Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 166 (MP)

Santosh Bharati v. State of Madhya Pradesh

2022-01-28

SUBODH ABHYANKAR

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. With the consent of the parties, heard finally. This petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against order dated 14.09.2015 (Annexure P/8) passed by respondent No.3 [G.T. Polytechnic College, Jaora, District Ratlam (MP)], whereby the services of the petitioner have been terminated; and in an appeal preferred against the aforesaid order before respondent No.2 (Director, Technical Education, Bhopal), the same has also been dismissed vide order dated 21.06.2016 (Annexure P/12), which is also under challenge. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed in the G.T. Polytechnic College, Jaora, District Ratlam (MP) in the year 2008; and was regularized in the year 2011, as the College was declared as an Autonomous College by the State Government. On the basis of a complaint made in April, 2011 by certain students namely Harish Panwar s/o Prakash Chandra Panwar, Pradeep Tiwari s/o Madhusudan Tiwari and others, that the petitioner has illegally obtained certain money from them by threatening of serious consequences and also on the pretext that he would get them passed in the examination in First Division. On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, an enquiry ensued and on 10.03.2014, a charge sheet was also issued to the petitioner, although no Enquiry Officer was appointed in the matter. In the aforesaid charge sheet, an application was submitted by the petitioner on 31.05.2014 (Annexure P/2), denying the allegations levelled against him; and another application dated 31.05.2014 (Annexure P/3) was also filed for taking assistance of a retired Government Employee for the purpose of proper defence in the case, but the aforesaid application was not decided; and subsequently, the petitioner also submitted an objection before the State Government regarding the manner in which the Departmental Enquiry (DE) was being conducted; and vide order dated 11.05.2015 (Annexure P/4), the State Government directed the Disciplinary Authority, that the proceedings be conducted only in accordance with the law of the Madhya Pradesh Technical Education Polytechnic College (Teacher Cadre) Service Recruitment Rules, 2004 (herein after referred to as the Rules of 2004). However, the Enquiry Officer found the charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved and on 25.05.20015 (Annexure P/6), a show cause notice was also served to the petitioner along with a copy of Enquiry Report, a reply to which was also filed by the petitioner on 27.05.2015 (Annexure P/7) and thereafter, impugned order dated 14.09.2015 (Annexure P/8) regarding removal of the petitioner from the services has been passed. 3. The appeal against the aforesaid order dated 14.09.2015 was preferred by the petitioner on 20.10.2015 under Rule 23 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1966 (herein after referred to as the Rules of 1966), but as the same was kept pending, a Writ Petition No.3048/2016 was also filed by the petitioner before this Court which was disposed of vide its order dated 03.05.2016 (Annexure P/10), directing respondent No.2 (Director, Technical Education, Bhopal) to decide the petitioner's appeal expeditiously within a period of three months' time; and thus, following the aforesaid order, a Two Members Committee was constituted to decide the petitioner's case; and 17.03.2016 was fixed for personal hearing of the petitioner. The petitioner also submitted his written submissions, but the appeal also came to be dismissed by the Appellate Authority (Director, Technical Education, Bhopal) vide it's order dated 21.06.2016 (Annexure P/12) and thus, the order of removal of the petitioner has been affirmed by the Appellate Authority which is under challenge before this court. 4. Shri Santosh Baharihas vehemently argued before this Court; and it is submitted that the constitution of a Two Members Committee for the purpose of considering the statutory appeal in itself was contrary to law, who has also decided the appeal without appreciating the merits of the case. 5. It is further submitted that the DE in itself was without jurisdiction, as it is based on Preliminary Enquiry conducted behind the back of the petitioner; and no opportunity of hearing and no notice was ever given to the petitioner at the time of conduction of alleged Preliminary Enquiry; and even the copy of the Enquiry Report has not been furnished to the petitioner. 6. 