JUDGMENT : Alexander Thomas, J. The learned Single Judge, as per the impugned judgment dated 15.12.2021, has dismissed W.P.(C) No.13777 of 2021 filed by the appellants herein. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the above W.P.(C), the unsuccessful writ petitioners therein have preferred the instant intra-court appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act. 2. Heard Sri. A.L.Navaneeth Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in the W.A., Sri. B.Unnikrishna Kaimal, learned Senior Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 & 2 in the W.A., Sri. C.C. Abraham, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd., appearing for R3 and Sri. G.Biju, learned Standing Counsel for the Travancore Devaswom Board, appearing for R4 & R5 in the W.A. In the nature of the orders proposed to be passed by this Court in the W.A., notice to contesting respondent No.6 will stand dispensed with. 3. The appellants herein have filed the instant Writ Petition, W.P.(C) No.13777 of 2021, with the following prayers: “i. Issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records leading to Exhibits-P17 and to quash the same, since the proceedings initiated through Arbitration is without resorting the obligatory procedure as provided in the judgment of the Apex Court and this Court; ii. Issue a writ, order or direction, commanding the 1st respondent in convening a meeting for the parties and to take steps for resolving the disputes; iii. Grant such other reliefs as this Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 4. The main prayer in the above W.P.(C) is seeking for the quashment of the impugned Ext.P17, which is a plaint filed in the suit for recovery of money filed at the instance of respondent No.3, under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 and for other related reliefs. As per Section 100 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969, the jurisdiction of civil court is barred in respect of any matter for which provision is made in the said Act. Section 69 under Chapter IX of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 deals with the disputes to be decided by the Cooperative Arbitration Court and the Registrar as the case may be. Section 69 under Chapter IX of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 deals with the disputes to be decided by the Cooperative Arbitration Court and the Registrar as the case may be. Section 69(1)(c) would inter alia provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, if any dispute arises between the society or its committee and any officer, agent or employee or any past officer, past agent or past employee or the nominee, heirs or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent or deceased employee of the society, then such dispute shall be referred to the Co-operative Arbitration Court, constituted under Section 70A, in case of non-monetary disputes and to the Registrar, in the case of monetary disputes and the Arbitration Court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall decide such dispute and no other court or other authority shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of that dispute. Ext.P17, which is numbered as Arbitration Reference Case No.20 of 2020, has been styled as a suit for recovery of money. The basic averments in Ext.P17 suit for recovery of money are to the effect that the five defendants therein/five appellants herein are the past officers of the plaintiff therein/R3 herein [Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd.] and that the appellants herein had made steps for making tender quotations for item Nos.1, 2, 70 & 71 of Ext.P9 tender notification issued by the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board for 2016-17 for the collection and sale of coconuts and that the said tender bids made by the appellants herein were below the minimum tender quotes prescribed by the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board in Ext.P9 tender notification, even though it has been specifically stipulated in Ext.P9 that earnest money deposits furnished in any tender bid, which is below the minimum tender quotes, will be forfeited to the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board. Further that, the abovesaid tender bids were made by the appellants without any due authorization of the Board of Directors of the 3rd respondent [Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Federation] and that since the tender bids submitted by the appellants purportedly for and on behalf of the 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation was below the minimum tender quotes fixed by the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board in Ext.P9 tender notification, the earnest money deposits in three out of the said four tender bids were forfeited by the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board coming to an amount of Rs.36,44,000/-, etc. and that the appellants have thus caused a loss of Rs.36,44,000/-to the 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation and that the appellants herein/defendants therein are thus bound to recoup the said amount along with interest thereon to the plaintiff therein/3rd respondent herein. It is on this premise that Ext.P17 suit for recovery of money has been filed in terms of Ext.P17 Arbitration Reference Case No.2o of 2020 by the 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation, as plaintiff therein, in terms of Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act. One of the contentions urged by the appellants is that going by the dictum held by the Apex Court in the decision in Oil and