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2022 DIGILAW 172 (KAR)

K. P. Ramreddy v. Union of India

2022-02-08

B.M.SHYAM PRASAD

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioners have impugned the notifications issued by the respondents under the provisions of Sec. 3A and 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 (for short, "the Act"). The notification under Sec. 3A of the Act is issued on 22/12/2017 and the notification under Sec. 3D of the Act is issued on 16/3/2018. The principal ground on which the petitioners impugn the aforesaid notifications is on the ground of lack of opportunity to file objection and show cause against the acquisition of their lands as contemplated under Sec. 3C of the Act. 2. In elaboration of the petition averments, Sri.S.M.Kalwad, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the petitioners are the owners of different lands in Kasaba Village, Haddinagudu Village and Sanganakallu Village of Ballari District and only certain portions of their larger lands are notified for acquisition for the purposes of constructing a National Highway under the impugned notifications. Though the first respondent has issued notification under Sec. 3A of the Act, indicating the names of the Village, Taluk, District, the survey numbers and the area required for the purposes of execution of the project, the first respondent has not mentioned the names of the owners whose lands would be acquired; however, in the subsequent notification issued under Sec. 3D of the Act, the names of the persons whose lands are acquired are mentioned apart from the aforesaid details, but again, without mentioning the extent that would be acquired from each of the land owners. The learned counsel canvasses that these anomalies have resulted in a lack of opportunity that is envisaged under the provisions of Sec. 3C of the Act. 3. Sri.S.M.Kalwad further canvasses that if the first respondent had only issued notification under Sec. 3A of the Act specifying the names of the land owners whose lands would be acquired and specifying the respective extents, it would have afforded a reasonable opportunity to them to file objections as contemplated under Sec. 3C of the Act which would have given them a further opportunity of hearing as contemplated under Sec. 3C(2) of the Act with the assistance of a legal practitioner. The notification issued under Sec. 3D of the Act, which is a culmination of the defective notification under Sec. 3A of the Act, also cannot prevail for the same reason. 4. The notification issued under Sec. 3D of the Act, which is a culmination of the defective notification under Sec. 3A of the Act, also cannot prevail for the same reason. 4. Sri.S.M.Kalwad, relies upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Housing Board vs. Mohd. Shafi and others reported in (1992) 2 SCC 168 , in support of his proposition that the the necessary details must be furnished in the notification issued at the first instance; even if the details are furnished in the final notification, the defect would not be cured and the acquisition must fail. 5. On the other hand, Sri.Shivaraj S. Balloli, the learned counsel for the respondents, submits that the notifications are issued for developing a national highway of 43.96 kms., and substantial work was completed when the petitioners and similarly other placed persons approached this Court impugning the notification. However, certain persons i.e., persons other than the petitioners have withdrawn their petitions and consequentially, about 90% of the work is presently executed and commissioned. The completion of the project in full is hindered only because of the petitioners' objections on the ground that they did not have opportunity. But, the petitioners cannot complain of lack of information or opportunity in view of the categorical statement in the notification issued under Sec. 3A of the Act that the plan would be available for inspection by the interested persons. The petitioners cannot succeed merely because certain details have not been furnished in the notification. In fact, Sri.Shivaraj S. Balloli submits that the requirement under Sec. 3A of the Act is to only give a brief description of the lands that are notified for acquisition. 6. Sri.Shivaraj S. Balloli next relies upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory and others reported in (2005) 13 SCC 477 in support of his submission that even if this Court were to find that the acquisition proceedings, because of the lack of details in the first notification under Sec. 3A of the Act, may have to fail, this Court may not interfere given the admitted fact that more than 90% of the project is executed and the authorities could always re-notify the lands and complete the project subject to hearing the other side. Sri.Shivaraj S. Balloli also submits that because the objection is only by the land owners of about 5% of the total land acquired, this Court must not interfere with the acquisition, and in this regard he relies upon the decision in Writ Petition Nos.27610- 27627/2010 and connected matters which are disposed of by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court by order dtd. 17/10/2011. 7. The question for consideration in these writ petitions, given the rival submissions and the undisputed fact is: whether the petitioners have established any reason for quashing the impugned notifications, and this question must be answered in the negative for the following reasons but with the direction that the petitioners must be given compensation determined at the rate prevailing as of the date on which possession of the respective portions is taken by the respondents from them. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory [supra], in very similar circumstances while considering the grounds as urged by Sri.Shivaraj S. Balloli in support of the notification issued without furnishing all the details, has held that the notifications failed to meet the statutory mandate because it was vague and therefore not in accordance with law. The Supreme Court's exposition in this regard reads as under: "So far as the question whether the impugned Notification meets the requirement of Sec. 3-A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of land is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of land in respect of each mouza are given, different pieces of land are acquired either as whole or in part. Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece of land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired. Unless it is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners would be unable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any objection about user of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a claim for compensation. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. It is settled law that where a statute requires a particular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that manner alone. Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning. In our view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate. It is vague. The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition notification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what he is going to lose. The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not in accordance with the law. 9. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in view of the admitted fact that during the pendency of the SLP the project was completed with national highway being commissioned has also considered the question of granting relief to the petitioners on hand and the Supreme Court held as follows: "14. Having held that the impugned notification regarding acquisition of land is invalid because it fails to meet the statutory requirements and also having found that taking possession of the land of the writ petitioners in the present case in pursuance of the said notification was not in accordance with law, the question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioners. The High Court rightly observed that the acquisition of land in the present case was for a project of great national importance, i.e. the construction of a national highway. The construction of national highway on the acquired land has already been completed as informed to us during the course of hearing. No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the land owners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the quantum of compensation payable to the land owners. Quashing of the notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view that a better course will be to compensate the land owners, that is, writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of. Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action. 15. Normally, compensation is determined as per the market price of land on the date of issuance of the notification regarding acquisition of land. There are precedents by way of judgments of this Court where in similar situations instead of quashing the impugned notification, this Court shifted the date of the notification so that the land owners are adequately compensated. Reference may be made to: (a) Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Rajkumar Johri and others [ 1992 (1)SCC 328 ] (b) Gauri Shankar Gaur and Ors. v. State of UP and Ors. [ 1994 (1) SCC 92 ] (c) Haji Saeed Khan and Ors. v. State of UP and Ors. [ 2001 (9) SCC 513 ] In that direction the next step is what should be the crucial date in the facts of the present case for determining the quantum of compensation. We feel that the relevant date in the present case ought to be the date when possession of the land was taken by the respondents from the writ petitioners. This date admittedly is 19/2/2003. We, therefore, direct that compensation payable to the writ petitioners be determined as on 19/2/2003, the date on which they were deprived of possession of their lands. We do not quash the impugned notification in order not to disturb what has already taken place by way of use of the acquired land for construction of the national highway. We direct that the compensation for the acquired land be determined as on 19/2/2003 expeditiously and within ten weeks from today and the amount of compensation so determined, be paid to the writ petitioners after adjusting the amount already paid by way of compensation within eight weeks thereafter. The claim of interest on the amount of compensation so determined is to be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority. The claim of interest on the amount of compensation so determined is to be decided in accordance with law by the appropriate authority. We express no opinion about other statutory rights, if any, available to the parties in this behalf and the parties will be free to exercise the same, if available. The compensation as determined by us under this order along with other benefits, which the respondents give to parties whose lands are acquired under the Act should be given to the Writ Petitioners along with what has been directed by us in this judgment." 10. It follows from this exposition that because the notifications issued are vague and does not meet the statutory requirements, these notifications need not be quashed and the clock set back. It would be open in appropriate cases for the Courts to mould the relief and grant such relief as would be just. In the present case, where the petitioners do not dispute that the national highway proposed is commissioned except for a stretch which is much below 10-15% of the total stretch and the fact that the respondents could revisit the very acquisition after issuance of notice and hearing the objections from the petitioners (if any), this Court is of the considered view that it would be appropriate to dispose of the writ petition without quashing the impugned notification but with certain directions. 11. It would also be necessary to observe that the respondents must be directed, to avert the consequences that are made obvious in the present writ petitions, to indicate names of the land owners whose lands are proposed for acquisition and the extent of the lands that is proposed for acquisition with the definite boundaries therefor, and if for any reason it is not possible for them to show such details in the notification, to annex a sketch of the proposed project to the notification itself as observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Competent Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory supra. For the foregoing the writ petitions stands disposed of directing the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioners determined on the basis of the market value as of the day the possession of the respective portions are taken and to pay the compensation so determined within a period of sixteen [16] weeks from today with liberty to the petitioners to work out their statutory remedies, if in case they are not satisfied with the compensation so determined.