JUDGMENT : Rajendra M. Sareen, J. 1. The State being prosecuting agency has preferred this appeal under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the judgment and order dated 02.07.1994 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana in Sessions Case No.57 of 1994. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that, deaseased was married to Vithalbhai Valjibhai Vaghari and both were residing at Radhanpuriwas, Patan. On the day prior to the incident, there was exchange of words between deceased and her in-laws that the deceased was not giving food to her husband. On the day of the incident, her mother-in-law had come to her house and started quarraling on the flimsy ground that she is not giving food to her son and is often quarraling with her son. Therefore, she should return the golden ornaments, which she was having with her. At that time, accused No.2 Babubhai Valjibhai came and gave carosine to accused No.1 Govabhai @ Govindbhai Valjibhai poured kerosine and lighted a matchstick. As a result of which deceased – Geetaben was burnt and she came out of the house shouting for the help. The neighbours gathered and extinguished the fire. At that time three accused were present over there. The father in law of the deceased took her to the hospital, where Medical Officer in charge intimated the incident to the police constable, who was on duty in the hospital about the incident and complaint was registered by the deceaed. Dying declaration was also recorded by the Executive Magistrate. The statements of the witnesses – mainly brother of the deceased was also recorded. The PSI also recorded the statement of the deceased and she succumbed to the burn injuries during her treatment and thereafter, on completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed for the offences punishable under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The case was committed to the Sessions Court by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Patan, wherein the Sessions Case was tried against the accused. Witnesses were examined and several documentary evidence were produced by the prosecution. 3. The case was committed to the Sessions Court by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Patan, wherein the Sessions Case was tried against the accused. Witnesses were examined and several documentary evidence were produced by the prosecution. After the evidence was over, further statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and arguments were heard and after appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence, the trial Court has delivered the judgment, acquitting the accused persons from the offence as alleged against them. 4. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant - State has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Court. 5. It is pertinent to note that during the pendency of the appeal, accused – respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have expired. As such, appeal stands abated against respondent Nos. 2 and 3. Thereby, appeal has been heard only qua accused – respondent No.1. 6. By way of preferring the present appeal, the appellant has mainly contended that learned trial Court has failed to appreciate the evidence on record and wrongly recorded the order of acquittal. It is further contended that learned trial Judge has erred in evaluating the evidence on record and without appreciating the evidence in its proper perspective acquitted the accused and therefore, the impugned judgment and order of acquittal is required to be reversed, as such. 7. We have heard learned APP Mr. H.K. Patel appearing for appellant – State and learned advocate Mr. P.T. Jasani for respondent – accused No.1. Learned advocate has filed written submissions in support of his arguments. 7.1 Learned APP has vehemantally argued that the Sessions Court by the impugned judgment has acquitted the accused. The impugned judgment is contrary to law, facts and evidence on record. The impugned judgment is illegal, improper and bad in law. The learned Sessions Judge has erred in disbelieving the prosecution evidence, which has supported the case of prosecution. It is also submitted that the deceased gave five dying declarations, One before the Doctor, other before the Head Constable in form of the complaint, third one before the Executive Magistrate and oral dying declaration before her brother Jivanbhai and lastly when she was taken to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad in form of further statement recorded by the Investigating Officer. It is also submitted that the deceased gave five dying declarations, One before the Doctor, other before the Head Constable in form of the complaint, third one before the Executive Magistrate and oral dying declaration before her brother Jivanbhai and lastly when she was taken to the Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad in form of further statement recorded by the Investigating Officer. All the statements though consistant, are not believed by the learned Sessions Judge and the reasons shown for disbelieving the dying declaration are not proper. Moreover, the learned Sessions Judge has failed to appreciate that there is no material contradictions in evidence of prosecution. The entire evidence though consistant is disbelieved by the trial Court. The learned Judge has also failed to appreciate that part played by each accused in the crime is fully corroborated by the witnesses as well as dying declaration of the deceased. As such the learned Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective. Hence, it is prayed to consider the evidence on record and to set aside the impugned judgment and further pass an order of conviction against the accused. 