JUDGMENT : These two captioned regular second appeals are filed questioning the judgment and decree arising out of O.S.No.193/1998 and O.S.No.197/1999. The appellants in RSA No.2105/2013 are assailing the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.197/1999 and also the judgment rendered in R.A.No.88/2011. O.S.No.197/1999 was filed seeking the relief of mandatory injunction. RSA No.100003/2014 is filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.193/ 1998 questioning the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.193/1998 and also the judgment and decree rendered by the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.86/2011. The appellants in RSA No.100003/2014 filed suit in O.S.No.193/1998 for declaration and injunction against the respondents herein. 2. Both the appeals were heard together on admission and this Court has admitted these appeals on 02.02.2022 by formulating following substantial question of law. “Whether the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court is in gross violation of provisions of Order XLI Rule 30 and 31 and also Section 107 of CPC?” 3. The appellants in these appeals feeling aggrieved by the common judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.88/2011 and R.A.No.86/2011 are before this Court. The First Appellate Court while deciding the appeals has not at all applied its mind and therefore, this Court having examined the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court has formulated the top noted substantial question of law. The short point that would arise for consideration in the present appeals is as to whether the First Appellate Court has independently assessed the ocular and documentary evidence let in by the parties. My answer to it is no. The same can be gathered from the manner in which the First Appellate Court has decided the appeal. It would be useful for this Court to cull out the relevant portion of the judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court which starts at paragraph 20 and closes at paragraph 27: “20. Before discussing the oral evidence of the respective parties, it is necessary to see the documentary evidence. Ex.D24 to Ex.D28 are the main documents to the cause for the present lis. Before discussing the oral evidence of the respective parties, it is necessary to see the documentary evidence. Ex.D24 to Ex.D28 are the main documents to the cause for the present lis. Ex.D24 is the deed of partnership of M/s. Mangaldeep, Dharwad made on 13.05.1982 and partners are shown at Sl.No. 1 to 5 i.e., party to the suit O.S.No.510/97 wherein they admitted the R1 as party No.5 of their firm and shifted the place of business to shop No.7 and urged about their share of profit and loss and it is one of the covenant mentioned at Sl.No.17 of the said agreement which reads thus: “It is hereby further agreed that in case of dissolution of the partnership or changes of its premises, the partners No.1 to 4 shall not have any right whatsoever in the premises and furnitures and fittings of the firm. Partner No.5 viz; Shri M. N. Hebsur alone shall have absolute right in the said premises, furnitures and fittings and other partners shall not be entitled to any amount payable in this behalf as compensation, cost or any other things. However, said partner No.5, Shri. M. N. Hebsur shall not have any right in respect of good will of the firm’s business or its name” 21. Ex.D27 and 28 which are clarification and one letter of partners of M/s Mangaldeep that it is clear that one Hebsur is having only right over stall No.7 and Ex.D25 is the letter addressed to M. N. Hebsur from one Asst. Engineer (Electrical) HDMC., wherein permission was accorded to the M. N. Hebsur for additional power to the stall No.7 and Ex.D.26 is the Memorandum of understanding between the partners of the firm on 1st day March 1982 wherein it is one of the conditions mentioned that: 5th party as long as continue in the partnership of M/s Mangaldeep, the firm can continue its business in the premises of stall No.7. If the party No.5 retires from the partnership firm and parties 1 to 4 will have to shift their business elsewhere, immediately.” Such being the understanding between the parties of the firm, appellants’ firm namely M/s Mangaldeep have no right to continue in the stall No.7 when M.N.Hebsur is claiming that he is retired from the said firm. 22. If the party No.5 retires from the partnership firm and parties 1 to 4 will have to shift their business elsewhere, immediately.” Such being the understanding between the parties of the firm, appellants’ firm namely M/s Mangaldeep have no right to continue in the stall No.7 when M.N.Hebsur is claiming that he is retired from the said firm. 22. Further it is agreed between them that if M.N.Hebsur is not interested to continue in the business of M/s Mangaldeep firm, the other partner No.1 to 4 of the said firm shall have to shift their business from stall No.7 to elsewhere immediately. Under these circumstances, the partners of the M/s Mangaldeep firm whoever may be have no right to say against either M. N. Hebsur or M/s N. I. Hebsur & sons. 23. No doubt, number of litigations have been pending between the parties in the court of law. But party must understand an agreement between them otherwise there is no end for lis. 24. I have very well remember the arguments canvassed by the learned senior counsel for both parties. The counsel for the appellants has argued vehemently and noticed about legal points regarding maintainability of the suit O.S.No.17\97/99 and relied upon number of decisions reported below: Suit by a partner or a firm Order 30 of C.P.C. 1. AIR 1970 RAJ page:86 2. AIR 1969 Guj page: 178 3. AIR 1961 SC page : 325 4. AIR 1978 Delhi Page: 255 5. AIR 1995, Part VI page: 84 6. ILR 1922, Part I, KAR page: 955 7. 