Research › Search › Judgment

Tripura High Court · body

2022 DIGILAW 169 (TRI)

Rakhal Mallik v. Umesh Majumder

2022-04-01

T.AMARNATH GOUD

body2022
JUDGMENT T. Amarnath Goud, J. - Heard Mr. P.K. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. S. Deb, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. B. Debnath, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. S. Debnath, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the respondent-State. 2. By means of filing this revision petition under Section-401 read with Section-397 and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for setting aside the judgment dated 01.03.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia in Criminal Appeal No. 15 of 2019 upholding the judgment and order dated 18.06.2019 in N.I. 13 of 2016 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia awarding sentence to convict petitioner Sri. Rakhal Mallik to suffer S.I. for 1(one) year and pay a fine of Rs. 22,00,000/- in default to suffer SI for 6(six) months. 3. The petitioner before this Court is a defaulter of cheque. The cheque issued by him was dishonoured. The cheque amount is Rs. 11,00,000/- and the Court below has passed the order of conviction with a fine of Rs. 22,00,000/-. 4. In gist, the case of the prosecution as it appears from the copy of the judgment of learned trial Court is that, complainant Sri. Umesh Majumder render service by providing materials, goods, i.e. brick, chips, cement, etc. and labourers to the accused-petitioner for execution of the work of road construction under PMGSY within the jurisdiction of Hrishyamukh R.D. Block and accordingly the accused-petitioner has been liable to pay Rs. 11,00,000/- to the complainant as the cost of said materials, goods and labourers, etc. and in discharge of his said liability accused-petitioner issued a cheque vide No. 623748, dated 15.04.2016 of Rs. 11,00,000/- drawn on the bank account of accused-petitioner vide Account No. 0261010107800 lying in the United Bank of India, Belonia Branch. On 03.06.2016 the complainant presented the said cheque to his banker, i.e. the State Bank of India, Belonia Branch through his account vide Account No. 30791798956 for collection of the aforesaid cheque amount. 11,00,000/- drawn on the bank account of accused-petitioner vide Account No. 0261010107800 lying in the United Bank of India, Belonia Branch. On 03.06.2016 the complainant presented the said cheque to his banker, i.e. the State Bank of India, Belonia Branch through his account vide Account No. 30791798956 for collection of the aforesaid cheque amount. The SBI, Belonia Branch forwarded the said cheque to UBI, Belonia Branch, i.e., the banker of the accused-petitioner for collection of the said cheque amount, but the UBI, Belonia Branch dishonoured the said cheque for the reason of 'funds insufficient' in the account of accused-petitioner and intimated to the SBI, Belonia Branch and on 13.06.2016 SBI, Belonia Branch returned the said cheque along with Return Memo issued by the UBI, Belonia Branch to the complainant and debited Rs. 460/- from the not pay the cheque amount to him. Thereafter, the complainant had filed the instant case U/S. 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. Account of the complainant being the Cheque Return Charge. On 11.07.2016 the complainant issued a statutory Demand Notice to the accused demanding re-payment of cheque amount with 15% up to date interest through Registered Post with A/D within 15 days of the receipt of notice and as per tracking record of the registered letter, that demand notice was delivered to the accused-petitioner on 13.07.2016. But even after received of the statutory demand notice, the accused-petitioner did not pay the cheque amount to him. 5. Thereafter, the complainant filed a complaint petition on 27th August, 2016 before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Belonia, South Tripura against the accused-petitioner. The learned trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence against the accused-petitioner under Section-251 of Cr.P.C. being satisfied with the case records and being accused pleaded not guilty of the offence and claimed to be tried. 6. During trial the complainant Sri. Umesh Majumder examined himself as PW-1 and also examined two more witnesses namely Sri. Sujit Das as PW-2 and Sri. Khokan Ch. Bhowmik as PW-3. The convict-petitioner was examined under Sec. 313 of Cr.P.C., at which he denied the incriminating materials and also denied to adduce defence witness. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia after evaluating the evidence, convicted the petitioner for the offence under Sec. 138 of N.I. Act as indicated above. 7. Khokan Ch. Bhowmik as PW-3. The convict-petitioner was examined under Sec. 313 of Cr.P.C., at which he denied the incriminating materials and also denied to adduce defence witness. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, South Tripura, Belonia after evaluating the evidence, convicted the petitioner for the offence under Sec. 138 of N.I. Act as indicated above. 