6. It is further stated that the Appointing Authority of the petitioner is the Board of Governors, but for the reasons best known to the respondents, the matter was never placed before the Board of Governors; and in such circumstances, the impugned proceedings are also vitiated for want of jurisdiction. It is further submitted that the proceedings have also not been initiated in the light of Rules of 2004. 7. The petitioner has submitted that he has been removed from the services only on the basis of Preliminary Enquiry Report and was not given right to cross examine the witnesses, which has vitiated the entire proceedings. 8. It is submitted that wrong burden of proof has been placed on the petitioner despite the fact that the respondents themselves were not able to prove their case on its own merits. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned orders be quashed. 9. It is submitted that from the record, it is also apparent that complainant Vinod Lovanshi s/o Mohanlal Lovanshi had never submitted any complaint against the petitioner and in the name of Vinod Lovanshi, one Deepak Shukla s/o Umakant Shukla has signed the complaint and thus, on the basis of such complaint, the petitioner could not have been held guilty. In support of his contentions Shri Bharati has also relied upon the decisions in the case of Bhagirath Sharma Vs. Home Department (Police) in WP No.3688/2017, Om Prakash Lashkar Vs. M.P. State Civil Supplies in WP No.1301/2004, Om Prakash Lashkar Vs. M.P. State Civil Supplies in WA No.553/2009, Shishuvendra Singh Tomar Vs. State of M.P. and others in WP No.9690/2014. 10. A reply to the aforesaid petition has also been filed by the respondents, denying the contents of the petition. 11. It is submitted by the learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the respondent/State that no case for interference is made out, as the impugned orders have been passed, in accordance with law, by a reasoned and speaking order, taking all the grounds raised by the petitioner in appeal. 12. It is further submitted that serious financial illegalities were committed by the petitioner by obtaining money from the students namely Harish Panwar and Pradeep Tiwari and others, who have made their complaint on affidavit to various authorities. 13. 12. It is further submitted that serious financial illegalities were committed by the petitioner by obtaining money from the students namely Harish Panwar and Pradeep Tiwari and others, who have made their complaint on affidavit to various authorities. 13. It is further submitted that the allegations made by them were not bald allegations and in fact, the amount was deposited from the students' bank's account to the bank account of the petitioner for getting them passed in First Division; and after receiving the complaint, the Collector, District Ratlam, Ratlam has directed the Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) to conduct a Preliminary Enquiry upon the allegations made in the complaint against the petitioner; and the allegations levelled against the petitioner were found to be correct. Simultaneously, the Director, Technical Education, Bhopal also directed the Principal, Government Polytechnic College, Ujjain to make an enquiry in the matter and thus, show cause notice dated 10.06.2011 (Annexure R/5) was issued to the petitioner, seeking his explanation; and as the reply filed by the petitioner was not found to be satisfactory, it was proposed to be placed before the Board of Governors of Institution on 15.11.2011 to conduct a Departmental Enquiry against the petitioner. The aforesaid proposal was duly accorded by the Collector being the Chairman of Board of Governors on 18.11.2011. A show cause notice under Section 14 of the Rules of 1966 was issued to the petitioner on 29.12.2011, but in the aforesaid proceedings also, the petitioner tried to evade the proceedings by seeking certain documents. However, in his reply dated 03.02.2012, he denied the allegations by saying that he had obtained money from the students, as he had loaned them the said amount, which was borrowed by the students from him from time to time; and thus, enquiry was conducted and the charges levelled against the petitioner were found to be proved. Hence, another notice dated 25.05.2015 (Annexure P/6) was served on the petitioner regarding penalty of removal from services as per Rule 10 (1) (b) (4) of the Rules of 1966. A reply of the said notice was also filed by the petitioner on 27.05.2015 (Annexure P/7) and thus the impugned order was passed on 14.09.2015 directing his removal from services and his appeal has also been rejected by the Appellate Authority rightly. 