JUDGMENT : C.S. Sudha, J. This appeal filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Act), is against the order dated 20/02/2020 in O.P.(Arb)No.28/2018 of the Additional District Judge-II, District Court, Ernakulam. The appellant herein is the petitioner before the court below and the respondent in the arbitral proceeding. The respondent herein is the respondent before the court below and the claimant in the arbitral proceeding. 2. The respondent herein, namely, Pilotsmith (India) Pvt. Ltd. (the claimant Company), filed O.A.No.24/2015 before the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, Thiruvananthapuram, (the Council), seeking to direct the Spices Board (the Board), the appellant herein, to release the complete payment due to them along with interest and compensation in relation to the work of erection and commissioning of a chilly processing plant in Guntur, Hyderabad, totaling an amount of Rs. 33,76,225/- The Board filed objection contending- The claimant Company had undertaken the work of ‘Design, Fabrication, Supply, Erection, Testing and Commissioning of Chilly processing plant in Spices Park at Guntur' as per Ext. C2 agreement dated 20/10/2010 executed between the parties. The chilly processing plant erected by the Company is faulty and unworkable and has never been operational due to the defective commissioning of the plant. The Company failed to discharge its contractual obligations as per the contract dated 20/10/2010 and so has committed breach of the contract by failing to perform their part of the contract. Hence the Board contended that the Company is not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for in the original application and prayed for a dismissal of the same. 3. The Council referred the matter for arbitration and appointed Justice (Retd.) T. V. Ramakrishnan as the sole Arbitrator. The pleadings filed before the Council were adopted before the Arbitrator as well. 4. 3. The Council referred the matter for arbitration and appointed Justice (Retd.) T. V. Ramakrishnan as the sole Arbitrator. The pleadings filed before the Council were adopted before the Arbitrator as well. 4. The learned Arbitrator after giving opportunity to both sides to adduce oral and documentary evidence, passed an Award on 02/11/2017 directing the Board to take over the plant manufactured by the Company and within two weeks from the date of the Award to issue the necessary certificate as provided in clause 20.1 of the Special Conditions of Contract (SCC) and also to pay an amount of Rs.17,32,349/-along with the EMD amount of Rs.50,000/-and cost of Rs.17,500/-within one month from the date of the Award, failing which the Company was held entitled to take appropriate steps to recover the amount with interest at the rate provided in Chapter 5 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, from the date of the Award till the date of recovery. Aggrieved, the Board moved the District Court under Section 34 of the Act. The Original Application has been dismissed by the impugned order. Hence, the Board, the appellant herein, is before us in this appeal. 5. Heard Sri.Antony Mukkath, the learned counsel for the appellant and Sri.Lal K.Joseph, the learned counsel for the respondent. 6. As found by the learned Arbitrator, the short point that arises for consideration is whether the claimant Company has complied with clause 20.1 of the SCC, which is admittedly part of the contract/agreement executed between the parties. This was the bone of contention between the parties in the arbitral proceedings and it is based on the finding that the same has been complied with, the final award has been passed. The issues framed by the learned Arbitrator are – “1. Whether the applicant has full filled its contractual obligations of conducting the trial run in order to ensure the required output capacity and other specifications as per LOA or not? 2. What if any is the relief for which the applicant is entitled to? 3. What order as to interest and cost?” In the light of the issues raised, we will confine ourselves to the question as to whether the finding that there has been compliance of clause 20.1 of the SCC by the claimant Company is in any way perverse or illegal. 3. What order as to interest and cost?” In the light of the issues raised, we will confine ourselves to the question as to whether the finding that there has been compliance of clause 20.1 of the SCC by the claimant Company is in any way perverse or illegal. Clause 20.1 of the SCC reads - “20.0 GUARANTEE RUN, FINAL TAKING OVER AND GUARANTEE PERIOD After commissioning, the Supplier shall arrange for the guarantee run as specified. 