2008 Part IV KCCR page: 2234 8. 2012 Part I KCCR SN 6. 9. 2012 Part II SCC page: 196 Partnership at Will: 1. 1966 SC page: 1300 2. AIR 1970 MAD page: 5 3. AIR 2002 AP page: 389 Sec. 23,31,32 and 72 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1. AIR 1959 AP 116 Assets of the firm: 1. AIR 1993 BOM page: 30 Partnership at Will 1. AIR 1991 CAL, page: 195 Section 20 of CPC 1. AIR 2006 SC page: 1828 Arbitration Clause: 2008 part I RAJ – Civil Journal Dinesh Jangi Vs. Laxmikant Jangid. Retirement of a partner: AIR 1959 AP page: 116 Not partnership agreement: AIR 1973 CAL page: 193 1. AIR 1952 AP Page : 837 2. AIR 1957 CAL page: 336 3. AIR 1957 CAL page: 620 4. AIR 2006 SC page: 1828 Arbitration Clause: 2008 part I RAJ – Civil Journal Dinesh Jangi Vs. Laxmikant Jangid. Retirement of a partner: AIR 1959 AP page: 116 Not partnership agreement: AIR 1973 CAL page: 193 1. AIR 1952 AP Page : 837 2. AIR 1957 CAL page: 336 3. AIR 1957 CAL page: 620 4. KCCR 2005 Part 4 page: 2334 Suit for possession: 1. AIR 2003 SC page: 2508 2. KCCR 2002 Part 2 page: 226 3. KCCR 2002 Part 2, page: 1364 4. AIR 2002 KAR page: 3 to 6 5. AIR 2000 Gouhatti pg: 173 6. ILR 2006 KAR page: 4251 7. KCCR 2011 part 3 page: 2123. Assignee of firm: 1. AIR 1993 BOM page: 30 Mere suit for mandatory injunction not maintainable: 1. AIR 1978 page: 133 2. AIR 1988 Orissa Page : 117 3. AIR 1900 SC page: 867 4. AIR 1981 J & K page: 78 5. KCCR 2002 Part 4 page: 3514 6. AIR 2012 Part 2 page: 524 7. AIR 2012 SC pg: 1727 Dissolution of title: 1. KCCR 2011 Part 2 page: 1277 25. But, on the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent/who is plaintiff in O.S.No.197/1999 also vehemently argued and prayed for confirming the judgment passed by the trial court as it does not suffer any angle. 26. I have gone through the decisions relied upon by the appellants. But, they do not help the appellants in view the agreement entered into between them, as they estopped from taking such contention. On the other hand, I carefully perused the pleadings of the parties, evidence and judgment passed by the trial Court. On perusal of the same, it is made clear that the judgment passed by the trial court is in accordance with law, facts, pleadings and there is no error committed by the trial court while passing the judgment. Accordingly, I have no hesitation to answer Points 1 and 2 in the negative. 27. Point No.3: in view of my findings on Point No.1 and 2, I proceed to pass the following: 4. If the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court at these relevant paragraphs are examined, then this Court is of the view that the power which is invested with the Appellate Court in independently assessing the entire material on record is not forthcoming from the judgment under challenge. If the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court at these relevant paragraphs are examined, then this Court is of the view that the power which is invested with the Appellate Court in independently assessing the entire material on record is not forthcoming from the judgment under challenge. Section 107(2) of CPC does invest the Appellate Court with some powers that are conferred on Court on original jurisdiction. It is a trite law that it is a bounden duty of the Appellate Court to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the Trial Court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising through a number of circumstances which in the opinion of the Court outweighs such finding. Though the First Appellate Court has concurred with the findings of the Trial Court, it is still incumbent on the part of the First Appellate Court to formulate proper issues that would arise for consideration in the light of the grounds urged in regular appeal. The legislature has entrusted a very important duty to the First Appellate Court and it is for Appellate Court to decide finally all questions on facts on which the disposal of the suit might depend. The First Appellate Court has to make an honest endeavor to make a proper apprising of the merits of the case put up by the parties. But on plain reading of above culled out paragraphs of the judgment of the First Appellate Court, it can be easily inferred that the First Appellate Court has not taken trouble to give a relook into the matter. The First appellate Court being a final fact finding authority has to exhaustively deal with every contention, which would be vital and would have a bearing on the conclusions that are arrived at by the Trial Court. There must be sufficient discussion to show that it has applied its own mind to the evidence. The First Appellate Court has to pronounce the judgment only after applying judicial mind to the appreciation of evidence and thereafter has to manifestly convey the judicial thinking by which it either confirms or reverse with the judgment of the Trial Court. There must be sufficient discussion to show