JUDGMENT 1. These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners for issuance of writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the letter dated 2.2.2013 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms (DP), Government of Manipur; advertisement dated 7.5.2013 issued by the Manipur Public Service Commission (MPSC); the appointment letter dated 8.9.2014; and, the continuation letter dated 30.10.2015 in so far as it relates to Public Health Engineering Department, Government of Manipur. 2. Since the challenge and the point for consideration are one and the same, all the writ petitions were heard together and disposed of by this common order. 3. Brief common facts are as follows:- The petitioners have joined as Section Officers in the Public Health Engineering Department in the year 1999. On 29.4.1999, the Government of Manipur issued an Office Memorandum making provision for holding Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) at regular annual intervals against the vacancies occurring during the course of a year. On 6.11.1999, a complete ban was imposed on direct recruitment as well as declaration of the result of DPCs already held. The aforesaid imposition of ban was made pursuant to a Memorandum of Undertaking dated 19.4.1999 between the State and the Government of India. On 7.3.2001, the State Cabinet took a decision in terms of the MoU dated 19.4.1999 for termination of all appointment on direct recruitment, part time etc. and the ban on all direct recruitment, including downsizing of the Departments by abolishing various posts. Following the decision, the Finance Department issued a letter dated 19.3.2001 and the Government of Manipur had also imposed a temporary ban on filling up of vacancies by promotion for some time. However, such ban on promotion was lifted with effect from 19.6.2001. 3.1. The next higher post from the post of Section Officer is the post of Assistant Engineer and the Assistant Engineer is to be filled as per the provisions contained in the PWD, IFCD and PHED Manipur Assistant Engineers (Civil/Mechanical)/ASW Recruitment Rules, 1984/2009/2013 and all three Rules are pari materia with regard to the quota for direct recruitment vis-à-vis quota for promotion. The said Recruitment Rules provides 60% of vacancies of the post of Assistant Engineer to be filled up by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. 3.2. The said Recruitment Rules provides 60% of vacancies of the post of Assistant Engineer to be filled up by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. 3.2. Out of the said 60% promotion quota, 50% of the vacancies are to be filled up by Section Officer Grade-I Degree Holders and the remaining 50% by Section Officer Grade-I Diploma Holders/others. As per the Recruitment Rules, a Section Officer Grade-I (Decree Holder) in PHE Department is eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer after rendering 3 years of regular service and a Section Officer Grade-I (Diploma Holder) is eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer after rendering 8 years of regular service. The petitioners became eligible for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer during the period from 2002 - 2007. 3.3. According to the petitioner, during the subsistence of the ban on direct recruitment, the Chief Engineer, PHE Department vide letter dated 29.8.2012 submitted a proposal to the Principal Secretary for making requisition for direct recruitment of Assistant Engineer in the PHE Department in respect of 25 vacancies out of 27 vacancies of the year 2007 to 2012 leaving 2 vacancies of Assistant Engineer to be filled up by promotion. On 2.2.2013, the Department of P& AR submitted a requisition to the Secretary, MPSC for recruitment of 25 vacancies along with other vacancies of Assistant Engineers in other Departments etc. without authority. 3.4. Challenging the requisition dated 2.2.2013, W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 was filed by some Section Officers and during the pendency of the said petition, the MPSC issued an advertisement dated 7.5.2013 and also the Government had issued an order dated 12.8.2013 partially lifting the ban on direct recruitment. On 25.9.2013, W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 came to be disposed of. Assailing the said order, SLP (C) No.35459 of 2013 has been filed and by the order dated 3.7.2014, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reserved 3 vacancies for the 3 petitioners in the said SLP. 3.5. W.P.(C) No.145 of 2014 was filed by the petitioners and others and pending writ petition, a miscellaneous petition was filed for a direction for reserving vacancies in the line of the order dated 3.7.2014 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, this Court declined to grant such relief. 3.5. W.P.(C) No.145 of 2014 was filed by the petitioners and others and pending writ petition, a miscellaneous petition was filed for a direction for reserving vacancies in the line of the order dated 3.7.2014 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, this Court declined to grant such relief. Assailing the said order, SLP (C) No.29104 of 2014 was filed and the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to direct that any appointment made pursuant to the said notification shall be subject to the outcome of the case while issuing notice. Thereafter, the MPSC declared the final merit list of the candidates on 18.7.2014 and the Government of Manipur also issued orders dated 8.9.2014 filling up 22 vacancies of Assistant Engineers by way of direct appointment in PHE Department, subject to the outcome of SLP No.35459 of 2013. 3.6. By the common judgment dated 2.9.2015, Civil Appeal No.6783 of 2015 (arising out of SLP No.35459 of 2013), Civil Appeal No.6784 of 2014 (arising out of SLP No.21904 of 2014) and Civil Appeal No.6785 of 2015 (arising out of SLP No.21910 of 2015) were disposed of holding that the appellants' case shall be considered for promotion against the promotion quota leaving the questions of law raised by the appellants open. 3.7. According to the petitioners, in view of the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 3.7.2014 directing to reserve 3 vacancies for 3 petitioners only 22 out of 25 requisitioned and advertised vacancies of Assistant Engineer were filled by way of direct recruitment and the said 3 vacancies had to be filled up by way of promotion and it also clearly reflected amongst the 4 vacancies of Assistant Engineer of the year 2010. Despite the admission of the abovesaid 3 vacancies, the said 3 vacancies were never filled up by way of promotion, instead issued the impugned order dated 30.10.2015 appointing the private respondents to the post of Assistant Engineer by way of direct recruitment. The factum of non-filling up of the aforesaid 3 vacancies of the year 2010 is also reflected in the DPC proceedings dated 19th and 22nd December, 2015. 3.8. According to the petitioners, DPC for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in PHE Department was held on 2.8.2022 resulting in the promotion of all the direct recruitment Assistant Engineers in PHE Department to the post of Executive Engineer with two other Assistant Engineers. 3.8. According to the petitioners, DPC for promotion to the post of Executive Engineer in PHE Department was held on 2.8.2022 resulting in the promotion of all the direct recruitment Assistant Engineers in PHE Department to the post of Executive Engineer with two other Assistant Engineers. If the Government is allowed to fill the vacancies of Assistant Engineer on the basis of total cadre strength, another 25 direct recruits is likely to be recruited after the promotion of all the direct recruit Assistant Engineers to the higher posts on the ground that only promotee Assistant Engineers are left in the cadre resulting in the blockage of promotion avenues of the Sections Officers like the petitioners. Hence, these writ petitions. 4. The first respondent State filed affidavit in opposition in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016 stating that on the implementation of ban on direct recruitment of posts as well as promotion, the Department has allowed some Section Officer Grade-I to hold the post of Assistant Engineer on in-charge basis in their Grade Pay of Section Officer Grade-I. The requisition made by Department of P&AR for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineers was done as per the decision of the State Cabinet, which is the highest decision making authority of the Government. The vacancies for the post of Assistant Engineers are to be filled by 60% by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment and these quarters cannot be crossed. Hence, vacancies for direct recruitment that arose during the ban on direct recruitment cannot be filled up by promotion. The Office Memorandum dated 29.4.1999 nowhere mentioned that the unfilled vacancies meant for direct recruitment shall be filled up by promotion. Vide order dated 11.7.2021, the Government had resorted for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer by promotion and accordingly 22 Section Officers were given promotion as Assistant Engineer on regular basis vide order dated 17.11.2007. 4.1. It is stated that as per the Recruitment Rules, for the post of Assistant Engineer, 60% of the vacancies are to be filled up by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. Even though ban is imposed on direct recruitment, all vacancies occurred during that period could not be filled up by promotion and the direct recruitment quota shall kept reserved. It is stated that as per the Recruitment Rules, for the post of Assistant Engineer, 60% of the vacancies are to be filled up by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. Even though ban is imposed on direct recruitment, all vacancies occurred during that period could not be filled up by promotion and the direct recruitment quota shall kept reserved. The calculation for direct/promotion quota are done from the vacancies occurred from time to time and also carrying forward the backlog quota of the direct/promotion, as the case may be. Therefore, there has been no illegality in calculating the total strength of Assistant Engineers in the Department. No writ can be issued to set aside the impugned letter dated 2.2.2013. 4.2. It is further stated that in the Manipur Combined Competitive Examination for Direct Recruitment of Assistant Engineers Rules, 2006, it is clearly mentioned that the Department of Personnel shall be the nodal Department. As such, the allegation of the petitioners that the Department of Personnel is neither the cadre controlling nor administrative authority for recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineer in the PHE Department is without any legal basis. Hence, the requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 does not suffer from any legal infirmity. Consequently, the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 and the appointment orders have also do not suffer from any legal infirmity. According to the respondent State, the seniority position of an employee to the post is determined as per merit list recommended by a validly constituted DPC and not from the date of vacancy of the post. