JUDGMENT : ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA, J. 1. Heard Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs and Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned senior counsel for the respondent/defendant. 2. The respondent as the plaintiff instituted Title Suit No. 62/1991 in the Court of the Sadar Munsiff No. 1, Dibrugarh with the following prayers: “(a) for declaration that the plaintiff’s lawful possession over the years as existing legal right are not liable to be disturbed, restrained by acts of any obstructions, interference, interventions, for the purpose of coercing him to pay the ‘Salami’ at the instance of the defendants. (b) for perpetual injunction U/s 38 specific Relief Act, restraining the defendants, their agent and workmen from obstructing, interrupting, interfering from lawful possession of the plaintiff as a lawful occupier of the shop premises described in the schedule below, below over the last forty (4) years. (c) for a mandatory injunction under section 39 of Specific Relief Act; by breaking open of the locks and the shuttering of the shop door and also to perform the requisite acts preventing the defendants from breach of obligation as mentioned herein before under section 39 of the Specific Relief Act. (d) all costs of the suit. (e) any other further relief or relief’s to which the plaintiff is found entitled in law and equity.” 3. The said Title Suit No. 62/1991 was dismissed by the Munsiff No. 1 Dibrugarh vide judgment dated 09.03.2006. Against the judgment of the learned Munsiff No. 1, Dibrugarh dated 09.03.2006, an appeal was preferred by the respondent/plaintiff before the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh vide Title Appeal No. 18/2006. The said appeal was allowed vide judgment dated 27.09.2010 and the judgment dated 09.03.2006 in Title Suit No. 62/1991 of the learned Munsiff No. 1 Dibrugarh was set aside. Being aggrieved, this civil revision petition is filed. 4. In paragraph 1 of the plaint, the plaintiff/respondent states that she was a lawful, continuous and peaceful possession of a shop house measuring 3.5 ft. x 3.75 ft. over plot No. 46A of Dibrugarh Municipal Board at New Market of Dibrugarh Town, which was described in the Schedule to the plaint and the possession is claimed to be of 40 years since the days of the grandfather of the plaintiff/respondent. 5. x 3.75 ft. over plot No. 46A of Dibrugarh Municipal Board at New Market of Dibrugarh Town, which was described in the Schedule to the plaint and the possession is claimed to be of 40 years since the days of the grandfather of the plaintiff/respondent. 5. In paragraph 2 of the plaint, it is averred that the defendants No. 1 and 5 who are lessees under the Dibrugarh Municipal Board, upon taking lease of the land, have constructed wooden shops over it, out of which one shop was rented to the grandfather of the plaintiff/respondent in the year 1950-51 and it is stated that an amount of Rs. 35/- per month was to be paid as rent to the defendants No. 1 and 5. 6. In paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the plaint, it is averred that on 27.01.1991, a devastating fire which broke out at New Market of Dibrugarh had gutted the shop premises and to that effect, appropriate FIR etc had been filed. It is also stated that the Deputy Commissioner, Dibrugarh had sanctioned an amount of Rs. 500/- as ex-gratia payment to the shop owners. In paragraph 10 of the plaint, the following as extracted is averred: “10. That after the gutting of the shop of the schedule the plaintiff on the request of the defendant no. 1 and 2 paid Rs. 10,000/- for the reconstruction of the gutted shop to complete it, which was completed in April on 25.04.1991 and after the completion, the defendant handed over the shop of the schedule to the plaintiff in which he restarted running his business of ‘SADA’ tobacco on and from the 6th day of May, 1991.” 7. A reading of paragraph 10 of the plaint goes to show that it is the stand of the plaintiff/respondent that after the shop premises were gutted in the fire, the premises was again handed over by the defendants to the plaintiff on 06.05.1991. The implication thereof would be that the earlier tenancy continued. If it is so, the entire matter has to be construed from the point of view as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration sought by construing that they are tenants under the defendants. 8. Paragraph 10 of the plaint had been controverted by the defendants in their written statement by the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 in paragraph 16 thereof. 8. Paragraph 10 of the plaint had been controverted by the defendants in their written statement by the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 in paragraph 16 thereof. Paragraph 16 of the written statement is extracted as below: “16. That the allegations made in Para-10 of the plaint that after the gutting of the shop of the schedule the plaintiff on the request of the defendant no. 1 and 2 paid Rs. 10,000/- for the re-construction of the gutted shop to complete it, which was completed in April on 25.04.91 and after the completion, the defendant handed over the shop of the schedule to the plaintiff in which he restrained running his business of ‘SADA’ tobacco on and from 6.5.1991 are specifically denied. In fact the defendant no. 1 and r started re-construction of their R.C.C. building site no. 46 after the devastating fire, by obtaining permission and approval of the ground plan of their R.C.C. building from Dibrugarh Development Authority on 18.03.1991. Since the Dibrugarh Municipal Authority the owner of the land reduced the area as per the new plan for the whole market after its destruction in fire the defendant no. 1 and 5 had to re-construct their building only on the original floor area foregoing the earlier elevated portion of the road side land possessed by them. While re-constructing their said R.C.C. Building they provided three small shop rooms in the western side of the building putting ‘Shutter’ Doors on them. By the time the said shutter doors were fixed on the pillars and left for drying up and to become hard the plaintiff, alongwith his father Md. Sarafat Hussain and Md. Salim and Amanulla Khan suddenly on 11.10.1991 appeared at the construction site, with some Court officials and police and broke open the locks of all the said three shops rooms and thereafter Md. Salim occupied the extreme south western room and the plaintiff with his father occupied extreme north western room while Md. Amanulla occupied middle room. When protested by the representatives