20.1 One week guarantee run to assure the system performs to the specified parameters, given the desired output, and to attend to the initial trouble shooting, shall be arranged by the Supplier. Operational problems noticed during this period shall be attended by the Supplier at his cost. Responsible personnel from the Supplier's side shall be present at all times during the period of guarantee run. Operating personnel, raw materials and utilities will be arranged by the Purchaser. The guarantee run shall be deemed to be completed, if the Supplier has successfully rectified all the defects/malfunctioning noticed during the period and the operation of various machines are stabilised to the satisfaction of the Purchaser/Consultants. A certificate to this effect will be issued by the Purchaser. However the guarantee run period may be extended in case any major defects/malfunctioning of the system persists. This shall be communicated to the Supplier in writing by the Purchaser/Consultants, pointing out the problems experienced. The Supplier shall provide continued effort to overcome the difficulties pointed out and rectify the defects, only after which he will be relieved of his obligations. On successful completion of the guarantee run, the Purchaser shall issue the final taking over certificate to the Supplier. 20.2 xxxxxx 20.3 xxxxxx 20.4 xxxxxx 20.5 xxxxxx” The aforesaid clause makes it clear that only after the successful completion of the guarantee run/trial run, the duration of which is one week, the claimant Company would be relieved of its obligations. It is only on successful completion of the guarantee run/trial run, the purchaser, i.e., the Board, becomes obliged to issue the final taking over certificate to the Company. Therefore, reciprocal promises are to be performed by both sides. Hence the crucial question is, has the claimant Company performed their part of the contract? The Board in paragraph 20 of their counter statement contends as follows – “20. Therefore, reciprocal promises are to be performed by both sides. Hence the crucial question is, has the claimant Company performed their part of the contract? The Board in paragraph 20 of their counter statement contends as follows – “20. With regard to the averments in paragraph 16 of the OA, it is submitted that in case the applicant fulfills their contractual obligation by conducting the guaranteed trial run in order to ensure the output capacity and other specification as per the LOA, and complete the same within a period of one month to hand over the system to the Spices Board for commencing the operations; then the Board is more than willing to settle the entire account within two weeks from the date of handing over of the system after ensuring the output and other specifications, as well as submission of the relevant documents. Nevertheless, the final settlement of the bill would be based on the requirement of meeting the output capacity and other specifications, after deduction of other costs that were incurred by the Board. Otherwise, the Board will entrust the work to some other agency at the risk and cost. The averments to the contrary are emphatically denied.” This was taken note of by the learned Arbitrator, who appreciated the practical wisdom of the Board in making the aforesaid suggestion to settle the dispute amicably in a realistic manner. After the oral evidence was completed, keeping the aforesaid suggestion in mind, the Arbitrator sought the views of both the parties. Both sides agreed to give the suggestion a try. On the basis of the same, the learned Arbitrator passed an interim Award/ order dated 23/05/2017 in the presence of the parties and their respective counsel, which reads - “The dispute between the parties in the proceedings, mainly center around the question whether the chilly plant manufactured, supplied and erected by the claimant for the respondent on the basis of the agreement entered in to between the parties is or is not functioning properly and is capable of producing the targeted quantity of chili powder namely 500 Kgs per hour as specified in the agreement? The dispute is one pending for the last 4 or 5 years and it is only proper to settle it in a manner acceptable to both parties if possible in the course of the proceedings. The dispute is one pending for the last 4 or 5 years and it is only proper to settle it in a manner acceptable to both parties if possible in the course of the proceedings. With this in view, as arbitrator I have a detailed discussion at the beginning of the sitting on 19.5.2017 with the claimant, respondent and the respective counsel and the consultant who was in charge of the chilly plant project. During the discussion it was submitted that the claimant is ready and willing to depute sufficient number of technicians at his cost to enable the trial run to be conducted as agreed in the contract. It was further agreed that the claimant is ready to conduct the trial run as contemplated in the agreement to satisfy that the plant is fully capable of producing the required quantity of chilly powder namely 500 kg per hour for 7 days. As soon as the claimant is ready to conduct the trial run, notice should be given to the respondents to all others concerned. On receipt of notice from the claimant indicating the date on which trial run is proposed to be carried out, the claimant has to arrange the required quantity of chilly at the expense of the respondent based on pro forma invoice of the chilly supplier/claimant. The respondent should also provide three helpers to assist the claimant to conduct the trial run for a week. The claimant may meet all expenditure necessary for running the plant for the required period. Needless to point out that both parties would show sufficient interest in taking appropriate steps necessary for conducting