that it has applied its own mind to the evidence. The First Appellate Court has to pronounce the judgment only after applying judicial mind to the appreciation of evidence and thereafter has to manifestly convey the judicial thinking by which it either confirms or reverse with the judgment of the Trial Court. It is a trite law that the appeal is a continuation of suit and therefore, the First Appellate Court is under a bounden duty to revisit over the disputed questions of fact and thereafter come to a conclusion. In the process if the First Appellate Court comes to a conclusion that it cannot accept the reasons assigned by the Trial Court, then it can divert with the reasons which are recorded by the Trial Court and while reversing the decree of the Trial Court, it has to attend all relevant questions, which would arise for consideration in the context of issues framed therein and ocular and documentary evidence which would be let in by the parties. 5. It would be relevant for this Court to refer to the principles laid down by the Kerala High Court in the case of Kurian Chacko v. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316 while examining the power of the Appellate Court hearing an appeal under Section 96 has held as under: “Civil P.C. (5 of 1908) S.96, S.107 – Duty of appellate Court to consider evidence independently. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him. No supplementing of appreciation is contemplated at the appellate stage. But, an independent appraisal of the evidence is the duty of the Court at that level. Failure to do that is an abdication of appellate power. It is the appellate Court's function not to find out whether there is perversity in the trial Court's judgment but whether it is wrong. There is very wide difference between a wrong conclusion and a perverse conclusion. Failure to do that is an abdication of appellate power. It is the appellate Court's function not to find out whether there is perversity in the trial Court's judgment but whether it is wrong. There is very wide difference between a wrong conclusion and a perverse conclusion. A restricted revisional jurisdiction may be invoked under certain statutes only where there is perversity in the findings but the wider appellate jurisdiction conferred under Section 96 of the Civil P. C., demands a little more effort on the part of the appellate Court in going into the evidence to come to its own conclusion and reversing the trial Court's decision if it is found to be wrong” (Emphasis supplied) 6. The Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 , has held that the judgment of the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of CPC read with Order XLI Rule 1 and 2 of CPC must display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions. 7. The Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Madhukar and others v. Sangram and others, (2001) 4 SCC 756 reiterating the principles laid down in the case of Santosh Hazari (supra) has further held that if Court fails to fulfill its obligations, the parties would not get the true benefit of a first appeal, which is a valuable right on the basis of which parties have the right to be heard on questions of law as well as of fact. 8. If the judgment and decree under challenge is examined in the light of the principles discussed supra, I am of the view that the Appellate has passed a very cryptic order and no cogent reasons are forthcoming while ordering for remand. 9. If the judgment and decree under challenge is examined in the light of the principles discussed supra, I am of the view that the judgment is found wanting and same is contrary to the procedure contemplated under Section 107 read with Order XLI of CPC and also contrary to the mandatory provisions of Order XLI Rules 30 and 31 of CPC. Therefore, on this short point, the judgment rendered by the First Appellate Court is held to be palpably erroneous and since no reasons are assigned, the judgment and decree also suffers from perversity. In that view of the matter, since there is no proper appreciation of ocular and documentary evidence and the fact that the same is not done by final fact finding authority under Section 107 of CPC, this Court, left with no other alternative than to remand the matter to the First Appellate Court to formulate proper points that would arise for consideration and thereafter proceed to hear the parties and then pass a fresh judgment on merits in accordance with law based on material on record. Sine the suits are of the year 1997 and 1998, I direct the First Appellate Court to decide the case on merit in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of receipt records from the Trial Court. 10. For the foregoing reasons, the substantial question of law formulated by this Court is answered in the affirmative and I proceed to pass the following: ORDER Both the appeals are allowed. The matter stands remitted back to the First appellate Court and since the parties are represented by their respective counsel, they shall appear before the First Appellate Court on 21.03.2022 without expecting notice by the Court and the First Appellate Court shall dispose of the case within three months from that date. In view of disposal of the appeals, pending interlocutory applications, if any, do not survive for consideration and are dismissed accordingly.