14. A reply of the said notice was also filed by the petitioner on 27.05.2015 (Annexure P/7) and thus the impugned order was passed on 14.09.2015 directing his removal from services and his appeal has also been rejected by the Appellate Authority rightly. 14. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the respondent/State of Madhya Pradesh has submitted that the petitioner was given due opportunity of hearing, as the petitioner had submitted his reply in Preliminary Enquiry as well. Counsel has also submitted that the enquiry has been duly conducted and has placed reliance on the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965, as provided under the gazette notification dated 06.09.2004 (Annexure R/6). 15. Regarding placing of the matter before the Board of Governors, it is submitted that the petitioner was employed by the Chairman of the Institute and hence, approval was taken from the Board of Governors. In such circumstances, it is submitted that the Chairman is not competent to take disciplinary action against the petitioner. 16. So far as the grievance of the petitioner that he was not given proper opportunity to take assistance of any retired Government Employee in his defence in the Departmental Enquiry is concerned, it is submitted that as per circular dated 31.05.2002, there was no necessity to take permission from the Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority for taking assistance of any retired Government Employee. Copy of the circular is also placed on record as Annexure R/7. Thus, it is submitted that if the petitioner has not appointed any such person in his defence, the respondents cannot be blamed for the same. Counsel has also drawn the attention of this Court to the admissions made by the petitioner himself in the Enquiry Report. Thus, it is submitted that impugned orders of removal and its affirmation by the appellate authority is just and proper, and do not call for any interference. 17. Heard, the petitioner as also the learned counsel for the respondent and perused the record. 18. From the record it is found that although the petitioner has tried to allege various illegalities committed by the respondents in the departmental proceedings concluded against him, but in sum and substance, it is alleged that the inquiry was conducted behind his back and he was also not given any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses which goes to the root of a free and fair inquiry. In their reply, the respondents have refuted the allegations and reliance has been placed on the petitioner's own admissions. 19. The allegations against the petitioner in the charge sheet are that on the basis of a complaint made by certain students, namely Pradeep Tiwari s/o Madhusudan Tiwari, Vinod Lovanshi, and Harish Panwar s/o Prakash Chandra Panwar that the petitioner has illegally obtained certain money from them by threatening them of bad result and also on the pretext that he would get them passed in First Division in the examination. The respondents have also relied upon the entries in the savings bank account of the petitioner at State Bank of India wherein a sum of Rs.20000/- were said to be deposited by Pradeep Tiwari and Harrish Pawar jointly, Rs.4000/- by student Deepak Shukla and Rs.8000/- by Vinod the receipts of which were also sought to be proved in the charge sheet. 20. In the initial inquiry report prepared by the Principal, Engg. 20. In the initial inquiry report prepared by the Principal, Engg. C. G. Dhabu, the defence of the petitioner has been noted in the following manner (page 23 of paper book):- ^^nksuksa gh Nk=ksa us Jh Hkkjrh ds Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad ds [kkrs esa ijh{kk esa ikl djkus@vad c<+okus ds fy, iSlk tek djus dh ckr dgh xbZ gSA Jh Hkkjrh tkapdrkZ vf/kdkjh ds le{k fnukad 17-09-2014 dks mifLFkr gq, ,oa mUgksusa iwNs x;s Á'uksa ds tokc fyf[kr esa ÁLrqr fd;s gS] tks layXu gSA Jh Hkkjrh us voxr djk;k fd mUgksaus le; ij i= ,oa Li"Vhdj.k ÁLrqr fd;s gS vkSj Á'uksa ds lkFk&lkFk oks vyx viuk ,d tokc ÁLrqr dj jgs gS] tks fd layXu gSA tokc ds lkFk Jh Hkkjrh us Hkkjrh; LVsV cSad ds [kkrk Øekad@ 63028985078 esa fnukad 20-12-2005 ds :i;s 4000@& fnukad 10-12-2010 dks :i;s 8000@& ¼Jh yksguflag }kjk½ fnukad 10-12-2010 dks gh :i;s 20]000@& ¼Jh gjh'k iokj }kjk½ tek djus dh tek iphZ Hkh layXu dh gSA Jh Hkkjrh us fyf[kr esa voxr djk;k gS fd mijksDr [kkrk mudk gh gS] muls ;g iwNus ij fd muds [kkrs esa mDr jkf'k gjh'k iokj us D;ksa tek dh] rks mUgksaus voxr djk;k fd gjh'k iokj us m/kkj fy, iSls cSad esa tek djk;s Fks ,oa :i;s 8000@& tek