7.2 On the other hand, learned advocate Mr. P.T. Jasani appearing for for the sole surviving respondent No.1 – accused No.1 has submitted that in this case, the prosecution has not examined any eye witness and only relied upon dying declarations given by the deceased at different places. The dying declarations which are on record, are in consistance with each other, not confirming the mental status of the deceased at the time of recording of the dying declaration. There are major loop holes coming on record, which are not in consistant with the law relating to the dying declaration. Though dying declarations are recorded by the doctor in the form of history, recorded by the police constable in the form of complaint, dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate, oral declaration before the brother and further statement before the Investigating Officer, it has not come on record in any manner, that when the statement of the deceased was recorded by the either by the Executive Magistrate or either by the police constable or by the Investigating Officer, deceased was conscious and was in mental fit state to give dying declaration. As such, the dying declarations in this case are of such nature, which cannot be fully relied upon. As such, the dying declarations in this case are of such nature, which cannot be fully relied upon. 7.3 Moreover, it is also submitted by learned advocate Mr. Jasani that here in this case, the prosecution has examined witness Maheshkumar Ratilal Thakkar, who as per his evidence, is an eyewitness of this incident. In his cross examination, he has supported the case of defence rather than the case of the prosecution and he has not been turned hostile by the prosecution. In his evidence, it has come on record that deceased was instigated by her husband to give the names of present accused to teach them a lesson and therefore, all three accused were implicated by the deceased. Moreover, it is also submitted that as per the evidence of the Investigating Officer himself though statements of neighbours and other witnesses are recorded, they are not examined and as per the admission of Investigating Officer, the statement reveals that accused were not present when the deceased came out of the house in burning condition. It is admitted by the Investigating Officer that the statements of the witnesses revealed that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were 2 to 3 kms away for labour work when the incident has occurred. As such, the case of the prosecution against the accused cannot be believed and the accused were falsely implicated in this case. 7.4 Lastly, it is submitted that the entire evidence on record is rightly appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge and findings to the effect appreciating the dying declaration and appreciating the evidence of other witnesses do not need any interference by this Court. Hence, it is prayed to dismiss the appeal. 8. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and going through the impugned judgment as well as the Record and proceedings of the case. 9. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 9. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 9.1 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. 9.2 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, reappreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged. 9.3 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that, “The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. 9.3 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752 , the Apex Court has observed that, “The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court”. 9.4 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under : “9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 ), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: 12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219 , Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17 , Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761 , Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699 , Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731 , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102 , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535 , Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445 ) 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) “… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1 , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216 , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200 , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450 , Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412 , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P (2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755 ) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 , this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368 , the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) “20. … an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.” 18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271 , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) “(i) The High Court’s decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.” A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401 . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 10. In the aforesaid backdrop in this case, upon reappreciating the evidence the prosecution has examined in all 8 witnesses on record. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 10. In the aforesaid backdrop in this case, upon reappreciating the evidence the prosecution has examined in all 8 witnesses on record. As here in this case as stated above no eye witnesses are available except one Maheshbhai Thakkar, who is termed to be an eye witness, who was present at the time of the incident when the deceased came out of her house and tried to embarrass the witness. However, that witness is not an eyewitness of the actual incident of burning of deceased but the prosecution case has rested entirely upon the dying declaration, which in this case has been recorded by different witnesses, at different time. 10.1 In the present case, it is an admitted fact as per the deposition of PW 1 Dr. V.V. Patil at Exh.14 that the deceased had died due to extensive burns. As such her death was unnatural death which can be termed as homicidal. However, whether the respondent is responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased is to be reappreciated in the light of various dying declarations on record. 11. Here in this case, at the time, when deceased was brought to the hospital, Dr. J. J. Nayak has examined her at 8:05 hrs on 01.09.1993. He had made arrangements for her admission in the hospital and informed the police to arrange for recording dying declaration of the deceased. As per his say at that time, the deceased was conscious and was able to answer the questions being asked. As per the history given by the deceased herself before the Doctor, she was harassed by her mother in law. Her mother in law poured the kerosine and set her on fire who was helpd by accused – respondent Nos. 1 and 2. Here, in this evidence, what type of help or aid was given by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 is not on record. The entire act as per the say of the deceased at the first point of time, is by accused No. 3 against whom the case is abated. It is also stated by the doctor that deceased has received 2nd and 3rd degree burns on her body and he had issued certificate to that effect. The entire act as per the say of the deceased at the first point of time, is by accused No. 3 against whom the case is abated. It is also stated by the doctor that deceased has received 2nd and 3rd degree burns on her body and he had issued certificate to that effect. 