JUDGEMENT : 1. The above Interim Application is filed to condone the delay and to set aside the order dated 6th January 2017, under which the above Suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. The above Application is lodged on 13th September 2021. There is a delay of approximately 4 years and 7 months [approximately 1,674 days]. The reason I have mentioned this over here, is because in the Interim Application, the period of delay is not mentioned anywhere. 2. It appears that when the above Suit was called out on 6th January 2017, none appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff. In these circumstances, this Court by its order dated 6th January 2017 dismissed the Suit for want of prosecution. To set aside this order, the present Interim Application is lodged on 13th September 2021. 3. The explanation for non-appearance on 6th January 2017 as well as for the delay in filing the present Application, is set out in paragraphs 3, 4 & 5 thereof. In the Interim Application it is stated that in the year 2010, amendments to the Plaint were allowed and thereafter the matter was adjourned for framing issues. However, after January 2011, the Suit was not appearing on board for framing issues for a long period of time and it is for this reason that the advocate for the Plaintiff did not keep track of the matter. In these circumstances, when the matter came up on 6th January 2017, the advocate for the Applicant was absent and the Suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. It is thereafter stated that after the amendments were allowed [in 2010], the Applicant was in regular touch with his advocate but since the matter was not appearing on board for a long period of time, the Applicant was under a bona fide impression that as and when the matter is listed, issues would be framed, and his advocate would inform him accordingly. It is thereafter stated that the Applicant was unaware of the Suit being listed on 6th January 2017 and came to know about the dismissal order only on 31st August 2021, i.e. when he visited the office of his advocate and enquired about the Suit. It is thereafter stated that the Applicant was unaware of the Suit being listed on 6th January 2017 and came to know about the dismissal order only on 31st August 2021, i.e. when he visited the office of his advocate and enquired about the Suit. It is also stated that because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Applicant could not communicate with his advocate and was under a bona fide impression that the Court is not working and therefore there was no occasion for the Applicant to communicate with his advocate and enquire about the status of the above Suit. 4. Relying upon this explanation, Mr. Sawant, the learned advocate appearing on behalf the Applicant, submitted that sufficient cause has been shown for condoning the delay of approximately 1674 days. He submitted that though the delay is substantial, the same can be condoned in the interest of justice, so that the Applicant is not non-suited and is given an opportunity to prosecute the above Suit on merits. He submitted that if the delay is condoned, no prejudice would be caused to the Defendants whereas irreparable, harm, loss and injury would be caused to the Applicant, if he is not permitted to prosecute the above Suit on merits. In support of his submissions, Mr. Sawant relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Yashwantrao Bhaskarrao Deshmukh v/s. Raghunath Kisan Saindane, [2021 SCC OnLine SC 914]. 5. On other hand, Mr. Amrut Joshi, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of Defendant Nos.7 to 9, as well as Mr. Dhawal Patil appearing on behalf of Defendant No.1(d), vehemently opposed the Application for condonation of delay. Both counsels submitted that there is absolutely no explanation for the enormous delay of 1674 days and the only explanation that is sought to be given is that the advocate of the Applicant was not diligent and did not appear when the matter was listed on 6th January 2017. This apart, both learned counsels submitted that from 6th January 2017 to 31st August 2021, there is not a whisper in the Application as to what was done by the Applicant to find out the status of his Suit. In these circumstances, it was submitted that no cause whatsoever has been made out in the Application, let alone “sufficient cause”, to condone such a huge delay. In these circumstances, it was submitted that no cause whatsoever has been made out in the Application, let alone “sufficient cause”, to condone such a huge delay. In support of their submissions, they relied upon the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260]. 6. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at some length. It is not in dispute that there is a huge delay of approximately 1674 days in filing the above Application. The question before me is whether I ought to exercise my discretion in condoning such a huge delay. I can condone this delay only if sufficient cause is shown and not otherwise. It is now quite well settled that in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an application gives rise to a right in favour of the opposite party. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired, the opposite party has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation. In the present case it is the dismissal of the Suit. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown, discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and entertain the application. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion should be exercised to advance substantial justice. This discretion has to be exercised upon principles which are well understood. The words “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the Applicant. In other words, discretion has to be exercised on well-established judicial principles and not at the whims and fancy of a particular judge. In fact, if a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction which cannot be justified, then the Court cannot condone the delay even by imposing conditions. If the Courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions, then that would amount to violation of the statutory principles and showing utter disregard to the legislature. If the Courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions, then that would amount to violation of the statutory principles and showing utter disregard to the legislature. Discretion has to be exercised in favour of the party who is vigilant and not one who sleeps over his right. These principles have been succinctly set out in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Majji Sannemma (Supra), the relevant portion of which reads as under:- 16. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing the appeal are referred to and considered as under:— 17. In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra) (1962) 2 SCR 762 , it is observed and held as under:— In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.” 18. In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra) (1997) 7 SCC 556 , while refusing to condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court has to exercise discretion judiciously. 19. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra) (2008) 17 SCC 448 , it is observed as under:— “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” 20. In the case of Basawaraj (supra) (2013) 14 SCC 81 , it is observed and held by this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that the expression “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is further observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is observed that each application for condonation of delay has to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court. It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions then that would amount to violation of statutory principles and showing utter disregard to legislature. 21. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra) (2008) 17 SCC 448 , it is observed by this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights”. 22. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering the averments in the application for condonation of delay, we are of the opinion that as such no explanation much less a sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had been offered by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - appellants before the High Court for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal. The High Court is not at all justified in exercising its discretion to condone such a huge delay. The High Court has not exercised the discretion judiciously. The reasoning given by the High Court while condoning huge delay of 1011 days is not germane. Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original defendants. Impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts. (emphasis supplied) 7. Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein - original defendants. Impugned order passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as well as on facts. (emphasis supplied) 7. I shall now apply these principles to the facts of the present case, to see whether “sufficient cause” has been made out and whether I ought to exercise my discretion and condone the delay of 1674 days. 8. As mentioned earlier, the explanation sought to be given by the Applicant can be found in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the Interim Application. The only explanation that is sought to be given is that the Suit had not come up for a long period of time and therefore, when it was listed on 6th January 2017, the advocate for the Applicant missed the matter and consequently it was dismissed for want of prosecution. It is thereafter stated that the Applicant came to know of this dismissal only on 31st August 2021 when he visited the office of his advocate and enquired about the matter. There is absolutely no explanation as to what the Applicant did from 6th January 2017 to 31st August 2021. The only explanation that is sought to be given is that in March 2020, the entire country went into a lockdown because of the COVID-19 pandemic. This explanation and which is sought to be given in paragraph 5 of the Interim Application, is not bona fide. It is true that the country did undergo a lockdown from 22nd March 2020 for quite some time. Even if I were to assume that because of this lockdown, the Applicant was unable to contact his advocate and therefore there is some sort of an explanation for the delay from 22nd March 2020 to 31st August 2021, there is absolutely no explanation whatsoever for the delay from 6th January 2017 to 22nd March 2020 [i.e. approximately 1139 days]. In fact, in the Application, it is not even mentioned that between 6th January 2017 till 22nd March 2020 the Applicant made any efforts to contact his advocate to find out the status of his Suit. In fact, in the Application, it is not even mentioned that between 6th January 2017 till 22nd March 2020 the Applicant made any efforts to contact his advocate to find out the status of his Suit. Admittedly, during this time, the Courts were fully functioning and there was no impediment for the Applicant to reach out to his advocate to find out the status of his matter. I must mention that it is not as if that the Applicant is an uneducated man residing in some remote place who put all his faith in his lawyer to ensure that the Suit is properly and effectively prosecuted. Admittedly, he is an educated man residing at Borivali, Mumbai. He is not some villager who was unaware of his rights. This being the case, it is highly unfair on the part of the Applicant to simply blame his advocate for seeking condonation of delay. This is more so in the present case because the Applicant has not changed his advocate but even today continues with the same advocate. I therefore find that the blame is being shifted to the advocate to somehow justify the huge delay. This being the case, and there being absolutely no cause being shown for such a huge delay, I am afraid, I am unable to exercise my discretion in favour of the Applicant and condone the same. If I were to do so, even by imposing strict conditions, the same would be contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in several of its decisions, the latest being in the case of Majji Sannemma (Supra) and referred to by me earlier. 