the trial run for a period of 1 week. At the time of inspection and running of the plant to ensure the production of the assured quantity of chill y powder both the parties should take care to depute their authorized representatives well versed in technical aspects to be taken note of during the trial run. The reports of the trial run held on every day may be prepared and submitted with signatures of both parties in the proceedings. If the trial run is successfully completed on grinding, as and when the size of the collar for the packing machine is specified by the respondent, the trial of the packing machine will also be conducted within 60 days’ time. If the trial run is successfully completed on grinding, as and when the size of the collar for the packing machine is specified by the respondent, the trial of the packing machine will also be conducted within 60 days’ time. However the release of the balance amount shall not depend upon the completion of trial run of packing machine. Both sides may submit statements expressing the views after attending the trial run for the required time requesting for further orders if any required”. (Emphasis supplied) By virtue of cause 20.1 of the SCC and the interim order, trial run was to be conducted for a week. The Board has consistently taken up a stand that the trial run was to be conducted for eight hours a day for one week. The said contention is apparently incorrect as is evident from clause 20.1 and the aforesaid interim order, both of which only stipulate that the trial run should be conducted for a week. Pursuant to the interim order, the trial run was conducted on 24/07/2017. On the next hearing date, i.e., on 28/07/2017, the learned Arbitrator passed the following order: “From both parties I understand that the Trial run ordered as per order dated 23.5.2017 had been conducted by the claimant in the presence of the respondent. As per the order both parties were directed to 'submit statements expressing their views after attending the trial run for the required time requesting for further orders if necessary’. As such I direct both parties to submit statements as directed by the order referred to above as early as possible at any rate within one week from the date of receipt of this notice positively for taking further actions in the matter.” Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the claimant Company and the Board submitted reports dated 03/08/2017 and 10/08/2017 respectively. On the basis of the aforesaid two reports, the learned Arbitrator concluded that clause 20.1 has been complied with and hence, proceeded to pass the Award. 7. This finding of the learned Arbitrator is assailed by the Board. According to the Board, even the claimant Company does not have a case that trial run for the period as directed in the interim order had been conducted. The learned Arbitrator has committed a patent error by concluding so on the basis of the reports dated 24/07/2017 and 02/08/2017 of the representative of the Board. According to the Board, even the claimant Company does not have a case that trial run for the period as directed in the interim order had been conducted. The learned Arbitrator has committed a patent error by concluding so on the basis of the reports dated 24/07/2017 and 02/08/2017 of the representative of the Board. The Board contended that a perusal of the said reports would make it apparent and obvious that their representative, namely, Dr. Sreekantan Thampi, has only stated that total output of nearly 618 to 620 kgs/hour was obtained during the trial run conducted on 24/07/2017 for a period of 28 minutes. Dr. Sreekantan Thampi on the basis of the same, reported that in the light of the said output, it may be possible for the plant to achieve the desired output. He has also observed that optimum result could possibly be achieved only if the trial run is done regularly. He has reported that the plant is not fully operational; that many other parts of the machinery had not been operated during the trial run; that the plant had not worked continuously for eight hours; that trial run has to be conducted for eight hours per day for a period of seven days. Instead, trial run had been conducted for two short spells of 28 minutes and 2 hours 30 minutes only, which is not in accordance with the interim order passed by the learned Arbitrator. Therefore, the respondent contended that the trial run conducted on 24/07/2017 for two short spells of time, cannot be made the basis for deciding the issues involved in the arbitration case. However, the Arbitrator misread the reports of the representative of the Board and in violation of Section 28(3) of the Act, proceeded to pass the Award, which according to the Board is in conflict with the public policy of India as contemplated under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. This was the ground urged before the court below also where the first issue raised was – “ whether the Award is liable to be set aside under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act?” 8. Admittedly it is the amended provisions of Section 28 and Section 34(2) of the Act that are to be applied in this case. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Admittedly it is the amended provisions of Section 28 and Section 34(2) of the Act that are to be applied in this case. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019 KHC 6554), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paragraphs 31 and 32 of Associate Builders v. DDA ( AIR 2015 SC 620 ), while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, as contemplated under Section 34(2-A). Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at a decision, would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Therefore, now it is Section 34(2-A) of the Act that would be applicable to a challenge of the nature as raised in this case. The contention of the Board is that the finding of the Arbitrator is a patent illegality, which is apparent on the face of the record and that the same goes to the root of the matter. This challenge after the amendment in the year 2015, can only come under Section 34(2-A) and not under Section 34(2)(b) (ii) of the Act as contended by the Board and as understood by the court below. The court below did not accept the contentions of the Board and has dismissed the original application. But the stand taken that the challenge set up by the Board falls under Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Act is apparently incorrect in the light of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 9. Section 34(2-A), says that an award may be set aside if the court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. We take note of the proviso also, which says that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of law or by reappreciation of evidence. In Associate Builders (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under the Act and held that the courts have no business to enter into pure questions of fact to set aside an award. In Associate Builders (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the courts in exercise of their jurisdiction under the Act and held that the courts have no business to enter into pure questions of fact to set aside an award. Courts are not to meddle with the findings in the award and do a 'rough and ready justice' in matters before them. Such a ‘rough and ready justice’ cannot be done by any court under its jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act. It has been further held that, the expression 'justice' when it comes to setting aside an award, can only mean an award which shocks the conscience of the court. It cannot possibly include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of a case for which it then seeks to substitute its view for the Arbitrator's view and thus what it considers to be 'justice'. The whole approach of setting aside an arbitral award on such a ground is incorrect as the court under Section 34 or a court under Section 37 is not a First Appellate Court and cannot interfere with errors of fact. 10. Having reminded ourselves of the law on the point, we now proceed to examine whether any patent illegality has been committed by the Arbitrator in this case. Admittedly, the first trial run conducted during day time on 24/07/2017 pursuant to the interim order dated 23/05/2017 was for a duration of 28 minutes only. Thereafter on the same day during night also, a trial run was conducted for about 2 hours 30 minutes. According to the Arbitrator, the second trial run was actually conducted for a duration of 1 hour 38 minutes and not for 2 hours 30 minutes. The fact that trial run was conducted for 28 minutes in the first trial run and for 2 hours 30 minutes only as contended by the Board, is not disputed by the claimant Company. The Arbitrator finds that though trial run for only 28 minutes was conducted, the representative of the Board had never objected to the same or insisted that the trial run should be continued for seven days. The fact that trial run was not conducted for the time period directed in the interim order, was also not brought to the notice of the Arbitrator. The fact that trial run was not conducted for the time period directed in the interim order, was also not brought to the notice of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator also referred to a service report produced by the claimant Company along with its report dated 03/08/2017. According to the claimant Company, the representative of the Board, namely, Dr. Sreekantan Thampi on 24/07/2017 has certified that the working of the plant was satisfactory and so informed the latter that no further trial run was necessary. The Board contends that their representative had never informed the claimant Company that the trial run conducted on 24/07/2017 for a period of 28 minutes was sufficient and that no trial run need be conducted for a week. The Arbitrator found that the case of the claimant Company to be probable in the light of the service report, the reports of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi dated 24/07/2017 and 02/08/2017 and also due to the delay in sending the second report dated 02/08/2017. According to the Arbitrator, the report of the trial run conducted on 24/07/2017 during day time, was sent by Dr. Sreekantan Thampi on the very same day in the evening. However, the report relating to the trial run conducted on the same day during night with the