djus okys O;fDr dks oks ugha tkursA Jh Hkkjrh }kjk mijksDr jkf'k ds ckjs esa iwNus ij mUgksaus crk;k fd ;g jkf'k mUgha dh Fkh vkSj mUgksaus mldk lkekU; mi;ksx fd;kA Jh Hkkjrh }kjk vuqfoHkkxh; vf/kdkjh tkojk dks iwoZ esa crk;k x;k gS fd] muls tc dksbZ iSls m/kkj ekaxrk gS rks os mls m/kkj ns nsrs gS mUgksaus Nk= gjh'k dks :i;s 35000@& nsus ds laca/k esa dksbZ Áek.k ÁLrqr ugha fd;k Fkk tcfd Jh Hkkjrh dh cguksa }kjk ÁLrqr 'kiFk i= esa :i;s 25000@& dk mYys[k fd;k gSA tc muls Nk=ksa ds laca/k esa vU; tkudkjh pkgh xbZ rks mUgksaus voxr djk;k fd bu Á'uksa dk tokc eSa iwoZ esa gh ns pqdk gw¡ tk¡p vf/kdkjh voyksdu djsaA ¼C;ku layXu gS½ tk¡p ds nkSjku Jh Hkkjrh us tks tokc ÁLrqr fd;k gS] mlesa mUgksaus fy[kk gS fd] mudh fu;qfDr HkrhZ vf/kfu;e 2004 ds varxZr dh xbZ gS] vkSj muds laca/k esa dksbZ Hkh dk;Zokgh 'kklu Lrj ls u dh tkdj dsoy lapkyd eaMy Lrj ls gh dh tk ldrh gSA-------------- nksuksa i{kksa }kjk ÁLrqr nLrkostksa ds vk/kkj ij eSa bl fu"d"kZ ij igqaprk gaw fd] Jh larks"k Hkkjrh ,d f'k{kdh; in ij gS fdUrq mudk vkpj.k ,oa muds }kjk dh xbZ fyf[kr dk;Zokgh vuqdwy Árhr ugha gksrhA Nk=ks ds fo:) Nk=ksa }kjk muds [kkrs esa iSls tek djus ij Nk=ksa ds fo:) dk;Zokgh djus dh ckr dguk ,d rjg ls ;g Lohdkj djuk gS fd Jh Hkkjrh esa iSls tek fd;s x;s FksA** (emphasis supplied) 21. After the aforesaid inquiry, in reply to a subsequent notice issued to the petitioner, amongst others, his contention regarding bank transaction was as follows (page 31 of the paper book):- ^^dkuwu esa Hkh Nk=ksa dk ml iSls ls dksbZ laca/k ugha gS vkSj lR; ;gh gS fd eSaus gh Nk=ksa dks viuk iSlk nsdj [kkrs esa tek djus ds fy, Hkstk Fkk ftldh tek jlhn muds ikl jg xbZA pwafd eSa mu fnuksa O;Lr jgrk Fkk vkSj Nk=ksa ls esjk O;ogkj Fkk vkSj Nk=ksa ds bl Ádkj ds pfj= dk eq>s irk ugha Fkk bl otg ls eSaus viuk iSlk mUgsa esjs [kkrs es Mkyus ds fy, dg fn;k vkSj mUgksaus ek= cSad dh tek jlhn muds ikl gksus vkSj LFkkuh; vijkf/k;ksa ls muds laca/kksa dk ykHk mBkdj esjs lkFk bl Ádkj dk vkijkf/kd d`R; fd;kA bl Ádkj cSad LVsVesaV ls Li"V gS fd Nk=ksa us esjs }kjk mUgsa fn;k x;k iSlk gh esjs [kkrs esa Mkyk FkkA----------------------- ;s lc ckrsa Jh lhth <cw dks vius Áfrosnu esa fy[kuk pkfg, Fkh tks mUgksaus lafnX/k dkj.kksa ls ugha fy[khA lcls cMh ckr ;g gS fd Lo;a f'kdk;rdrkZ Nk=ksa }kjk esjs [kkrs esa esjk gh iSlk Mkyus ds yxHkx 5 eghus ckn 'kiFk i= nsdj esjh f'kdk;r djuk gS blfy, fd okLro esa og esjk gh iSlk Fkk tks eSaus Nk=ksa dks vius [kkrs es Mkyus ds fy, fn;k FkkA ;fn Nk=ksa dk iSlk rks os rHkh f'kdk;r dj nsrs rc mUgksausa esjs [kkrs esa iSlk Mkyk FkkA var esa Jh lhth nks"kh Bgjkus ds fy, iwoZ esa dh xbZ tkapksa dks gh vk/kkj cukuk bl iwjh ÁfØ;k dks gh lafnX/k cuk nsrk gS blfy, fd iwjh tkap ÁfØ;k u, fljs dh tkuk Fkh vkSj iqjkuh tkpksa ls bl tkap dk dksbZ laca/k ugh FkkA** (emphasis supplied) 22. It is also found that the respondents have also placed on record a letter annexure-R/5 which is reproduced as under:- ^^Ákpk;Z xksŒ iksysVsfDud egkfo|ky; tkojk fo"k;& vkids ^^dkj.k crkvks lwpuk i=** Øekad@thihts@LFkk@2011@1304 fnukad 10-06-2011 ds mRrj ds fo"k; esaA lanHkZ& laLFkk ds iwoZ Nk= Jh gjh'k firk Jh Ádk'k paæ iaokj }kjk ÁLrqr f'kdk;rA mijksDRk fo"k;kUrxZr ys[k gS fd lanfHkZRk f'kdk;r esa ÁkFkhZ us Lo;a ;g Lohdkj fd;k gS fd mUgksaus mRrh.kZ gksus ds fy, iSls fn, gSaA ijh{kk esa mRrh.kZ gksus ds fy, iSls nsuk ijh{kk esa vuqfpr lk/ku viukuk gSA bl d`R; ds fy, ÁkFkhZ Nk=ksa ds fo:) U.F.M. dk dsl cukdj R.G.P.V. Hkstuk iwjh rjg fof/k lEer gSA ijarq tc ÁkFkhZ Nk=ksa ds fo:) U.F.M. dk dsl cukus dh ctk, mUgsa ijh{kk esa cSBk fy;k x;k gS rks esjs fo:) tkap dk vk/kkj gh lekIr gks x;k gS blfy, fd U.F.M. dk dsl u cukus ls ;g Li"V gks x;k gS fd egkfo|ky; Á'kklu Nk=ksa dh LohdkjksfDr dks >wBk eku jgk gSA ;fn ,d O;fDr ;g dgs fd mlus nwljs O;fDRk dks gR;k djus ds fy, iSls fn, Fks vkSj vc u rks gR;k gqbZ vkSj u gh iSls okil feysA ,slh fLFkfr esa loZÁFke igys O;fDr ds f[kykQ gh mldh LohdkjksfDr ds vk/kkj ij dk;Zokgh gksxhA ;gh fLFkfr Nk=ksa ds lkFk Hkh gSA vr% fu;ekuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsA larks"k Hkkjrh O;k[;krk flfoyA** (emphasis supplied) 23. In the light of the aforesaid admissions on the part of the petitioner, so far as the contentions of the petitioner regarding the violation of the principles of natural justice are concerned, it would be apt at this juncture to refer to the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India, (1984) 1 SCC 43 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 62, the relevant pars of the same read as under : - '28. The main argument of Mr Garg, counsel for the appellant, was that the requirements of Rule 50 of the aforesaid rules have