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the writ petitions. 5. The private respondents in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016 filed affidavit in opposition stating that the writ petition has been filed mainly on the ground that there has been illegal/faulty calculation of vacancies for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer in PHE Department in the requisition for recruitment, the selection and appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer. It is stated that during the year 1986-1990, there were vacancies in the post of Assistant Engineers to be filled by promotion and the direct recruitment and that in order to extract the work of Assistant Engineer various Government Orders were issued appointing some Section Officers to work in the post of Assistant Engineer on in-charge basis in their Grade Pay. The promotion quota is anyhow filled up whereas the direct recruitment quota stalls or is kept unfilled up. 5.1. It is stated that as soon as the ban partially lifted for promotion, the recruitment for promotion of 24 posts of Assistant Engineer has been made by holding DPC on 23.12.2006 and that the DPC proceedings was challenged by one Ksh Lakshaheb Sing and others by filing W.P.(C) No.906 of 2007 before the Gauhati High Court, Imphal Bench, which was dismissed by an order dated 23.5.2012. But no recruitment process for filling up the direct recruitment post has been made till the requisition dated 2.2.2013 was made for recruitment of 25 posts of Assistant Engineer on direct recruitment quota. In pursuance to the requisition, the MPSC issued an advertisement and it is clear that since 1986 to 2013 i.e. for 29 years, no recruitment for filling up the post of Assistant Engineer on direct recruitment quota has been made. 5.2. It is stated that the petitioner appeared in the recruitment examination and they were not selected. Out of frustration, the petitioners have filed the writ petition. Further, no recruitment or appointment in excess of the direct recruitment quota has been made. The 16 vacancies for promotion quota mentioned in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been there before the appointment of 22 Assistant Engineers. 6. Since the contents of the affidavit in opposition filed in W.P.(C) No.138 of 2016 and 443 of 2017 filed by the official respondents as well as the private respondents are same as stated in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016, they were not stated separately. In W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022, no affidavit in opposition has been filed by the respondents. 7. 6. Since the contents of the affidavit in opposition filed in W.P.(C) No.138 of 2016 and 443 of 2017 filed by the official respondents as well as the private respondents are same as stated in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016, they were not stated separately. In W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022, no affidavit in opposition has been filed by the respondents. 7. Assailing the impugned requisition dated 2.2.2013, impugned advertisement dated 7.5.2013 and the impugned appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that number of vacancies to be filled up by promotion and direct recruitment was not decided by this Court while disposing of W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 on 25.9.2013 and on the contrary, this Court stated that the State authorities would re-examine the exact number of vacancies falling under direct recruitment quota before any appointment is made to the post of Assistant Engineer in terms of the recommendation of the MPSC on direct recruitment quota so that any vacancy, which otherwise would fall under the promotion quota is not filled up by direct recruitment. He submits that in the said case, this Court held that if any appointment is made under the direct recruitment quota in excess of the direct recruitment quota as per the relevant Recruitment Rules, the petitioners, if aggrieved would be at liberty to approach this Court. 8. Mr. E. Premjit, the learned counsel further submitted that as against the order dated 25.9.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013, SLP No.35459 of 2013 was filed and vide order dated 3.7.2014, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed an order to the effect that the State shall be free to fill up the vacancies advertised in the direct recruitment quota subject to the condition that three out of such vacancies are left unfilled. During the course of hearing before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Government filed an additional affidavit admitting 16 vacancies (including the 3 vacancies kept unfilled out of 25 advertised vacancies) in promotion quota. 9. The learned counsel submitted that on 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of Civil Appeal Nos.6783 to 6785 of 2015 and contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the impugned order dated 30.10.2015 was issued by the Government appointing 3 persons to the post of Assistant Engineers. 9. The learned counsel submitted that on 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of Civil Appeal Nos.6783 to 6785 of 2015 and contrary to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the impugned order dated 30.10.2015 was issued by the Government appointing 3 persons to the post of Assistant Engineers. The said order dated 30.10.2015 was issued in continuation of the order dated 8.9.2014 appointing 22 persons to the post of Assistant Engineers by direct recruitment. The learned counsel submitted that even though the Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded the 16 vacancies admitted by the Government as promotion quota, the right of the petitioners to be considered for promotion against the promotion quota was not limited to the said 16 vacancies. 10. The learned counsel urged that due to the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015 appointing 25 persons to the post of Assistant Engineers by way of direct recruitment against the earlier vacancies, the said direct recruits are placed above the petitioners in the seniority list as the petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers against the later vacancies on later dates and that the en bloc promotion of the said direct recruits eliminates the promotional avenues of the petitioners. Since the petitioners are aggrieved by the filling up of 25 vacancies of Assistant Engineers by way of direct recruitment and in view of the order dated 25.9.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.6783 to 6785 of 2015, the petitioners have valid grounds to seek quashing of the requisition dated 2.2.2013, advertisement dated 7.5.2013 and the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and continuation order dated 30.10.2015 so far it relates to filling up of 25 vacancies of Assistant Engineers in PHE Department. Thus, he submits that the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015 are contrary to the Recruitment Rules and the same are liable to be quashed. 11. Per contra, Mr. S. Nepolean, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the impugned requisition dated 2.2.2013 does not suffer from legal infirmity and the result has already been declared as per the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereafter, the petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers. Therefore, no interference is warranted in the present writ petitions. Per contra, Mr. S. Nepolean, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the impugned requisition dated 2.2.2013 does not suffer from legal infirmity and the result has already been declared as per the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and thereafter, the petitioners were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers. Therefore, no interference is warranted in the present writ petitions. He would submit that the petitioners have no locus to seek retrospective seniority and, therefore, their writ petitions are liable to be dismissed. 12. By placing reliance upon the order passed in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 [Rajkumar Surendra Singh v. State of Manipur and others] and batch cases decided on 24.05.2022, the learned Government Advocate submitted that the impugned order dated 30.10.2015 has been challenged in W.P.(C) No.755 and 849 of 2021 and this Court has not entertained the challenge and dismissed the writ petitions. The challenge made to the impugned requisition, advertisement and the appointment orders do not suffer from any illegalities. Thus, a prayer is made to dismiss all the writ petitions. 13. Mr. RK Milan, the learned counsel for the private respondents firstly submitted that the Recruitment Rules provide 60% for promotion and 40% for direct recruitment and that no direct recruitment in excess of the quota has been made and less number of direct recruitment posts has been worked out. He submits that the total authorized strength of the post of Assistant Engineer in PHE Department is 63. Out of this authorized strength of 63, the number of post fall within the promotion quota is 38 in the ratio of 60% and that of the direct recruitment quota in the ratio of 40% is 25. Highlighting the aforesaid calculation, the learned counsel submitted that 2 posts are shown in excess of the promotion quota and that the said fact has been concealed by the petitioners. Therefore, it is clear that the writ petitions have been filed basing on an erroneous calculation of the posts on promotion quota and in fact, the three posts fall within the direct recruitment quota. 14. The learned counsel for the private respondents further submitted that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners are tenable and worth consideration for a challenge made in the writ petitions. 14. The learned counsel for the private respondents further submitted that none of the grounds raised by the petitioners are tenable and worth consideration for a challenge made in the writ petitions. The learned counsel submits that the Recruitment Rules, 1984/2009/2013 constantly provide 60% for promotion and 40% for direct recruit to be accrued side by side and shall remain the same so long as the same are not filled up by holding DPC for promotion quota and by conducting recruitment process for the direct recruitment for the direct recruit and that the imposition of ban and lifting of it do not affect the maintenance of the quotas provided in the Recruitment Rules in question. 