7. After hearing the parties and perusal of the evidence on record and the observation made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the learned Sessions Court has observed as under: 'So, in the totality of the evidence and materials available on record I find no impropriety in the judgment of learned trial Court justifying any interference from this Court. I find no merit in the appeal. Thus, the appeal is dismissed. The convict-petitioner is hereby directed to surrender before learned trial Court within one month from today to undergo the sentence and to pay the fine amount.' 8. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order dated 01.03.2021 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Belonia upholding the judgment and sentence dated 18.06.2019 awarded by the learned CJM, Belonia, South Tripura, the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner. 9. In support of the case of the petitioner Mr. P.K. Pal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that both the courts below have erred both on points of law and facts in awarding the sentence to the accused petitioner. He has further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have applied his mind on the records to ascertain as to whether the learned trial Court has passed the judgment and sentence in consonance with the statutory provisions of law vis-a-vis the documents exhibited in the case and by not doing so, the learned Appellate Court has caused serious miscarriage of justice upholding the judgment and sentence as passed by the learned trial Court. 10. Mr. Pal, learned counsel has contended that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have come to the conclusion that the complaint itself suffers from non-sustainability on the ground of filing the complaint beyond the period as prescribed under the Limitation under Section-142(1)(a) & (b) read with Section(c) of Section-138 of the Act. 10. Mr. Pal, learned counsel has contended that the learned Sessions Judge ought to have come to the conclusion that the complaint itself suffers from non-sustainability on the ground of filing the complaint beyond the period as prescribed under the Limitation under Section-142(1)(a) & (b) read with Section(c) of Section-138 of the Act. The entire proceeding hits by the cause of action inasmuch as the complaint filed much after the validity of the cheque and also that no cognizance of the offence ought to have been taken on a complaint filed without explanation of delay as required under Section-142-(a) and (b) of the Act, 1881. 11. He has averred that in the instant case, the learned trial court ought to have rejected the complaint of the complainant for non-compliance with the provisions laid down under Section-142(1) Sub-clause (b) read with sub-Clause (c) of Section-138 of the Act, 1881 inasmuch as the complaint presented on 27.08.2016 was later of the validity of the cheque dated 15.04.2016 without explanation of delay to the satisfaction of the learned Court. Moreover, cognizance of the offence under Section-200 of the Cr.P.C. on the complaint taken by the learned Trial Court hits by the prescribed period of limitation and most illegally issued notice by the court below. 12. He has further contended that the 3rd ingredient of the offence is that the cheque must be presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date mentioned on it. But, the Exbt. A (Cheque No. 623748) clearly indicates that the cheque was issued on 15.04.2016 and by prescription valid for three months only. Therefore, expires the validity of the cheque on 14.07.2016. Moreover, the cause of action arose in the case receipt of the statutory notice dated 13.07.2016 duly received by the accused petitioner on 27.07.2016 as it is revealed from Indian Posts tracking report. Therefore, no cause of action arose on the date of filing the complaint petition on the part of complainant on 27th August, 2016 before the court of learned CJM. 13. The learned Court below ought to have considered the fact that the complainant (PW-1) during cross examination on the question of liabilities of the accused, the complainant deposed that 'the accused was indebted me for the alleged amount as I have performed some Govt. construction works on his behalf' (emphasis added). 13. The learned Court below ought to have considered the fact that the complainant (PW-1) during cross examination on the question of liabilities of the accused, the complainant deposed that 'the accused was indebted me for the alleged amount as I have performed some Govt. construction works on his behalf' (emphasis added). This statement of the complainant on deposition in entirety varies from the statement made in the complaint petition as the complainant failed to answer to the specific question on the existence of the consideration and the actual fact behind the quantum of liability which were the probable defence of the accused and the depositions of the PW-1 shades doubt as to whether he was the supplier of materials or, he had actually performed the work on behalf of the accused. Hence, the burden of proof shifted on the complainant remained disproved and thereby, the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of the accused. 