bench held that hardship faced by the family on account of death of the deceased employee would become insignificant which is the prime object behind the compassionate appointment and accordingly by considering aforesaid aspect the Division Bench has allowed the Appeal and quashed and set aside the order passed by the Labour Court and learned Single Judge. 5. Mr. Rawal thereafter submitted that another Division Bench of this Court while passing the order dated 22.07.2005 in CA No. 990 of 2004 in LPA (Stamp No)1873 of 2004 in case of GSRTC Vs. Meenaben Ramjibhai has categorically observed that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to issue mandamus for compassionate appointment of the respondent and ignored the fact that similar applications made by other dependents of deceased employee are pending. Meenaben Ramjibhai has categorically observed that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to issue mandamus for compassionate appointment of the respondent and ignored the fact that similar applications made by other dependents of deceased employee are pending. He pointed out from the award under challenge that in the instant case also, the Tribunal has issued direction mandating the present petitioner to appoint the respondent on the post of Helper or Clerk within a period of 30 days which is contrary to the view expressed by the Division Bench in Civil Application No.9090/2004. 5.1 Learned advocate Mr. Rawal relied upon the recent judgments of the Supreme Court in case of Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Anusree K.B in 30.09.2022 CA 6958 of 2022 and relied upon para. 9 and 9.1 of the said judgment and submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the object behind the act was to provide immediate financial help to the deceased family and held that after 24 years of death of the deceased employee, if any appointment is given the same shall be against the object and purpose for which the appointment of compassionate ground is provided. 5.2 Thereafter learned advocate Mr. Rawal relied upon another judgment of Supreme Court dated 30.09.2022 in case of State of Maharashtra and Ors. Vs. Ms. Maruti Vidhate in Civil Appeal No. 6938 of 2022 and by relying upon para 7 and 7.1 of the said judgment he submitted that compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of appointment in public service just to provide some source of livelihood to the family of the deceased to meet both ends. He submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court had considered the aforesaid object and observed that if after a number of years passed, after the death of the deceased-employee the compassionate appointment is provided, in that case the very object and purpose of the appointment would be frustrated. He pointed out that Hon’ble Supreme Court while taking the aforesaid view quashed and set aside the order passed by the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal. By relying upon the aforesaid judgment learned Advocate Mr. Rawal prayed that the impugned award may be quashed and setting aside the impugned award. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Mamta Vyas for respondent vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that those judgment relied by learned advocate Mr. By relying upon the aforesaid judgment learned Advocate Mr. Rawal prayed that the impugned award may be quashed and setting aside the impugned award. 6. Learned advocate Ms. Mamta Vyas for respondent vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that those judgment relied by learned advocate Mr. Rawal would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. She submitted that those judgments are in respect of specific facts of those cases and in the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal has passed an order directing the petitioner to appoint the respondent on compassionate basis by taking into consideration the settlement arrived at between the petitioner and the Union. She submitted that once the settlement is arrived at between the parties the same would have binding effect for ever and once the Clause 30 of the said settlements provides for compassionate appointment and when the same is considered by the Industrial Tribunal the same shall have binding effect and therefore the petitioner cannot pray for quashing of the award by ignoring the fact that the aforesaid settlement is mandatory. 6.1 In support of her submission she relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Mohan Mahatre Ltd Vs. M/S Coal Ltd and ors reported in AIR 20078 SC 39 and by relying upon paragraph no.16, of the aforesaid judgment learned advocate Ms. Vyas, submitted that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that in that case also elder brother was in employment therein and yet on the basis of settlement the younger brother was declared entitled for compassionate appointment and necessary directions in that regard were issued. 7. During the course of arguments learned advocate Mr. Rawal had also drawn attention of this Court to the one of the administrative instructions dated 09.08.1995, which is of clarificatory in nature wherein, it is stated that if a family member of any employee is appointed in the State Transport Corporation by way of direct recruitment then no any other family member of the said family would be entitled to seek benefit of compensation appointment even if he is residing separately. 