15. The learned counsel then submitted that since 1986 till 2012 no recruitment to fill up the posts in the direct recruitment quota has been made and only in 2013, the recruitment process for the direct recruits has been made and that during the period 1986 to 2013, 25 posts of Assistant Engineers for direct recruitment and 40 posts for promotion have been worked out. 16. The learned counsel added that the Office Memorandum dated 29.4.1999 is a mere guideline to be looked into and considered at the time of promotion and is not at all applicable to the recruitment to the direct recruitment posts. The 27 vacancies of the years 2007-2012 while the ban on direct recruitment was in force have to be filled up by promotion is quite contrary to the Recruitment Rules in question, inasmuch as the Recruitment Rules provide 60% for promotion and 40% for direct recruitment and the posts shall remain as such till the same are not filled up. Therefore, a submission is made on misinterpretation and misconception by the petitioners. 17. The learned counsel next submitted that the private respondents are selected and recommended in the recruitment process conducted by the MPSC, in which some of the petitioners have participated and failed. Out of frustration only, the petitioners have filed these writ petitions. In fact, the MPSC had conducted the recruitment process smoothly as per the Government requisition which has been made correctly as per the requirement and as per law. 18. Out of frustration only, the petitioners have filed these writ petitions. In fact, the MPSC had conducted the recruitment process smoothly as per the Government requisition which has been made correctly as per the requirement and as per law. 18. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have no right to seek retrospective seniority and the private respondents who have fulfilled the criteria have been appointed to the post of Assistant Engineers following the required procedures. Hence, there is no infirmity in the orders impugned in these writ petitions. 19. By placing reliance upon the order of this Court passed in W.P.(C) No.217 of 2016 dated 8.11.2019, the learned counsel submitted that in the said writ petition a similar challenge was made and this Court after analyzing the rival submission of the parties, dismissed the writ petition and that the said order squarely applies to the instant writ petitions. It is the submission of the learned counsel that the principle of res judicata will apply in this case. Thus, a prayer is made to dismiss the writ petitions. 20. This Court considered the rival submissions and also perused the materials available on record. 21. There is no dispute that pursuant to the requisition letter dated 2.2.2013, the MPSC issued an advertisement dated 7.5.2013 for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineer of Power/Works/PHED/IFC Departments. Altogether 84 posts of Assistant Engineer were advertised, out of which 25 posts belongs to PHE Department. The advertisement for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer on direct recruitment was pursuant to the order of relaxation of ban on direct recruitment of the Government of Manipur. 22. The petitioners are questioning the impugned requisition letter of the Government dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 as also the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015 on the following grounds: (1) PWD, IFCD and PHED Manipur Assistant Engineer (Civil/Mechanical) Assistant Surveyor of Works Recruitment Rules, 1984/2009/2013 require the respective quotas for direct recruitment and promotion to be applied to vacancies, as such, the application of the quotas to posts in the cadre is not valid. (2) In view of the provisions contained in the Office Memorandum dated 7.2.1986, 3.3.2008 and 4.3.2014, Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, Government of India regarding determination of inter-se seniority amongst the direct recruits and promotees, the quota for direct recruits and promotes are required to be maintained strictly applied against the vacancies occurring during the course of a year for determining the inter-se seniority position amongst direct recruits and promotes. (3) Complete ban on direct recruitment with effect from 6.11.1999 imposed by the Government which continued till 11.8.2013 and lifting of ban on promotions with effect from 12.8.2013 necessarily implies that all vacancies which arose upto 11.8.2013 shall be filled by promotion only. (4) In the absence of a provision in the relevant Recruitment Rules for carrying forward of vacancies, 25 out of 27 vacancies which arose in the years 2007, 2009 and 2010 while the ban on direct recruitment was in force could not be filled by direct recruitment. (5) Even if it is assumed without admitting that the vacancies of years 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012 falling in the quota of direct recruitment could be carried forward, only 40% of the 27 vacancies could be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining had to be filled by promotion. Consequently, filling up of 25 out of 27 vacancies by direct recruitment is illegal i.e. 16 vacancies should be filled up by promotion and 11 by direct recruitment. (6) Office Memorandum dated 29.4.1999 requires DPC to be held at regular annual intervals and in case the State Government had filled up the 27 vacancies arising during the period upto 2012 in time, some/all the said vacancies would have been filled up by promotion. (7) The petitioners cannot be deprived of their valuable right of promotion against the promotion quota arose from time to time. (8) The partial relaxation of the ban on direct recruitment on 12.8.2013, the 27 vacancies of the year 2007-2012 when the ban on direct recruitment was in force have to be filled up by promotion and the vacancies arising after partial relaxation of the ban have to be filled up in the ratio of 60% by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. (9) The impugned orders are otherwise contrary to law as well as the facts on record and are liable to be quashed. (9) The impugned orders are otherwise contrary to law as well as the facts on record and are liable to be quashed. (10) The appointment order dated 30.10.2015 appointing the respondents 27, 28 and 29 in W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022 to the post of Assistant Engineer by way of direct recruitment were made against the 16 vacancies which were admittedly for promotion quota as clearly recorded in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 2.9.2015 in Civil Appeal Nos.6783 to 6785 of 2015. (11) If the Government is allowed to fill the vacancies of Assistant Engineer on the basis of total cadre strength, another 25 direct recruits is likely to be recruited after the promotion of all the direct recruit Assistant Engineers to higher post on the ground that only promote Assistant Engineers are left in the cadre resulting in the blockage of promotion avenues of the petitioners. 23. From the materials produced by the parties, it appears that the State Government had resorted to appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer by promotion and, accordingly, 22 Section Officers were given promotion as Assistant Engineers on regular basis on 17.11.2007. As per the Recruitment Rules, for the post of Assistant Engineer, 60% of the vacancies are to be filled up by promotion and 40% by direct recruitment. Even though ban was imposed on direct recruitment, all vacancies occurred during that period could not be filled up by promotion and the direct recruitment quota was kept reserved. 24. The respondent authorities have given the details of vacancies for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers in PHE Department, which is reproduced hereunder: Year of vacancy Total no. of posts No. of posts for Diploma Break up No. of posts for Degree Breakup UR ST UR ST 2011-12 2 1 - 1 1 1 - 2012-13 3 1 1 - 2 1 1 2013-14 6 3 2 1 3 3 - 2014-15 2 1 - 1 1 1 - 2015-16 9 5 4 1 4 3 1 Total 22 11 7 4 11 9 2 25. According to the respondent authorities, there were 22 vacancies of Assistant Engineers available for promotion from Section Officer Grade-I, of which 11 each were meant for Diploma and Degree Holders respectively. According to the respondent authorities, there were 22 vacancies of Assistant Engineers available for promotion from Section Officer Grade-I, of which 11 each were meant for Diploma and Degree Holders respectively. The Administrative Department furnished the MPSC the combined seniority list of Section Officer Grade-I on 10.10.2013 as well as seniority list of 35 Degree Holders and 35 Diploma Holders serving in the Grade of Section Officer Grade-I in the PHE Department. According to the respondent authorities, no other eligible officer has been left out while the list was prepared and sent to the MPSC. The fact was recorded in the Minutes of the DPC meeting held on 19.12.2015 and 21.12.2015. 26. According to the respondent authorities, the DPC considered all eligible officers in the Section Officer Grade-I, including the petitioners taking into account the orders passed by this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court relating to appointment by promotion to Assistant Engineers. On the recommendation of the said DPC, total of 21 posts of Section Officer Grade-1 (10 seats for Diploma Holders and 11 seats for Degree Holders) were promoted as Assistant Engineers. One seat reserved for ST candidate was carried forward for want of eligible candidate. Since the petitioners were not within the zone of consideration of eligible Section Officer Grade-I, they were not promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers. 27. Admittedly, the aforesaid stand taken by the respondent authorities has not been seriously disputed by the petitioner. On the other hand, in support of their plea, the respondent authorities have produced materials and this Court also gone through the same and satisfied with the records. 28. At this juncture, it would be apt to mention the earlier litigations initiated by the parties in connection with the same orders impugned herein. On the other hand, in support of their plea, the respondent authorities have produced materials and this Court also gone through the same and satisfied with the records. 28. At this juncture, it would be apt to mention the earlier litigations initiated by the parties in connection with the same orders impugned herein. Alleging that the post which is to be filled up by direct recruitment quota is not proportionate to the quota reserved for the direct recruitment as per the relevant Recruitment Rules and that even though the ban has not been lifted by the State for appointment under the direct recruitment quota, the respondent authorities are proceeding to make appointment by way of direct recruitment quota, W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 came to be filed by Lakshaheb Singh and others before this Court seeking to quash the impugned requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 addressed to the MPSC by the Department of P&AR to initiate process for direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Engineers in the PHE Department. 