14. The Appellate Court ought to have been come to the conclusion that the proceeding before the learned Trial Court was vitiated by the non-affording the natural justice to the accused as there was no specific documentary evidence as regards the probabilities as to when and how the extent of debts or liabilities presumed to have been occurred against the accused-person in view of the statement made in the complaint beyond all shadow of doubt. 15. PWs. 2 and 3 are hearsay witnesses made statement in favour of PW-1 in filing the examination-in-chief. The learned Appellate Court ought not to have relied on the statement made in the examination-in-chief not being cross-examined. 15. PWs. 2 and 3 are hearsay witnesses made statement in favour of PW-1 in filing the examination-in-chief. The learned Appellate Court ought not to have relied on the statement made in the examination-in-chief not being cross-examined. The learned Appellate Court ought to have come to the conclusion that the learned trial court in passing the judgment and awarding sentence failed to consider the presumption mandated under Section-139 of the Act, 1881 the existence of legally enforceable debts or liability inasmuch as the indebtedness was not established against the accused against which particular job and the period of time purportedly the materials were supplied for road construction by the complainant if at all he was entrusted the government under PMGSY scheme and that the reverse onus upon the complainant being failed in the absence of existence of any consideration to support of statement made in the complaint petition, therefore, the presumption fails and by not coming to such conclusion the learned Appellate Court has caused serious miscarriage of justice upholding the decisions rendered by the trial Court. 16. In the absence of a single iota of evidence and presumptive oral depositions of PW-1 contrary to statement made in the written complaint, the probability give rise to the fact that the accused never issued the cheque for an amount of Rs. 11,00,000/- as against any enforceable debts and liability. Mr. Pal, learned counsel has submitted that admittedly there was no document showing legal entrancement by the accused upon him to perform the construction works was produced to prove the enforceable liability. 17. He has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Subodh S. Salaskar v. Jayprakash M. Shah and Another, reported in (2008) 13 SCC 689 , wherein the Apex Court has observed inter alia: '14. A complaint petition alleging commission of an offence under Section 138 of the Act must demonstrate that the following ingredients exist, i.e.: (a) A cheque was issued; (b) The same was presented; (c) But, it was dishonoured; (d) A notice in terms of the said provision was served on the person sought to be made liable; and (e) Despite service of notice, neither any payment was made nor other obligations, if any, were complied with within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice.' 18. In the light of the above submissions and evidence on record, let me discuss whether learned trial Court committed any wrong in convicting the petitioner. The complainant Sri. Umesh Majumder was examined himself as PW-1, and according to him, he render service by providing brick, chips, cement, etc. and labourers to the accused-petitioner for execution of the work of road construction under PMGSY within the jurisdiction of Hrishyamukh R.D. Block and accordingly the accused-petitioner has been liable to pay Rs. 11,00,000/- to him as the cost of said materials, goods and labourers, etc. and in discharge of his said liability accused-petitioner issued a cheque vide No. 623748, dated 15.04.2016 of Rs. 11,00,000/- drawn on the bank account of accused-petitioner vide Account No. 0261010107800 lying in the United Bank of India, Belonia Branch. On 03.06.2016 he presented the said cheque to his banker, i.e. the State Bank of India, Belonia Branch through his account vide Account No. 30791798956 for collection of the aforesaid cheque amount. The SBI, Belonia Branch forwarded the said cheque to UBI, Belonia Branch, i.e., the banker of the accused-petitioner for collection of the said cheque amount, but the UBI, Belonia Branch dishonoured the said cheque for the reason of 'funds insufficient' in the account of accused-petitioner and intimated to the SBI, Belonia Branch and on 13.06.2016 SBI, Belonia Branch returned the said cheque along with Return Memo issued by the UBI, Belonia Branch to him and debited Rs. 460/- from his account being the Cheque Return Charge. 