not been complied with. He submitted that the materials against the appellant were gathered in his absence and he was not allowed to cross- examine the witnesses, and that evidence against him was not recorded in his presence. He urged that only an opportunity to show cause, after he had replied the charges against him which were based on materials gathered behind him for imposition of penalty, was given. He urged that only an opportunity to show cause, after he had replied the charges against him which were based on materials gathered behind him for imposition of penalty, was given. He submitted that reasonable opportunity under the rules required that materials against a person should not be gathered behind his back and he should be given an opportunity to cross-examine, if necessary, the persons who had supplied the materials or given evidence against him. He further submitted that the delinquent officer should also be given an opportunity to rebut such evidence. Mr Garg submitted that infraction of this procedure under the rules will make the investigation bad as basic fundamental requirement of an opportunity was implied in the rule. The impugned order should be struck down as having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 29. We are of the opinion that Mr Garg is right that the rules of natural justice as we have set out hereinbefore implied an opportunity to the delinquent officer to give evidence in respect of the charges or to deny the charges against him. Secondly, he submitted that even if the rules had no statutory force and even if the party had bound himself by the contract, as he had accepted the Staff Rule, there cannot be any contract with a Statutory Corporation which is violative of the principles of natural justice in matters of domestic enquiry involving termination of service of an employee. We are in agreement with the basic submission of Mr Garg in this respect, but we find that the relevant rules which we have set out hereinbefore have been complied with even if the rules are read that requirements of natural justice were implied in the said rules or even if such basic principles of natural justice were implied, there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice in respect of the order passed in this case. In respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an officer or an employee of Statutory Corporations like the State Bank of India, there must be an investigation into the charges consistent with the requirements of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice as far as these were applicable to a particular situation. In respect of an order involving adverse or penal consequences against an officer or an employee of Statutory Corporations like the State Bank of India, there must be an investigation into the charges consistent with the requirements of the situation in accordance with the principles of natural justice as far as these were applicable to a particular situation. So whether a particular principle of natural justice has been violated or not has to be judged in the background of the nature of charges, the nature of the investigation conducted in the background of any statutory or relevant rules governing such enquiries. Here the infraction of the natural justice complained of was that he was not given an opportunity to rebut the materials gathered in his absence. As has been observed in On Justice by J.R. Lucas, the principles of natural justice basically, if we may say so, emanate from the actual phrase 'audi alteram partem' which was first formulated by St. Augustine (De Duabus Animabus, XIV, 22 J.P. Migne, PL. 42, 110). 30. In dealing with particular situation we must formulate the actual principles to be applied in a particular situation. Hence it may be illustrated as J.R. Lucas - On Justice (p. 86) has done it, thus: 'Hence, when we are judging deeds, and may find that a man did wrong, there is a requirement of logic that we should allow the putative agent to correct misinterpretations or disavow the intention imputed to him or otherwise disown the action. God needed to ask Adam 'Hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat?' Because it was essential that Adam should not be blamed or punished unless he had done exactly that deed. If the serpent had planted the evidence, or if he had beguiled Adam into eating it under the misapprehension that it came from another, non-forbidden tree, then Adam had not sinned and should not have been expelled from Eden. Only if the accused admits the charge, or, faced with the accusation, cannot explain his behaviour