JUDGMENT : Prayer: Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of C.P.C, to allow the second appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 11.07.2019 passed in A.S.No. 11 of 2019 on the file of the I Additional Subordinate Court, Tiruchirappalli confirming the judgment and decree dated 17.12.2018 made in O.S.No.1240 of 2011 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif Court, Tiruchirappalli. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant. 2. The plaintiff had filed O.S.No.1240 of 2011 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif Court, Trichy for the relief of permanent injunction restraining the first defendant or any person claiming under him from in any way interfering or preventing the plaintiff's right of user of the suit road shown in 'B' schedule property vested with the second defendant as access to 'A' schedule property. The said suit was dismissed by the trial Court. The plaintiff had filed A.S.No.11 of 2019 before the I Additional Subordinate Court, Trichy. The learned Subordinate Judge was pleased to dismiss the said appeal. As against the concurrent findings, the present second appeal has been filed. 3. The plaintiff had contended that he is the owner of 'A' schedule property by means of two sale deeds dated 30.03.1995 and 03.07.1995 under which he has purchased the same from one Thangaraj. According to the plaintiff, he is in possession and enjoyment of 'A' schedule property. The plaintiff had further contended that the said 'A' schedule property is located in T.S.No.23/2B. In the west of the said 'A' schedule there is a road in T.S.No.22/3 and T.S.No.8. The said road has been shown as 'B' schedule in the suit. 4. The plaintiff had further contended that the first defendant and his brother were owning vacant plots on the western side and also on the southern side of the road. The first defendant and his brother sold all the vacant site to various persons including hospital and flats. According to the petitioner, 'B' schedule road is the access road for reaching Dhanalakshmi Srinivasan College Medical and Engineering College. The plaintiff had further contended that the first defendant and his brother have left the road in 'B' schedule property as the road for all the purchasers to have access through the road. According to the petitioner, 'B' schedule road is the access road for reaching Dhanalakshmi Srinivasan College Medical and Engineering College. The plaintiff had further contended that the first defendant and his brother have left the road in 'B' schedule property as the road for all the purchasers to have access through the road. It is the metal road and the plaintiff was gaining entry into his property through a gate facing the suit road located in 'B' schedule property. The plaintiff had further contended that in the year 2008, he prepared a plan for construction of commercial building in 'A' schedule property and the second defendant has sanctioned the plan on 06.05.2008. In the said building plan, 'B' schedule road shown as existing road for 'A' schedule property. 5. The plaintiff had further that the second respondent Corporation had directed the plaintiff to deposit a sum of Rs.4,10,050/- for development of 'B' schedule road. Accordingly, the said amount was paid by the plaintiff on 12.11.2008 and on 12.05.2010 to the Director of Town and Country Planning Authorities towards the Provisions of basic amenities and infrastructure for rain water harvesting. 6. The plaintiff had further contended that the second defendant had taken over 'B' schedule property after calling for tender and thereafter has laid a Thar road and also provided street lights and laid under ground drainage connection and drinking water connection to all the premises facing 'B' schedule road. The plaintiff had further contended that the Corporation in exercise of their power under Section 225 of Trichy City Municipal Corporation Act, made it as a public road and the same is vested with the Corporation. The plaintiff had contended that he has been using 'B' schedule road even since it was formed and also after a commercial construction was made by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had further contended that he has let out his building to various institutions and the tenant also using the said road as a public road in order to reach their respective portion through the gate in the 'A' schedule property. 7. The plaintiff had further contended that suddenly the first defendant has lodged a complaint to the local police that the 'B' schedule property has been grabbed by the plaintiff. However on enquiry, the authorities have closed the said complaint. 7. The plaintiff had further contended that suddenly the first defendant has lodged a complaint to the local police that the 'B' schedule property has been grabbed by the plaintiff. However on enquiry, the authorities have closed the said complaint. He had further contended that the first defendant has no right to prevent the plaintiff to use the 'B' schedule property as a road vested with the second defendant and the first defendant does not own any land nearby. According to the plaintiff, the said road namely 'B' schedule property is the only road through which the plaintiff and his tenants can enter into 'A' schedule property. The plaintiff further claimed that he has prescribed his right of way for 'B' schedule property over a statutory period. However, since the defendants are attempting to prevent the plaintiff from using 'B' schedule property, the present suit for permanent injunction has been filed. 