Natural Gas Commission & Anr. v. Collector of Central Excise [(1995) Supp. 4 SCC 541] and decision of this Court in K.S.E.B. v. Chief Conservator of Forests [ 1996 (2) KLT 232 ], disputes between public institutions will have to be resolved by constituting a high power committee in the first place and that the practice of a public institution suing another public institution should be avoided, etc. It is argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the 3rd respondent herein/plaintiff in Ext.P17 is a public institution and that therefore their disputes with the respondent Travancore Devaswom Board, which is a statutory authority, should have been resolved through such high power committees, etc. and the present institution of the suit for recovery of money, as per Ext.P17, is to be interdicted by this Court, etc. 5. and the present institution of the suit for recovery of money, as per Ext.P17, is to be interdicted by this Court, etc. 5. To the above, Sri.C.C.Abraham, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Federation Ltd., appearing for R3, would submit that the said dictum may not apply in this case as the dispute is between the 3rd respondent and its past officers/past employees and Ext.P17 is not a dispute between the 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation and the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board. Further, it is submitted by the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent that the competent authority of the State Government in the Revenue (Devaswom) Department had issued Ext.R3(c) letter dated 22.10.2020, whereby both the 3rd respondent [Co-operative Marketing Federation] and the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board were invited for a meeting to resolve the disputes regarding refund of the said earnest money deposit of the year 2016-17. Further that, later the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board has issued Ext.R3(e) letter dated 05.02.2021, making their stand clear that the dispute occurred only because the officials of the 3rd respondent had given tender bids, which are below the tender quotes fixed in Ext.P9 tender notification, in spite of the specific provision therein that any tender bid made below the minimum tender quotes will be rejected and the earnest money deposit will also be forfeited and that therefore the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board has the legal right to forfeit the earnest money deposits made and that the earnest money deposits in respect of three out of the four tender bids referred to in Ext.P9 have been ordered to be forfeited to the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board. Learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent has invited our attention to the contents of Ext.R3(e) letter dated 05.02.2021, issued by the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board, from para No.2 onwards therein, which read as follows: Hence, it is urged by the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent that the mechanism of discussion of the matter between the 3rd respondent and 4th respondent under the aegis of the competent authority of the State Government, as ordered in Ext.R3(c), was complied with by the 3rd respondent and the 4th respondent has taken the stand that the abovesaid earnest money amount coming to Rs.36,44,000/-will stand forfeited to the 4th respondent for the abovesaid reason. So, it is urged that the abovesaid procedure contemplated by the Apex Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission's case supra has already been duly complied with by the 3rd respondent and hence, the abovesaid contention of the appellants are bereft of any merits. 6. After hearing both sides, we are of the view that the abovesaid contention of the 3rd respondent will have to be countenanced. A reading of Ext.R3(c) dated 22.10.2020 would make it clear that the competent authority of the State Government in the Revenue (Devaswom) Department had directed both the 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation and the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board to enter into a discussion as decided therein and later, the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board has taken a decision as per Ext.R3(e) to reject the said plea made by the 3rd respondent and the abovesaid amount in question has been thus forfeited to the 4th respondent, etc. 7. The next contention urged by the appellants is to the effect that the decision to make tender bids for the four items in pursuance of Ext.P9 tender notification was made at the instance of the business committee of 3rd respondent Co-operative Marketing Federation, as can be seen from item No.3 of decision No.1 under subject 1 of Ext.P7 dated 25.06.2016, which reads as follows: 8. It is argued by the appellants that it is pursuant to the abovesaid decision taken on 25.06.2016, as per Ext.P7, by the business committee of the 3rd respondent that the appellants had submitted tender bids for the four items covered by Ext.P9 and that it is on this basis that tender bids were made for the said four items, which was below the minimum tender quotes stipulated in Ext.P9 tender notification, as otherwise, the tender bids would not have been profitable for the 3rd respondent, etc. Further that, the decision of the business committee of the 3rd respondent as per Ext.P7 was subsequently approved by the board of directors of the rd respondent as per Exts.P8 dated 16.08.2016 and Ext.P10 dated 07.12.2016. Therefore, it is urged that the tender bids were submitted by the appellants only as per the directives of the