7.1 To counter the aforesaid submissions learned advocate Ms. Vyas relied upon the decision of the learned Single judge of this Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transportation Corporation Vs. 7.1 To counter the aforesaid submissions learned advocate Ms. Vyas relied upon the decision of the learned Single judge of this Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transportation Corporation Vs. Rameshbhai Makwana reported in 2002 GLH 282 and relying on para.6 she submitted that if the said judgment the settlement was arrived at between the parties has legal effect and the same cannot be violated by the Corporation by issuing administrative instructions and therefore the administrative instructions dated 29.08.1995, cannot be considered as it is the settlement which is binding and administrative instruction does not have any binding effect and therefore also the Labour Court has justified by partly allowing the petition to appoint the respondent on compassionate ground. She further submitted that Clause 29 and 30 are independent from each other and therefore even if the elder brother is benefited by virtue of clause 29 and clause 30, the same would not come in way of the present respondent in seeking compassionate appointment. 7.2 Except the aforesaid no other submissions were made by learned advocate Mr. Rawal and Ms. Vyas nor any other judgments stated in the forgoing paragraphs were relied upon by the learned advocates. 8. Having heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the judgments cited by the learned advocates for the parties. The record indicates that at the time when the deceased- father of the respondent died on 30.04.1997, his elder brother Nilesh Trikam Pandya was already employed by the petitioner-Corporation, by giving him the benefit under clause 29 of the settlement. Further, the date on which the deceased employee died the present respondent was a minor and subsequently on attaining the age of majority he has applied for compassionate appointment which was denied on the ground that elder brother has already been employed and the after 2 to 3 years the father of the respondent has died and therefore, there is no financial hardship. 8.1 It is not disputed by learned advocate Ms. Vyas that the elder brother of the respondent was given appointment in the petitioner Corporation by virtue of clause 29 of the settlement. Considering the fact that in similar set of facts the Division Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the very issue in similar set of facts while deciding the LPA No. 1205/2011 in case of Division Controller Vs. Considering the fact that in similar set of facts the Division Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the very issue in similar set of facts while deciding the LPA No. 1205/2011 in case of Division Controller Vs. Sirajmia Anwarmiya Sumra S/o Deceased Anwarmiya Nathumiya and ors. observed in para.2 and 3 narrated the facts as under: “2. The learned Single Judge after adverting to certain facts relied on clause 29 and 30 of the settlement and GSO 361 of 1973 and found that the claimant namely, respondent herein was entitled and eligible to be appointed pursuant to settlement clause 30 by way of compassionate appointment. 3. Mr. Hardik Rawal, learned counsel for S.T Corporation would contend that recording certain facts about the case in para.4.4, learned Single judge has committed an error and in fact application preferred by the respondent seeking the compassionate appointment after death of this father was already rejected on 28.06.1995 and so was also recorded by learned Labour Court. In para.3 of the award the specific fact of rejecting the above application by order dated 28.06.1995 by Divisional Controller of GSTRC, Himmatnagar was referred to. Thereafter, reference was numbered upon a dispute raised as IT No. 131 of 2000 as the respondent approached the Labour Court after 7 years which came to be allowed. It is submitted that with regard to appointment of elder brother of respondent namely, Mr. Mehmudmiya Sumra had applied for seeking an appointment as early as on 20.08.1992 and after interviewing him as per the Clause 29 of GSO 361 of 1973 Shri Mehmudmiya Sumra was appointed as conductor and appointment was given on 12.02.1995. Thus, father of respondent no.1 died on 17.12.1993, for which, the claim made by respondent younger sin of the deceased employee was already rejected as early as on 20.06.1995 and another member of the family namely, elder son of the deceased employee was given appointment of course by virtue of clause 29. That request for compassionate appointment by another son by virtue of clause 30 would defeat the very purpose of grant of compassionate appointment. It is submitted that if benefits of clause 29 and 30 are to be extended to both the members namely, sons of the deceased employee, it would create unfair and unbalance and discriminatory circumstances in favour of eligible an competent candidates who are otherwise qualified but remained un-employed. It is submitted that if benefits of clause 29 and 30 are to be extended to both the members namely, sons of the deceased employee, it would create unfair and unbalance and discriminatory circumstances in favour of eligible an competent candidates who are otherwise qualified but remained un-employed. It is further submitted that apart from above when the very request of respondent was rejected as early as on 28.06.1995 belatedly availed remedy by invoking jurisdiction of Labour Court, after 7 years, and the Labour Court simply was carried away by interpretation of Clause 30 of the settlement but the fact remains that major son of the deceased employee was given employment by virtue of clause 29 and the respondent herein was found ineligible at the time when his application came to be rejected in the year 1995. It is therefore submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is on the premise that application preferred by respondent no.1 initially on 23.12.1993 was not replied or answered.” 