19. On 11.07.2016 he issued a statutory Demand Notice to the accused demanding re-payment of cheque amount with 15% up to date interest through Registered Post with A/D within 15 days of the receipt of notice and as per tracking record of the registered letter, that demand notice was delivered to the accused-petitioner on 13.07.2016. But even after received of the statutory demand notice, the accused-petitioner did not pay the cheque amount to him. Thereafter, he has filed the instant case. Basically the examination-in-chief of the complainant is a replica of his complaint petition. 20. But even after received of the statutory demand notice, the accused-petitioner did not pay the cheque amount to him. Thereafter, he has filed the instant case. Basically the examination-in-chief of the complainant is a replica of his complaint petition. 20. The complainant as PW-1 also exhibited certain documents viz., original cheque bearing No. 623748, dated 15.04.2016 of UBI, Belonia as exhibit-1, counter foil of the deposit slip dated 03.06.2016 regarding deposition of the cheque before SBI, Belonia Branch for clearance as exhibit-2, letter of intimation dated 13.06.2016 issued by SBI, Belonia Branch along with return memo dated 07.06.2016 issued by UBI, Belonia Branch as exhibit-3 (series), copy of legal notice dated 11.07.2016 as Exhibit-4 and postal receipt dated 11.07.2016 along with on-line tracking record of the same as Exhibit-5 (series). 21. During cross-examination PW-1, the complainant admitted that he got the cheque from the accused-petitioner on 15.04.2016 and he deposited the said cheque to the bank on 03.06.2016 and he had no knowledge about the position of fund lying in the account of the accused-petitioner. He also admitted that the accused was indebted to him for the alleged amount as he had performed some Government construction works on his behalf and also admitted that he has not submitted any document before the Court to show any legal entrustment by the accused-petitioner upon him to perform the construction work. However, he denied the suggestion that before deposition of the cheque, the accused-petitioner requested him to submit the cheque after some time. 22. PW-2, Sri. Sujit Das in his examination-in-chief has stated that he worked as a mason in the contrary work of road construction under PMGSY within the jurisdiction of Hrishyamukh R.D. Block under the supervision of PW-1 as the accused-petitioner engaged him to supervise his said contrary work and PW-1 rendered service by providing brick chips, sand, cement and labourers to the petitioner for execution of work and in discharge of the said liabilities the petitioner issued a cheque to PW-1 and subsequently PW-1 deposited the said cheque for encashment and he heard from PW-1 that the said cheque was dishonoured. 23. PW-3, Sri. Khokan Ch. Bhowmik in his examination-in-chief also stated that he knows the petitioner since he worked few contrary works with him as a partner and also know the complainant. 23. PW-3, Sri. Khokan Ch. Bhowmik in his examination-in-chief also stated that he knows the petitioner since he worked few contrary works with him as a partner and also know the complainant. He also stated that the petitioner executed the construction work of roads construction (under PMGSY) within the jurisdiction of Hrishyamukh R.D. Block and in executing the said work the petitioner engaged PW-1 for providing brick chips, sand, cement etc. and labourers including supervision of the said work and in discharge of the said liabilities the petitioner issued a cheque to PW-1 and subsequently PW-1 deposited the said cheque for encashment and he heard that the said cheque was dishonoured. PW-2 and PW-3 were cross-examined by the accused petitioner and only denial has been taken that they deposed falsely in favour of the complainant. 24. So, from the evidences and documents on record I find that, the complainant Sri. Umesh Majumder render service by providing materials, goods, i.e. brick, chips, cement, etc. and labourers to the petitioner for execution of the work of road construction under PMGSY within the jurisdiction of Hrishyamukh R.D. Block and accordingly the petitioner has been liable to pay Rs. 11,00,000/- to the complainant as the cost of said materials, goods and labourers, etc. and in discharge of his said liability petitioner issued a cheque vide No. 623748, dated 15.04.2016 of Rs. 11,00,000/- drawn on the bank account of petitioner vide Account No. 0261010107800 lying in the United Bank of India, Belonia Branch. 25. The cheque, marked as exhibit-1 and the issuance of the same is not denied by the petitioner in his defence. Rather, in cross-examination of PW-1, it was suggested to deposit the said cheque of accused after some time and it has also on record that the petitioner was indebted to the complainant for the alleged amount, as the complainant had performed some Government construction works on his behalf. Exhibit-1, the cheque was issued on 15.04.2016 and the complainant presented the said cheque to the bank on 03.06.2016 vide Exhibit-2 and it was returned with Return Memo expressing fund insufficient vide exhibit-3 (series). So, it is clear that the cheque was presented for payment within the statutory period of 6 (six) months. The cheque was returned unpaid for the reason 'funds insufficient'. So, it is clear that the cheque was presented for payment within the statutory period of 6 (six) months. The cheque was returned unpaid for the reason 'funds insufficient'. The original Return Memo vide exhibit-3 (series) placed on record, present dishonour of cheque while presumption raised u/s. 146 of the Act and during the trial exhibit-3 (series) went un-controverter. 