29. By the order dated 25.9.2013, W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 was disposed of and the operative portion of the order reads thus: '10. In view of the above facts, having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this Court is of the view that the present petition can be disposed of at this stage as follows. Since the Government has already taken a decision as evident from the order dated 12.08.2013 for lifting the ban on direct recruitment partially in respect of certain posts including the post of Assistant Engineer for Public Health Engineering Department, the action taken by the Department for filling up the vacancies in the grade of Assistant Engineer against direct recruitment quota as mentioned in the impugned letter dated 02.02.2013 cannot be faulted with and accordingly, no writ can be issued to set aside/quash the impugned letter dated 02.02.2013. However, as regards the actual number of vacancies to the post of Assistant Engineer in the Public Health Engineering Department which may be filled up by direct recruit, it is clarified that the State authorities would reexamine the exact number of vacancies falling under direct recruitment quota before any appointment is made to the post of Assistant Engineer in terms of the recommendation of the Manipur Public Service Commissioner on direct recruitment quota, so that any vacancy, which otherwise would fall under the promotion quota is not filled up by direct recruitment. Accordingly, if any appointment is made under the direct recruitment quota in excess of the direct recruitment quota as per the relevant recruitment rules, the petitioners, if aggrieved, would be at liberty to approach this Court again. 11. With the above observation and direction, the present petition stands disposed of.' 30. Aggrieved by the order dated 25.9.2013, S.L.P.No.35459 of 2013 was preferred before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by the interim order dated 29.11.2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed the following order: 'The result of the selection shall remain pending subject to final decision of the Special Leave Petition.' 31. The order dated 29.11.2013 has been modified by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 3.7.2014 in the following lines: '1) The State shall be free to fill up the vacancies advertised in the direct recruitment quota subject to the condition that three out of such vacancies are left unfilled. 2) Appointment against the advertised vacancies if any, shall remain subject to the ultimate outcome of these proceedings. 3) Appointment orders issued to the selected candidates shall specifically mention that their appointments are subject to the outcome of this petition. Post the petition for final disposal after six weeks. Counter affidavits and rejoinder, if any, be filed in the meantime if not already filed.' 32. In pursuance of the impugned requisition letter dated 2.2.2013, the MPSC issued an advertisement on 7.5.2013 for recruitment of 24 Assistant Engineers in IFCD. Stating that the computation of 24 vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment by the State is illegal, W.P.(C) No.523 of 2014 has been filed. 33. W.P.(C) No.145 of 2014 also came to be filed by Laishram Gokulchandra Singh and others praying to pass an interim order as per the order dated 3.7.2014 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Stating that the computation of 24 vacancies to be filled up by direct recruitment by the State is illegal, W.P.(C) No.523 of 2014 has been filed. 33. W.P.(C) No.145 of 2014 also came to be filed by Laishram Gokulchandra Singh and others praying to pass an interim order as per the order dated 3.7.2014 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. By the order dated 25.7.2014, this Court declined to pass an interim order. Against which, SLP No.29104 of 2014 was filed. While issuing notice in the said SLP, the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that any appointment made pursuant to the notification shall be subject to the outcome of the case. It is alleged that while so, on 8.9.2014, the Government of Manipur passed an order giving appointment to 22 persons as Assistant Engineers on the recommendation of the MPSC on direct recruitment basis. 34. The Special Leave Petitions came to be numbered as Civil Appeal Nos.6783-6785 of 2015 and by the judgment dated 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of the same. The operative portion of the judgment reads thus: '14. As noticed above, Mr. Gupta, learned counsel, very fairly submitted that 16 vacancies for promotion against the promotion quota are available and in any case the appellants shall be considered for promotion. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. However, we dispose of the appeals holding that the appellant's case shall be considered for promotion against the promotion quota are available and in any case the appellants shall be considered for promotion. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. However, we dispose of the appeals holding that the appellant's case shall be considered for promotion against the promotion quota as they are much above in the seniority list. The question of law raised by the appellants shall be kept open.' 35. It also appears that the very facts has been stated by this Court in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch decided on 24.05.2022. The question of law raised by the appellants shall be kept open.' 35. It also appears that the very facts has been stated by this Court in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch decided on 24.05.2022. Further, if we look into the order dated 8.11.2019 passed in W.P.(C) No.217 of 2016 and 523 of 2014, in paragraph 30, this Court observed as under: '[30] From the above orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not interfered with the order impugned in the said Civil Appeals, out of which one Civil Appeal arose out of the order dated 25.09.2013 passed in WP(C) No. 155 of 2014, wherein this Court declined to set aside the impugned letter/requisition dated 02.02.2013. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court has not disturbed the impugned letter dated 02.02.2013, the contention of the petitioners that the impugned requisition letter dated 02.02.2013, followed with the Advertisement dated 07.05.2013 and appointment order dated 16.09.2014 are illegal, arbitrary and ultra vires, cannot be sustained.' 36. As stated supra, a challenge was made in those two writ petitions to the letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 and this Court after considering the arguments raised by both sides, finally dismissed the writ petitions, meaning thereby the challenge made by the petitioners therein was not accepted and, thus, the requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 stand sustained. Nothing has been produced by the petitioners herein to show that as against the order dated 8.11.2019, an appeal has been preferred and the order of the learned Single Judge has been set aside by the appellate Court. In the absence of any appeal, the order dated 8.11.2019 attained finality. 37. The petitioners herein have challenged the very same requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013. Since the validity of the aforesaid requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 has been tested in W.P.(C) No.217 of 2016 and decided finally, this Court cannot again re-consider the same in these batch of writ petitions. 38. When a similar case has been considered and dismissed by this Court, another similar case, namely the present writ petitions cannot have different views. 38. When a similar case has been considered and dismissed by this Court, another similar case, namely the present writ petitions cannot have different views. That apart, while disposing of the Civil Appeals referred to above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere the order of this Court dated 25.9.2013 passed in W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 whereby a challenge was made to the impugned requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013. Therefore, as per the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court also, the requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 are sustained. 39. Coming to the challenge made to the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015, this Court finds that the same has also been dealt with by this Court in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch. It appears that in the said batch, W.P.(C) Nos.755 and 849 of 2021 have been filed by the petitioners therein to quash the order dated 30.10.2015 issued by the Under Secretary (PHED), Government of Manipur filling up three vacancies of Assistant Engineers by way of direct recruitment of the private respondents to the post of Assistant Engineer in PHE Department, coupled with the prayer to quash the seniority list dated 29.1.2021. In W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch, the petitioners have also sought a prayer to direct to fill three vacancies of Assistant Engineers arose due to promotion of H.Ibotombi Singh, L.Brojendro Singh and Th. Joychandra Singh to the post of Executive Engineer by promotion by holding necessary DPC/Review DPC. 40. While addressing the issue on the validity of the appointment orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015, in paragraph 49, this Court observed as under: '49. It is pertinent to point out that out of 25 posts of Assistant Engineers advertised for direct recruitment quota, appointments were given to 22 persons on 8.9.2014 and another three on 30.10.2015 mainly based on the recommendation of the MPSC. The aforesaid appointments, in fact, did not encroach upon the promotion quota. At the same time, as rightly argued by learned Government Advocate, 21 Section Officers Grade-I were also given promotion as Assistant Engineers on 29.12.2015 on the recommendation of the MPSC. According to the learned Government Advocate, the petitioners were not included in the promotion list as they were not within the zone of consideration. The aforesaid argument of the learned Government Advocate merits acceptance. According to the learned Government Advocate, the petitioners were not included in the promotion list as they were not within the zone of consideration. The aforesaid argument of the learned Government Advocate merits acceptance. Further, the petitioners have failed to challenge the appointment of the aforesaid 21 Section Officers Grade-I on promotion to Assistant Engineers. Therefore, challenging the impugned seniority list of Assistant Engineers and equivalent by the petitioners was not sustainable in the eye of law.' (emphasis supplied) 41. In view of finding arrived at by this Court in paragraph 49 of the order dated 24.5.2022 in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch referred to above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the calculation of 25 vacancies for direct recruitment was done on the basis that all the Assistant Engineers at that time was promotee Assistant Engineers and similarly situated has again be repeated in the Department consequent to the promotion of the said direct recruits to the higher post leaving no direct recruits in the cadre of Assistant Engineer and that if the Department allowed to fill up the vacancies on the basis of total cadre strength, it will result in eliminating the promotional avenues of the petitioners who are in feeder cadre as Sections Officers, cannot be countenanced. Though the petitioners are not parties in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch, when the petitioners are part of PHE Department and are working in the same Department, they should know about the things happening in the Department and they cannot plead ignorance. 42. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that assuming without admitting that the vacancies of years 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012 falling in the quota of direct recruitment could be carried forward, whether only 40% of the 27 vacancies could be filled by direct recruitment and the remaining will have to be filled by promotion and consequently, filling up of 25 out of 27 vacancies by direct recruitment is illegal. Admittedly, nothing has been produced by the petitioners in support of the said argument. 43. Admittedly, nothing has been produced by the petitioners in support of the said argument. 43. The further argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondent authorities have not only applied the quota to the cadre strength as stated above, but also carried forward almost all the vacancies on the erroneous supposition that they are meant for direct recruitment and filled up 25 out of 27 accumulated vacancies by direct recruitment and this is in clear violation of not only the statutory rules and administrative instructions but also violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. He added that the principle of res judicata does not arise in this case. In support, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the following decisions: (1) Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, (1975) 3 SCC 503 . (2) B.S.Minhas v. Indian Statistical Institute, (1983) 4 SCC 582 . 44. In Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '8. Now, it is true that clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 was not a statutory provision having the force of law and was merely an administrative instruction issued by the State Government in exercise of its executive power. But that does not present any difficulty, for it is now well-settled by several decisions of this Court that where no statutory rules are made regulating recruitment or conditions of service, the State Government always can in exercise of its executive power issue administrative instructions providing for recruitment and laying down conditions of service. Vide B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore [ AIR 1966 SC 1942 : (1966) 3 SCR 682 : (1967) 1 LLJ 698 ] and Sant Ram Sharma v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1967 SC 1910 : (1968) 1 SCR 111 : (1968) 2 LLJ 830 ] . It was, therefore, competent to the State Government to issue clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 in exercise of its executive power laying down the principle to be followed in adjusting inter se seniority of the officers in the integrated service. 9. It was, therefore, competent to the State Government to issue clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 in exercise of its executive power laying down the principle to be followed in adjusting inter se seniority of the officers in the integrated service. 9. But the question then arises whether the State Government could issue the order dated December 4, 1967 providing that the seniority of Respondents 3 to 19 shall be reckoned from the date of issue of their order of appointment, namely, April 8, 1964 irrespective as to when they assumed charge of the higher posts, if such order was in contravention of the principle of seniority laid down in clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25. 1965. The argument urged on behalf of the State Government was that it was competent to it to fix an assumed date on which the continuous service of Respondents 3 to 19 should be deemed to have commenced for the purpose of determining their seniority in the integrated service, and the order dated December 4, 1967 was, therefore, not beyond its power. But we do not think this argument is well founded. Clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 provided that the seniority of the officers in the integrated service shall be determined by reference to the length of continuous service from the date of appointment in the group within their respective service. What was, therefore, required to be taken into account was the actual length of continuous service from the date of appointment and not the length of continuous service reckoned from an artificial date given by the State Government. Now, it is true that clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965 was in the nature of administrative instruction, not having the force of law, but the State Government could not at its own sweet will depart from it without rational justification and fix an artificial date for commencing the length of continuous service in the case of some individual officers only for the purpose of giving them seniority in contravention of that clause. That would be clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The sweep of Articles 14 and 16 is wide and pervasive. These two articles embody the principle of rationality and they are intended to strike against arbitrary and discriminatory action taken by the 'state'. That would be clearly violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The sweep of Articles 14 and 16 is wide and pervasive. These two articles embody the principle of rationality and they are intended to strike against arbitrary and discriminatory action taken by the 'state'. Where the State Government departs from a principle of seniority laid down by it, albeit by administrative instructions, and the departure is without reason and arbitrary, it would directly infringe the guarantee of equality under articles 14 and 16. It is interesting to notice that in the United States it is now well-settled that an executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. Vide the Judgment of Mr Justice Frankfurter in Vitaralli v. Seaton [359 US 535, 546-547 : 3 L Ed 2nd 1012] . This view is of course not based on the equality clause of the United States Constitution and it is evolved as a rule of administrative law. But the principle is the same, namely, that arbitrariness should be eliminated in State action. If, therefore, we find that the order dated December 4, 1967 gave an artificial date from which the continuous service of Respondents 3 to 19 shall be deemed to have commenced, though in fact and in truth their continuous service commenced from different dates and it was thus in contravention of the principle of seniority laid down in clause (2)(ii) of the memorandum dated October 25, 1965, it would have to be held to be void as being violative of Articles 14 and 16. 45. In B.S.Mihhas, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '23. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1 is illegal because of non-compliance with byelaw 2. Bye-law 2 does require that before appointment, the vacancy in the post of Director should be suitably publicised. In the instant case, it is admitted on both sides that no publicity whatsoever was given in respect of the vacancy. The contention of Shri Garg, however, is that the bye-law having no force of statute, non-compliance with its requirement cannot in any way affect the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1. In the instant case, it is admitted on both sides that no publicity whatsoever was given in respect of the vacancy. The contention of Shri Garg, however, is that the bye-law having no force of statute, non-compliance with its requirement cannot in any way affect the appointment of Respondent 4 as Director of Respondent 1. Shri Tarkunde, however, contended that assuming that the bye-law is not statutory, even so Respondent 1 was bound to comply with it. In support of his contention he strongly relied upon Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 : AIR 1979 SC 1628 : (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : (1979) 2 LLJ 217 ]. The Court in that case held: (SCC p. 503, para 10) 'It is a well-settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton [359 US 535 : 3 LEd 2d 1012 (1959)] where the learned Judge said: An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged.... Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword.'' The aforesaid principle laid down by Mr Justice Frankfurter in Vitarelli v. Seaton [359 US 535 : 3 LEd 2d 1012 (1959)] has been accepted as applicable in India by this Court in Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [ (1975) 3 SCC 503 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 27 : AIR 1975 SC 984 : (1975) 3 SCR 82 : (1975) 1 LLJ 228 and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [ (1975) 1 SCC 421 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 101 : AIR 1975 SC 1331 : (1975) 3 SCR 619 : (1975) 1 LLJ 399 ]. Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr Justice Frankfurter with approval. 24. Mathew, J. quoted the above-referred observation of Mr Justice Frankfurter with approval. 24. In view of the pronouncement of this Court on the point it must be held to be obligatory on the part of Respondent 1 to follow the byelaws, if the bye-laws have been framed for the conduct of its affairs to avoid arbitrariness. Respondent 1 cannot, therefore, escape the liability for not following the procedure prescribed by bye-law 2. 25. Compliance with this bye-law also seems to be necessary in the name of fair-play. If the vacancy in the post of Director had been publicised as contemplated by bye-law 2, all the persons eligible for the post may have applied and in that case, the field of consideration would have been enlarged and the Selection Committee or the Council would have had a much larger field from which to choose the best available person and that would have removed all doubts of arbitrariness from the mind of those eligible for the post. Of course, we do not wish to suggest for a moment that appointment to every post must be made only after advertising or publicising the vacancy. That would not be right, for there are quite a few posts at the top level which cannot be and should not be advertised or publicised, because they are posts for which there should be no lobbying nor should any applications be allowed to be entertained. Examples of such posts may be found in the post of Commander of Armed Forces or the Chief Justice or the Judges of the Supreme Court or the High Courts. But here bye-law 2 requires that the vacancy in the post of Director should be publicised and hence we are making the above observation in this paragraph.' 