11.1 As per the admission of the Doctor in his cross – examination, the deceased was accompanied by two to four person, whom he does’t know and. those persons were sitting when her treatment was going on, condition of Geetaben was serious, he treated Geetaben for half an hour and thereafter treatment was taken over by full time surgeon. It is stated by the Doctor in his cross examination that due to the burn injuries Geetaben was in extreme pain and agony and as and when the Executive Magistrate came for recording dying declaration, he has endorsed that Geetaben was consious and in fit mental condition to give statement on yadi, which is produced at Exh. 17. 11.2 Considering the Record and proceedings, original yadi Exh.17 does not contain any kind of endorsement pertaining to consciousness and mental status of the deceased, which can affirm that at the time of recording dying declaration by the Executive Magistrate, the deceased was in a fit condition of mind to understand and answer the questions. As such the first history given by the deceased which is very first point in time after the incident implicating the name of accused No.3 only as the perperator of the crime, and as per the admission of the doctor, deceased was in extreme agony and pain due to injuries, as such mental status at the time of implicating the name of respondent No.3 and respondent Nos. 1 and 2 helping her in the crime cannot be said to be sound declaration given before the doctor can be termed as reliable. 11.3 As regardings the second dying declaration of the deceased is concerned, it is before the PW 2 Executive Magistrate, who has been examined at Exh.16 and dying declaration has been produced on record at Exh.18. 1 and 2 helping her in the crime cannot be said to be sound declaration given before the doctor can be termed as reliable. 11.3 As regardings the second dying declaration of the deceased is concerned, it is before the PW 2 Executive Magistrate, who has been examined at Exh.16 and dying declaration has been produced on record at Exh.18. As per the evidence of the Executive Magistrate, in view of the yadi, he had gone to Patan hospital and Doctor said that Geetaben is conscious and can reply the questions and so he recorded the dying declaration and affixed the thumb impression and has taken an endorsement after recording the dying declaration regarding consciousness of the deceased. 11.4 Now considering this aspect whether dying declaration was recorded in fit condition of mind or not, is to be seen. On dying declaration Exh.18 there is an endorsement upon it regarding consciousness and signature of somebody dated 01.09.1993 at 9:35 a.m. In evidence of Dr. Nayak staed that he had endorsed upon the yadi and yadi does not reveal anything regarding endorsement. As regarding endorsement at the end of the dying declaration, the author of the endorsement is not coming on record. No such doctor was examined by the prosecution. Prosecution has not proved this aspect cogently and convincingly that at the time of recording dying declaration the deceased was fully consious, able to speak and was in fit mental state to understand and answer the question. On the contrary it has come on record in the deposition of the Executive Magistrate that as and when questions were asked to the deceased it was repeated more than once before the desesed, which itself specifies that the deceased at the time of recording of dying declaration before the Executive Magistrate was not in a fit condition of mind so as to understand the question, at once. Hence considering the evidence of the Executive Magistrate also on record and in comparison to the evidence of the Dr. Nayak, he has endorsed on the yadi that the patient is conscious, whereas on yadi Exh.17 no such endorsement is found and the endorsement on dying declaration at Exh. 18 at the end of the dying declaration does not reveals that as to by whom the endorsement has been made. Nayak, he has endorsed on the yadi that the patient is conscious, whereas on yadi Exh.17 no such endorsement is found and the endorsement on dying declaration at Exh. 18 at the end of the dying declaration does not reveals that as to by whom the endorsement has been made. Hence, the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate also in absence of cogent and convencing endorsement and evidence regarding the mental status of the deceased cannot be relied upon. 11.5 Reference is made to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Kanti Lal vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2009) 12 SCC 498 , wherein in para 32 it is observed that; “32. It is well settled that one of the important tests of the credibility of the dying declaration is that the person, who recorded it, must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. For placing implicit reliance on dying declaration, the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to narrate the correct facts of occurrence. If the capacity of the maker of the statement to narrate the facts is found to be impaired, such dying declaration should be rejected, as it is hightly unsafe to place reliance on it. The dying declaration should be voluntary and should not be prompted and physical as well as mental fitness of the maker is to be proved by the prosecution.” 11.6 Under these circumstances, the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate does not pass the credibility test as laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court. 