JUDGMENT : Subhash Vidyarthi, J. 1. Heard Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, learned AGA for the appellant on the application under Section 378(3) Cr.P.C. seeking leave to file appeal against the judgment and order dated 02.09.2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Session Trial No. 120 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav and another) and Session Trial No.121 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav). 2. Facts of the case, briefly stated, are that on 03.05.2014 a first information report was lodged at 00:30 hours against unknown persons on the information given by Ajay Kumar Maurya son of Late Ramji Maurya stating that the informant's father was employed as Muneeb in the oil depot of Madan Lal Agrahari. On 02.05.2014 at 21:30 hours, he received an information that his father was murdered at Toll Plaza of Lala Nagar, near petrol pump of Natwa Village by some unknown miscreants. 3. The accused persons Shivchand Yadav (respondent no.1) and Kamlesh Dubey (respondent no.2) were arrested on 08.05.2014 and one pistol along with three cartridges were recovered from respondent no.1. On the basis of the said recovery, Case Crime No. 145 of 2014 under Sections 3/25/27 of the Arms Act was registered against him on that very day. After investigation a charge sheet under Section 302 IPC was submitted in Case Crime No.143 of 2014 against both the respondents and a charge sheet under Section 3/25/27 of the Arms Act was submitted in Case Crime No.145 of 2014 against the respondent no.1. 4. As many as 11 witnesses were examined by the prosecution before the learned Trial Court. After examination of the statements of witnesses, the Trial Court came to a conclusion that there was no delay in lodging the FIR and the prosecution has proved the time and place of occurrence. 5. P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 were said to be eye-witnesses of the incident and the learned Trial Court has discussed and analyzed their statements in great detail for ascertaining their presence at the time and place of the incident. It was emphasized by the defence counsel before the Trial Court that the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence was highly doubtful. They were neither accompanying the deceased nor are they residents of any locality near the place of occurrence. It was emphasized by the defence counsel before the Trial Court that the presence of eye-witnesses at the time and place of occurrence was highly doubtful. They were neither accompanying the deceased nor are they residents of any locality near the place of occurrence. As they are chance witnesses and residents of places far away from the place of the incident, it was incumbent upon them to disclose the particular occasion for which they were present on the time and place of the incident. 6. The learned Trial Court has recorded that in his examination in chief, P.W.-1 Ajay has deposed that while returning from the police station, he was informed by some people that the incident was witnessed by Guddu Dubey and Pappu Maurya. Pappu Maurya is uncle (Mausa) of P.W.-1 Ajay. When P.W.-1 reached on the spot, Pappu was not present there. Even at the hospital, he had not met Pappu. He has stated that he met Pappu in the morning of the next day, i.e. on 03.05.2014. However, P.W.-2 Pappu stated that in the night of the occurrence, he went to the house of the deceased at 10:30 P.M. and he stayed there overnight. He further stated that he met with P.W.-1 Ajay when he left the spot to visit the deceased's house. He also talked with Ajay for a few minutes. He was present at the time of inquest and post-mortem. At one place P.W.-2, Pappu has said that when he reached the spot of occurrence, it was crowded and about 50 to 100 persons were present there. The assailants were not present at the spot and they had fled away. The deceased's son Ajay (P.W.-1), deceased's brother Prakash and his brother-in-law Manoj Kumar were present at the spot. The learned Trial Court has further noted that there is no explanation as to why the names of the accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR when both P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 were in contact and there was no reason for concealment of the names of the assailants from the informant, who is a close relative of P.W. 2. 7. The learned Trial Court has further noted that there is no explanation as to why the names of the accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR when both P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 were in contact and there was no reason for concealment of the names of the assailants from the informant, who is a close relative of P.W. 2. 7. Similarly, if the testimony of P.W.-1, Ajay is to be believed then naturally questions will arise about the conduct of P.W.-2 Pappu who, being an eye witness of the incident and a relative (co-brother) of the deceased, could not inform the family members immediately about the incident and waited till morning to visit the house of the deceased. Such conduct of P.W.-2, Pappu is unnatural and it cannot be believed by any stretch of imagination that a person who is witnessing the murder of his close relative or acquaintance will keep mum and not disclose the name of the assailants, whom he claims to identify, even to the family members of the deceased, with whom he had met just after the incident. 8. After extensively referring to the statements of P.W.-1-the informant and son of the deceased and P.W.-2 the eye witness of the incident and nephew of the deceased, the learned Trial Court came to a conclusion that a close scrutiny of their statements depicts that there are material inconsistencies in the statements of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 and the contradictions between the testimonies of the two witnesses are such as cannot be reconciled. Upon a careful examination of the testimonies of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, it is apparent that neither P.W.-2 was present on the spot at the time of occurrence nor any disclosure was ever made by him to P.W.1 regarding the names of the assailants. 9. Regarding the alleged second eye witness-P.W.-4 Arvind Maurya, the learned Trial Court has recorded that this witness came to light after the statement of P.W.-3, Janki Devi wife of the deceased was recorded by the Investigation Officer on 15.05.2015 i.e. after a fortnight. P.W.-3 has stated that she knew the names of the assailants from the very beginning, but she had not disclosed the same to her son-P.W.