of the defendant no. 1 and 5 they reported that on the strength of orders issued by the Court they have done so. The defendant representatives were served with papers and orders of the Court pertaining to Title Suit No. 14/91 and Misc. Amanulla occupied middle room. When protested by the representatives of the defendant no. 1 and 5 they reported that on the strength of orders issued by the Court they have done so. The defendant representatives were served with papers and orders of the Court pertaining to Title Suit No. 14/91 and Misc. (J) No. 22/91 of the Court of Munisiff II and accordingly they have appeared in the said Court and have already filed written statement and objection therein, concluding them on bonafide goodfaith that all the three shops were occupied by the said persons on the strength of the said order. Since then all of them have brought some goods therein and are retaining their illegal occupation and.” 9. A reading of the stand of the defendants in paragraph 16 of the written statement would go to show that the averment of the plaintiff that the premises were handed over to the plaintiff by the defendants on 06.05.1991 was denied and on the other hand it is the stand of the defendants that the plaintiff along with his father Md. Sarafat Hussain, Md. Salim and Amanullah Khan on 11.10.1991 appeared at the construction site where the reconstruction of the premises were going on and by referring to certain order of the Court in Title Suit No. 14/1991 and Misc. (J) Case No. 22/1991 of the learned Munsiff No. 2, forcibly entered the premises concerned. No material is available as to what was the final outcome in TS No. 14/1991 as well as Misc. (J) Case No. 22/1991 nor it is available on record as to what order was passed by the Court enabling the plaintiff and others to enter the suit premises. 10. The suit was given a final consideration by the judgment dated 09.03.2006 and the following issues were framed: “(1) Whether the suit is maintainable? (2) Whether the plaintiff has right to sue? (3) Whether the suit is bad for want of notice U/s 80 C.P.C and or 326 of the Assam Municipality Act? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-filing of proper Court Fee? (5) Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of proper defendants? (6) Whether the plaintiff was a monthly tenant under to defendants? (7) Whether the plaintiff paid ‘Salamy’ as alleged? (8) Whether the plaintiff lawfully obtained possession of the suit house and is entitled to it? (4) Whether the suit is bad for non-filing of proper Court Fee? (5) Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder and non-joinder of proper defendants? (6) Whether the plaintiff was a monthly tenant under to defendants? (7) Whether the plaintiff paid ‘Salamy’ as alleged? (8) Whether the plaintiff lawfully obtained possession of the suit house and is entitled to it? (9) To what other relief or reliefs the parties are entitled to?” 11. In view of the Court, the core issue to have been determined as to whether the defendants had handed over the shop premises to the plaintiff on 06.05.1991 so as to give an indication that the tenancy was continued or whether the plaintiff had forcibly entered the shop premises or whether they had entered the shop premises in a legitimate manner pertaining to some Court order and further what further happened in such Court proceeding. 12. A reading of the issues shows that the core issue for decision was neither framed as an issue by the learned Trial Court nor the said issue was decided. The entire claim of the plaintiff is that their possession is lawful on the premises of being a continuous tenancy even after a reconstruction whereas it is the claim of the defendants that the plaintiff had forcibly and illegally entered the premises, so as to not entitle them to any right for remaining in possession. 13. Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants points out that there were some other contentions also being taken in paragraph 7 of the written statement that the suit premises were beyond the lease premises. 14. We are not expressing any view on such contention. Taking note of the aspect that the core issue for determination had not been framed by the learned Trial Court, we are of the view that for the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to remand the matter back to the learned Civil Judge No. 1 (Junior Division), Dibrugarh for framing of issue in an appropriate manner as indicated above and decide the dispute between the parties based on the materials on record that may be produced. If the present designation of the Civil Judge No. 1 (Junior Division), Dibrugarh has in the meantime been changed, it would be construed that the equivalent Court having the same jurisdiction would decide the matter. If the present designation of the Civil Judge No. 1 (Junior Division), Dibrugarh has in the meantime been changed, it would be construed that the equivalent Court having the same jurisdiction would decide the matter. If the defendants by referring to some averments in the written statements feel that some further issues are to be framed, the same may be urged upon before the learned Trial Court, Dibrugarh and the learned Trial Court would take an appropriate decision after hearing the plaintiffs on framing of such additional issue, but the core issue as indicated above would mandatorily be framed and decided upon. 15. As it is a suit of the year 1991 and today we are in the year 2022, we request the learned Civil Judge No. 1 (Junior Division), Dibrugarh to frame and decide the issues by giving due opportunity to the respective parties within a period of six months from the parties appearing before the Court. Both the petitioner/defendant and the respondent/plaintiff to appear before the learned Civil Judge No. 1 (Junior Division), Dibrugarh on 14.03.2022 without fail. 16. Till the parties appear before the Court on 14.03.2022, a status-quo as on today as regards the suit premises be maintained. After appearance of the parties, it would be open for the learned Trial Court to pass any other interim order/injunction order as may be advisable under the law on the instance of the parties, if so made. As the matter is remanded back, the judgment dated 09.03.2006 in Title Suit No. 62/1991 of the learned Munsiff No. 1, Dibrugarh and the judgment dated 27.09.2010 in Title Appeal No. 18/2006 of the learned Civil Judge, Dibrugarh shall not have its effect and any judgment that may be passed would hold the field. 17. With the above, the civil revision petition stands allowed. Send back the LCR immediately.