8.2 Considering the submissions made by learned advocates for the parties the Division Bench of this Court observed in para. 5, 6 and 7 which read as under: “5. Upon careful perusal of the record of the case and submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and Clause 29 and 30 of the settlement bipartite settlement as reproduced in para 7.1 of the order under challenge, we find that both the above clauses no doubt operate in a different circumstances and requirement but facts of this case as recorded earlier application preferred by respondent herein seeking compassionate appointment was already rejected by the S.T Corporation as early as on 28.6.1995 and elder brother of respondent was given appointment as conductor on the strength of clause 29 with prescribed eligibility and entitlement of children of an employee of the S.T Corporation who has completed 10 years of continuous service. As one of the family members of deceased employee was given benefit of Clause 29 the fact about hardships that may cause to the family of the deceased employee would pale into insignificance inasmuch as purpose of Clause 30 appointment on compassionate ground is to provide immediate succor to the members of the bereaved family of the deceased employee. 6. As one of the family members of deceased employee was given benefit of Clause 29 the fact about hardships that may cause to the family of the deceased employee would pale into insignificance inasmuch as purpose of Clause 30 appointment on compassionate ground is to provide immediate succor to the members of the bereaved family of the deceased employee. 6. Thus, the Labour Court as well as learned Single Judge while upholding the prayer of respondent to grant appointment on the compassionate ground has committed an error by ignoring the very fact that application made by respondent herein was rejected in the year 1995 and such incorrect recording of fact has resulted into consequential direction of giving appointment on compassionate ground to the respondent. Before parting with the judgment, though Clause 29 as such is not under challenge but such policy of the Gujarat State Transport Corporation may be as apart of the settlement to appoint children of employees in service for about 10 years on holding age limit and educational qualifications etc. would run counter to Article 14 and 16 of the constitution of India and sooner is better if such policy is discontinued which deprive other eligible, meritorious and competent unemployed youths seeking public employment Corporation like the appellant. 7. Mr. N.D. Sonogara has also relied on a decision in the case of Karansinh Amarsinh Gohel Vs. Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation ( 1999 (1) GCD 76 ) about interpretation of Clause 29 and 30 as both are different and independent to each other for which, we have no different reasoning but as stated earlier in facts and circumstances of the case one of the members of the family of the deceased employee was given an appointment by extending Clause 29 and another son whose application for compassionate appointment was already rejected was not entitled for the benefit of Clause 30. Accordingly order dated 18.3.2011, passed by learned Single Judge confirming the award of Labour Court dated 21.5.2010 impugned in this appeal is quashed and set aside.” 8.3 The aforesaid observations if viewed in the light of present facts of case, in that case, there is no much difference in the facts of the case which was examined by the Division Bench of this Court and the case on hand. The Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that the elder brother of the respondents was employed by the State Transport Corporation on completion of 10 years of the deceased father. In fact, the practice of the petitioner Corporation to give appointment to the family members of the employees by virtue of clause 29, was observed and viewed as the scheme which would run counter to Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 8.4 While allowing the LPA the Division Bench of this Court categorically observed that Clause 29 and clause 30 both are different and independent to each other but the fact remains that when one member of the deceased was given employment by extending benefit under clause 29 then another son who was not entitled for the benefit of clause 30 as the same would defeat the very object of compassionate appointment which is provided for meeting with the hardship that the family of deceased may face on account of death of the employee. Similarly, the Labour Court has issued mandatory direction to the petitioner- Corporation to provide compassionate appointment to the respondent within a period of one month. 