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2022 DIGILAW 1731 (RAJ)

State v. Ram Pratap @ Lilu

2022-05-24

PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant-State against the judgment dated 11.06.1996 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act) Cases, Churu (‘trial court’) in Special Case No.48/94, whereby the accused-respondents were acquitted of the charges under Sections 450, 366 & 376 IPC, and Section 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act as well as Section 336 IPC read with Section 3(1) of the SC/ST Act; however, the accused-respondents were convicted by the learned trial court under Sections 147, 323 and 447 IPC. However, vide the impugned judgment, looking to the custody period already undergone by accused-respondent No.1-Ram Pratap @ Lilu and accused-respondent No.2-Ramniwas, they were directed to be released, while treating their custody period, already undergone by them, as the period of sentence for their conviction. 1.1 Vide the impugned judgment, except for the accused-respondent No.1-Ram Pratap @ Lilu and accused-respondent No.2-Ramniwas, for the conviction under Section 147 IPC, fine of Rs.200/-each was imposed upon rest of the accused-respondents; for the conviction under Section 447 IPC, a fine of Rs.100/-was imposed upon each of the accused-respondents; for the conviction under Section 323 IPC, a fine of Rs.200/-was imposed upon each of the accused-respondents; in default in payment of the aforementioned fine, each of the accused-respondents was directed to undergo ten days S.I., five days S.I. and ten days S.I., respectively. 2. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the appellant-State submits that a written report was lodged by one Mahaveer Prasad Meena (complainant – father of the prosecutrix) on 11.03.1994 at about 05:30 p.m., alleging therein that on 06.03.1994, in the midnight, while his daughter (prosecutrix) was sleeping in a room at home, accused-respondents, namely, Ram Pratap @ Lilu and Ramniwas came there and tucked a cloth in her mouth, and forcefully took her to the house of accused-respondent Ram Pratap @ Lilu; thereafter, both the accused, one by one, subjected the prosecutrix to the forcible sexual intercourse, and after committing such crime, they let her go; after being released from the clutches of the said accused persons, the prosecutrix raised hue and cry; whereupon one Smt. Ghewar and Smt. Bhagwani Devi (mother of the prosecutrix) and other persons came out of their house(s), whereafter, the prosecutrix narrated them the whole incident. 2.1 Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that after the alleged incident being complained of, the accused persons, came to the house of the complainant party and pelted stones/bricks on them, as a result whereof the members of the complainant party received several injuries. 2.2 Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that upon the incident in question came to the knowledge of the complainant (father of the prosecutrix), the aforementioned report was lodged by him; as per the complainant, on the date of lodging of the report, he came to know about the subsequent incident, as aforementioned, resulting into injuries to the members of the complainant party. 2.3 Learned Prosecutor also submits that on the basis of the aforementioned report, the police registered a case for the offences under Sections 376, 366, 452, 147, 149, 336 & 337 IPC and Section 3 of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, and the investigation commenced thereafter; after investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 450, 376, 366A, 447, 147, 149, 336 & 323 IPC and Sections 3(1)(1-7)(12) & 3(2)(5) of the SC/ST Act, was filed before the concerned Magistrate; whereupon owing to the nature of the offences, the matter was transferred to the learned trial court, upon committal, for the necessary adjudication. 2.4 Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that upon the aforementioned charges being denied by the accused-respondents, they were made to stand the trial, and the trial accordingly commenced; in support of its case, the prosecution produced 17 witnesses as well as 31 documents as exhibits. 2.5 Learned Public Prosecutor also submits that the factual matrix of the case, more particularly the allegations levelled against the present accused-respondents, as revealed from the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the one as narrated by the complainant in his complaint, were very much consistent; that apart, the version of the prosecutrix in regard to the incident remained very much consistent during the complete trial. Thus, as per learned Public Prosecutor, such consistency, was sufficient for convicting the accused-respondents, while holding them guilty for the alleged offences, thereby awarding the accused-respondents the sentence of imprisonment, as per the provisions of law. Thus, as per learned Public Prosecutor, such consistency, was sufficient for convicting the accused-respondents, while holding them guilty for the alleged offences, thereby awarding the accused-respondents the sentence of imprisonment, as per the provisions of law. 2.6 As regards the delay in lodging of the FIR, learned Public Prosecutor submits that the said delay had occurred on count of the fact that the complainant (father of the prosecutrix) was away from the place of his residence and the alleged offences were committed on different dates. 