12. The third dying declaration made by the deceased is before the PW 5 Head Constable Anwarkhan of City Police Station, Patan before whom the complaint was lodged, which is produced at Exh.22. Considering the evidence of Head Constable Anwar Khan at Exh.21, it is admitted by the witness that before recording complaint he has not obtained any opinion of doctor regarding consciousness or mental status of the patient. In context of this evidence coupled with evidence of Dr. Nayak at 8:05 a.m. when Dr. Nayak examined the deceased, she was in a serious condition and was in extreme agony and pain. Under this circumstances, it was necessary for Head Constable to ascertain the mental status of the deceased before recording the complaint. In context of this evidence coupled with evidence of Dr. Nayak at 8:05 a.m. when Dr. Nayak examined the deceased, she was in a serious condition and was in extreme agony and pain. Under this circumstances, it was necessary for Head Constable to ascertain the mental status of the deceased before recording the complaint. As such the complaint recorded by the Head Constable vide Exh.22 also suffers from infirmity regarding the mental status of the deceased and also fails in credibility test. In such complaint being devoid of any merits without there being any endorsement of consciousness of parents. Hence this dying declaration in form of complaint also cannot be relied upon. 13. It is the case of the prosecution that when the deceased was shifted to the Ahmedabad, during her shifting her brother – Jivanbhai Galubhai was accompanying her and she has stated the incident before her brother wherein she has named accused No.2 as the perpetor of the crime pouring kerosine and setting her on fire. It is also to be noted that this oral declaration was made on 01.09.1993 while shifting to Ahmedabad and that is also contradictory to the version stated before Dr. Nayak and Executive Magistrate. However, though on 01.09.1993 the oral declaration was given before the brother, statement of brother was recorded by the Investigating Officer on 21.09.1993. The brother has not disclosed aspect of this oral declaration by his injured sister before the Investigating Officer. As such evidence of PW 3 Jivanbhai Galubhai – brother of the deceased also does not inspire confidence. Considering the condition of the deceased at the time of examination by Dr. Nayak and also considering the agony and pain of the deceased, as stated by Dr. Nayak at the time of first examination the oral declaration before PW 3 Jivanbhai also cannot be relied upon. 14. It is pertinent to note that though the complaint by the deceased was recorded by the head constable on 01.09.1993 and thereafter she was shifted to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital, further statement of the deceased was recorded by the Investigating Officer Shri B.S. Nathani in Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. 14. It is pertinent to note that though the complaint by the deceased was recorded by the head constable on 01.09.1993 and thereafter she was shifted to Ahmedabad Civil Hospital, further statement of the deceased was recorded by the Investigating Officer Shri B.S. Nathani in Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. It is surprising as to when the complaint itself is lodged at Patan by the deceased on 01.09.1993 what was the reason to record further statement at Ahmedabad, is not brought on record but considering the evidence of Investigating Officer during this recording of statement the Investigating Officer has not cared to take any kind of opinion of any doctor regarding consciousness and mental status of the deceased and without any kind of opinion of doctor statement has been recorded which cannot be relied upon. 15. Considering the entire evidence on record in this case wherein the prosecution has relied upon Five different dying declarations, the version of the deceased are inconsistant. In one of the versions she has implicated respondent No.3, in complaint she has implicated respondent No.1 whereas in oral declaration before her brother, she has implicated respondent No.2. As such, it is on record that the deceased has changed her version on and often implicating different accused and as stated above, all the statements, the dying declarations, the history given to the doctor and the oral declaration and the complaint, nowhere it has come on record that deceased was in a fit mental condition to understand the question and answer accordingly. Per contra, it has come on record that she was in much agony and pain. Endorsement taken by the Executive Magistrate is not cogent and reliable and Police constable before recording the complaint and the investigating officer before recording further statement did not care to ascertain the consciousness and mental status of the deceased. In such circumstances, the trial Court has rightly rejected the reliability of the dying declaration and has given cogent and convencing findings to that effect. 15.1 Here in this case, evidence of PW 4 Maheshkumar Ratilal Thakkar, who has not supported the case of prosecution and who has not been declared hostile by the prosecution, is to be reappreciated. In such circumstances, the trial Court has rightly rejected the reliability of the dying declaration and has given cogent and convencing findings to that effect. 15.1 Here in this case, evidence of PW 4 Maheshkumar Ratilal Thakkar, who has not supported the case of prosecution and who has not been declared hostile by the prosecution, is to be reappreciated. In his evidence, this witness - Maheshkumar Ratilal Thakkar who is termed to be an eyewitness of the incident and owning a shop just opposite the house of the deceased, has tried to bring the real facts of the case, which helps the defence rather than prosecution, wherein, it reveals that when the deceased came out of the house she was alone and nobody was found at the time of incident. It is also admitted by the witness that due to some dispute regarding theft of one vessel by the deceased and as the accused were supporting the allegations of theft being committed by the deceased, the husband of the deceased was angry and he had instigated the deceased to name the present accused, at that time, witness Maheshkumar Thakkar was present. This aspect of falsely implicating the accused by instigating the deceased, has not been challenged by declaring the witness hostile. He has admitted that the names of the accused were tutored to the deceased so that accused learnt a lesson and due to that reason the accused have been implicated in the offence by the deceased. Under these circumstances, in light of the evidence of witness Maheshbhai it can be inferred that whatever stated by the deceased before the authorities – either doctor, police head constable, executive magistrate or investigating officer was not voluntary at all and the evidence of Maheshbhai falsifies all the allegations against the accused on the basis of false implications at the instance of the husband of the deceased, who was in a burnt condition. 