business committee of the 3rd respondent, as later confirmed by the board of directors of the 3rd respondent and that hence, the appellants cannot be made liable for the loss. Therefore, it is urged that the tender bids were submitted by the appellants only as per the directives of the business committee of the 3rd respondent, as later confirmed by the board of directors of the 3rd respondent and that hence, the appellants cannot be made liable for the loss. That at any rate, the members of the board of directors and the business committee of the 3rd respondent also should have been then made equally liable for the said loss, apart from the appellants, etc. 9. To the above, Sri.C.C.Abraham, learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent would strongly urge that the abovesaid so called decision, as per item No.3 under decision No.1 appended under subject 1 of Ext.P7 dated 25.06.2016, is a forged document and that the original of the said proceedings is marked as Ext.R3(a) dated 25.06.2016, wherein the abovesaid decision, as per item No.3 mentioned above, does not find any place. That it is only the decision as per Ext.R3(a) that has been confirmed by Exts.P8 & P10. Further that, disciplinary proceedings were also subsequently initiated and finalized by the 3rd respondent as against the 2nd and 3rd appellants, who were then in service and they were found guilty of causing loss of the abovesaid forfeited EMD amounts and the 2nd appellant was ordered to be demoted from his then position as Senior Marketing Manager to the lower post of Manager and since the 3rd appellant had by then retired, no penalty could be imposed against him. Further that as per the specific direction in the abovesaid disciplinary proceedings, the 2nd and 3rd appellants were directed to re-pay the abovesaid amount in question. Further, it was also found in the disciplinary proceedings that the relevant portion of Ext.P7 herein is a forged document, whereas the original decision is one as per Ext.R3(a) herein, etc. That, being aggrieved by the penalty proceedings, both the 2nd and 3rd appellants had preferred statutory appeals in terms of Rule 198(6) and statut0ry appeals were also dismissed. Thereafter both of them have preferred Arbitration Reference Cases, A.R.C. No. 24 of 2020 at the instance of the 2nd appellant and A.R.C. No.46 of 2020, on behalf of the 3rd appellant and both the said A.R.Cs. are now pending before the State Arbitration Court. 10. Thereafter both of them have preferred Arbitration Reference Cases, A.R.C. No. 24 of 2020 at the instance of the 2nd appellant and A.R.C. No.46 of 2020, on behalf of the 3rd appellant and both the said A.R.Cs. are now pending before the State Arbitration Court. 10. To the above, the learned counsel for the appellants would urge that Ext.P7 is the correct and original document and the same is not a forged one and further that the genuineness of Ext.P7 decision dated 25.06.2016 is also reflected from decision No.3 of subject No.3 appended under Ext.P10 dated 07.12.2016. 11. To the above argument, the learned Standing Counsel for the 3rd respondent would point out that the relevant portion of Ext.P7, on which the appellants placed reliance, is a forged document and that is a matter which cannot be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings, etc. Further that, even if it is assumed that a decision was taken, as referred to in Ext.P7, the only decision referred to therein is that tender bid should be submitted to generate reasonable profit to the 3rd respondent and nowhere it is decided therein that the tender bid should be submitted below the minimum tender quotes fixed by the 4th respondent Travancore Devaswom Board in Ext.P9 tender notification. Further that, fully knowing about the condition in Ext.P9 tender notification that, any tender bid made below the minimum tender quotes would not only be rejected and that the EMD would also be forfeited, etc., the appellants have submitted the tender bids for the four items in question, which are admittedly well below the minimum tender quotes, which has led to the present imbroglio and huge loss of Rs.36,44,000/-to the 3rd respondent and that the so called decision referred to in Ext.P7 cannot come to the aid and rescue of the appellants, etc. 12. After hearing both sides, we are of the firm view that since the 3rd respondent has taken a specific plea that the relevant portion of Ext.P7 is a manipulated document, we are not at all in a position to adjudicate on the said vexed and complicated issue, which would require fact finding. 12. After hearing both sides, we are of the firm view that since the 3rd respondent has taken a specific plea that the relevant portion of Ext.P7 is a manipulated document, we are not at all in a position to adjudicate on the said vexed and complicated issue, which would require fact finding. Moreover, we are also told that a similar finding on the plea of the 3rd respondent about the alleged forgery of the relevant portion of Ext.P7 has already been made in the disciplinary proceedings against the 2nd & 3rd appellants and that the question of its correctness and legality are under challenge in the Arbitration Reference Cases filed by the 2nd and 3rd appellants before the State Arbitration Court. When such disputed issues, especially relating to forgery of documents, are made and when Ext.P17 essentially is a suit for recovery of money, etc., the prudent approach of a writ court would be to keep its hands off on such vexed issues, especially since the matter requires adducing of evidence, it can be easily done in the Forum where Ext.P17 suit for recovery of money is now