8.5 The Division Bench of this Court in the case of GSTRC Vs. Meenaben Ramjiobhai while deciding Civil Application No. 9090 of 2004 vide order dated 22.08.2005 observed as under: “We are further of the view that the Tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to issue a mandamus for compassionate appointment of the respondent ignoring the fact that similar applications made by other dependents of the deceased employees were pending. True it is that the learned Single Judge has modified the direction given by the Tribunal but in our opinion it is not possible to approve the direction given by him because there could be no justification to offer appointment to the respondent on compassionate ground after 24 years of the demise of her father.” 8.6 The aforesaid observations makes it clear that the Tribunal does not have any jurisdiction to issue a mandamus for compassionate appointment of the respondent which would result in providing employment to the concerned person despite pendency of claim of other eligible dependents of deceased employee. Now keeping in mind the aforesaid observations and the fact that in the instant case also the tribunal has issued mandatory directions to the petitioner Corporation. The judgment relied upon learned advocate Ms. Now keeping in mind the aforesaid observations and the fact that in the instant case also the tribunal has issued mandatory directions to the petitioner Corporation. The judgment relied upon learned advocate Ms. Vyas are required to be considered as far as the judgment relied upon Ms. Vyas in case of GSRTC Vs. Ramesh Makwana(supra) learned Single Judge has held that settlement arrived at between the parties have legal effect and the settlement cannot be violated by the Corporation by issuing any administrative instructions concerned even instructions were also ignored. Considering the fact that those two clauses being Clause no.29 and 30 have been examined by the Division Bench of this Court and after examining the same once Division Bench of this Court has been taken a view that once benefit has been taken by one family member under Clause 29 of the settlement, he is not entitled to take benefit under Clause 30 as per the settlement. Considering the fact that this view is taken by the Division Bench of this Court the same is binding upon me, and therefore I, have no hesitation in holding that the Tribunal was not justified in considering the aspect of compassionate appointment only by looking at Clause 30 and by completely ignoring fact that the family member of deceased employee has already been appointed by granting benefit of Clause 29 of the Act. 8.7 As far as the judgment relief upon learned adv. Ms. Vyas in case of Mohan Mahato Vs. Central and ors (supra) is considered, it is true that there also the facts were similar to the facts of the present case, however, there the employee died on 23.02.1997 and ultimately, while deciding the Civil Appeal on 18.09.2017 the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the settlement and directed the respondents to offer compassionate appointment on a suitable post, however, the the issue was different. The ground on which the compassionate appoint was denied was on account of limitation as can be seen from para.15, of the judgment by way of circular limitation for applying compassionate appointment within a period of six months by way of the prescribed by circular dated 12.12.1995 that was one of the consideration by the Supreme Court. 9. The ground on which the compassionate appoint was denied was on account of limitation as can be seen from para.15, of the judgment by way of circular limitation for applying compassionate appointment within a period of six months by way of the prescribed by circular dated 12.12.1995 that was one of the consideration by the Supreme Court. 9. However, in the instant case, the deceased employee died in the year 1997 the application for compassionate appointment was made by the respondent in the year 1998 and reference was made in the year 1999 and the same was decided in the year 2009, directing the petitioner to appoint the respondent on compassionate ground is challenged by way of this petition in 2009 itself. 9.1 Though while passing order dated 14.07.2009, during admission hearing the Court issued notice for final disposal and it was made returnable on 10.08.2009, and in the meantime the impugned award was stayed, thereafter, vide order dated 29.10.2009 after parted hearing the Court issued Rule and since then the matter is pending for final hearing. Though stay was operating for respondent, since 14.07.2009, no efforts were made by the respondent to see that the matter is heard at the earliest. In fact for the first time an application was preferred in the year 2011 being CA No. 995 of 2011 and the Court fixed the matter for final hearing on 21.03.2011. Thereafter, after about 11 years the respondent preferred an application for early hearing on 11.03.2022, the matter was fixed for final hearing and thereafter time to time the matter was listed for final hearing. The aforesaid details are refereed at length because of the reason that though the stay was operating against the respondent by staying order of compassionate appointment in his favour almost for 11 years from 2011 to 2022 no attempts were made by the respondent to see