26. The complainant received intimation of dishonour of the cheque on 13.06.2016 by the SBI, Belonia and he sent Legal Notice dated 11.07.2016 and it was duly served upon the petitioner also remain uncontroverted. It is also evident that the petitioner did not make the payment of the cheque amount within 15 days of the receipt of the Legal Notice for which the complainant has filed the case. So, it is proved that the cheque is presented against a legally recoverable liability in favour of the complainant and the cheque was dishonoured for the reason of insufficient fund, the cheque is drawn and issued on account of the accused and for which payment was not made within the period of 15 days of the receipt of legal notice. 27. The only argument of the counsel appearing for the petitioner-who has defaulted the payment of the cheque amount is that the case is filed after completing of 30 days and there is no application of limitation Act of Section-138 and thus the Courts below ought to have rejected the complaint but instead, has entertained the complaint and allowed the petition and convicted the petitioner herein. 28. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the complaint is filed within 30 days and the question of 1 (one) day delay is not there and the order passed by the trial Court in entertaining and imposing the fine and conviction is correct and prayed to dismiss the case. 29. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that the complaint has been filed within 30 days as contemplated under the Act and there is no delay of one day as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The order passed by the learned trial Court and the Appellate Court in favour of the complainant is correct and in accordance with law. The order passed by the learned trial Court and the Appellate Court in favour of the complainant is correct and in accordance with law. In support of his argument for the purpose of computation of the limitation, he has relied upon Econ Antri Limited v. Rom Industries Limited and Another reported (2014) 11 SCC 769 and Saketh India Ltd. and Others v. India Securities Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 1 . 30. It becomes necessary to extract the dates as mentioned in the present petition such as (i) case of issue of cheque i.e. 15.04.2016, date of presentation of the cheque to bank i.e. 03.06.2016, cheque dishonoured as per Bank's return 13.06.2016, notice issued to the accused under Section-138(b) of the Act 11.07.2016, amount within 15 days of the receipt of this notice under Section 138(c) of the Act 13.07.2016, 15 days completed on 27.07.2016 reckoning the date of receipt of the notice on 13.07.2016 i.e. 27.07.2016, cause of action starts from 28.07.2016 to file a complaint under Section-142 (b) of the NI Act within 30 days i.e. 28.07.2016, 30 days be ended on 26.08.2016 and complaint filed on 27.08.2016 i.e. delayed for 1 day i.e. 27.08.2016. 31. As per contention of the petitioner that the date of receipt of the demand notice was 13.07.2016 and accordingly the 30 days limitation is 30.07.2016 and the limitation of 15 days will be 28th July, 2016. The private complaint ought to have been instituted by 26.07.2016 i.e. 30 days. But the complaint has been filed on 27.08.2016 with one day delay and hence, the same is not maintainable and prayed to set aside the judgment and allow the present petition. 32. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the complainant contended that 15 days has to be calculated from day one after the receipt of the demand notice i.e. 13.07.2016 i.e. the date of receipt and the limitation of 15 days start from 14.07.2016 as day one and ends on 29.07.2016. The 30 days of filing the complaint will be computed as from the day one and the limitation 30 days would come to end vide 29th August 2016. The complaint has been filed on 28.08.2016. Hence, there is no delay and it is well within the time scheduled as per Section-138 of the NI Act and prayed to dismiss the present petition. 33. The complaint has been filed on 28.08.2016. Hence, there is no delay and it is well within the time scheduled as per Section-138 of the NI Act and prayed to dismiss the present petition. 33. For the purpose of deciding this case, it is relevant to extract the legal provisions involved which are as under: '138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.--Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for 19 [a term which may be extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless-- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, 20 [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, 'debt or other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]' Section 139 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 139. Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, 'debt or other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.]' Section 139 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 139. Presumption in favour of holder.--It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.] Section 140 in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 140. Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under section 138.--It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in that section.] 'Section-142. Cognizance of offences-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), (a) No court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; ..... Emphasis Added. (b) Such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138: [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period;] (c) .......' Section-138: dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account-where any cheque drawn ........... or with both. Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless: (a) ............... (b) ................ (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 34. Section-142 of NI Act has already been discussed supra. (b) ................ (c) The drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. 34. Section-142 of NI Act has already been discussed supra. The Apex Court in Econ Antri Limited v. Rom Industries Limited and Another, reported in (2014) 11 SCC 769 , has held thus: (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act?' The same question was reframed in simpler language as under: 'Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?' '9. In Saketh cheques dated 15/3/1995 and 16/3/1995 issued by the accused therein bounced when presented for encashment. Notices were served on the accused on 29/9/1995. As per proviso (c) to Section 138 of the NI Act, the accused were required to make the payment of the said amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice i.e. on or before 14/10/1995. The accused failed to pay the amount. The cause of action, therefore, arose on 15/10/1995. According to the complainant for calculating one month's period contemplated under Section 142(b), the date 15/10/1995' has to be excluded. The complaint filed on 15/11/1995 was, therefore, within time. According to the accused, however, the date on which the cause of action arose i.e. 15/10/1995' has to be included in the period of limitation and thus the complaint was barred by time. The accused, therefore, filed petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ('the Code') for quashing the process issued by the learned Magistrate. That petition was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, wherein it was held that (SCC p. 641, para-5) 5. ....... That petition was rejected by the High Court. Hence, the accused approached this Court. This Court referred to its judgment in Haru Das Gupta v. State of West Bengal, wherein it was held that (SCC p. 641, para-5) 5. ....... the rule is well established that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act is to be done, the day on that date is to be excluded; the effect of defining the period from such a day until such a day within which an act is to be done is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. 18. Undoubtedly, the view taken in SIL Import USA runs counter to the view taken in Saketh. What persuaded this Court in Saketh to take the view that in computing time, the rule is to exclude the first day and include the last can be understood if we have a look at the English cases which have been referred to in the passage quoted therein from Haru Das Gupta. 21. The third case referred to is Marren v. Dawson Bentley & Co. Ltd. In that case on 8/11/1954 an accident occurred whereby the plaintiff was injured in the course of his employment with the defendants. On 8/11/1957, he issued a writ claiming damages for the injuries which he alleged were caused by the defendants' negligence. The defendants pleaded, inter alia, that the plaintiff's cause of action, if any, accrued on 8/11/1954 and the proceedings had not been commenced within the period of three years thereof contrary to Section 2(1) of the Limitation Act, 1939. It was held that the day of the accident was to be excluded from the computation of the period within which the action should be brought and, therefore, the defendants' plea must fail. While coming to this conclusion reliance was placed on passages from Halsbury's laws of England. It is necessary to quote those passages: '207. The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. It is necessary to quote those passages: '207. The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. This rule is especially reasonable in the case in which that person is not necessarily cognizant of the act or event; and further in support of it there is the consideration that in case the period allowed was one day only, the consequence of including that day would be to reduce to a few hours or minutes the time within which the person affected should take action. 