assistance of the technicians supplied by the claimant Company in the presence of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi, was sent only on 02/08/2017, after a long delay of about 8 days. The Arbitrator found fault with Dr. Sreekantan Thampi for not having demanded the claimant Company to conduct trial run for eight hours continuously. According to the Arbitrator, if Dr. Sreekantan Thampi had entertained a view that the plant was required to be run at least for a minimum of eight hours without any mechanical problems as stated by him in his second report dated 02/08/2017, then he ought to have said so in his first report dated 24/07/2017 also. The learned Arbitrator found it ‘surprising’ that Dr. Sreekantan Thampi had not expressed any such opinion while submitting his first report. These aspects were found to be grounds probabilising the case of the claimant Company. 11. Based on the two reports of Dr. The learned Arbitrator found it ‘surprising’ that Dr. Sreekantan Thampi had not expressed any such opinion while submitting his first report. These aspects were found to be grounds probabilising the case of the claimant Company. 11. Based on the two reports of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi, the Board filed a report before the Arbitrator on 10/08/2017 in pursuance of the order dated 28/07/2017 in which they say that from the trial report of the former it is apparent that the plant has not been made fully operational. Product is collected from a point at vibrator swifter and the processing lines like cooling cylinder, blender, cylo and packing were never operated. The plant was not worked continuously for 8 hours in any of the trial runs. As per the interim order, trial run had to be conducted for 8 hours for a period of seven days. But trial run for two short spells of 28 minutes and 2 hrs. 30 minutes alone was conducted. Assessing the capacity of the plant based on the trial run conducted for such short spells of time is not in accordance with the interim order. Further, the trial run was meant for testing the full operational capacity of the plant, except the packing part, and to see whether the desired output of 500 kgs of chilly powder per hour could be achieved if the plant is run continuously for 8 hours in a day for seven days. Hence, they contended that the Interim Order dated 23/05/2017 of the Arbitrator has not been complied with by the claimant Company and so the result of the trial run conducted for short spells of time cannot be relied on for deciding the issues involved in the matter. 12. The learned Arbitrator concluded from the aforesaid reports that if the time taken for the trial run is computed correctly as 1 hour 38 minutes instead of 2 hours 30 minutes as shown in the report, it could be seen that the output received was more than 500 kg/hour. The learned Arbitrator found that of the two trial runs conducted, one had been conducted by the claimant Company in the presence of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi and the second one by Dr. Sreekantan Thampi in the absence of the claimant but with the assistance of the technical team provided by the latter. The learned Arbitrator found that of the two trial runs conducted, one had been conducted by the claimant Company in the presence of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi and the second one by Dr. Sreekantan Thampi in the absence of the claimant but with the assistance of the technical team provided by the latter. The output during the trial runs was above 500 kgs/hour and hence the plant had delivered the expected output during both the trials held. This according to the Arbitrator would indicate that the trial run held independently by the representative of the Board with the assistance of the technical expert of the claimant Company was also fully successful. The Arbitrator further held that it must be because of the consistent and satisfactory results obtained during the two trial runs held on 24/07/2017, no objection had been raised by the representative of the Board either before the claimant Company or before the Arbitrator. If the representative of the Board had actually wanted to continue the test runs for seven days as directed in the order dated 23/05/2017, he ought to have demanded the same in writing to the claimant Company, with a copy of the Arbitrator. However, neither was such a demand made by Dr. Sreekantan Thampi to the claimant Company nor was the omission brought to the notice of the claimant Company. The continued silence on the part of Dr. Sreekantan Thampi and the Board from 25/07/2017 to 02/10/2017 in not informing the claimant Company or the Arbitrator relating to their objection in the stopping of the trial run on 24.07.2017 during day time itself and leaving the place immediately without conducting the trial run for seven days as directed in the interim award/order, would show that there is in fact some truth in the statement of the claimant Company in its report dated 03/08/2017 that the representative of the Board was satisfied with the smooth performance of the plant and hence the reason why he had signed the service report dated 24/07/2017 certifying the fact that the performance of the plant was satisfactory. The