JUDGMENT : In this application, filed under Section 11 sub-Section 6 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as the Act for brevity), the applicant M/s Compack Foam Pvt. Ltd., a registered company, has prayed for appointment of Arbitrator for settlement of dispute between it and the National Insurance Company Ltd., i.e. the sole respondent in this case for resolving dispute between them in relation to the insurance claim alleged by it. 2. The facts of the case may be stated as follows:- The claimant, being a registered company, having its registered office at Raipur Industrial Area was carrying out business of manufacturing of foams etc. It was availing a credit facility by placing its raw materials, good in process and finished stocks as well as the plant and machinery from the State of Bank of India. It has also obtained an insurance policy covering insurance of plant and machinery and tools for Rs. 8.00 crores, stocks of raw, semi and finished goods of the trade for Rs. 2.00 crores and factory building including boundary wall for Rs. 75.00 lakhs. In all insured declared value/sum insured of Rs. 10.75 crores against the Policy No. 462200/11/11/3300000014 w.e.f. 19.04.2011 to 18.04.2012. The said insurance policy covers the risk of the complainant as well as the State Bank of India. A insurance premium of Rs. 1,72,968/- was paid by the company. That on 16.10.2011, there was fire in the factory premises which caused heavy damage to the stock as well as plant and machinery and the building. The applicant immediately reported the matter to the fire station and requested the fire officer for assessment of the loss. FIR was lodged on the same day. On the request of the applicant, the concerned officer inspected the premises and came to the conclusion that fire hazard occurred because of electric shot circuit and then assessed the loss of electric cable damage to the tune of Rs. 25,63,068.00/-. On 24.01.2012, the applicant filed claim before the respondent giving full details. As per the applicant, an amount of Rs. 5,02,57,301.00/- was the total loss to it. The loss assessor appointed by the respondent-insurance company assessed the loss of Rs. 1,33,68,112/- submitted its report on 26.04.2012. Such report was challenged by the applicant. However, the respondent-company further reduced the said compensation amount, assessed by its own assessor, by another Rs. As per the applicant, an amount of Rs. 5,02,57,301.00/- was the total loss to it. The loss assessor appointed by the respondent-insurance company assessed the loss of Rs. 1,33,68,112/- submitted its report on 26.04.2012. Such report was challenged by the applicant. However, the respondent-company further reduced the said compensation amount, assessed by its own assessor, by another Rs. 12 lakhs and made final assessment of Rs. 1,21,46,885/- against the total loss claimed by the applicant of Rs. 5 crores (approx.). In the meantime, due to non-settlement of the claim by the respondent-company, the applicant could not repay the loan amount and the State Bank of India declared its account as N.P.A. On 15.10.2014, the applicant prayed the bank for settlement of the loan and, ultimately, on 18.04.2015, the applicant and the bank entered into compromise settlement, and settled the loan amount to the tune of Rs. 9.00 crores with certain conditions. On 28.04.2015, the bank supplied copy of the statement of the loan account which revealed that on 30.11.2012, an entry of Rs. 1,21,46,885/- was shown as credited. On an enquiry, the bank informed the applicant that the Insurance Company had made such payment. Thereafter, the applicant filed an application before this Court and notice was sent to the Insurance Company. The said application was registered as Arbitration Application No. 7 of 2016 which was dismissed on 26.04.2019 giving liberty to the applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, if needed, after complying with the second limb of Clause 13 of the arbitration agreement which provides for appointment of an arbitrator by each of the parties. In compliance of the said order, and by invoking the second limb of the arbitration agreement the applicant, vide, letter dated 10.05.2019, communicated the respondent that the applicant has already nominated and appointed Hon’ble Mr. Justice Krishan Kumar (Retd.) Judge of the High Court of Allahabad and called upon the respondent to nominate and appoint second impartial arbitrator and communicate the name of the same. On receipt of such letter, the respondent asked the applicant to submit certified copy of the letter dated 01.02.2016 and the order dated 26.04.2019, which was duly complied by the applicant. In spite of receiving such letter, the respondent failed to appoint an arbitrator, and, accordingly, when no communication was received to the applicant, he prayed to appoint the sole arbitrator to settle the dispute between the parties. In spite of receiving such letter, the respondent failed to appoint an arbitrator, and, accordingly, when no communication was received to the applicant, he prayed to appoint the sole arbitrator to settle the dispute between the parties. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the Insurance Company, inter alia, admitting the insurance coverage but denying some of the averments made in the application. However, the Insurance Company admitted that the Surveyor M/s S.K. Agrawal & Company has assessed the loss in its detailed survey report to Rs.1,33,68,112/- as per the norms, and, further stated that electrical installation under the policy is not covered, and, therefore, reduction of Rs. 12 lakhs from the total amount. It took specific plea that the approval of the claim amount i.e. Rs. 1,21,46,885/- on 20.11.2012 was duly informed to the applicant and the financer i.e. State Bank of India, Ranipur Branch, Haridwar. The respondent also sends Form No. B-17 (disbursement voucher) for necessary discharge to the applicant. On receiving Form B-17 (disbursement voucher), duly signed by Sri Vinod Kandoi, authorised signatory for the applicant, the approved amount was paid and credited in the bank account at S.B.I. Ranipur Branch, Haridwar. It has also taken specific plea that the applicant has accepted the disbursement voucher, duly signed by Sri Vinod Kandoi, authorised signatory for the applicant, in full and final settlement of the claim without any protest. Hence, it was claimed that the applicant is not entitled to the relief claimed. It is submitted that application under Section 11 (6) of the Act, being filed at late stage, is liable to be rejected. 4. A rejoinder affidavit has been filed. It is stated, inter alia, that Annexure-CA1 i.e. discharge voucher relied upon by the Insurance Company does not bear signature upon the revenue stamp which clearly shows that the impugned discharge voucher was a blank signed document at the time of the submission of the claim form by the applicant. It is further submitted that the name and designation of the signing person, is not mentioned in Annexure CA2. The claimant further claimed that no person in the name of Mr. Tyagi worked in applicant’s company at any point of time. Neither any seal/stamp of the company nor any board resolution of applicant’s company showing authorization of any such person to sign on behalf of applicant’s company has been annexed by the respondent. 5. The claimant further claimed that no person in the name of Mr. Tyagi worked in applicant’s company at any point of time. Neither any seal/stamp of the company nor any board resolution of applicant’s company showing authorization of any such person to sign on behalf of applicant’s company has been annexed by the respondent. 5. In course of hearing, Mr. Dharmendra Barthwal, the learned counsel appearing for the applicant would submit that the Insurance Company, being a nationalised public sector undertaking, having huge resources at its disposal was placed at a higher pedestal then the claimant which was suffering losses and was running under negative financial implications of the fire accident, and, therefore, it was not having proper bargaining capacity with the Insurance Company. A document which is printed prior to its execution has to be given strict construction and if there is natural doubt raised about it then the Court should not accept it. The learned counsel for the applicant would further argue that the question of delay is not to be considered in a case of appointment of arbitrator and this issue should be relegated to the arbitrator to decide the same after taking into consideration all evidences, documents and other material laid before it. He further would argue that as per the various cases decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, two important aspect that has to be seen by the Court while taking a decision under section 11 (6) of the Act, are (i) whether there was an agreement to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator and, (ii) whether there is a dispute regarding the same. He would argue that in this case both the conditions are fulfilled and Arbitrator should be appointed, as the sole respondent has failed to comply its part of obligation of the arbitral agreement. 6. Mr. Tarun Pandey, the learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Prabhat Pande, the learned counsel for the Insurance Company would argue that the Insurance Company has deputed his Surveyor and as per his assessment has paid the amount by directly crediting it into the loan account of the applicant maintained by the State Bank of India, Ranipur Branch and they had taken a discharge voucher, i.e., a voucher of full and final settlement from the authorized signatory on behalf of the insured-claimant. He would further argue that the incident took place in the year 2011 and this application has been made on 28.08.2019, and, therefore, the claim is bad for delay and laches. 7. On the basis of the pleadings raised and submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, this Court consider it appropriate to answer the following questions:- (i) Whether there is an agreement between the parties to refer the dispute to the Arbitrator? (ii) Whether there is a dispute between the parties? (iii) Whether the discharge voucher without a date, reflected at CA2, will lead to a conclusion that there is full and final settlement of the dispute in question? (iv) Whether there is delay in filing an application under Section 11 (6) of the Act and if such issue has to be decided by the Arbitrator or by this Court? 