15.2 Here in this case, the evidence of Investigating Officer is also to be noted. No witness neighbouring the place of incident has been examined though the Investigating Officer Shri Nathani in his evidence at Exh.35 has deposed that during his investigation he has recorded the statements of neighbours and many have stated that accused were not present at the time of incident. No witness neighbouring the place of incident has been examined though the Investigating Officer Shri Nathani in his evidence at Exh.35 has deposed that during his investigation he has recorded the statements of neighbours and many have stated that accused were not present at the time of incident. It is on record that the witnesses whose statements were recorded, were not supporting the case of prosecution. It has come on record through a statement of neighbour that at the time of incident accused Nos. 1 and 2 were 2 to 3 kms away from the place of incident doing labour work. As such admission by the Investigating Officer also falsify the case of the prosecution and false implications of the accused cannot be ruled out. 16. A beneficial reference of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Versus Ram Niwas reported in (2010) 15 SCC 463 be made in this regard. In the said case, it has been observed as under:- “6. This Court has held in Kalyan v. State of U.P., (2001) 9 SCC 632 : “8. The settled position of law on the powers to be exercised by the High Court in an appeal against an order of acquittal is that though the High Court has full powers to review the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is passed, it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused persons, as envisaged under the criminal jurisprudence prevalent in our country is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court. Normally the views of the trial court, as to the credibility of the witnesses, must be given proper weight and consideration because the trial court is supposed to have watched the demeanour and conduct of the witness and is in a better position to appreciate their testimony. The High Court should be slow in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by the trial court. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808 , this Court observed that the golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court further observed: "27. It is no doubt true that wrongful acquittals are undesirable and shake the confidence of the people in the judicial system, much worse, however, is the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. The consequences of the conviction of an innocent person are far more serious and its reverberations cannot but be felt in a civilised society. Suppose an innocent person is convicted of the offence of murder and is hanged, nothing further can undo the mischief for the wrong resulting from the unmerited conviction is irretrievable. To take another instance, if an innocent person is sent to jail and undergoes the sentence, the scars left by the miscarriage of justice cannot be erased by any subsequent act of expiration. Not many persons undergoing the pangs of wrongful conviction are fortunate like Dreyfus to have an Emile Zola to champion their cause and succeed in getting the verdict of guilt annulled. All this highlights the importance of ensuring, as far as possible, that there should be no wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Some risk of the conviction of the innocent, of course, is always there in any system of the administration of criminal justice Such a risk can be minimised but not ruled out altogether It may in this connection be apposite to refer to the following observations of Sir Carleton Alien quoted on page 157 of "The Proof of Guilt" by Glanville Williams, second edition: "I dare say some sentimentalists would assent to the proposition that it is better that a thousand, or even a million, guilty persons should escape than that one innocent person should suffer; but no responsible and practical person would accept such a view. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. For it is obvious that if our ratio is extended indefinitely, there comes a point when the whole system of justice has broken down and society is in a state of chaos." 28. The fact that there has to be clear evidence of the guilt of the accused and that in the absence of that it is not possible to record a finding of his guilt was stressed by this Court in the case of Shivaji Sahebrao, (1973) 2 SCC 793 , as is clear from the following observations: "Certainly it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely, may be guilty before a court, can be convicted and the mental distinction between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure considerations." “9. The High Court while dealing with the appeals against the order of acquittal must keep in mind the following propositions laid down by this Court, namely, (i) the slowness of the appellate court to disturb a finding of fact; (ii) the non-interference with the order of acquittal where it is indeed only a case of taking a view different from the one taken by the High Court." 8. In Arulvelu and another Versus State reported in (2009) 10 SCC 206 , the Supreme Court after discussing the earlier judgments, observed in para No. 36 as under: “36. Careful scrutiny of all these judgments lead to the definite conclusion that the appellate court should be very slow in setting aside a judgment of acquittal particularly in a case where two views are possible. The trial court judgment can not be set aside because the appellate court's view is more probable. The appellate court would not be justified in setting aside the trial court judgment unless it arrives at a clear finding on marshaling the entire evidence on record that the judgment of the trial court is either perverse or wholly unsustainable in law.” 17. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. The judgment and order dated 02.07.1994 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana in Sessions Case No.57 of 1994 is confirmed. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed accordingly. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. The judgment and order dated 02.07.1994 rendered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana in Sessions Case No.57 of 1994 is confirmed. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed accordingly. Bail bond, if any, stands cancelled. R & P be sent back to the concerned trial Court, forthwith.