2.7 Learned Public Prosecutor further submits that despite the aforementioned backdrop, which clearly reveals that there was neither any inconsistency in the version of the prosecutrix, nor in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, and both were also consistent with the narration as made in the complaint, regarding commission of the crime in question by the accused-respondents, thereby constituting a corroborative evidence, the learned trial court, vide the impugned judgment of partial conviction, acquitted the accused-respondents, of the prime charges levelled against them, while awarding them a meagre punishment of imposition of fine; not only this, the learned trial court, vide the impugned judgment, further ordered the release of the accused-respondents No.1 and 2, namely, Ram Pratap @ Lilu and Ram Niwas, respectively, while treating their custody period, as the period of sentence, as mentioned above. 2.8 Learned Public Prosecutor thus, submits that since the learned trial court has passed the impugned judgment, to the extent of acquittal/partial conviction of the accused-respondents, without taking into due consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the case and without duly appreciating and analyzing the evidence placed on record before it, therefore, the said judgment cannot be sustained in the eye of law, and deserves to be quashed and set aside, to the extent of acquittal of the accused-respondents, more particularly, in light of the fact that the prosecution has proved the case against the accused-respondents, beyond all reasonable doubts. 3. 3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the accused-respondents, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellant-State, submits that the version of the prosecutrix was not only clearly inconsistent with the testimonies of most of the prosecution witnesses before the learned trial court, but the nature of such inconsistencies was such, which projects a a completely different picture of the alleged incident in question, and thus, the said version was not believed by the learned trial court, while passing the impugned judgment, and rightly so. 3.1 Learned counsel further harped upon the inordinate delay in lodging the FIR in connection with the alleged incident, while submitting that the incident in question, which allegedly had occurred on 06.03.1994 (in the night), but the FIR in connection therewith, as is apparent on the face of the record, was lodged on 11.03.1994 at about 05:00 p.m.; further, in regard to such delay, no satisfactory or cogent explanation, on the part of the complainant, was put forth before the learned trial court. 3.1.1. Such a delay in lodging the FIR, as per learned counsel, clearly shows that the present criminal proceeding is nothing, but a consequence of the concocted version, tried to be projected by the complainant, as per his own wishes; not only this, the whole endeavour of the complainant clearly shows that the same is an afterthought; in the backdrop of such delay, a conclusion could be easily drawn, that the present criminal proceedings, as launched against the accused-respondents, more particularly, the invocation of the provisions of the SC/ST Act, are nothing but a method devised by the complainant to settle personal scores with the accused-respondents, owing to the alleged incident of pelting of stones/bricks, as above. 3.2 Learned counsel also submits that the aforementioned unlawful endeavour of the complainant party was set at naught by the learned trial court, by giving a cogent and reasoned finding on each and every aspect of the case, more particularly, in regard to grave consistencies and contradictions between the version of the prosecutrix, complainant and other prosecution witnesses, coupled with gross and inordinate delay in lodging of the FIR, thereby holding that the prosecution has clearly failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts, against the accused-respondents. 3.3 Learned counsel thus submits that the learned trial court, before passing the impugned judgment of partial conviction/partial acquittal, has taken into due consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the case and also duly appreciated and analyzed all the evidence placed on record before it, more particularly, in view of the fact that the prosecution has miserably and completely failed to prove its case against the accused-respondents, beyond all reasonable doubts. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 5. Firstly, coming to the version of the prosecutrix and the medical evidence placed on record, this Court observes that the medical evidence shows that following the alleged incident, the prosecutrix had received no injury – neither on genitals nor on any other body part(s); though, the medical examination of the prosecutrix was done on 12.03.1994 i.e. after six days of the alleged incident, and in all probabilities, even if the traces of alleged crime may have gone after six days, but looking to the version of the prosecutrix herself that she did not receive any injury, despite the alleged forcible sexual intercourse by both the accused-respondents one by one, it is highly improbable that she would not have resisted the alleged forceful criminal act; had the said criminal act been resisted by the prosecutrix, certain traces in the form of injury must have been there on her genitals and/or other parts of the body; further, no blood oozing from the relevant part of the body, also casts a serious doubt upon the prosecution story, as had already been recorded by the learned trial court in the impugned judgment. 