8. Giving answer to the first question it is seen that both the parties admitted that insurance company has covered risk of the applicant and as per the insurance policy, clause 13 provides for an arbitration clause. It reads as follows:- “IF ANY DISPUTE OR DIFFERENCE SHALL ARISE AS TO QUANTUM TO BE PAID AND UNDER THIS POLICY SUCH DIFFERENCE BE REFERRED TO THE DECISOIN OF A SOLE ARBITRATOR TO BE APPOINTED IN WRITING BY THE PARTIES TO OR IF THEY CANNOT AGREE UPON A SINGBLE ARBITRATOR WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ANY PARTY INVOKING ARBITRATION, THE SAME SHALL BE REFERRED TO A PANEL OF THREE ARBITRATORS, COMPRISING OF TWO ARBITRATORS, ONE TO BE APPOINTED BY EACH OF THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE/DIFFERENCE AND THE THIRD ARBITRATOR TO BE APPOINTED BY SUCH TWO ARBITRATOR AND ARBITRATION SHALL BE CONDUCTED UNDER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996.” Thus, it is clear that if there is any dispute or difference arise as to the quantum paid under the policy such difference shall be referred to a sole arbitrator, and, if they do not in agreement of sole arbitrator then a Penal Arbitrator shall be appointed. Thus, it is clear from the aforesaid clause that whenever the insurance company admitted the claim, in other words he did not hold it to be “zero claim” or “no claim” but assessed a loss at a figure which is not acceptable to the claimant and a dispute is raised then such a dispute has to be referred to arbitration. Accordingly, question no. (i) is answered in favour of the applicant. 9. As far as question no. (ii) is concerned, it is apparent from the record that there is a dispute regarding the exact quantum of compensation to be paid by the insurance company to the applicant. As far as questions regarding valid insurance coverage and damage due to fire are no more in dispute. The Insurance Company having admitted the same and assessing the loss of Rs. 1.2 crores (approx.) which was not accepted by the applicant. Thus, question no. (ii) is decided that dispute exists between the parties regarding quantum of compensation to be paid by the insurance company. The question is accordingly decided in favour of the applicant. 10. Coming to question no. (iii) it is seen that the insurance company heavily relies upon a document which according to it was executed on full and final settlement of the claim, which is Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit. For the purpose of better appreciation we quote the same in verbatim excepting the letter head portion of the said letter. “B-17 VOUCHER Received the sum of Rs.1,21,46,885/- (Rupees in word) One Crore Twenty One Lakh Forty Six Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Five towards FULL AND FINAL Settlement of our CLAIM No. 462200/11/11/3390000002 and we do not have any objection towards this settlement and this be treated as our full and final discharge for the above claim. Claimant Signature Bank A/c No.- 30967328462 Name of Bank – STATE BANK OF INDIA RANIPUR BRANCH HARIDWAR (UK) Claimant Name :VinodKandoi Dated Place : BHAGWANPUR RAIPUR INDUSTRIAL AREA” It is apparent from the document that an amount paid has been written in hand, however, the expression “towards FULL AND FINAL Settlement of our CLAIM” and the expression “and we do not have any objection towards this settlement and this be treated as our full and final discharge for the above claim” are printed. It is also borne out from the record that the said document does not bear any date either on any signature appearing thereon or on any revenue stamp affixed to it. 11. In the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited & another vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly & another, (1986) 3 SCC 156 , while deciding the matter relating to the service of two employees and the letters of appointment which were in a stereotype, the corporation without any previous notice terminated their services, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration the various judgments of different Courts even Courts outside India and has held as follows:- “89. Should then our courts not advance with the times? Should they still continue to cling to outmoded concepts and outworn ideologies? Should we not adjust our thinking caps to match the fashion of the day? Should all jurisprudential development pass us by, leaving us floundering in the sloughs of nineteenth-century theories? Should the strong be permitted to push the weak to the wall? Should they be allowed to ride roughshod over the weak? Should the courts sit back and watch supinely while the strong trample under foot the rights of the weak? We have a Constitution for our country. Our judges are bound by their oath to "uphold the Constitution and the laws". The Constitution was enacted to secure to all the citizens of this country social and economic justice. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees to all persons equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws. The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. It is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all bargains of this type. No court can visualize the different situations which can arise in the affairs of men. One can only attempt to give some illustrations. For instance, the above principle will apply where the inequality of bargaining power is the result of the great disparity in the economic strength of the contracting parties. It will apply where the inequality is the result of circumstances, whether of the creation of the parties or not. It will apply to situations in which the weaker party is in a position in which he can obtain goods or services or means of livelihood only upon the terms imposed by the stronger party or go without them. It will also apply where a man has no choice, or rather no meaningful choice, but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules may be. This principle, however, will not apply where the bargaining power of the contracting parties is equal or almost equal. This principle may not apply where both parties are businessmen and the contract is a commercial transaction. In today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infra-structural organizations and with the State through its instrumentalities and agencies entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce, there can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargains between parties possessing wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. These cases can neither be enumerated nor fully illustrated. The court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. Thus after taking into consideration, the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed reinstatement of the first respondent holding that the contract was unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable in view of the gigantic stature of the appellant in that case. The aforesaid ratio was again reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC of India & another vs. Consumer Education & Research Centre & others, (1995) 5 SCC 482 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering whether action of the LIC to turn down the application of the individual/ respondent for appropriate payment of insurance compensation under Table 58 of the contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court took into consideration various judgments of the different Courts including Courts outside India and has held as follows : “32. An unfair and untenable or irrational clause in a contract is also unjust amenable to judicial review. In common law a party was relieved from such contract. In Gillespie Brothers & Co. Ltd. v. Roy Bowles Transport Ltd, Lord Denning for the first time construing the indemnity clause in a contract stated that the court to permit party to enforce his unreasonable clause, even when it is so unreasonable, or applied so unreasonably, would be unconscionable, and stated : "When it gets to this point, I would say, as I said many years ago. There is the vigilance of the common law which while allowing freedom of contract, watches to see that it is not abused. It will not allow a party to exempt himself from his liability at common law when it would be quite unconscionable for him to do so". 37. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, 1986 (2) SCR 278 at 369-70, Madan, J. speaking for a bench of two judges considered the development of law, held that an instrumentality of the State cannot impose unconstitutional conditions in statutory rules vis-a-vis its employee to terminate the service of a permanent employee in terms of the rules and held thus: (SCC pp. 215-16, para 89) (already quoted at para 11) It was held that rule giving power to terminate the services of the permanent employee with one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof was unconstitutional. The above ratio was upheld, per majority, in Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor congress, where one of us K. Ramaswamy, J. considered similar contract of service whether consistent with the Constitution. Approving the statement of law in, Chitty on Contract, 25th Edin., Vol.I and in Anson's Law of Contract, pp.6-7, held that the freedom of contract must be founded on equality of bargaining power between contracting parties. Though ad idem is assumed, the standard form contract is the rule. The consent or consensus ad idem of a weaker party be totally absent. He must assent to it in terms of the dotted line contract or to forgo the goods or services. The freedom of equal bargaining power is largely an illusion. Though ad idem is assumed, the standard form contract is the rule. The consent or consensus ad idem of a weaker party be totally absent. He must assent to it in terms of the dotted line contract or to forgo the goods or services. The freedom of equal bargaining power is largely an illusion. It was also further held that (in para 22 at p.308) that in today's complex world of giant corporations with their vast infrastructural organisations and with the State, through its instrumentalities and agencies has been entering into almost every branch of industry and commerce and field of service. There can be myriad situations which result in unfair and unreasonable bargain between parties which possess wholly disproportionate and unequal bargaining power. The court must judge each case on its own facts and circumstances. While approving the ratio in Brojonath's case per majority, it was held that Regulation 9 was unconstitutional.” 