JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Sameer Sharma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ajay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondent. Submissions : 2. Learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection of maintainability of the present appeal on the ground that the order impugned is not an order, punishing the appellant for contempt, therefore, the appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is not maintainable in view of law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399 (Paragraph 11). He also relied upon the two Division Bench judgement of this Court in S.M.A. Abdi and another vs. Private Secretary Brotherhood and another, 2009 (4) UPLBEC 3106 and Tarun Kumar Agrawal vs. The Executive Engineer U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Meerut 2013 (101 ALR 46. He also supports the impugned order on merit. 3. Sri S.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appeal is maintainable and he relied upon a Division Bench judgement of this Court in Subhawati Devi vs. R.K. Singh and others (Special Appeal No. 553 of 2003 decided on 19.03.2004) and in view of law laid down in Modi Telefibres Ltd. and Ors. vs. Sujit Kumar Choudhary and Ors. (2005) 7 SCC 40 (Paragraph 4 and 5). He submits that the impugned order records of finding. He submits that once an order in compliance to the order of the writ court has been passed it was not open for the competent court to direct the appellant to revisit the order. Hence, on merit the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 4. Brief facts of the present case are that in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.30057 of 2016 (Santosh Kumar Srivastava vs. State of U.P. and others) was filed by the respondent herein which was allowed by the writ court by judgement dated 04.12.2017, directing as under :- “In view of the above, we direct the respondents to consider the petitioner for grant of promotion on the post of Assistant Regional Manager (Technical) w.e.f. 09.06.2016 the date on which the persons junior to him have been promoted on the said post ignoring the entry dated 30.03.2012 in accordance with law within a period of three months and to accord all monitory benefits admissible as such to the petitioner.” 5. Thereafter, Managing Director of the U.P. Transport Corporation passed an order dated 06.11.2018 concluding as under :- ^^ek0 mPp U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; fnukad 04-12-2017 ds vuqikyu esa buds Ádj.k ij p;u lfefr dh gksus okyh vkxkeh cSBd esa fopkj fd;k tkuk Fkk] fdUrq Hkz"Vkpkj fujks/kd ny }kjk fnukad 01-12-2017 dks iqfyl vfHkj{kk esa Hkz"Vkpkj ds vkjksi esa fu#) fd;s tkus laca/kh xEHkhj vkjksiksa ds laca/k esa vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh orZeku esa yfEcr gSA foxr esa ÁksUufr gsrq foHkkxh; p;u lfefr dh cSBd fnukad 13-4-2018 esa budk Ádj.k ÁksUufr ij fopkj gsrq ÁLrqr fd;k x;k Fkk ftlesa buds fo#) fnukad 04-08-2014 ds iwoZ dh vuq'kklfud dk;Zokfg;ksa ds Ádj.kksa esa fn;s x;s n.M dks p;u lfefr }kjk fopkj esa ugha fy;k x;kA fdUrq buds fo#) vuq'kklfud dk;Zokgh xfr'khy gksus ds n`f"Vxr p;u lfefr }kjk lE;d~ fopkjksijkUr budh ÁksUufr dh laLrqfr cUn fyQkQs esa j[ks tkus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;kA vkxkeh foHkkxh; p;u lfefr dh cSBd esa buds }kjk ikfjr Áfrdwy Áfo"V fnukad 30-03-2012 dks Washed-off ekudj vU; fooj.kksa lfgr iqu% ÁksUufr ds lac/k esa fopkj gsrq j[kk tk;sxk] ftl ij p;u lfefr }kjk fu;ekuqlkj fu.kZ; fy;k tk;sxkA rn~uqlkj ek0 mPp U;k;ky;] bykgkckn ds fu.kZ; fnukad 04-12-2017 ds vuqikyu esa ;kph Jh larks"k dqekj JhokLro] lhfu;j QksjeSu xzsM&1 }kjk ÁLrqr iR;kosnu fnukad 07-02-2018 ,oa 08-10-2018 dk vfUre #i ls fuLrkj.k fd;k tkrk gSA 6. Thereafter, the respondent herein filed the aforesaid Contempt Application (Civil) No.5916 of 2018 in which the impugned order dated 14.09.2022 has been passed, as under : “On 07.09.2022, time was granted to the counsel representing the opposite party to go through the matter. Today, when the case was taken up, further time was sought by the counsel for the opposite party. This Court finds that the officers are totally in contempt of the order passed by the writ Court dated 04.12.2017 as the Court had required to consider grant of promotion to the applicant with effect from 09.06.2016, the date on which the persons junior to him were promoted. According to counsel appearing for the opposite party, certain irregularities were committed by the applicant in the year 2017 and in view of Government Order, the benefit could not be extended though the D.P.C. had recommended for promotion of the applicant. This Court finds that the decision is in totally in the teeth of the order passed by the writ Court on 04.12.2017. This Court finds that the decision is in totally in the teeth of the order passed by the writ Court on 04.12.2017. As a last opportunity, three weeks' further time is granted to the opposite party to revisit its order and take decision complying the order dated 04.12.2017. List this matter on 12th October, 2022. In case no decision is taken by the Board till that date, the Court will be compelled to proceed against the officers concerned.” 7. Aggrieved with the aforesaid quoted order dated 14.09.2022, the opposite party / appellant herein has filed the present appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1971”) Discussion and Finding :- 8. The submission made by learned counsel for the parties in the afore-noted appeal raises the following questions : (a) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the present appeal under Section 19 of the 1971 Act is maintainable? (b) Whether under the facts and circumstances, the impugned order is valid? Question (a) 9. Section 19(1) of the Act, 1971 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt— (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court; Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. 10. In Purshotam Dass Goel vs. Justice B.S. Dhillon, 1978 (2) SCC 370 (Para 3), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :- “The contempt proceeding is initiated under Section 17 by issuance of a notice.” Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceedings by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. . .. . . . . . .” 11. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. . .. . . . . . .” 11. In State of Maharashtra vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy, (1996) 4 SCC 411 (Para 4), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :- “As sub-section (1) of Section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words 'any order' has to be read with the expression 'decision' used in said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 'Any order' is not independent of the expression 'decision'. They have been put in an alternative form saying 'order' or 'decision'. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression 'any order' is read independently of the 'decision' then an appeal shall lie under sub-section (1) of Section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result.” 