208. In view of these considerations the general rule is that, as well in cases where the limitation of time is imposed by the act of a party as in those where it is imposed by statute, the day from which the time begins to run is excluded; thus, where a period is fixed within which a criminal prosecution or a civil action may be commenced, the day on which the offence is committed or the cause of action arises is excluded in the computation.' Reliance was also placed in this judgment on Radcliffe v. Bartholomew. In that case on June 30 an information was laid against the petitioner therein in respect of an act of cruelty alleged to have been committed by him on May 30. An objection was taken on the ground that the complaint had not been made within one calendar month after the cause of the complaint had arisen. It was held that the day on which the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from the computation of the calendar month within which the complaint was to be made; that the complaint was, therefore, made in time.' 26. We have extensively referred to Saketh. It was held that the day on which the alleged offence was committed was to be excluded from the computation of the calendar month within which the complaint was to be made; that the complaint was, therefore, made in time.' 26. We have extensively referred to Saketh. The reasoning of this Court in Saketh based on the above English decisions and decision of this Court in Haru Das Gupta which aptly lay down and explain the principle that where a particular time is given from a certain date within which an act has to be done, the day of the date is to be excluded, commends itself to us as against the reasoning of this Court in SIL Import USA where there is no reference to the said decisions.' This Court quoted the relevant provisions of Halsbury's Laws of England, 37th Edn., Vol. 3, p. 92. We deem it appropriate to quote the same: 'Days included or excluded--When a period of time running from a given day or even to another day or event is prescribed by law or fixed as contract, and the question arises whether the computation is to be made inclusively or exclusively of the first-mentioned or of the last-mentioned day, regard must be had to the context and to the purposes for which the computation has to be made. Where there is room for doubt, the enactment or instrument ought to be so construed as to effectuate and not to defeat the intention of Parliament or of the parties, as the case may be. Expressions such as 'from such a day' or 'until such a day' are equivocal, since they do not make it clear whether the inclusion or the exclusion of the day named may be intended. As a general rule, however, the effect of defining a period in such a manner is to exclude the first day and to include the last day.' 35. In case of Saketh India Ltd. and Others v. India Securities Ltd., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 1 , the Apex Court has observed thus: '3. In the present case, cheques dated 15th and 16th March, 1995 issued by the petitioners bounced when presented for encashment as per the bank endorsement. Notices were served on the accused on 29th September, 1995. In the present case, cheques dated 15th and 16th March, 1995 issued by the petitioners bounced when presented for encashment as per the bank endorsement. Notices were served on the accused on 29th September, 1995. As per section 138 (c) accused were required to make payment of the said amount of money within 15 days. The accused failed to pay the said amount, hence the cause of action for filing the complaint arose from 15th October, 1995. Complaints were filed on 15th November, 1995. Therefore, it is contended that complaints were filed beyond time. Accused petitioners approached the High Court by filing petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing and setting aside the process issued by the XI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore. Those petitions were rejected by the High Court by common order and Judgment dated 25th September, 1997. Hence, these appeals. 8. Hence, there is no reason for not adopting the rule enunciated in the aforesaid case which is consistently followed and which is adopted in the General Clauses Act and the Limitation Act. Ordinarily in computing the time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last.. Applying the said rule, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. Period of 15 days, in the present case, expired on 14th October, 1995. So cause of action for filing complaint would arise from 15th October, 1995. That day(15th October) is to be excluded for counting the period of one month. Complaint is filed on 15th November, 1995. The result would be that the complaint filed on 15th November is within time.' When time begins to run '622. Accrual of cause of action: In general the period of limitation under the Limitation Act 1939 