8. The first defendant had filed a written statement contending that deliberately a wrong description and misleading description are given in the sale deeds in which the plaintiff is alleged to have purchased 'A' schedule property. The defendant had further contended that T.S.No.22/3 and T.No.8 is not a road. He had further contended that the said road was laid by the city Corporation only under the influence of a political party. He had further contended that no tender were called for metalling the road. Without any tender, the City Corporation had laid a road. Just because the road has been laid by the corporation, 'B' schedule property in question cannot be said to be vested in any public. The defendant had further contended that he has not executed any document in favour of the second defendant vesting the private road which is the subject matter of a registered pathway agreement that came into existence for exclusive enjoyment between the defendant and his brother and three other persons who are the purchasers from his brother. The defendant further claimed title to the 'B' schedule property relying upon a document dated 08.09.1965 and a Will said to have been executed in his favour on 30.06.2000 and a partition deed dated 22.04.2004. The defendant had further contended that the so called road has not been used by any one of the plot owners, no development activities in T.S.No.8 has taken so far except one or two buildings. The defendant had further contended that the so called road has not been used by any one of the plot owners, no development activities in T.S.No.8 has taken so far except one or two buildings. The defendant had further contended that the plaintiff has opened a door facing 'B' schedule property and the same is of a very recent origin. Therefore no rights have got vested for the plaintiff. They further contended the 'B' schedule property being a private property of the defendant, the plaintiff cannot have any right to seek development of the said road. The defendant had further contended that any charges paid by the plaintiff would only relate to the development charges in respect of 'A' and not in respect of 'B' schedule property. The defendant further contended the some third parties have encroached into a portion of T.S.No.26 which exclusively belongs to the defendant. Since the plaintiff is an encroacher, he is not entitled to any equitable relief of an injunction. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the suit. 9. The trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence arrived at a finding that 'B' schedule property originally belonged to the first defendant. The trial court has also relied upon the Advocate Commissioner's report that part of 'B' schedule property is located in Survey No.22/2B belonging to one Jeyaraman and in T.S.No.8, the defendant is having the right. The trial Court has further found that the first defendant though has created a lay out, he has not approached the Corporation for declaring 'B' schedule property as a road. The trial court further found that 'B' schedule property is the property of the first defendant and his brother Jeyaraman. In such circumstance, the suit filed for bare injunction without a prayer for declaration of title is not maintainable. 10. The trial Court further arrived at a finding that the road has been laid in 'B' schedule property by the Corporation without following the due process of law. 'B' schedule property has not been acquired by the second defendant Municipal Corporation. Without acquisition of the said 'B' schedule property, the second defendant Corporation has laid a Thar road in violation of provisions of the relevant statute. 'B' schedule property has not been acquired by the second defendant Municipal Corporation. Without acquisition of the said 'B' schedule property, the second defendant Corporation has laid a Thar road in violation of provisions of the relevant statute. Based upon the said findings, the trial court arrived at a conclusion that 'B' schedule property is the private pathway of the first defendant and hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. 11. The First Appellate Court after re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence referred to various provisions of Trichy Municipal Corporation Act and arrived at a finding that 'B' schedule property was never handed over to the Municipal Corporation. The First Appellate Court further found that G.O.Ms.No.79 dated 16.06.2000 will not be applicable to the facts of the present case because no records have been placed by the plaintiff or the second defendant Corporation to indicate that the procedure contemplated under the said G.O has been followed. The First Appellate Court further found that the private pathway which was created for the benefit of the first defendant and his family members ('B' schedule property) has been taken over by the second defendant Corporation and they have laid a road without following due process of law. The