-1. 10. As per the prosecution version, there are four witnesses of the incident out of whom only two (P.W.-2 and P.W.-4) have been examined. P.W.-3 has stated that she knew the names of the assailants from the very beginning, but she had not disclosed the same to her son-P.W.-1. 10. As per the prosecution version, there are four witnesses of the incident out of whom only two (P.W.-2 and P.W.-4) have been examined. Both of them claimed that they witnessed the incident when they were present at the petrol pump. They stayed at the spot for some time after the incident. P.W.-1 Ajay stated that he met P.W.-2, Pappu on the next day, which is a very awkward circumstance that none of the witnesses, who were close to the deceased, could remain at the spot at least till arrival of the family members of the deceased. The witnesses have not uttered anything about the steps taken by them after the occurrence. It is very strange that these witnesses did not send any information of the incident to the family members of the deceased and the information was sent by some unknown persons. The Trial Court has held that after a close scrutiny of all the witnesses, it is very much clear that all the witnesses of fact examined by the prosecution have less to disclose and more to hide about the occurrence and the presence of the eye witnesses at the spot. Stark contradictions and inconsistencies appearing in the testimonies of witnesses establish that neither P.W.-2 nor P.W.-4 had witnessed the incident. 11. The Trial Court has also recorded that the incident occurred in the night at the southern track of the G.T. Road and it was allegedly seen by the witnesses from the northern track of the road which is partitioned by a divider and the divider is embedded with oleander (Kanail shrubs) and the vehicles were passing from both sides of the road and there was no source of light on the southern track of the road where the incident occurred. The site plan does not show any electric polls in it. P.W.-4 claims to have witnessed the occurrence from the distance about 25 meters. The site plan does not show any electric polls in it. P.W.-4 claims to have witnessed the occurrence from the distance about 25 meters. These circumstances can only lead to one conclusion that it is impossible for anybody to witness the incident from the distance of 25 meters while there is no source of light at the scene and the witnesses were present on one side of the road while see the incident occurred on the other side of the road and the road is divided, shrubs are planted on the divider and traffic was moving on both sides of the road. 12. P.W.-4, Arvind Maurya has stated that when he heard the gun shot, he was driving his motorcycle. The learned Trial Court has recorded that generally when a person is himself driving a motorcycle on highway in night hours, his focus will be concentrated on his front side and it is not possible that while driving the motorcycle they would have observed the incident from the other side of the road. In such circumstances, it was not possible for P.W.-2 and P.W.-4 have witnessed the occurrence on the other side of the road which was not illuminated. 13. The learned Trial Court has recorded that in their examination in chief, both the aforesaid witnesses stated that initially they saw that the accused persons and the deceased were talking and in the meantime the accused persons started abusing the deceased and afterwards they fired at him. However, in his cross examination, P.W.-4 stated that he saw the accused persons and the deceased only after he heard the gun shot. 14. After a very detail and thorough scrutiny of the statements of all the witnesses, the learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that if all the facts are combined together, the only conclusion is that the witnesses have not witnessed the incident. The learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution witnesses could not prove the guilt of the accused persons. Consequently, it concluded the accused persons by means of the judgment and order dated 02.09.2020. We do not find any infirmity in the aforesaid finding of the learned Trial Court. 15. The learned Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the prosecution witnesses could not prove the guilt of the accused persons. Consequently, it concluded the accused persons by means of the judgment and order dated 02.09.2020. We do not find any infirmity in the aforesaid finding of the learned Trial Court. 15. In Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to reiterate the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, in the following words :- “12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P., Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P., Narendra Singh v. State of M.P., Budh Singh v. State of U.P., State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, Arulvelu v. State, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. and Ram Singh v. State of H.P.) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, the Privy Council observed as under: (SCC Online PC: IA p. 404) ‘… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.’ 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran.) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) ‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.’ 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.’ 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) ‘(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.’ A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State. 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” (emphasis supplied)” 16. Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, learned AGA has submitted that the appellant was seeking leave to file an appeal against the aforesaid judgment mainly on the ground that although it is a case of circumstantial evidence, the accused persons had a strong motive to kill the deceased. 17. Ms. Nand Prabha Shukla, learned AGA has submitted that the appellant was seeking leave to file an appeal against the aforesaid judgment mainly on the ground that although it is a case of circumstantial evidence, the accused persons had a strong motive to kill the deceased. 17. Regarding motive, P.W.-1 Ajay Kumar Maurya has stated that while he was returning from the police station, some people informed him that the incident was witnessed by Guddu Dubey and Pappu Maurya and they also told him that a few days ago, Kamlesh Dubey alias Karia (respondent no.2) and Shivchand Yadav (respondent no.1) had forcibly tried to take kerosene oil from his father and when refused, they had abused his father. 