12. Again in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. vs. Govindan Raghavan, (2019) 5 SCC 725 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding an unfair one sided contract in favour of a builder and relied upon the earlier decided case of Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. (supra) came to a conclusion that a term of contract will not be final and binding if it is shown that the flat purchasers had no option but to sign on the dotted line, on a contract framed by the builder. The contractual terms of the agreement dated 08.05.2012 are ex facie one sided, unfair and unreasonable. The incorporation of such one-sided clause in an agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice as per Section 2(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 13. In a very recent judgment of NBCC (India) Limited vs. Shri Ram Trivedi, (2021) 5 SCC 273 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court had a occasion to examine the concept of unfair trade practice and decided under what conditions term of an agreement between buyer and seller is one sided and it constitutes unfair trade practices. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the judgment referred by it in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) has come to the following conclusion : “9. NCDRC held that the condition in the allotment of payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the judgment referred by it in the case of Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) has come to the following conclusion : “9. NCDRC held that the condition in the allotment of payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 per sq ft is one-sided and constitutes an unfair trade practice. In Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited v. Govindan Raghavan, a two-Judge Bench of this Court considered a similar agreement where there was a delay on the part of the Builder. This Court upheld the NCDRC’s award of compensation at the rate of 10% p.a., instead of the contractually stipulated rate by holding the following: (Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. case SCC p. 734, para 6 “6.8. A term of a contract will not be final and binding if it is shown that the flat purchasers had no option but to sign on the dotted line, on a contract framed by the builder. The contractual terms of the agreement dated 8-5-2012 are ex facie one-sided, unfair and unreasonable. The incorporation of such one-sided clauses in an agreement constitutes an unfair trade practice as per Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it adopts unfair methods or practices for the purpose of selling the flats by the builder.” 10. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Arifur Rahman Khan v. DLF Southern Homes (P) Ltd. followed the decision in Pioneer Urban in interpreting an Apartment Buyers’ Agreement that was, inter alia, breached by the Developer on the ground of a gross delay. This Court noted: (Arifur Rahman Khan case, SCC pp. 533-34, paras 25 & 28) “2. The only issue which then falls for determination is whether the flat buyers in these circumstances are constrained by the stipulation contained in clause 14 of ABA providing compensation for delay @ Rs. 5 per square feet per month. In assessing the legal position, it is necessary to record that the ABA is clearly one-sided. The only issue which then falls for determination is whether the flat buyers in these circumstances are constrained by the stipulation contained in clause 14 of ABA providing compensation for delay @ Rs. 5 per square feet per month. In assessing the legal position, it is necessary to record that the ABA is clearly one-sided. Where a flat purchaser pays the instalments that are due in terms of the agreement with a delay, clause 39(a) stipulates that the developer would “at its sole option and discretion” waive a breach by the allottee of failing to make payments in accordance with the schedule, subject to the condition that the allottee would be charged interest @ 15% per month for the first ninety days and thereafter at an additional penal interest of 3 per cent per annum. In other words, a delay on the part of the flat buyer attracts interest @ 18% p.a. beyond ninety days. On the other hand, where a developer delays in handing over possession the flat buyer is restricted to receiving interest at Rs. 5 per square foot per month under clause 14 (which in the submission of Mr Prashant Bhushan works out to 1-1.5% interest p.a.). Would the condition which has been prescribed in clause 14 continue to bind the flat purchaser indefinitely irrespective of the length of the delay? The agreement stipulates thirty-six months as the date for the handing over of possession. Evidently, the terms of the agreement have been drafted by the developer. They do not maintain a level platform as between the developer and purchaser. The stringency of the terms which bind the purchaser are not mirrored by the obligations for meeting times lines by the developer. The agreement does not reflect an even bargain. 