convincingly in any other way, are we logically entitled to conclude that he did indeed do it.' 31. Wade in his Administrative Law , 5th Edn. at pp. Only if the accused admits the charge, or, faced with the accusation, cannot explain his behaviour convincingly in any other way, are we logically entitled to conclude that he did indeed do it.' 31. Wade in his Administrative Law , 5th Edn. at pp. 472-475 has observed that it is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply: nor as to their scope and extent. Everything depends on the subject-matter, the application of principles of natural justice, resting as it does upon statutory implication, must always be in conformity with the scheme of the Act and with the subject-matter of the case. In the application of the concept of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth. 32. The basic concept is fair play in action administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial. The concept of fair play in action must depend upon the particular lis, if there be any, between the parties. If the credibility of a person who has testified or given some information is in doubt, or if the version or the statement of the person who has testified, is, in dispute, right of cross-examination must inevitablly form part of fair play in action but where there is no lis regarding the facts but certain explanation of the circumstances there is no requirement of cross- examination to be fulfilled to justify fair play in action. When on the question of facts there was no dispute, no real prejudice has been caused to a party aggrieved by an order, by absence of any formal opportunity of cross-examination per se does not invalidate or vitiate the decision arrived at fairly. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version or the credibility of the statement. 33. This is more so when the party against whom an order has been passed does not dispute the facts and does not demand to test the veracity of the version or the credibility of the statement. 33. The party who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence from record or testimony gathered behind his back cannot expect to succeed in any subsequent demand that there was no opportunity of cross-examination specially when it was not asked for and there was no dispute about the veracity of the statements. Where there is no dispute as to the facts, or the weight to be attached on disputed facts but only an explanation of the acts, absence of opportunity to cross-examination does not create any prejudice in such cases. 34. The principles of natural justice will, therefore, depend upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case. We have set out hereinbefore the actual facts and circumstances of the case. The appellant was associated with the preliminary investigation that was conducted against him. He does not deny or dispute that. Information and materials undoubtedly were gathered not in his presence but whatever information was there and gathered namely, the versions of the persons, the particular entries which required examination were shown to him. He was conveyed the information given and his explanation was asked for. He participated in that investigation. He gave his explanation but he did not dispute any of the facts nor did he ask for any opportunity to call any evidence to rebut these facts. He did ask for a personal hearing, as we have mentioned hereinbefore and he was given such opportunity of personal hearing. His explanations were duly recorded. He does not allege that his version has been improperly recorded nor did he question the veracity of the witnesses or the entries or the letters or documents shown to him upon which the charges were framed and upon which he was found guilty. Indeed it may be mentioned that he was really consulted at every stage of preliminary investigation upon which the charges were based and upon which proposed action against him has been taken. Indeed it may be mentioned that he was really consulted at every stage of preliminary investigation upon which the charges were based and upon which proposed action against him has been taken. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, that it cannot be said that in conducting the enquiry or framing of the charges or arriving at the decision, the authorities concerned have acted in violation of the principles of natural justice merely because the evidence was not recorded in his presence or that the materials, the gist of which was communicated to him, were not gathered in his presence. As we have set out hereinbefore, indeed he had accepted the factual basis of the allegations. We have set out hereinbefore in extenso the portions where he had actually admitted the factual basis of these allegations against him, where he has not questioned the veracity of the witness of the facts or credibility of the witnesses or credibility of the entries on records. Indeed he has given explanation namely, he was overworked, he had consulted his superiors and sought their guidance, his conduct has not actually, according to him caused any financial risk or damage to the bank concerned. Therefore, in our opinion, in the manner in which the investigation was carried out as a result of which action has been taken against him cannot be condemned as bad being in violation of the principles of natural justice. Had he, however, denied any of the facts or had questioned the credibility of the persons who had given information against him, then different considerations would have applied and in those circumstances, refusal to give an opportunity to cross-examine the persons giving information against him or to lead evidence on his own part to rebut the facts would have been necessary and denial of such opportunity would have been fatal. But such is not the case here as we have mentioned hereinbefore. 40. In substance, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the provision of the rules under which the enquiry was conducted, the procedure mentioned above has been followed. Here also the appellant was allowed to show that the evidence against him was not worthy of credence or consideration. The evidence was discussed. His explanation was sought for and recorded. The materials and other records were shown to him. Here also the appellant was allowed to show that the evidence against him was not worthy of credence or consideration. The evidence was discussed. His explanation was sought for and recorded. The materials and other records were shown to him. He did not ask for any chance to cross- examine the witness or to examine himself or any other witness in support of his defence. Indeed, as we have noted before, he admitted the facts. He was also given in addition an opportunity of showing that he has not been guilty of any such misconduct as to merit the particular punishment proposed to be meted out to him. This opportunity was given. He gave his explanation and that was considered. He asked for a personal hearing which, we have noted in this case, was duly given to him. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the aforesaid passage relied on behalf of the appellant would not be of any assistance to the appellant in this case. 41. It is true that all actions against a party which involve penal or adverse consequences must be in accordance with the principles of natural justice but whether any particular principle of natural justice would be applicable to a particular situation or the question whether there has been any infraction of the application of that principle, has to be judged, in the light of facts and circumstances of each particular case. The basic requirement is that there must be fair play in action and the decision must be arrived at in a just and objective manner with regard to the relevance of the materials and reasons. We must reiterate again that the rules of natural justice are flexible and cannot be put on any rigid formula. In order to sustain a complaint of violation of principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity of cross-examination, it has to be established that prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed. See in this connection the observations of this Court in the case of Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa. Hidayatullah, C.J., observed there at p. 394 of the Report: '.. .there is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. Hidayatullah, C.J., observed there at p. 394 of the Report: '.. .there is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right'. Judged by this principle, in the background of the facts and circumstances mentioned before, we are of the opinion that there has been no real prejudice caused by infraction of any particular rule of natural justice of which appellant before us complained in this case. See in this connection the observations of this Court in the case of Union of India v. P.K. Roy where this Court reiterated that (SCR p. 202) 'the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in a particular case'. See also in this connection the observations of Hidayatullah, C.J.. in the case of Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore. In our opinion, in the background of facts and circumstances of this case, the nature of investigation conducted in which the appellant was associated, there has been no infraction of that principle. In the premises, for the reasons aforesaid. there has been in the facts and circumstances of the case, no infraction of any principle of natural justice by the absence of a formal opportunity of cross-examination. Neither cross-examination nor the opportunity to lead evidence by the delinquent is an integral part of all quasi-judicial adjudications. 