pending. Hence, for the above reasons, we are of the firm view that the learned Single Judge was fully correct in reaching the conclusion as per the impugned judgment that, these are all matters on which the writ court should not interfere and that discretionary remedy should not be invoked in the facts and circumstances of this case. 13. That apart, the essential plea made in this writ proceedings is for quashment of a plaint filed by a plaintiff in Ext.P17, which is essentially a suit for recovery of money. Ordinarily we are of the view that such a plea for quashment of a plaint in a suit, may not be maintainable in writ proceedings in contradistinction to criminal proceedings, where there may not be any dispute that a criminal complaint could be quashed by resort to the discretionary power conferred either under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. But, to seek for quashment of a plaint as per Ext.P17, which is admittedly stated to be a suit for recovery of money, before the competent statutory Forum, may not be the remedy that can be ordinarily granted by a writ court. But, to seek for quashment of a plaint as per Ext.P17, which is admittedly stated to be a suit for recovery of money, before the competent statutory Forum, may not be the remedy that can be ordinarily granted by a writ court. That apart, since the proceedings in terms of Ext.P17 is one as per Section 69(1)(c) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act and since it is a monetary dispute, it is to be instituted before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. Section 69(1) mandates that no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or other proceedings in respect of disputes covered under Section 69(1). Section 100 also provides for bar of jurisdiction of civil court. But for the bar of jurisdiction conceived under Section 100 and Section 69(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, a dispute of this nature in respect of a suit for recovery of money should have been instituted before a civil court. Thus, the Forum created in terms of Section 69(1) is in lieu of the civil court. That being so, a proceedings challenging the very jurisdiction of a court dealing with a suit for recovery of money essentially would lie in the province of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. So, it is really doubtful as to whether an intra-court appeal would lie under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, as such an intra-court appeal may be maintainable only in exercise of original jurisdiction by the Single Bench, as conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Of course, where the matter is an Arbitration Reference Case filed before the competent Forum under Section 69, on a matter relating to disciplinary proceedings, then the substantial part of the said cause of action, especially relating to the disciplinary action or service matters finalized by the disciplinary authority/competent authority and the impugned orders as confirmed by the appellate authority would be matters which would substantially and predominantly lie within the province of Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the matters relating to the decision making process of the statutory Forum/Arbitration Court would lie within the province of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In such cases, the substantial jurisdiction would be both in terms of Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, with the result that intra-court appeal will be maintainable. In such cases, the substantial jurisdiction would be both in terms of Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, with the result that intra-court appeal will be maintainable. We have made this observation in the light of the dictum laid down by a Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath and Ors. [ (2015) 5 SCC 423 ] wherein it has been held that a civil court will not be amenable to the writs issued under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the decision of the civil court may be amenable only to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, etc. However, the Apex Court has held in the decisions in Ashok K. Jha & Ors. v. Garden Silk Mills Ltd. & Anr. [ (2009) 10 SCC 584 ] and Jogendrasinhji Vijay Singhji v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ (2015) 9 SCC 1 ] that in the case of a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, constituted in terms of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the jurisdiction that may be invoked should be both under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. So, intra-court appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court may be maintainable as against a decision of the Single Bench, since the substantial part of the adjudication in question could be traceable to Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. It is in the light of the above aspects, we are of the view that it is highly doubtful as to whether the present intra-court appeal will be maintainable in terms of Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, in as much as the main relief sought for is for quashment of the plaint in a suit for recovery of money filed in terms of Section 69(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act before the statutorily designated Forum. However, as ordered by the learned Single Judge, we would make it clear that all contentions available in law to the appellants should be urged by them before the statutory Forum during the adjudication process of Ext.P17. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeal will stand dismissed.