46. On a perusal of the impugned appointment order dated 8.9.2014, this Court finds that the appointment of the candidates mentioned to the post of Assistant Engineer (Civil) on regular basis in the time scale shall be subject to the outcome of the S.L.P.No.35459 of 2013. On a further perusal of the impugned order dated 30.10.2015, this Court finds that the Government appointed three candidates as recommended by the MPSC to the post of Assistant Engineers (Civil) as per the outcome of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.6783-6785 of 2015 dated 2.9.2015. 47. On a further perusal of the impugned order dated 30.10.2015, this Court finds that the Government appointed three candidates as recommended by the MPSC to the post of Assistant Engineers (Civil) as per the outcome of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal Nos.6783-6785 of 2015 dated 2.9.2015. 47. It is pertinent to point out that in W.P.(C) No.108 of 2021 etc. batch an argument on behalf of the petitioners therein was raised that despite the request made by the petitioners to comply with the direction of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated 2.9.2015, the Government of Manipur issued the impugned order dated 30.10.2015, thereby filling three vacancies of Assistant Engineers of the year 2010 by way of direct recruitment and that the said three vacancies filled vide order dated 30.10.2015 were already been admitted by the Government as promotion quota before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Civil Appeals. This Court also recorded the submissions of the learned Government Advocate as well as the private respondents therein who argued that the letter dated 5.6.2015 of the MPSC would reveal that direct recruitment and promotion quota were 25 and 16 respectively and as per the information furnished, the number of 16 vacancies for promotion quota includes the vacancies of the year 2010 and that three vacancies were filled as per the outcome of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the order passed in W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 and the said factum was also stated in the appointment order itself. After recording the arguments raised, this Court in paragraph 50 observed that the remedy available now to the petitioners was to pursue W.P.(C) Nos.122 and 138 of 2016. 48. As stated supra, while passing the interim order on 3.7.2014 in the SLP, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly stated that the State shall be free to fill up 22 out of 25 vacancies advertised in the direct recruitment quota leaving 3 unfilled. When the Civil Appeals arising out of the SLPs were disposed of on 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere the order dated 25.9.2013 passed in W.P.No.155 of 2013. When the Civil Appeals arising out of the SLPs were disposed of on 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere the order dated 25.9.2013 passed in W.P.No.155 of 2013. In the judgment dated 2.9.2015, the Hon'ble Supreme Court further mentioned about the availability of 16 posts of Assistant Engineers for consideration for promotion of the appellants therein and ordered that the case of the appellants should be considered for promotion against promotion quota and the question of law raised by the appellants were kept open. As rightly argued by learned counsel for the private respondents, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not say that the 3 posts which were kept as unfilled belong to the promotion quota. Rather, non-interference with this Court order dated 25.9.2013 suggests that direct recruitment post was 25. Thereafter, the 3 post of Assistant Engineers which were left unfilled against direct recruitment quota were filled up from the list recommended by the MPSC (i.e. the respondents 27, 28 and 29 in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016) vide order dated 30.10.2015. 49. It is informed that 25 posts advertised for direct recruitment quota were given appointment and 21 Section Officers Grade-I who filed W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 and others were also given promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers on the recommendation of DPC against the promotion quota i.e. 16 plus resultant vacancies. 50. In view of the above factual position narrated above, the alleged violation canvassed by the petitioners has no legs to stand, as the respondent authorities never carried forward all the vacancies on an erroneous supposition that they are meant for direct recruitment and accordingly filled 25 out of 27 accumulated vacancies by direct recruitment. Therefore, the judgments in the case of Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia and B.S.Mihas, supra, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present writ petitions. 51. Therefore, the judgments in the case of Amarjit Singh Ahluwalia and B.S.Mihas, supra, relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners are not applicable to the facts of the present writ petitions. 51. The learned counsel for the petitioners, by placing reliance upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (1) Paramjeet Singh v. Ram Rkha Mal, (1979) 3 SCC 478 ; (2) Paramjeet Singh Sandhu v. Ram Rakha Mal, (1982) 3 SCC 191 ; (3) State of Punjab and others v. Dr.R.N.Bhatnagar and another, (1999) 2 SCC 330 and (4) Major General H.M.Singh VSM v. Union of India and another, (2014) 3 SCC 670 , submitted that the quota prescribed for promotion and direct recruitment will apply to vacancies and not to posts in the cadre and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be denied their right to be considered for promotion against the promotion available promotion quota. 52. In Paramjeet Singh, (1979) 3 SCC 478 , supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '14. It may be pointed out that where recruitment is from two sources and the seniority in the cadre is determined according to the date of confirmation, to accord utmost fair treatment a rotational system has to be followed while giving confirmation. The quota rule would apply to vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. If the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation. A roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and the recruit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source. This system would break down the moment recruitment from either source in excess of the quota is made. In fact a strict adherence to the quota rule at the time of recruitment would introduce no difficulty in applying the Rule at the time of confirmation because vacancies would be available for confirmation to persons belonging to different sources of recruitment. This system would break down the moment recruitment from either source in excess of the quota is made. In fact a strict adherence to the quota rule at the time of recruitment would introduce no difficulty in applying the Rule at the time of confirmation because vacancies would be available for confirmation to persons belonging to different sources of recruitment. The difficulty arises when recruitment in excess of the quota is made and it is further accentuated when recruits from one source, to wit, in this case direct recruits get automatic confirmation on completion of the probationary period while the promotees hang out for years together before being confirmed. In Mervyn Coutinho case this Court in terms said that rotational system of fixing seniority meaning thereby confirmation followed by seniority does not offend equality of opportunity in Government service and recruitment not following the fixed quota rule need not be a ground for doing away with rotational system. 53. In Paramjeet Singh, (1982) 3 SCC 191 , supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '6. In our opinion there is no ambiguity in the judgment. Ordinarily speaking, where recruitment is from two sources with a view to integrating recruits from both sources after the recruitment seniority is determined from the date of entry into the cadre except where there has been a substantial violation of the quota giving undeserved advantage to one or the other source. Seniority ordinarily speaking is determined with reference to the date of entry into the cadre which in service jurisprudence is styled the date of continuous officiation. These notions of service jurisprudence may have to yield place to the specific rules and the fact situation with reference to Rule 10 did compel this Court to depart from the normal concept in service jurisprudence. However, introduction of a roster system is very well known in service jurisprudence. What this Court meant while saying that when a quota rule is prescribed for recruitment to a cadre it meant that quota should be co-related to the vacancies which are to be filled in. Who retired and from what source he was recruited may not be very relevant because retirement from service may not follow the quota rule. Promotees who come to the service at an advanced age may retire early and direct recruits who enter the service at a comparatively young age may continue for a long time. Who retired and from what source he was recruited may not be very relevant because retirement from service may not follow the quota rule. Promotees who come to the service at an advanced age may retire early and direct recruits who enter the service at a comparatively young age may continue for a long time. If, therefore, in a given year larger number of promotees retire and every time the vacancy is filled in by referring to the source from which the retiring person was recruited it would substantially disturb the quota rule itself. Therefore, while making recruitment quota rule is required to be strictly adhered to. That was what was meant by this Court when it said: [SCC p. 486, para 14: SCC (L&S) p. 318] The quota rule would apply to vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. The quota in the present case is 4:1, that is, four promotees to one direct recruit. Therefore, whenever vacancies occur in the service the appointing authority has to go on recruiting according to quota. In other words, whenever vacancies occur, first recruit four promotees irrespective of the factors or circumstances causing the vacancies and as soon as four promotees are recruited bring in a direct recruit. That was what was meant by this Court when it said that a roster has to be introduced and this roster must continue while giving confirmation. The sentence which seems to have created a difference of opinion reads as under: [SCC p. 486, para 14: SCC (L&S) p. 318] A roster is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every time which post has fallen vacant and the recruit from that source has to be confirmed in the post available to the source. 