12. In the case of Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda (2006) 5 SCC 399 (Para 11), the legal position has been summarized as under :- (i) An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. (ii) Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. (iii). In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (iv). (iii). In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (iv). Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. (v). If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). 13. In the case of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) vs. S.C. Sekar and others, (2009) 2 SCC 784 (Para 39 to 40), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under :- “39. It may a different matter, if the court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show cause. Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the court by showing cause that the contemnors / respondents had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. 40. Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the court by showing cause that the contemnors / respondents had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. 40. Although we need not go into the larger question of maintainability of the appeal in view of the fact that the matter has been referred to the Three Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal and others (SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of 2005), but prima facie, in view of the decision of this Court in Purshottam Das (supra) there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its jurisdiction.” 14. In ECL Finance Limited vs. Harikishan Shankarji Gudipati and others, (2018) 13 SCC 142 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the afore-noted principles of law on the question of maintainability of appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971, as laid down in its earlier decisions in Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholdrs Welfare Association (2) (supra) and Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. (supra). 15. Thus, the legal position on the point of maintainability of an appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971, as per law settled by Hon'ble Supreme Court; may be summarized as under :- (i) An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt (ii) Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. (iii). In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. (iii). In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties. (iv). Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under Section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions. The order or decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. (v). If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). (vi) If the court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other, then, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show cause. (vii) There cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor, an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its jurisdiction. (vii) There cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor, an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a court which is beyond its jurisdiction. (viii) The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable." 16. Having summarized the settled legal position on the question of maintainability of appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971, we now proceed to examine the impugned order dated 14.09.2022. 17. We have perused the impugned order and we find that the court below has recorded a finding in the second paragraph of the order that the Officer is totally in contempt of the order passed by the writ court dated 04.12.2017. In the fourth paragraph of the impugned order, the contempt court has again recorded a finding that without commenting upon the decision dated 06.11.2018 whereby the representation of the respondent was disposed of by the Managing Director; the Contempt court observed such decision to be totally in the teach of the order passed by the writ court on 04.12.2017. Thereafter, the contempt court has issued a direction in fifth paragraph of the impugned order that last opportunity is granted to the opposite party to revisit its order and take decision. Thereafter, in the last paragraph, the contempt court observed that in case, no decision is taken by the Board till that date, the Court will be compelled to proceed against the officers concerned. 18. The findings recorded, direction issued and the observation made in the order dated 14.09.2022 as noted above, leaves no manner of doubt that the contempt court has held the officers to be totally in contempt. Therefore, the appeal would be maintainable in view of law summarized in para 15 (i) and (iii) above. 19. That apart, the Managing Director had taken a decision dated 06.11.2018 which could have been challenged by the respondent / contempt applicant before appropriate forum. Therefore, the appeal would be maintainable in view of law summarized in para 15 (i) and (iii) above. 19. That apart, the Managing Director had taken a decision dated 06.11.2018 which could have been challenged by the respondent / contempt applicant before appropriate forum. We have specifically asked learned counsel for the respondent to apprise us as to whether the order dated 06.11.2018 passed by Managing Director has been challenged by the respondent? and he replied that it has not been challenged as yet and the respondent proposes to challenge it by filing a writ petition or before appropriate forum. 20. Under these circumstances, the contempt court traveled beyond its power to issue directions to the authorities concerned to revisit its order and to take a decision. Hence, the appeal is maintainable in view of the settled legal position summarized above. 21. In view of discussion made above, we reject the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent and we hold that present appeal under Section 19 of the Act, 1971, is maintainable. 22. At this stage, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent states that the respondent proposes to challenge the order dated 06.11.2018 by filing a writ petition and therefore, liberty may be granted to him to file a writ petition. 23. In our view, if the respondent is aggrieved with the order dated 06.11.2018 passed by the Managing Director, it is well within his rights to challenge that order by filing writ petition or to challenge it before appropriate forum. 24. So for as the impugned order is concerned, it would be suffice to observe that in the impugned interlocutory order, the findings have been recorded that the Officers are totally in contempt. Therefore, the impugned order is unsustainable. 25. That apart, the impugned order contains a directions for revisit and pass a fresh order, which in our humble view could not have been issued. Therefore, the impugned order dated 14.09.2022 cannot be sustained. 26. For all the reasons aforestated, the impugned order dated 14.09.2022 is set aside. 27. The contempt court may proceed in accordance with law. The contempt Application (Civil) No. 5916 of 2018 shall be listed before the contempt court in second week of January, 2023. 28. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.