First Appellate court further found that just because the first defendant and his family members have admitted, the private pathway will not become a public pathway. The First Appellate Court further found that Sections 254 and 255 of Trichy Municipal Corporation Act will not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The First Appellate Court further found that without any notice to the first defendant and his family members and without their being any request from the plaintiff as contemplated under Section 255 of Trichy Municipal Corporation Act, the Corporation has laid a road. Just because thar road has been laid by the Corporation, the same cannot be declared to be a public pathway. When the pathway continues to be a private pathway and not been acquired by the Government, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. Based upon the said findings, the First Appellate Court arrived at a conclusion that the there is no reason for interfering in the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 12. When the pathway continues to be a private pathway and not been acquired by the Government, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a decree for permanent injunction. Based upon the said findings, the First Appellate Court arrived at a conclusion that the there is no reason for interfering in the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 12. The above second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: “a).Whether the Courts below are right in dismissing the suit and appeal without framing an issue whether the suit 'B' schedule property is a public street or not? b) Whether the notification as contemplated under Section 255 of the Tiruchirappalli City Municipal Corporation Act, 1944, is applicable to the road earmarked in an unapproved layout?” 13. The learned counsel for the appellant had contended that in the 'B' schedule property, a road has been laid connecting it with Karur Byepass Road on the eastern side. He had further contended that the street lights and underground drainage connection and drinking water connection have also been provided through 'B' schedule property. The learned counsel had further contended that it has been declared as a public road under Section 255 of Trichy Municipal Corporation Act. The learned counsel for the appellant had further contended that the Courts below have not properly appreciated the fact that the defendant is not the owner of 'B' schedule property. Once a Thar road has been laid by the Corporation and the maintenance of the said road has been taken over by the Corporation, the said road becomes a public street and thereafter, the general public is entitled to use the same as a public street. The first defendant was never the owner of the survey number covered under B schedule property. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant had further contended that the Courts below were under a wrong impression that unless acquired by the Government, a public road cannot be formed. It is a case where a road was created for an unapproved lay out. This road will automatically become a public road by way of laying metal road by the Corporation and it is not purely a private property. Hence, the Courts below having misdirected themselves in considering 'B' schedule property as a private property of the first defendant and non suited the plaintiff. 15. This road will automatically become a public road by way of laying metal road by the Corporation and it is not purely a private property. Hence, the Courts below having misdirected themselves in considering 'B' schedule property as a private property of the first defendant and non suited the plaintiff. 15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/first defendant had contended that the entire 'B' schedule property is a private property of the first defendant and he has traced his title by way of a sale deed dated 08.09.1965 and a partition deed dated 22.04.2004. The learned counsel for the respondent further relied upon a pathway agreement dated 30.04.2004 which was entered into between the first defendant's family and the family member of one Jeyaraman. All the three documents will clearly indicate that 'B' schedule property is the private road among the family members of the first defendant. Hence, the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have rightly held that without acquiring the said property, the private road cannot be converted into a public road. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent had further contended that the second defendant Corporation has forcibly laid a road in the 'B' schedule property. This will not confer any right upon the plaintiff to claim it to be a public road to have free access. He had further contended that T.S.No.26 which is shown as part of 'B' schedule property is the exclusive property of the first defendant. The plaintiff had encroached upon the said T.S.No.26 and hence, the plaintiff will not be entitled to the equitable relief of permanent injunction. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent had further contended that when the survey numbers mentioned in the 'B' schedule property have been proved to be a private property of the first defendant and his family members, without the Government resorting to acquisition proceedings, the same cannot be declared to be a public road. When 'B' schedule property cannot be declared to be a public road, the plaintiff will not have any legal right to have an access to the street as a matter of right. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the second appeal. 18. When 'B' schedule property cannot be declared to be a public road, the plaintiff will not have any legal right to have an access to the street as a matter of right. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the second appeal. 18. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the second respondent Corporation has contended that the Government has passed G.O.Ms.No.59 Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department dated 25.07.2006, to lay a road in an unapproved layouts after collecting development and amenities charges. Only based upon the said Government order, the road was laid in 'B' schedule property. The learned Additional Advocate General had further contended that survey No.22/2B1A has been recorded as Thar road in Town Survey Register. He had further contended that admittedly, the first defendant and his brother have created a road for the purpose of an unapproved layout. Once a road is indicated in an unapproved layout, the same can never be treated to be a private property of a developer. Hence, the question of acquisition of the land over which a road is shown in a layout does not arise. Any road shown even in an unapproved layout would automatically get vested in the Corporation. He had further contended that the Courts below have without considering the fact that the property gets vested in the Municipal Corporation, have misdirected themselves and arrived at a conclusion that without acquisition, a property cannot vest in the Corporation. 19. The learned Additional Advocate General had further contended that once a road has been laid and all the amenities are provided in the said road, the first defendant cannot claim it to be a private road. He had further contended that the Commissioner's report will indicate that several big commercial establishments have come up on either side of the 'B' schedule property. The other owners on either side of the 'B' schedule property are utilising 'B' schedule property as a road, the plaintiff alone cannot be prevented to use it as a road. He had further contended that the road was laid in the year 2006. So far the first defendant has not challenged the formation of the road in the property alleged to be his private property. Therefore, he contended that 'B' schedule property is a public road and the entire general public including the plaintiff would be entitled to use the said road. So far the first defendant has not challenged the formation of the road in the property alleged to be his private property. Therefore, he contended that 'B' schedule property is a public road and the entire general public including the plaintiff would be entitled to use the said road. Hence, he prayed for allowing the second appeal. 20. I have considered the submissions made by all the counsels. 21. The plaintiff had claimed that 'B' schedule property is a public road which had got vested with the second defendant Corporation. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant is obstructing his access to the road which is shown as 'B' schedule property in the plaint. 22. A perusal of 'B' schedule property discloses that it consists of three survey numbers namely T.S.No. 22/2B, T.S.No.8 and T.S.No.26. According to the first defendant, all these three survey numbers over which the road passes is his private property and hence, the plaintiff would not have any right of access. 23. The plaintiff has purchased 'A' schedule property under two registered sale deeds dated 30.03.1995 and 03.07.1995 under Exhibits A1 and A2. The title of the plaintiff over 'A' schedule property is not in dispute. The boundary recital in both these documents would disclose that on the western side of the property, T.S.No.22 is located. As per the plaint averment, the plaintiff is claiming right of access to the road only on his western side namely T.S.No. 22.Though the plaintiff has claimed that the road passes through T.S.No.8 and T.S.No.26, the building of the plaintiff is having frontage only facing T.S.No.22 as per boundary recital in Exhibits A1 and A2. 24. The first defendant has claimed title to the 'B' schedule property based upon Exhibit B1 sale deed dated 08.09.1965. Under the said document, the first defendant's father has purchased 1 acre of land from one Narayanasamy Pillai in T.S.No.569/1. The said property purchased by the father has been partitioned between the first defendant and his brother under Exhibit B4 dated 22.04.2004. A perusal of Exhibit B4 will indicate that the property which is located in old T.S.No.569/1 and new T.S.No.8 having an extent of 1 acre has been partitioned between the brothers. Hence, it is clear that the plaintiff and his brother have created 30 feet pathway over T.S.No.8 alone under Exhibit B4 partition deed. A perusal of Exhibit B4 will indicate that the property which is located in old T.S.No.569/1 and new T.S.No.8 having an extent of 1 acre has been partitioned between the brothers. Hence, it is clear that the plaintiff and his brother have created 30 feet pathway over T.S.No.8 alone under Exhibit B4 partition deed. There is no reference about T.S.No.22 in the said partition. In fact T.S.No.22 has been shown as northern boundary of the property allotted to the first defendant's brother. 