6. Secondly, the version of the prosecutrix is that on hearing her cries, Smt. Ghewar went to call her mother and other relatives and neighbours, whereupon they all rushed towards the prosecutrix, and on seeing such persons, the accused-respondents released the prosecutrix and ran away. However, a very pertinent aspect of the case is that even PW-4 Smt. Ghewar, the key prosecution witness, has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution story, which had also been duly dealt with the by the learned trial court in the impugned judgment. However, a very pertinent aspect of the case is that even PW-4 Smt. Ghewar, the key prosecution witness, has turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution story, which had also been duly dealt with the by the learned trial court in the impugned judgment. 6.1 Apart from Smt. Ghewar having turned hostile, the other prosecution witnesses have projected the story to the effect that the prosecutrix herself was coming, after the alleged incident, while crying, and at that time, the prosecution witnesses were at their respective houses, and thus, the version of the prosecutrix that upon seeing the members of the complainant party and other persons, the accused-respondents released the prosecutrix, which makes the version of the prosecutrix highly doubtful and strikes at the very substratum of the prosecution case. 7. Thirdly, as regards the delay in lodging of the FIR, this Court observes that as per the prosecution case itself, the alleged incident had happened on 06.03.1994, whereas the FIR was lodged on 11.03.1994, i.e. after an inordinate delay of five days, that too without any cogent and satisfactory explanation therefor; this is more so, when the complainant (father of the prosecutrix) has come to know about the alleged incident on 08.03.1994, and at the time of the alleged incident other core members of the family were very much there at home, but they did not bother to lodge the FIR immediately. Further, being a police personnel, at the relevant time, the complainant was very much aware about the consequences of a delayed FIR, without any reasonable cause, but despite that, the FIR had been lodged with an inordinate and unexplained delay. The said aspect also substantially strikes at the very root of the prosecution case, for seeking conviction of the accused-respondents for the alleged offences. 8. This Court also observes that the present criminal proceedings have been launched belatedly, as a consequence of the alleged incident of pelting of stones by the accused party on the members of the complainant party. The said aspect also substantially strikes at the very root of the prosecution case, for seeking conviction of the accused-respondents for the alleged offences. 8. This Court also observes that the present criminal proceedings have been launched belatedly, as a consequence of the alleged incident of pelting of stones by the accused party on the members of the complainant party. This observation is strengthened by the fact that a bare perusal of the record, coupled with delayed FIR, shows that there is nothing on record to show that except the incident of pelting of stones, any other cause was available with the complainant party to launch the present criminal proceedings; more particularly, looking into the grave inconsistencies between the version of the prosecutrix and the other key prosecution witnesses, coupled with the pertinent recorded fact of Smt. Ghewar PW-4, the key prosecution witness, having turned completely hostile. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the present criminal proceedings, more particularly the invocation of the provisions of the SC/ST Act are nothing but a gross abuse of the process of law. Hence, all the aforementioned aspects, as discernible from the record, are clearly detrimental to the prosecution case. Moreover, as revealed from the record, once the alleged offences under Sections 450, 376 & 366 IPC were not found to be proved against the accused-respondents, there is no question of convicting and punishing them for the alleged offence under the SC/ST Act. 9. Thus, this Court is of the opinion, that the learned trial court before passing the impugned judgment of partial conviction, has taken into due consideration each and every aspect pertinent and relevant for the purpose of the adjudication, while duly analyzing and appreciating all the evidence placed on record before it. 10. In view of the above, this Court does not find any legal infirmity in the well reasoned impugned judgment of partial conviction passed by the learned trial court, so as to warrant any interference. 11. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed. All pending applications also stand disposed of. Record of the learned court below be sent back forthwith.