ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. This is an admitted matter by virtue of the order dated 23rd October 2019 and the writ Court's records have been attached with the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the order dated 11th January 2018 passed in W.P.(S) No.5316 of 2008. 3. By the said order, the learned writ Court quashed the order of punishment dated 16th May 2008, however, remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority who was arrayed as respondent no.5 in the writ proceeding. 4. Grievance of the appellant is that the order of remand as contained in the order dated 11th January 2018 would provide an opportunity to the Central Coalfields Limited (hereinafter referred to as CCL) to fill up those very lacunae which vitiated the order of punishment, as the entire matter has been sent back for a fresh consideration by the respondent no.5 from the stage of submission of the inquiry report. 5. The order of punishment dated 16th May 2008 passed by the respondent no.5 in a departmental proceeding under which the appellant was imposed the punishment of stoppage of one increment and recovery of excess amount was challenged by him before the writ Court. From the records we observe that the disciplinary inquiry against the appellant started on the allegation of misconduct in terms of Clauses 26.1, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order of CCL. 6. Clauses 26.1, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order are extracted below : “26.1 Theft, fraud or dishonestly in connection with the employer's business or property. 26.22 Any willful and deliberate act which is subversive of discipline or which may be detrimental to the interests of the company. 26.41 Violation of any clause of these standing orders.” 7. 6. Clauses 26.1, 26.22 and 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order are extracted below : “26.1 Theft, fraud or dishonestly in connection with the employer's business or property. 26.22 Any willful and deliberate act which is subversive of discipline or which may be detrimental to the interests of the company. 26.41 Violation of any clause of these standing orders.” 7. For the sake of fullness we would extract the imputations against the appellant which read as under : “That said Sri M.C Jha, while he was posted and functioning as Accountant, Rajrappa Project during the year 2001-02, committed gross irregularities in as much as while submitting the final TA bill in respect of official tour performed by him though as per railway time-table, there was no 1st class service in the train by which the journey was performed, he fraudulently claimed to have traveled by 1st class for his journey from Ranchi to Bangalore on 4/6/2001 and return journey from Bangalore to Ranchi starting on 16/6/2001 giving false mode of travel and fictitious ticket numbers and withdrew an additional amount of Rs.1,996/- in excess being the difference between the 1st and 2nd class fares at the relevant time whereas as per extent rules governing TA reimbursements, the Company's liability was restricted only to the extent of fare by the class in which you has actually traveled for undertaking the said tours.” 8. The inquiring officer held that the incidents of misconduct under Clauses 26.1 and 26.22 were not proved in the departmental inquiry. However, the inquiring officer made an observation that the delinquent employee committed misconduct under Clause 26.41 of the Certified Standing Order. The disciplinary authority accepted the findings recorded in the inquiry report and concurred with the inquiring officer. 9. The fundamental issue before the writ Court was whether the disciplinary authority had powers to impose punishment upon the appellant for the purported violation of any of the Clauses of the Certified Standing Order which shall be treated misconduct under Clause 26.41. 10. A bare glance at Clause 26.41 would make it abundantly clear that the expression “violation” used under Clause 26.41 refers to other instructions contained under the Certified Standing Order and does not refer to any instance of misconduct which has been specifically dealt with under the Certified Standing Order. 10. A bare glance at Clause 26.41 would make it abundantly clear that the expression “violation” used under Clause 26.41 refers to other instructions contained under the Certified Standing Order and does not refer to any instance of misconduct which has been specifically dealt with under the Certified Standing Order. Once the incidents of misconduct under Clauses 26.1 and 26.22 were found not proved and the findings by the inquiring officer were accepted by the disciplinary authority, merely because the inquiring officer had observed that misconduct under Clause 26.41 is proved the order dated 16th May 2008 imposing punishment of stoppage of one increment and recovery of excess amount could not have been passed by the disciplinary authority. 11. In view of the judgment in “Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra” (1998) 7 SCC 84 the law is well settled that the disciplinary authority can disagree with the findings recorded by the inquiring officer but before proceeding further in the matter the disciplinary authority is required to issue a note of disagreement so that the delinquent is put to notice as regards the grounds on which the disciplinary authority formed a tentative opinion not to accept the favourable findings recorded by the inquiring officer. This procedure was not adopted by the disciplinary authority and as the records would speak that he accepted the findings by the inquiring officer in toto. In our opinion, the learned writ Court rightly interfered with and quashed the order dated 16th May 2008, however, we do not find any support in law to countenance with the order of remand by which the entire matter has been remanded back to the respondent no.5 for a fresh consideration from the stage of submission of the inquiry report. 