25. The first defendant and his brother have entered into a registered common pathway agreement with the legal heirs of one Jeyaraman on 30.04.2004 which is marked as Exhibit B2. This document has been entered into 8 days after Exhibit B4. Under the said document, the pathway created in T.S.No.8 under Exhibit B4 partition deed is shown as 'B' schedule property. Similarly the pathway created by the legal heirs of the said Jeyaraman is shown as 'A' schedule property in T.S.No.22/2B. A rough sketch has also been annexed to the said registered agreement. A careful perusal of the boundary recital in Exhibit B2 and rough sketch will indicate that T.S.No.22/2B is located on the northern side immediately abutting east-west main road which is now called as Karur Byepass Road. Immediately, south of T.S.No.22/2B, the pathway in T.S.No.8 is shown. The entire frontage of the plaintiff is facing T.S.No.22/2B only and not T.S.No.8. 26. A combined reading of the boundary recitals in Exhibits A1, A2, B1, B2 and B4 will clearly indicate that the plaintiff has purchased 'A' schedule property in Survey No.23/2B which is facing westwards abutting survey No.22. 27. Though the learned counsel for the first defendant had contended that the entire 'B' schedule property belongs to him, a perusal of Exhibit B4 partition deed will indicate that the family of the first defendant has got right only over T.S.No.8 and not over T.S.No.22 or T.S.No.26. The pathway agreement entered into between the first defendant's family and Jeyaraman family under Exhibit B2 will disclose that only Jeyaraman family had right over T.S.No.22 and not the first defendant's family. The plaintiff has not made any allegation of obstruction against the said Jeyaraman family. T.S.No.8 which was partitioned between the first defendant and his brother is located to the south of T.S.No.22 as per Exhibits B2 and B4. The plaintiff has not made any allegation of obstruction against the said Jeyaraman family. T.S.No.8 which was partitioned between the first defendant and his brother is located to the south of T.S.No.22 as per Exhibits B2 and B4. The first defendant has entered into a common pathway agreement with Jeyaraman family under Exhibit B2 only because of the fact that the first defendant and his brother (owner of T.S.No.8) can have access to the Karur Byepass Road on the eastern side only through T.S.No.22/2B which is owned by Jeyaraman family. So the pathway agreement under Exhibit B2 will disclose that the first defendant does not have any right at all over T.S.No.22/2B. The first defendant has also not produced any records whatsoever to establish his right over T.S.No.26. 28. From the above said discussion, it is clear that the plaintiff's property is facing only T.S.No. 22/2B which was originally owned by Jeyaraman and family and the first defendant or his ancestor in title did not have any right whatsoever over T.S.No.22/2B. That part, the plaintiff has filed an unregistered document dated 12.04.2004 which was marked as an additional document ( Exhibit A16) before the First Appellate Court which discloses that Jeyaraman and family has permitted the plaintiff to use T.S.No.22/2B as a pathway. This document has been received across the Bar by the First Appellate Court without following Order 41 Rule 21 or Rule 28 of C.P.C., Hence, no importance can be attributed to Exhibit A16 document. 29. The first defendant was examined as DW1. In his cross examination, he has categorically admitted that this 30 feet pathway was created by him only as an access to the layout promoted by him. The first defendant has further admitted that he has not obtained any layout approval for the same. He has sold the plots to several persons and as on today, he does not own any plot in T.S.No.8. Hence, it is clear that the first defendant and his brother have formed an unapproved layout and as an access for the said plot owners, a 30 feet pathway has been created in T.S.No.8 while the brothers have entered into a registered partitioned deed under Exhibit B4. Therefore, the road created in T.S.No.8 under Exhibit B4 is part of an unapproved layout. 30. Therefore, the road created in T.S.No.8 under Exhibit B4 is part of an unapproved layout. 30. Once a layout has been created and a particular property is shown as a road, thereafter, the developer will not have any right or title over the property which is shown as a road in the layout. This proposition is applicable even if the layout is an unapproved layout. Otherwise after showing a particular property as a road, the developer will turn around and make a claim of title over a road in an unapproved layout. Therefore, viewed from different dimension also, the 30 feet created by the first defendant and his brother under Exhibit B2 can never be considered to be a private property of the first defendant. 