Research › Search › Judgment

Rajasthan High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 1676 (RAJ)

Vikas Singh v. State

2022-05-20

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2022
JUDGMENT : Learned counsel for the appellants has drawn attention of this Court to Section 9 of the Evidence Act, which reads as follows:- “9 Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts. -Facts necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which support or rebut an inference suggested by a fact in issue or relevant fact, or which establish the identity of anything or person whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact in issue or relevant fact happened, or which show the relation of parties by whom any such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far as they are necessary for that purpose. Illustrations (a) The question is, whether a given document is the Will of A. The state of A's property and of his family at the date of the alleged Will may be relevant facts. (b) A sues B for a libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A; B affirms that the matter alleged to be libellous is true. The position and relations of the parties at the time when the libel was published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts in issue. The particulars of a dispute between A and B about a matter unconnected with the alleged libel are irrelevant, though the fact that there was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations between A and B. (c) A is accused of a crime. The fact that, soon after the commission of the crime, A absconded from his house, is relevant, under section 8, as conduct subsequent to and affected by facts in issue. The fact that, at the time when he left home, he had sudden and urgent business at the place to which he went, is relevant, as tending to explain the fact that he left home suddenly. The details of the business on which he left are not relevant, except in so far as they are necessary to show that the business was sudden and urgent. (d) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A.C ., on leaving A's service, says to A- "I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer”. This statement is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue. (d) A sues B for inducing C to break a contract of service made by him with A.C ., on leaving A's service, says to A- "I am leaving you because B has made me a better offer”. This statement is a relevant fact as explanatory of C's conduct, which is relevant as a fact in issue. (e) A, accused of theft, is seen to give the stolen property to B, who is seen to give it to A's wife. B says, as he delivers it-" A says you are to hide this”. B's statement is relevant as explanatory of a fact which is part of the transaction. (f) A is tried for a riot and is proved to have marched at the head of a mob. The cries of the mob are relevant as explanatory of the nature of the transaction.” 2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the incident happened on 10.02.1996 at 11:30 AM and the prosecution examined 12 witnesses. Learned counsel further submits that out of 12 witnesses, PW-1 Charanjeet Kaur, PW-2 Vikram Singh, PW-7 Dharamveer, PW-8 Kuldeep Singh were turned hostile and thus, the testimony of the prosecution wavered. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants also submits that the identification was done first time in the court as recorded in the impugned judgment. Learned counsel further submits that in the complete story neither any specific name has been assigned in the FIR nor the injured witness/complainant have any definite motive attributed to the accused persons, so much so that even their identities not known to the injured witness. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that even the motive is attributed by the injured witness is a farther reason and does not correlate with the present incident. 5. Learned counsel also submits that there was no injury on the vital parts of the body, although the injuries were of knife. Learned counsel further submits that at best the offence did not travel beyond Section 324-IPC. 6. Learned counsel for appellants has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sukhbir Singh vs State Of Punjab, reported in 2011 (Suppl.) Cr.L.R. (SC) 632, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “6. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. 6. Learned counsel for appellants has relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sukhbir Singh vs State Of Punjab, reported in 2011 (Suppl.) Cr.L.R. (SC) 632, relevant portion of which reads as under:- “6. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties. It will be seen that the incident happened at about 9 p.m. on the 26th December 1991. In the FIR recorded about 8 hours later, the appellants had been described as two Sikh youth 25/30 years of age wearing kurta pajamas. The appellants were arrested on the 21st May 1992 by Sub-Inspector Pyara Singh, (who was not examined as a witness) and they were identified for the first time in Court by Naranjan Singh on the 21st September 1993. We are of the opinion that the physical description of the appellants given in the FIR would fit millions of youth in Punjab, and could not by itself pin the murder on them. The prosecution has also not come out with the steps in the investigation which had led to their identification as the primary assailants. It was, in this background, obligatory on the part of the prosecution to have produced Sub-Inspector Pyara Singh who could have testified to the steps in the investigation made by him which had enabled him to identify the appellants as the killers. This was not done. In this view of the Crl. Appeal No.1198/2007 matter, the judgments cited by Mr. Patwalia fully apply to the facts of the case. There is absolutely no evidence other than in the identification in court made by Naranjan Singh long after the incident. It is true that there is no inflexible rule that an identification made for the first time in Court has to be always ruled out of consideration but the broad principle is that in the background there is no other evidence against an accused on identification in Court made long after the event is clearly not acceptable. The judgment cited by Mr. Kuldip Singh of Malkhansingh's case (supra) is on the facts of that particular case, as a prosecutrix, who was the victim of a gang rape, had identified some of the accused for the first time in Court on which this Court opined that the identification was acceptable as a good piece of evidence. 