7. The sentence cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read with the earlier sentence that the quota rule would apply to the vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in view the vacancies available to the two sources according to the quota. The Court then proceeded to say that if the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation. 8. Introduction of a roster system is well known to service jurisprudence. The Court then proceeded to say that if the quota rule is strictly adhered to there will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view the quota rule even at the time of confirmation. 8. Introduction of a roster system is well known to service jurisprudence. When a roster is to be introduced it only means that ascertain the available number of vacancies and proceed to make recruitment keeping in view the quota. Now, if recruitment is strictly made according to quota there will be no difficulty in applying the very rule of quota even while giving confirmation. To illustrate, assuming there are five vacancies in a given period, the recruitment will be four from the cadre from which promotion can be given and one would be a direct recruit. Naturally when the date of confirmation comes it would obviously follow that confirmation will proceed along that very line. In our opinion, therefore, there is neither any ambiguity nor any blurred area which requires to be explained. 54. In Dr.R.N.Bhatnagar, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '9. So far as the first point is concerned, the High Court in the impugned judgment, has heavily relied upon the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of R.K. Sabharwal [ (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481 ]. Now it has to be kept in view that the Constitution Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision was concerned with entirely a different question, namely, as to how the roster indicating reserved points in connection with reservation of posts in a cadre to be filled in by Scheduled Caste (for short 'SC'), Scheduled Tribe (for short 'ST') and Backward Class (for short 'BC') candidates could be operated. Para 4 of the Report lays down that: (SCC p. 750) '4. Para 4 of the Report lays down that: (SCC p. 750) '4. When a percentage of reservation is fixed in respect of a particular cadre and the roster indicates the reserve points, it has to be taken that the posts shown at the reserve points are to be filled from amongst the members of reserve categories and the candidates belonging to the general category are not entitled to be considered for the reserved posts.' In this connection, reliance was placed by the Constitution Bench on Article 16(4) of the Constitution of India which permits the State Government to make any provision for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, was not adequately represented in the services under the State. In the light of the aforesaid scheme of the Constitution, the Bench had to consider whether reservation of posts for SCs, STs and BCs when sought to be secured by way of operation of the roster could permit the operation of the roster qua the posts or vacancies in the cadre. It was noted in this connection that if the roster operated on vacancies, then it may happen that at a given point of time, the percentage of reservation of posts for SCs, STs and BCs may exceed the permissible percentage of reservation. In para 5 of the Report, it was observed that reservations provided under the impugned government instructions permitted 16% of the posts to be reserved for members of SCs and BCs and it could be achieved by the roster to be maintained in each Department. The roster had to be implemented in the form of running account from year to year. In connection with 16% of the posts...' to be reserved for members of SCs and BCs in promotional posts, it was held as under: (SCC p. 751, para 5) '[W]hen recruitment to a cadre starts then 14 posts earmarked in the (100 points) roster are to be filled from amongst the members of the Scheduled Castes. ... When the total number of posts in a cadre are filled by the operation of the roster then the result envisaged by the impugned instructions is achieved. ... When the total number of posts in a cadre are filled by the operation of the roster then the result envisaged by the impugned instructions is achieved. In other words, in a cadre of 100 posts when the posts earmarked in the roster for Scheduled Castes and the Backward Classes are filled the percentage of reservation provided for the reserved categories is achieved. We see no justification to operate the roster thereafter. The 'running account' is to operate only till the quota provided under the impugned instructions is reached and not thereafter. Once the prescribed percentage of posts is filled the numerical test of adequacy is satisfied and thereafter the roster does not survive.' The aforesaid observations which were heavily relied on by the High Court and are also relied upon by the respondent's (writ petitioner's) counsel before us, cannot be of any assistance to the appellant-State on the facts of the present case. The result is obvious. As per Article 16(4) which carves out a separate field for itself from the general sweep of Article 16(1) which guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of appointments in government services to all citizens of India, the reservation for these categories in employment has to be achieved by earmarking the requisite percentage of posts for the reserved category of candidates and by pitchforking these posts on roster points on requisite points' roster and when such a roster takes a full cycle, posts earmarked on reserved points will enable the requisite reserved category of candidates to fill up these posts. After that is done, the roster would be treated to have achieved its purpose. Whenever a reserved candidate vacated a reserved post, the said post was liable to be filled only by a candidate belonging to the reserved category. If after the roster is first operated and thereafter it is again operated on future vacancies also, a situation may arise wherein a cadre may get reserved category exceeding the permitted quota of reservation. It is to avoid this contingency that the Constitution Bench laid down in the aforesaid decision as indicated therein. So far as Rule 9 of the Rules in the present case is concerned, it has nothing to do with reservation of posts in the cadre of Professors. It is not a rule of reservation envisaged for a specified category of persons as permitted by Article 16(4) of the Constitution. So far as Rule 9 of the Rules in the present case is concerned, it has nothing to do with reservation of posts in the cadre of Professors. It is not a rule of reservation envisaged for a specified category of persons as permitted by Article 16(4) of the Constitution. On the contrary, it is a rule of recruitment from two different sources, namely, in case of Professor's cadre, 75% of the posts has to be filled in by promotion while 25% by direct recruitment. These two sources of recruitment permit departmental promotees and direct recruits from the open market to get absorbed in the cadre. They merely serve as two entry points for the cadre. Rule 9 deals with reservation of appointment to the posts of Professor and does not deal with reservation of posts of Professor for any special class or category of candidates. It is well settled that once recruitment is made from two sources, i.e., departmental promotees and direct recruitment from the open market and once the candidates concerned enter into any cadre through entry point reserved for them, they get fused and blended into one single cadre and their birthmarks get obliterated. In this connection, we may usefully refer to a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa [ (1974) 1 SCC 19 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 49]. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), speaking for the Constitution Bench while dealing with recruitment to a cadre from two sources, namely, direct recruits and promotees in the light of an earlier judgment of this Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR 185 ] made the following pertinent observations: (SCC p. 38, paras 44-45) '44. The key words of the judgment are: 'The recruits from both the sources to Grade 'D' were integrated into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be made in favour of recruits from one source as against the recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to Grade 'C'.' (emphasis supplied) By this was meant that in the matter of promotional opportunities to Grade 'C', no discrimination could be made between promotees and direct recruits by reference to the source from which they were drawn. That is to say, if apprentice Train Examiners who were recruited directly to Grade 'D' as Train Examiners formed one common class with skilled artisans who were promoted to Grade 'D' as Train Examiners, no favoured treatment could be given to the former merely because they were directly recruited as Train Examiners and no discrimination could be made as against the latter merely because they were promotees. This is the true meaning of the observation extracted above and no more than this can be read into the sentence next following: 'To put it differently, once the direct recruits and promotees are absorbed into one cadre, they form one class and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further promotion to the higher Grade 'C'.' In terms, this was just a different way of putting what had preceded. 