31. A Division Bench of our High Court in a judgment reported in 2007-3-LW-995( T.N.Rajasekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others) in Paragraph No.22 has held as follows: “22..... As could be seen from the materials placed on record, the appellant herein after carving out the plots in his land, has sold them to third parties, who were compensated and dispossessed by the authorities. While selling the plots, it is mandatory on the part of any promoter/seller to carve out the roads and streets and other public utilities for the usage of purchasers and on such formation, such roads and streets would lose the character of private property and gains the character of public road whereupon none could claim any exclusive right, including the original owner of the land. Therefore, while selling the plots, after carving out the roads and streets, the appellant would have definitely included the cost/value of such portions left out as roads and streets in the plot cost and also would have collected the said cost from the purchasers of the plots. Therefore, at no stretch of imagination, he could be held to be the owner or person interested in the already sold out property. Knowing fully well that he has sold away the entire area carving out plots with roads and streets, the petitioner has made an attempt to gain wrongfully, by playing fraud, for which he shall be prosecuted”. 32. Another Division Bench of our High Court in a judgment reported in 2021 (5) CTC 648 (T.G.Naveen and others Vs. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and others) in Paragraph Nos.20 and 51 has held as follows: “20. 32. Another Division Bench of our High Court in a judgment reported in 2021 (5) CTC 648 (T.G.Naveen and others Vs. The Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and others) in Paragraph Nos.20 and 51 has held as follows: “20. Whether it is an approved or an unapproved layout, once the piece of land has been shown as a road promising the purchasers that the access is available through those roads to reach their plots, it would get the character of road and it should be used only for road purpose and it can neither be converted nor divested for any other purpose or claimed as private property by the developer. 51 ......However, in the instant case, the road which is sought to be used by the private respondent is not a private property but it is the one which is shown as road in the layout to have access to the plots. Whenever a sale is made, the purchasers not only purchases the plots but also the right to use the piece of land shown as road and the sale consideration of the plot would also involve the component of right to use the road portion. The land portion shown in the private layout developed by the appellants is meant for all the persons who purchase the plots in the layout. Hence, it has to be dedicated only for the purpose of road and it should have been handed over by the appellants to the local body. There is a failure on the part of the appellants to hand over the road portion to the local body and he cannot take advantage of his failure to make erroneous claim. Therefore, there is no necessity for the Government or the local body to initiate the land acquisition proceedings to take over the road portion in the layout for the purpose of make it as a public road....” 33. In view of the above Division Bench Judgements of our High Court, I am of the view that after creating a road as an access to the unapproved layout, the first defendant cannot turn around and contend that it will continue to be his private property and the second defendant Corporation has to acquire the same to convert it into a public road. That apart, the Corporation has laid a road in the year 2006 in 'B' schedule property, street lights, sewage lines and drinking water pipelines have been drawn through the said 'B' schedule property. So far, the first defendant has not chosen to challenge the action of the second defendant Corporation in laying the road in 'B' schedule property. It is an admitted fact that several commercial establishments have come up facing 'B' schedule property on either side and the same is being used by the general public. The first defendant had further admitted in his cross examination that T.S.No. 22/2B belongs to the Jeyaraman family. The first defendant has further admitted in the cross examination that 'B' schedule property is a road as on today and the same is being utilised by the purchasers who have purchased plots from the first defendant. The first defendant had further admitted that at the southern end of 'B' schedule property, a bus shed of a private college is also located. This deposition combined with the commissioner's plan will clearly show that as on today, it is a public road which is being accessed by the general public. The first defendant is disturbing only the plaintiff and not any other person who is using the 'B' schedule property. 34. Section 2(33) of Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act 1981 (as applicable to the Trichy Municipal Corporation)defines public street as follows: “2(33). Public Street” means any street, road, square, court, alley, passage or riding path, over which the public have a right of way, whether a thoroughfare or not, and includes- (a) the roadway over any public bridge or causeway; (b) the footway attached to any such street, public bridge or causeway; and (c) the drains attached to any such street, public bridge or causeway and the land, whether covered or not by any pavement, verandah, or other structure, which lies on either side of the roadway up to the boundaries of the adjacent property whether that property is private property or property belonging to the Central or any State Government.” 