28. A failure of the developer to comply with the contractual obligation to provide the flat to a flat purchaser within a contractually stipulated period amounts to a deficiency. There is a fault, shortcoming or inadequacy in the nature and manner of performance which has been undertaken to be performed in pursuance of the contract in relation to the service. The expression “service? in Section 2 (1) (o) means a service of any description which is made available to potential users including the provision of facilities in connection with (among other things) housing construction. The expression “service? in Section 2 (1) (o) means a service of any description which is made available to potential users including the provision of facilities in connection with (among other things) housing construction. Under Section 14(1)(e), the jurisdiction of the consumer forum extends to directing the opposite party inter alia to remove the deficiency in the service in question. Intrinsic to the jurisdiction which has been conferred to direct the removal of a deficiency in service is the provision of compensation as a measure of restitution to a flat buyer for the delay which has been occasioned by the developer beyond the period within which possession was to be handed over to the purchaser. Flat purchasers suffer agony and harassment, as a result of the default of the developer. Flat purchasers make legitimate assessments in regard to the future course of their lives based on the flat which has been purchased being available for use and occupation. These legitimate expectations are belied when the developer as in the present case is guilty of a delay of years in the fulfilment of a contractual obligation. To uphold the contention of the developer that the flat buyer is constrained by the terms of the agreed rate irrespective of the nature or extent of delay would result in a miscarriage of justice. Undoubtedly, as this court held in Dhanda, courts ordinarily would hold parties down to a contractual bargain. Equally the court cannot be oblivious to the one-sided nature of ABAs which are drafted by and to protect the interest of the developer. Parliament consciously designed remedies in the CP Act 1986 to protect consumers. Where, as in the present case, there has been a gross delay in the handing over of possession beyond the contractually stipulated debt, we are clearly of the view that the jurisdiction of the consumer forum to award just and reasonable compensation as an incident of its power to direct the removal of a deficiency in service is not constrained by the terms of a rate which is prescribed in an unfair bargain.” 11. In adverting to the facts of this case, the NCDRC was justified in taking the view that the condition in the allotment of payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 per sq ft is one-sided and constitutes an unfair trade practice. The letter of allotment is in a standard form. In adverting to the facts of this case, the NCDRC was justified in taking the view that the condition in the allotment of payment of compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 per sq ft is one-sided and constitutes an unfair trade practice. The letter of allotment is in a standard form. The purchaser has no option but to sign on the dotted line. On the other hand, under Clause 16, as noted by the NCDRC, if the buyer were to delay in the payment of any instalment, a liability to pay simple interest @ 12% p.a. is attracted. Clause 20, in other words, is not even-handed. While, on the one hand, it contemplates only compensation at the rate of Rs. 2 per sq ft in the event that there is a delay on the part of the appellant, the buyer is required to pay a substantially higher rate of interest (12%) for any delayed payment on his part.” 14. Thus, it is apparent that the Courts in India has always held that whenever any agreement or a clause in agreement is unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable then a ruling has to be made in favour of the party who was having a lesser bargain capacity then a party who relies upon on such weaker document. It is, we may reiterate here, that the document which is relied upon by the insurance company to show full and final settlement of the claim amount is a printed form of document except of the specific particulars of the policy and amount of compensation. That the words “Full and Final Settlement” are already printed there and is nor the case of the insurance company that the claimant had any option to avoid such condition or that he had option of not accepting this condition and also accepts the lower amount of compensation as calculated by the insurance company “under protest”. Moreover, it is also apparent from the record that the said document having no date of execution. The insurance company has also not produced any document to show that the person who has signed the document was legally authorized by the Board of Director to sign such a discharge voucher. 