begins to run when the cause of action accrues. In computing the period, the day on which the cause of action arose is excluded. When one the last day of the period of court office is closed all day, the time is extended to the first day on which the office reopens. In computing the period, the day on which the cause of action arose is excluded. When one the last day of the period of court office is closed all day, the time is extended to the first day on which the office reopens. Apart from any special provision, a cause of action normally accrues when there is in existence a person who can sue and another who can be sued, and when there are present all the facts which are material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed. In personal injury actions time begins to run from the date of the plaintiff's knowledge if this date is later than the date on which the cause of action accrued. Under the statutory provisions which enable a tortfeasor to recover contribution from any other person who is liable in respect of the same damage, a cause of action for contribution does not arise until judgment has been given against the tortfeasor seeking contribution by the party injured by the tort or an award is made in an arbitration, or, alternatively, payment in compensation for the damage has been made or agreed to be made. The cause of action of one demanding indemnification runs from the date of judicial ascertainment of that person's own liability to another. In certain circumstances a cause of action may be complete so that time begins to run, even though the action itself cannot be brought because of some reason not part of the cause of action. Where there has once been a complete cause of action arising out of contract or tort, time begins to run, and subsequent circumstances which, but for the prior wrongful act of default, would have constituted a cause of action disregarded. A cause of action in respect of a breach of the duty to build dwellings properly is deemed to have accrued at the time when the dwelling was completed, but if after that time a person who has done work for or in connection with the provision of the dwelling does further work to rectify the work he has already done, any cause of action in respect of that further work is deemed to have accrued at the time when the further work was finished. The running of time when there are recurring causes of action is considered subsequently, and the date from which time runs is respect of particular cause of action is considered further subsequently in relation to the causes of action in question. Period within which an act must be done 336. Exclusion of first day. The general rule in cases in which a period is fixed within which a person must act or take the consequences is that the day of the act or event from which the period runs should not be counted against him. This general rule applies irrespective of whether the limitation of time is imposed by the act of a party or by statute. Thus, where a period is fixed within which a criminal prosecution or a civil action may be commenced, the day on which the offence is committed or the cause of action arises is excluded in the computation. So, also, where a statute provides that something may only be done within a certain period from the passing of the Act, the day on which the Act was passed is excluded; and many other instances may be cited. In particular, where an act is required by the Civil Procedure Rules, a practice direction or by any judgment or order of the court to be done within a specified period, the day on which the period begins is not included in computing the number of days. Further, the rule excluding the day from which the period runs has been applied in construing the statutory provision by which the fact that goods seized by the sheriff are allowed to remain in his hands for 21 days constitutes an act of bankruptcy on the part of the owner, the date of the seizure being omitted in the computation. The court has no power to extend a period of time limited by statute for doing an act unless the statute so provides.' 36. This Court is in complete agreement with the submissions of the counsel appearing for the respondent and with the observations made in these two cases as referred to above. What has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placing reliance upon the judgment as cited above has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 37. What has been submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner placing reliance upon the judgment as cited above has no applicability in the facts and circumstances of the case in hand. 37. Hence, this Court finds no infirmity in the findings arrived at by both the Courts below. Since the petitioner herein has failed to make out his case before the Courts below, this Court has no hesitation to say that in the revision, appreciation of the factual issues are not permissible. Accordingly, the instant revision petition stands dismissed. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.