35. A parimateria provision under Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 has been interpreted by our High Court in a judgment reported in 2001 (3) CTC 257 (Soundara Rajes Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) in Paragraph No.22 has held as follows: “22. A parimateria provision under Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958 has been interpreted by our High Court in a judgment reported in 2001 (3) CTC 257 (Soundara Rajes Vs. State of Tamil Nadu) in Paragraph No.22 has held as follows: “22. Public road has been defined under Sec.2(28) of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1958,which reads as follows: “(28) 'Public Road' means any street, road, square, Court, alley, passage, cart-track, foot-path or riding-path, over which the public have a right of way, whether a thoroughfare or not, and includes;- (a) the roadway over any public bridge or causeway; (b) the footway attached to any such road, public bridge or cause way; and (c) the drains attached to any such road, public bridge or causeway, and the land, whether covered or not by any pavement, veranda, or other structure, which lies on either side of the roadway up to the boundaries of the adjacent property whether that property is private property or property belonging to the State or Central Government” If the public have right to use the road, even though it is a private property, it should be construed as a public road under the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1958.” 36. A reading of the above said judgment will disclose that if the public have a right to use the road even though it is a private property, it should be construed only as a public road. 37. In view of the discussion in the above said paragraphs, it is clear that the Corporation has laid the road and the general public are using the road as a thoroughfare. That apart, the first defendant has not established his exclusive right or title over any one of the survey numbers mentioned in 'B' schedule property. Though a road has been created by the first defendant and his brother under Exhibit B4 partition deed, the same is shown as access road for an unapproved layout. Hence, viewed from any angle, the defendant has not established his exclusive right over any one of the survey numbers mentioned in 'B' schedule property. On the other hand, the plaintiff and the second defendant Corporation have established that 'B' schedule property is a public road over which the general public have a right of thoroughfare. The first defendant has not obstructed any one from the general public from using the road except the plaintiff. On the other hand, the plaintiff and the second defendant Corporation have established that 'B' schedule property is a public road over which the general public have a right of thoroughfare. The first defendant has not obstructed any one from the general public from using the road except the plaintiff. Hence, it is clear that due to some ulterior motive, this obstruction is being done. 38. Under Section 236 of Coimbatore City Municipal Act 1981, all public streets get vested with the Corporation. Since 'B' schedule property is a public street as contemplated under Section 2(33) of the Coimbatore City Municipal Corporation Act 1981, it got automatically vested with the second defendant Corporation. When 'B' schedule property is a public road, the plaintiff will have a right of access to the same and the first defendant will not have any legal right to obstruct the plaintiff. 39. The trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court have not considered the claim relating to the title of the first defendant in a proper perspective by analysing Exhibits B1, B2 and B4. The Courts were under a wrong presumption that 'B' schedule property is a private property and unless acquired by the Government, a public road cannot be created. The Courts below have not properly understood the difference between the acquisition of the property by the Government and the automatic vesting of the property in the hands of the Corporation. When a particular street is construed to be a public street, as per definition of Section 2(33) of the coimbatore city Municipal Corporation Act, 1981, it gets automatically vested with the Corporation as contemplated under Section 236. Hence, the question of acquisition of the said property does not arise. 40. In the light of the above said provisions and the judgments discussed, I am of the opinion that the Courts below have erroneously arrived at a finding that the road in an unapproved layout continues to be a private property. 41. In view of the above said discussion, both the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant. The judgment and decree of the Courts below are set aside. The suit in O.S.No.1240 of 2011 on the file of the III Additional District Munsif Court, Tiruchirappalli is decreed as prayed for. The second appeal is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.