12. The powers of the writ Court to interfere with the findings recorded by the departmental authorities are well settled by decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court – one such judgment was referred by the learned counsel for CCL – “Bank of India & Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana” (1999) 5 SCC 762 . 13. Mrs. Swati Shalini, the learned counsel for CCL, would urge before us a similar plea and pressed hard to support the order of remand made by the learned writ Court. v. Degala Suryanarayana” (1999) 5 SCC 762 . 13. Mrs. Swati Shalini, the learned counsel for CCL, would urge before us a similar plea and pressed hard to support the order of remand made by the learned writ Court. The learned counsel for CCL has also informed us that in compliance of the learned writ Court's order the respondent no.5 has passed a fresh order on 13th December 2019. 14. Under what circumstances an order of remand can be made to the departmental authorities is well known in service jurisprudence. One such incident may be a case in which second show-cause notice was not served upon the delinquent employee with a copy of the inquiry report so as to offer him an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept or not to accept the findings recorded by the inquiring officer. Another instance may be where the writ Court for good reasons decided to interfere with the punishment awarded to the delinquent on the ground of its being disproportionate to the charges framed and found proved in the departmental proceeding. 15. In paragraph nos.12 and 13 of the order dated 11th January 2018, the learned writ Court has held as under : “12. It is settled principal of law that the disciplinary authority is supposed to take independent decision of imposing punishment on a delinquent employee. In this case, it is crystal clear that clause 26.41 of the certified standing order of the company itself is not an independent clause by which misconduct can be established and perusal of the memo reveals that to establish misconduct under clause 26.41 of the certified standing order of the company, at least there must be violation of any of the other clause of the said standing order of the company. 13. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this court is of the considered view that the impugned order dated 16.05.2008 passed by respondent 5 is not sustainable in the eyes of the law and is liable to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, as the cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, submissions, discussion and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order dated 16.05.2008 passed by respondent no.5 imposing the punishment of stopping of one increment and recovery of amount alleged to be an excess payment is set aside. The matter is remitted back to respondent no.5. Accordingly, as the cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, submissions, discussion and judicial pronouncements, the impugned order dated 16.05.2008 passed by respondent no.5 imposing the punishment of stopping of one increment and recovery of amount alleged to be an excess payment is set aside. The matter is remitted back to respondent no.5. The respondent no.5 may take steps as per law in the matter from the stage after submission of the enquiry report. With these observations, this writ petition is allowed.” 16. We are unable to infer any reason why the order of remand as contained in the order dated 11th January 2018 has been made from the stage of submission of the inquiry report – no procedural irregularity was alleged by the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that before the writ Court certain notings in the note-sheet pertaining to the proceedings against the appellant which were obtained by filing an application under Right to Information Act were produced in support of the contention that the disciplinary authority after his tentative opinion that only a caution letter should be issued to the delinquent employee proceeded to pass a different order against the appellant. After bestowing our thoughtful considerations to the aforesaid aspects of the matter, we are of the opinion that on the basis of the inquiry report dated 23rd February 2007 the disciplinary authority could not have imposed punishment upon the appellant. The writ Court's order of remand is in teeth of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in paragraph no.12 of the order dated 11th January 2018. In the circumstances of the case, the order of remand to the disciplinary authority for taking a fresh decision in our opinion is not proper. 17. For the aforesaid reasons, we are inclined to interfere with the last part of the order as contained in paragraph no.13 of the order dated 11th January 2018 passed in W.P.(S) No.5316 of 2008. As a consequence of which the departmental proceeding against the appellant stands terminated. We further indicate that in view of the judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Coal India Ltd. v. Ananta Saha” (2011) 5 SCC 142 , as a sequel to this order the consequences shall follow. 18. Accordingly, L.P.A. No.150 of 2018 stands allowed with the aforesaid observations.