7. The judgment cited by Mr. Kuldip Singh of Malkhansingh's case (supra) is on the facts of that particular case, as a prosecutrix, who was the victim of a gang rape, had identified some of the accused for the first time in Court on which this Court opined that the identification was acceptable as a good piece of evidence. 7. We now consider the case of the appellants in the connected matter. The suggestion made by the prosecution is that Sukhbir Singh and Dilbagh Singh had been engaged by the other appellants to settle scores with Jaswant Singh as he was apparently an obstacle in their way with respect to the school land. We have, in this connection, gone through the evidence of Naranjan Singh PW-2 and Mohinder Singh PW-3, in the background of these facts. We are of the opinion that the involvement of Sukhbir Singh and Dilbagh Singh has to be ruled out as they were not properly identified and the charge qua them under Section 302 read with Section 120-B of the IPC must fail. It is the prosecution Crl. Appeal No.1198/2007 story that a dispute regarding the school land existed between Jaswant Singh and Naranjan Singh on the one side and Harbans Singh and his sons Amir Singh, Mohanjit Singh and Bhupender Singh appellants on the other. It is also clear that in this dispute PW-3 Mohinder Singh, the Lambardar was siding with Jaswant Singh. We have gone through the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 very carefully. We see very substantial improvements in the statements made by PW-2 in Court vis-a-vis his statement made to the Police. Confronted with these statements, he could not give any cogent explanation for making them. It is also clear that except for his ipse-dixit with regard to the dispute, there is no other evidence that any dispute did exist. It has come in the evidence that no threat had ever been received by Jaswant Singh from militants prior to the incident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the statement of this witness cannot be relied upon. The statement of PW-3 is equally uncertain. PW-3 made very substantial improvements in his evidence as well. It has come in the evidence that no threat had ever been received by Jaswant Singh from militants prior to the incident. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the statement of this witness cannot be relied upon. The statement of PW-3 is equally uncertain. PW-3 made very substantial improvements in his evidence as well. The story that after seeing the murder, he had not made any attempt to meet Naranjan Singh, and his plea that after the incident he had returned home and had gone to sleep is difficult to swallow as it would be contrary to normal human behaviour. He also stated that a grant of Rs.1,00,000/-had been received for the school about 12 days prior to the incident and that the Qanungo had demarcated the school land which was legitimately in possession of Harbans Singh. No cogent evidence to this effect has been Crl. Appeal No.1198/2007 produced by the prosecution. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the evidence of this witness cannot also be believed.” 7. Learned Public Prosecutor opposes the appeal on the ground that the accused persons were identified in the court and thus, the identification was there and the injuries were also there and also PW-3 the injured witness has considerably shown the reasons of the crime. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 9. It is peculiar that the FIR does not have any details of the persons allegedly involved in the crime. The motive behind the crime is absolutely unknown, vague and non-coherent with the deposition of the injured witness. Throughout, from the FIR to the conviction not a single line of testimony of PW-5 is connecting the boys with the relevant details. The testimony of PW-3 is extremely vague as he is not able to connect the accused persons to the crime, or even attribute the weapons utilized for the same to them. The complete absence of such identification is fatal for the prosecution. 10. This Court finds that most of the witnesses have turned hostile and, therefore, the whole testimony of the prosecution rests upon the crucial witness of PW-3 Rajendra Mundra, who was the injured witness. This Court observes that PW-3, in his deposition, has stated that while he was going on cycle, two boys came and caused injuries upon him. 10. This Court finds that most of the witnesses have turned hostile and, therefore, the whole testimony of the prosecution rests upon the crucial witness of PW-3 Rajendra Mundra, who was the injured witness. This Court observes that PW-3, in his deposition, has stated that while he was going on cycle, two boys came and caused injuries upon him. The PW-3 has further deposed that he does not know those boys, while one was carrying a knife and another was carrying a blade. The PW-3 has further deposed that they caused injuries on his arms, forehead as well as on the wrists and thigh. The PW-3 has further deposed that both the boys were of dark colour and both looked as if they were Muslims. The PW-3 has further deposed that there was an altercation between the family of Satya Narayan Soni and his family, as the son of Satya Narayan Soni had eve teased the daughter of the cousin of PW-3, he, however, further submits that the incident happened about one and half year ago and virtually he also says in his cross-examination that he did not know what arms they were carrying. This Court also finds that it is an admitted fact that there was no identification parade. The prosecution was not able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The precedent law cited by learned counsel for the appellant is applicable in the present case. 11. Thus, in view of the above, the present criminal appeal is allowed. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 16.08.1999, passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No.2, Sriganganagar Camp, Suratgarh is quashed and set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges levelled against them. The appellants are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. 12. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned court below be sent back forthwith.