that the matter is heard which would indicate that the respondent was not facing any hardship on account of compassionate appointment. There is nothing on record to suggest that ever since the death of the father of the respondent, he is facing any financial hardship and therefore, the judgments cited by Ms. Vyas in case of Mohan Mahto(supra) is required to be considered in light of observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court into recent judgments of compassionate appointment in case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Vyas in case of Mohan Mahto(supra) is required to be considered in light of observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court into recent judgments of compassionate appointment in case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Maruti Vidhathe and in case of Fertilizers and Chemicals Teavancore Ltd. And Ors Vs. Anusree K.B in both the cases the Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently taken stand that the very object behind the compassionate appointment is to provide immediate financial help to the members of the deceased employee. In fact the Supreme Court in para 7 and 7.1 in case of State of Maharashta(Supra) observed as under:- “7. Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of appointment in the public services and is in favour of the dependents of the deceased dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood, and in such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided , the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependents of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus, to enable the family tooted over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give such family a post much less a post held by the deceased. 7.1 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, to appoint the respondent now on compassionate ground shall be contrary to the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate ground. The respondent cannot be said to be dependent on the deceased employee, ie, her mother. 7.1 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, to appoint the respondent now on compassionate ground shall be contrary to the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate ground. The respondent cannot be said to be dependent on the deceased employee, ie, her mother. Even otherwise, she shall not be entitled to appointment on compassionate ground after a number of years from the death of the deceased employee.” 9.2 In the case of Fertilizers and Chemicals Teavancore Ltd. And Ors, para 9.1 reads thus: “9.1 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering the above observations made herein above and the object and purpose for which the appointment on compassionate ground is provided, the respondent shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate ground on the death of her father who died in the year 1995. After a period of 24 years from the death of the deceased employee, the respondent shall not be entitled to the appointment on compassionate ground. If such an appointment is made now and or after a period of 14/24 years, the same shall be against the object and purpose for which the appointment on compassionate ground is provided.” 10. Therefore, while dealing with the aspect of object behind the compassionate appointment. Both the aforesaid observations would indicate that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically held that after a period of almost 24 years the purposed behind compassionate appointment would not serve as the purpose was to provide intimidate financial help to the family of the deceased and that would not serve after a long period of time. In the instant case also the deceased died in the year 1997 and we are in 2022 today, for all these 25 years ultimately the respondent could survive even without compassionate appointment. Considering the fact that the elder brother of respondent is already in service by virtue of benefit under clause 29 and therefore, it cannot be said that the respondent family have suffered financial hardship on account of the death of deceased employee. Therefore keeping in mind the object and ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) and Fertilizers and Chemicals (supra) though judgments relied upon by Ms. Therefore keeping in mind the object and ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra (supra) and Fertilizers and Chemicals (supra) though judgments relied upon by Ms. Vyas in case of Mohan Mahate(Supra) have some similar facts however, the basic object will not be served, if any direction issued and petition is dismissed by confirming the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal. More particularly, when the Division Bench of this Court has specifically examined that Clause 29 and Clause 30, and held that once a family member has been provided the employment by virtue of Clause 29, another family member would not be entitled to benefit of Clause 30. I, do not see any reason to confirm the view taken by the Labour Court. 11. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid discussion, the order dated 31.01.2009, passed by the Industrial Tribunal Court No.1 Rajkot in Reference IT No. 198 of 1999, is required to be quashed and set aside. The same is hereby quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute. No order as to cost.