42. Another aspect of the violation of the principles of natural justice that was urged before us on behalf of the appellant was that the final order did not contain reasons. In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. 42. Another aspect of the violation of the principles of natural justice that was urged before us on behalf of the appellant was that the final order did not contain reasons. In this connection reliance was placed on the observations of this Court in the case of Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of India v. Union of India where this Court observed that if courts of law were to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals were essential then administrative authorities and tribunals should afford fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by the orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. The Court, further, observed, that rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. 43. It may be mentioned that the facts in that case were different. In the instant case though reasons have not been expressly stated, these reasons were implicit namely, the nature of the charges, the explanation offered and the reply of the appellant to the show-cause notice. These appear from a fair reading of the order impugned in this case. It, further, appears that there was consideration of those facts and the decision was arrived at after consideration of those reasons. It is manifest, therefore, that absence of any denial by the appellant, indeed admissions on the factual basis and nature of the explanation offered by the appellant were considered by the authority to merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal. Such a conclusion could not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be considered to be unreasonable or one which no reasonable man could make.' (emphasis supplied) 24. Thus, testing the facts of the present case on the anvil of the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, this court has no hesitation to hold that the petitioner has not been able to make out any case for interference. The admissions on the part of the petitioner as noted hereinabove, clearly make out a case of gross misconduct against the petitioner. The admissions on the part of the petitioner as noted hereinabove, clearly make out a case of gross misconduct against the petitioner. So far as the grounds raised in para 6.17 of the petition are concerned, again the petitioner has tried to shift his burden on the respondents by pleading as under: 'para 6.17'. 'BECAUSE, the Respondent; has failed to consider that depositing of the amount in the petitioner's bank account is nothing but a pre-planned action against the petitioner as any one can deposit any amount of any person by collusing with any person. thus also, the removal order could not have been passed on this basis. It is humbly submitted that even looking to the statement of acount, it is clear that it has been mentioned in the statement that the deposit has been shown to be 'cash deposit self. It is further submitted that it has been very pecullarly shown on the deposit parchi (sic) that it has been deposited jointly by Pradeep Tiwari and Harish Pawar, which is not practically possible, as there can be a joint account in the bank, but it is never heard by any one that can be a deposit by two persons in one bank account.' (emphasis supplied) 25. Thus, it is apparent that on one hand the petitioner has admitted that it was his own money which has been deposited in his account and on the other hand, he has also tried to demonstrate that it has been deposited in his account in collusion, as a conspiracy. The defence, as set up by the petitioner that he lent the money to the students who deposited the same in his account appears rather lame and does not impresses this court. So far as the decisions cited by shri Bharati are concerned, the same are distinguishable on merits and are of no help to him. 26. As a result, the petition being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. No costs.