Arbitrator further held that if the Board or their representative who was present in Guntur had actually insisted the claimant Company to continue the trial run for seven days from 24/07/2017 and in spite of the said demand, had the claimant Company not acceded to the said demand and had left the spot disregarding the request, the Board ought to have informed the Arbitrator about its protest by way of a report. According to the Arbitrator, the absence of such a demand being made immediately after the test was conducted on 24/07/2017 or at least by 25/07/2017 in spite of the fact that the Board was aware of the same, are reasonable grounds to conclude that there was not only no express demand by the Board or its representative to the claimant Company to continue the trial run for seven days but also that they were not keen on conducting the test run for a week. The learned Arbitrator further held that the interim order was passed in the presence of both the parties and their respective counsel and that before finalising the order, both sides had gone through the contents of the order and at that time, no objection whatsoever had been raised against the same. Copy of the said order had also been given to both sides. In the interim order there was never a direction for conducting the trial run continuously for a period of eight hours a day. That being the position, it was held that the failure to conduct trial run continuously for eight hours cannot be considered as noncompliance with the order passed on 23/05/2017. On the basis of the reports, the Arbitrator further concluded that the chilly powder produced was much more than the agreed quantity of output per hour. The plant had been commissioned long back and has been working for the past more than 3 to 4 years continuously. The plant is in the possession and under the full control of the Board. The plant had been commissioned long back and has been working for the past more than 3 to 4 years continuously. The plant is in the possession and under the full control of the Board. Hence a reasonably lenient view needed to be taken and so it was found that the plant manufactured and commissioned by the claimant had succeeded in producing the required quantity of output of chili powder during the trial runs held as per the interim order dated 23/05/2017 and as such the Board is liable to pay the balance amount due to the claimant Company in compliance with clause 20.1 in the SCC. 13. The finding that there is no term in clause 20.1 to the effect that trial run has to be conducted for 8 hours a day and that no such direction had been given in the Interim Order dated 23/05/2017 is correct. However, there is no material on record to show that the representative of the Board had informed the claimant Company that no further trial run was required to be conducted. When clause 20.1 and the interim order dated 23/05/2017 of the Arbitrator are clear that trial run shall be conducted for a week, then where is the necessity for the representative of the Board to insist/demand for the same or inform the Arbitrator of the same? Even the claimant Company has no case that the aforesaid clause need not be complied with. Their only case is that the representative had informed them that the work of the plant is satisfactory and that no further trial run need be conducted. For this case taken up by the claimant Company there is no evidence on record, on the other hand, both the reports given by Dr. Sreekantan Thampi would show that the overall working of the plant was not satisfactory and that trial runs for longer periods required to be conducted. It is true that in the service report dated 24/07/2017 produced by the claimant Company along with their report dated 03/08/2017, Dr. Sreekantan Thampi has certified that the service was satisfactory. This is a printed form in which Dr. Sreekantan Thampi has tick-marked the box-‘YES’ against the query whether the service was satisfactory or not. This service report at best would only show that the performance of the plant when operated for 28 minutes was satisfactory. Sreekantan Thampi has certified that the service was satisfactory. This is a printed form in which Dr. Sreekantan Thampi has tick-marked the box-‘YES’ against the query whether the service was satisfactory or not. This service report at best would only show that the performance of the plant when operated for 28 minutes was satisfactory. This service report will not in any way show that Dr. Sreekantan Thampi had informed the claimant Company that further trial run need not be conducted. The reasons as to why the trial run was not conducted as directed in the order dated 23/05/2017 is clear from the proceeding dated 19/09/2017 of the learned Arbitrator, which reads - “The sitting commenced by 5.00 pm. Both the parties and their respective counsel were present. Being the first sitting after conducting the trial run ordered dated 23.5.2007, both the parties were directed to make their comments about the trial run and its result. Both sides have submitted reports about the trial run and the result of such of the trial run conducted as per the order passed on 23.5.2017. In answer to the question why trial run was actually conducted only on 