18. P.W.-3 Janki Devi wife of deceased has stated in her examination in chief that her husband had informed her that Shiv Chand Yadav and Kamlesh Dubey were pressurising him to deliver kerosene oil and upon his refusal, they had threatened to kill him. She had advised her husband to report the matter to police. Apart from this statement of P.W.3, there is no material on record in this regard. 19. A mere vague allegation of demand of delivery of kerosene oil without a specific mention of the date of the alleged demand and the quantity demanded, is not sufficient to establish a motive for committing a heinous offence of murder. We are not convinced that the non-fulfilment of a demand to deliver an undisclosed quantity of kerosene can be a sufficient motive to commit murder of the deceased. 20. Although, motive is a relevant consideration while deciding the case, it cannot be the sole ground for convicting an accused when there is no other sufficient evidence available on record to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, assuming that the alleged demand of delivery of kerosene oil could form a motive for committing an offence, the learned court below has committed no error in acquitting the accused when their guilt could not be established beyond reasonable doubt by evidence adduced by the prosecution. 21. In Surendra Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court pleased to hold that in the absence of proof of any other circumstance pointing to the guilt of the appellant, the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the motive is not of any significance. 22. 21. In Surendra Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 33, the Hon’ble Supreme Court pleased to hold that in the absence of proof of any other circumstance pointing to the guilt of the appellant, the evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of the motive is not of any significance. 22. In Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to and relied upon its previous decisions and proceeded to hold that motive alone can hardly be a ground for conviction. The relevant passage of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:- “29. In N.J. Suraj v. State the prosecution case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence and a motive. Having discussed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this Court rejected the motive which was the only remaining circumstance relied upon by the prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not enough for supporting a conviction, for it is well settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the innocence of the accused. 30. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka where this Court held that motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to convict the appellant. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Sunil Rai v. UT, Chandigarh. This Court explained the legal position as follows: (Sunil Rai case, SCC p. 266, paras 31-32) “31. … In any event, motive alone can hardly be a ground for conviction. 32. On the materials on record, there may be some suspicion against the accused, but as is often said, suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof.” 23. In the present case, there is no direct evidence to prove the guilt of the accused persons and it is a case of circumstantial evidence. In Anwar Ali Vs. 32. On the materials on record, there may be some suspicion against the accused, but as is often said, suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof.” 23. In the present case, there is no direct evidence to prove the guilt of the accused persons and it is a case of circumstantial evidence. In Anwar Ali Vs. State of H.P. (2020) 10 SCC 166 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to reiterate that “in a case of circumstantial evidence, the circumstances taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else and the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis that that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence would not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should also be inconsistent with his innocent. 24. Analyzing the facts of the present case in light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we find that in the present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused persons by leading sufficient evidence to form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused persons and therefore, even if we assume that the accused had a motive to commit murder of the deceased, it will not be sufficient to hold the accused persons guilty of the offence. 25. On examination of the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court it is clear that the judgment has been passed after a very detailed and thorough examination of the entire material available on record. The learned AGA has not assailed the validity of the judgment terming it as perverse. Her submission is that the learned Trial Court has not weighed and assessed the prosecution case in its proper perspective and has erroneously acquitted the accused-respondents. However, in view of the foregoing discussion, we find that the learned Trial Court has acquitted the accused respondents on the basis of the finding recorded after a thorough analysis of the entire evidence that it is a case of doubtful evidence against the accused persons. However, in view of the foregoing discussion, we find that the learned Trial Court has acquitted the accused respondents on the basis of the finding recorded after a thorough analysis of the entire evidence that it is a case of doubtful evidence against the accused persons. The aforesaid finding appears to be well founded, which needs no interference by this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under Section 378 Cr.P.C. 26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the view that no case is made out for grant of leave to file an appeal under Section 378(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 02.09.2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhadohi at Gyanpur in Session Trial No. 120 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav and another) and Session Trial No.121 of 2014 (State vs. Shivchand Yadav). 27. The application seeking leave to file an appeal is rejected. 28. Since the application granting for leave to appeal is rejected, consequently the appeal also stands dismissed.