9. Before concluding it would only be fair to deal with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Yashwantrao Bhaskarrao Deshmukh (supra) relied upon by Mr. Sawant.I have gone through the aforesaid decision and I find that the fact situation in that case was totally different from the facts before me. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) dismissed the application for condonation of delay of 650 days in filing the Second Appeal. The explanation sought to be given by the Appellant in that case was that originally a First Appeal was filed before the High Court (by the Respondent/Plaintiff). In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court, the High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) dismissed the application for condonation of delay of 650 days in filing the Second Appeal. The explanation sought to be given by the Appellant in that case was that originally a First Appeal was filed before the High Court (by the Respondent/Plaintiff). However, due to the enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Court, the said Appeal stood transferred from the High Court to the District Court. Thereafter, a fresh notice was given to the Appellant (before the Supreme Court), which was served through paper publication. Since the Appellant did not appear, as according to the Appellant, the notice was not served on him as his address had changed, the Adhoc District Judge-I, Amalner, proceeded ex-parte and allowed the Regular Civil Appeal No. 31 of 2012 vide judgment and order dated 8th September 2015 and granted a decree for specific performance in favour of the Respondent/Plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Adhoc District Judge, the Appellant filed Second Appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay and it is in this Appeal that an application for condonation of delay was taken out. The explanation for the delay was the lack of knowledge of the decision in the Appeal as the Appellant before the Supreme Court was not served with a notice of the First Appeal. It is in this factual background that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court categorically recorded that the Appellant before it had produced documents, including voters list/Aadhar Card showing his change of address from Amalner to Nashik. On the other hand, the Respondent before the Supreme Court had produced the voters’ list of Amalner itself contending that the name of the Appellant is still existing in the said voters’ list. The Supreme Court opined that in such a situation, without any enquiry, and without arriving at a finding disbelieving the explanation of the Appellant, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:- 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the facts of the case, suit seeking specific performance was based on an agreement to sell dated 18.2.1998. The relevant portion of this decision reads thus:- 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the facts of the case, suit seeking specific performance was based on an agreement to sell dated 18.2.1998. As per the said agreement to sell, appellant had agreed to sell 5 bighas of land for a consideration at the rate of Rs. 51000/- per bigha. As per the entries on the agreement to sell, certain amount was paid. Later on, certain refund is also recorded and acknowledged thereon. The Trial Court, considering the same, refused to grant a decree of specific performance but directed for refund of Rs. 61,000/-with interest. The said decree was reversed by the lower Appellate Court, directing specific performance. In both the courts, the appellant remained ex-parte. 13. The appellant filed an appeal before the High Court, which has been dismissed as barred by limitation. The High Court, while dismissing the application seeking condonation of delay in filing second appeal observed that sufficient cause for delay has not been established. The litigant, who is contesting the matter, cannot be negligent and it would be unfair to deprive the respondent, litigating for the last 17 years, of the valuable right that has accrued to him. 14. In this case, the appellant has also produced the documents including voters list/aadhar card showing his change of address from Amalner to Nashik. On the other hand, the respondent has produced the voters' list of Amalner itself contending that the name of appellant is still existing. However, in such a situation without any enquiry and without arriving at a finding disbelieving the explanation of the appellant, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. (emphasis supplied) 10. I fail to understand how this decision can be of any assistance to Mr. Sawant. As mentioned earlier, the factual matrix before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Yashwantrao Bhaskarrao Deshmukh (supra), was totally different from the fact situation before me. In the facts of the present case, I find that there is absolutely no explanation given by the Applicant (other than blaming his advocate) for the delay from 6th January 2017 to 22nd March 2020. This being the case, I find that the reliance placed by Mr. Sawant on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. This being the case, I find that the reliance placed by Mr. Sawant on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Yashwantrao Bhaskarrao Deshmukh (supra) is wholly misconceived and is of no assistance to the Applicant. 11. In view of the forgoing discussion, I find that the above Interim Application is devoid of any merit. It is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 12. This order will be digitally signed by the Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by fax or email of a digitally signed copy of this order.