24.7.2017 in the presence of the respondent's representative, the claimant submitted that though claimant's technicians were present on 7 days, they were not able to conduct the trial run only because of the non-availability of power supply. Incidentally the arbitrator directed both parties to submit a written statement showing the exact amount due as per the agreement. Both sides agreed to file the same on or before the next hearing date, which is fixed as 7th October 2017. Sitting will be held in the same venue by 10.30am….” The aforesaid order makes it clear that it was not because the representative of the Board had informed the claimant Company that further trial run was not necessary, but because of the non availability of power supply. Therefore, the conclusion of the Arbitrator that the case of the claimant Company that Dr. Sreekantan Thampi had informed the claimant Company that no further trial run was necessary, is probabilised by his conduct in not insisting for trial run for seven days, is apparently incorrect and wrong. The records show otherwise. This finding of the learned Arbitrator is based on probability, assumption and conjecture, when there was in fact material on record to show otherwise. The records show otherwise. This finding of the learned Arbitrator is based on probability, assumption and conjecture, when there was in fact material on record to show otherwise. The court below refused interference on the ground that the findings arrived at are based on facts; that the Arbitrator is the final authority on the same and therefore the court in exercise of its limited jurisdiction under Section 34 cannot interfere with the same. It is true that the court below under Section 34 or this Court under Section 37 are not sitting in appeal over the findings of the Arbitrator and its supervisory jurisdiction is quite limited. However, a case in which the finding on the basis of which the Award is passed, is based on no evidence or by ignoring the evidence available on record, the same is a patent illegality, into which the court can certainly interfere. This is not a case in which this Court is doing ‘rough and ready justice’ by meddling with the findings or substituting the plausible/possible view of the Arbitrator with that of this court. Clause 20.1 which is not disputed by either side, clearly provides that trial run should be conducted for a period of one week. More interestingly, the claimant Company also does not have a case that the trial run as contemplated under clause 20.1 was ever conducted. The claimant Company also has no case that due to any reason(s); the compliance of the said clause is not necessary or that it was impossible of compliance. That being the position, it is apparent that the finding of the Arbitrator that clause 20.1 has been complied with, is patently wrong. 14. The estimated cost of the work is Rs.150 lakhs approximately. The work as per the contract was required to be completed within four months. This period was to be reckoned from the 15th day of the issue of the Letter of Authority (LoA), which is Ext. C1 dated 06/10/2010. 90% of the amount relating to the work has already been disbursed to the claimant. It is only the balance 10% that remains. On going through the Original Application filed by the claimant Company and the Counter Affidavit of the respondent Board, it is clear that the plant was never operational. Even at this late point of time, it is admitted that the plant is not operational. It is only the balance 10% that remains. On going through the Original Application filed by the claimant Company and the Counter Affidavit of the respondent Board, it is clear that the plant was never operational. Even at this late point of time, it is admitted that the plant is not operational. The fact that the dispute was pending for about four to five years even at the time when the matter came up before the learned Arbitrator was noticed with anguish by the learned Arbitrator and hence the reason why after the close of the recording of evidence of both sides, an attempt to settle the matter was made. It is public money that is involved in this case. The Board has already invested a considerable sum of money with absolutely no returns or zero result. It is true that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting Section 28(3), has held that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. If the view of the Arbitrator is a plausible view, the court should refrain from interfering with the same. Here is a case where even the claimant has no case that clause 20.1 has been complied with. That being the position, the reasons given by the learned Arbitrator for concluding that clause 20.1 has been complied with, is neither a possible nor plausible view which a reasonable man would have arrived at. The finding is patently wrong, which is apparent on the face of the record and hence in such circumstances, the court below ought to have interfered with the same in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 34. Hence, we do so in exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the Award dated 02.11.2017 of the learned Arbitrator is set aside. All interlocutory applications, if any, pending, shall stand disposed of.