15. Moreover, it is also apparent from the record that the said document having no date of execution. The insurance company has also not produced any document to show that the person who has signed the document was legally authorized by the Board of Director to sign such a discharge voucher. 15. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that at this stage of appointment of arbitrator, the insurance company’s pleas should not be accepted rather the matter should be referred to an arbitrator, and for the further stipulation the arbitrator shall after taking evidence shall decide this issue of full and final settlement after allowing the parties to lead evidences in the Court. The observation that we have made in this judgment are only for the purpose of deciding whether to refer the matter to the arbitrator and it is not final as no oral evidence has been led before us, excepting filing of documents, by any of the parties. Hence, this Court finds it expedient to keep this issue open but at the same time comes to the conclusion, prima facie, it appears that this document being a printed form and against the tenor of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, discussed above, establishes that there is no “full and final settlement” of the ‘own damage claim’ made by the applicant. 16. Coming to the question no. (iv) it is admitted that the fire accident took place on 16.10.2011, and this application has been filed 20.08.2019. However, in the meantime, the applicant has also written several letters to the insurance company as well as filed application before this Court which was disposed of earlier vide order dated 26.04.2019. Thus, it cannot be said that, prima facie, petitioner is guilty of laches and there is absolute delay for which the application under Section 11(6) of the Act should be rejected. On the contrary, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that whenever there is a question of delay regarding the claim application or appointment of Arbitrator under Section 11 (6) of the Act, the matter should be relegated to the Arbitrator for deciding the same. 17. On the contrary, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that whenever there is a question of delay regarding the claim application or appointment of Arbitrator under Section 11 (6) of the Act, the matter should be relegated to the Arbitrator for deciding the same. 17. In the case of Duro Felguera, A.S. vs. Gangavaram Port Limited, (2017) 9 SCC 729 the Supreme Court has held that the scope of the power under Section 11 (6) of the Act was considerably wide in view of the decisions in SBP and Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Boghara Polyfab (P) Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 267 . Such position is continued till the amendment brought by in the year 2015. After the amendment, all that the courts need to see is whether an arbitration agreement exists-nothing more, nothing less. The legislative policy, and purpose is essentially to minimize the Court’s intervention at the stage of appointment of the arbitrator and this intention as incorporated in Section 11(6-A) ought to be respected. 18. The same view is taken by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Wexford Financial Inc. Panama vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, (2016) 8 SCC 267 wherein for an alleged time barred claim an application was moved under section 11 (6) of the Act but the Supreme Court held that the question whether the claim made by the petitioner is a time barred, cannot be examined in a proceeding under Section 11 (6) of the Act and that has to be raised before an arbitrator. Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the application and appointed Former Judge of Delhi High Court as sole arbitrator. 19. In that view of the matter, this Court having answered all the points raised as mentioned above, in the affirmative, has come to the conclusion that at present there is an arbitral agreement between the parties, and there is a dispute regarding the amount of compensation. 20. In that view of the matter the application is allowed. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Singh (Retd.), Judge, High Court of Uttarakhand is appointed as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties and settle it. 21. Let the Arbitrator be intimated accordingly. 20. In that view of the matter the application is allowed. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Alok Singh (Retd.), Judge, High Court of Uttarakhand is appointed as the sole arbitrator to arbitrate the dispute between the parties and settle it. 21. Let the Arbitrator be intimated accordingly. The learned Arbitrator shall, in terms of Section 11(8) of the Act, furnish disclosure in writing to this Court within 15 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. He shall, thereafter, fix his remuneration, and charges towards other expenses, in consultation with the parties to the dispute. He shall endeavour to complete the arbitral proceedings, and to pass an award with utmost expedition, preferably within six months from the date on which he enters upon a Reference.