45. Thus, all that Roshan Lal case [ AIR 1967 SC 1889 : (1968) 1 SCR 185 ] lays down is that direct recruits and promotees lose their birthmarks on fusion into a common stream of service and they cannot thereafter be treated differently by reference to the consideration that they were recruited from different sources. Their genetic blemishes disappear once they are integrated into a common class and cannot be revived so as to make equals unequals once again.' It has, therefore, to be appreciated that when posts in a cadre are to be filled in from two sources, whether the candidate comes from the source of departmental promotees or by way of direct recruitment, once both of them enter a common cadre, their birthmarks disappear and they get completely integrated in the common cadre. This would be in consonance with the thrust of Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India. No question of exception to the said general thrust of the constitutional provision would survive as Article 16(4) would be out of the picture in such a case. This would be in consonance with the thrust of Article 16(1) of the Constitution of India. No question of exception to the said general thrust of the constitutional provision would survive as Article 16(4) would be out of the picture in such a case. Consequently, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in R.K. Sabharwal case [ (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481 ] in connection with Article 16(4) and the operation of roster for achieving the reservation of posts for SCs, STs, and BCs as per the scheme of reservation cannot be pressed into service for the present scheme of Rule 9(1) is not as per Article 16(4) but is governed by the general sweep of Article 16(1). The attempt of learned counsel for the respondent to treat a quota rule as a reservation rule would result in requiring the State authorities to continue the birthmarks of direct recruits and promotees even after they enter the common cadre through two separate entry points regulating their induction to the cadre. Therefore, the roster for 3 promotees and one direct recruit is to be continued every time a vacancy arises and there is no question of filling up a vacancy arising out of a retirement of a direct recruit by a direct recruit or on the retirement vacancy of a promotee by a promotee. Consequently, the question of rotating the vacancies as posts or for treating the posts mentioned in the rules of recruitment as necessarily referable to total posts in the cadre at a given point of time in the light of R.K. Sabharwal [ (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481 ] judgment, therefore, cannot survive for in the case of a quota rule between direct recruits and promotees, the same is to be judged on the touchstone of Article 16(1) and the statutory rules governing the recruitment to the posts of Professor constituting the Punjab Medical Education Service (Class I) and not on the basis of Article 16(4). The Division Bench in the impugned judgment with respect wrongly applied the ratio of R.K. Sabharwal case [ (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481 ] governing Article 16(4) to the facts of the present case which are governed by Article 16(1). 55. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment with respect wrongly applied the ratio of R.K. Sabharwal case [ (1995) 2 SCC 745 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 548 : (1995) 29 ATC 481 ] governing Article 16(4) to the facts of the present case which are governed by Article 16(1). 55. In Major General H.M.Singh, supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: '10. In consonance with the order granting extension in service, DRDO issued an order dated 3-6-2008, retiring the appellant from the rank of Major-General with immediate effect. The appellant assailed the above order dated 2- 6-2008 (denying the appellant promotion to the rank of Lieutenant-General), and the order dated 3-6-2008 (by which the appellant was retired from service) by filing Writ Petition No. 15508 of 2008 before the High Court of Judicature of Madras (hereinafter referred to as 'the High Court'). Convening a meeting of the Selection Board on 27-2-2008 i.e. just two days before the appellant was to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, as also, the consideration of the recommendation made by the Selection Board at the hands of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet, more than three months after the date on which the appellant would retire from service, were vigorously referred to, to demonstrate the apathy at the hands of the authorities, which according to the appellant, had resulted in denial of promotion to him'. 56. There is no quarrel over the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the quota prescribed for promotion and direct recruitment will apply to vacancies and not to posts in the cadre. 57. In W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016, inter alia, the petitioners prayed for a direction directing the respondents to give retrospective seniority corresponding to the vacancies which arose during 2007, 2009 and 2010 along with consequential benefits. In W.P.(C) No.138 of 2016, inter alia, the petitioners prayed for direction on the respondents to give promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer with retrospective effect. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.443 of 2017, inter alia, prayed for direction to give promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer with retrospective effect corresponding to the respective sources of vacancies from the year 2007 onwards. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.443 of 2017, inter alia, prayed for direction to give promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer with retrospective effect corresponding to the respective sources of vacancies from the year 2007 onwards. The petitioners in W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022, inter alia, prayed for direction directing the respondents to fill the promotion quota by holding a Special DPC/Review DPC considering the case of eligible officers for promotion against the 25 vacancies of Assistant Engineers filled by direct recruitment vide impugned orders dated 8.9.2014 and 30.10.2015. 58. The argument of the petitioners that the promotion of the petitioners cannot take away their right to be considered for promotion against the vacancies of the promotion quota of the year 2007 onwards has no basis and also cannot be accepted in view of the findings arrived at by this Court in the preceding paragraphs of this order. The stand taken by the petitioners that they were stagnated for last many years in the same grade, cannot be a ground to challenge the impugned orders. Therefore, the challenge made in these writ petitions is unsustainable in the eye of law, as otherwise, the same has been decided in the earlier round of litigations which were instituted by the similarly situated persons and even by some of the petitioners herein. 59. It is reiterated that by the common judgment dated 2.9.2015 in Civil Appeal Nos.6783-6785 of 2015, Hon'ble Supreme Court disposed of all the cases relating to requisition vide letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement of 25 posts of Assistant Engineers and equivalent grade in PHE Department. Consequent upon passing of such order, 25 direct recruitment posts of Assistant Engineers have already filled up and 21 Section Officers Grade-I of PHE Department were given promotion to the post of Assistant Engineers/equivalent. However, alleging that still on the plea that the Hon'ble Supreme Court while passing the common judgment dated 2.9.2015 have kept the question of law open, W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016 was filed by the petitioners therein for quashing the appointment of those Assistant Engineers on direct recruitment. Similar writ petitions have also been filed, however, two writ petitions being W.P.(C) Nos.217 of 2016 and 523 of 2014 have already been dismissed by this Court by the common order dated 8.11.2019. Similar writ petitions have also been filed, however, two writ petitions being W.P.(C) Nos.217 of 2016 and 523 of 2014 have already been dismissed by this Court by the common order dated 8.11.2019. As stated supra, in the order dated 8.11.2019, this Court held that the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not held requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement of the MPSC dated 7.5.2013 were illegal. 60. It is further reiterated that appointments against direct recruitment and promotion quotas were made as per the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, nothing including the question of law which was kept open by the Hon'ble Supreme Court while passing the common judgment dated 2.9.2015 remains survive. Pursuant to the requisition for direct appointment of 25 post of Assistant Engineers of PHE Department against the vacancies arose from 2007 to 2013- 2014, the MPSC recommended a list and notified on 18.7.2014 in which the names of the private respondents were found. As stated supra, the challenge to the requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the MPSC's advertisement dated 7.5.2013 were not interfered by this Court in W.P.(C) No.155 of 2013 and in appeal also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere. In fact, the appointment of some of the private respondents was in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the same cannot be re-opened at this stage. After careful analysis, this Court is of the view that the selection of the private respondents does not suffer from any legal infirmity. As such, the recommendation of the MPSC was rightly done and the consequential appointment order issued by the respondent authorities was also legal. This Court finds no infirmity in it. 61. At this juncture, it needs to be observed that this court is not delving into the other decisions cited on either side, as a categorical finding has been rendered hereinabove on facts after considering the relevant legal position applicable to it. 62. At the end, it is to be pointed out that the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022 have made a challenge to the impugned requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 after a lapse of almost 7 years. The reason for the delay has not been properly explained. 62. At the end, it is to be pointed out that the petitioners in W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022 have made a challenge to the impugned requisition letter dated 2.2.2013 and the advertisement dated 7.5.2013 after a lapse of almost 7 years. The reason for the delay has not been properly explained. A writ petition filed with an unexplained delay of about 7 years cannot be entertained and the same is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. In view of the above, apart from merits as discussed above, W.P.(C) No.641 of 2022 is also liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. 63. It is to be mentioned that in service matters, the question of seniority should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There is an inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone is sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and to reject the writ petition. 64. For the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the view that there is no merit in the writ petitions and no valid grounds have been made out to interfere in the impugned orders and the appointments respectively. 65. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. 66. In view of the dismissal of the writ petitions, MC (WP) No.263 of 2022 in W.P.(C) No.122 of 2016 seeking to delete the petitioners 6 and 7 from the array of parties and MC (WP) No.253 of 2022 in W.P.(C) No.443 of 2017 to implead the applicants, namely, the Secretary/ Commissioner, Department of P&AR and the Secretary, MPSC as respondents 28 and 29 are closed. 67. The interim order already granted in this case is vacated.