JUDGMENT : 1. Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith by consent of the parties. 3. By this Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is challenging the order dated 08.06.2016 passed by the Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum, Nagpur, restricting the period of a bill to 24 months prior to issuance of the bill. 4. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present petition are as under : Respondent No.1 is a Charitable Institution running a School. On 30.07.2007, the electric connection was granted to respondent No.1's premises, and the electricity supply was also started on the same day. According to respondent No.1, the petitioner did not send any bill. Therefore, respondent No.1 on 27.06.2012 requested the employee of the petitioner to issue a bill. According to respondent No.1, on 19.12.2014, a provisional bill of Rs.6,74,093/- was issued without mentioning the period of the bill. It is contended that on 10.03.2015, the bill for the period from 01.10.2012 to 28.02.2015 was issued, which was Rs.6,69,970/-. According to respondent No.1, again on 09.09.2015, the petitioner issued a bill of Rs.9,40,070/-. 5. Respondent No.1 applied to respondent No.2 under Regulation 6.4 of the Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and Electricity Ombudsman) Regulations, 2006. The petitioner filed a reply on 13.05.2016, submitting that on 20.11.2014, employees of the petitioner inspected respondent No.1's meter, and it was observed that the bills were not issued. According to them, therefore, the provisional bill was issued for a period starting from August 2012 to November 2014. It is stated that the matter was reported to Superior Authorities to take action against the erring officer. It is alleged that respondent No.1, towards part payment of the bill, paid Rs.1,00,000/- in December 2015 and Rs.2,48,000/- in March 2016. 6. The learned Consumer Grievance Redressal Forum and respondent No.2 by impugned order directed the petitioner to revise the electricity bill for 30.07.2007 to 20.11.2014. Further, the petitioner shall recover the electricity bill for the period 21.11.2012 to 20.11.2014 for 24 months only without delayed payment charges and interest and adjust part payment made by the petitioner. The petitioner has filed a present petition challenging the order dated 08.06.2016. 7. Mr. S. V. Purohit, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that respondent No.2 could not have restricted the bill up to 2 years preceding the date of the first bill. The petitioner has filed a present petition challenging the order dated 08.06.2016. 7. Mr. S. V. Purohit, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that respondent No.2 could not have restricted the bill up to 2 years preceding the date of the first bill. According to him, charges for electricity consumed become due only after Distribution Licensee issues the demand bill. According to him, there was no dispute regarding the consumption of electricity. According to him, respondent No.2 has misread Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Assistant Engineer (D1), Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and Anr. Vs. Rahamatullah Khan Alias Rahamjulla reported in (2020) 4 SCC 650 and in the case of Prem Cottex Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. and Ors. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 870 to urge that the period of limitation of 2 years starts only after issuance of the bill and therefore, the respondent No.2 was not justified in restricting bill period prior to 24 months from the date of issuance of the bill. 8. Per contra, Mr. S. Y. Deopujari, learned Advocate for the respondent No.1, submitted that Section 56(2) of the said Act entitles Distribution Licensee to demand charges for electricity consumption for a period not more than two years preceding the date of the first demand of such charges. Therefore, according to him, the Distribution Licensee will have to raise demand by issuing a bill, and such bill may include an amount for a period preceding less than two years. He placed reliance upon the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd., Sindhudurg Kudal Vs. Electricity Ombudsman, Mumbai and Anr. reported in 2019 (2) Mh.L.J.884. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both sides and also scrutinized the material on record. 10. Since the bone of contention between the parties is an interpretation of Section 56 of the said Act, the same may be adverted to at the outset. Section 56 of the said Act reads as under : “56. 9. I have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both sides and also scrutinized the material on record. 10. Since the bone of contention between the parties is an interpretation of Section 56 of the said Act, the same may be adverted to at the outset. Section 56 of the said Act reads as under : “56. Disconnection of supply in default of payment.- (1) Where any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any sum other than a charge for electricity due from him to a licensee or the generating company in respect of supply, transmission or distribution or wheeling of electricity to him, the licensee or the generating company may, after giving not less than fifteen clear days' notice in writing, to such person and without prejudice to his rights to recover such charge or other sum by suit, cut off the supply of electricity and for that purpose cut or disconnect any electric supply line or other works being the property of such licensee or the generating company through which electricity may have been supplied, transmitted, distributed or wheeled and may discontinue the supply until such charge or other sum, together with any expenses incurred by him in cutting off and reconnecting the supply, are paid, but no longer: Provided that the supply of electricity shall not be cut off if such person deposits, under protest,— (a) an amount equal to the sum claimed from him, or (b) the electricity charges due from him for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months, whichever is less, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the licensee. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no sum due from any consumer, under this section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due unless such sum has been shown continuously as recoverable as arrear of charges for electricity supplied and the licensee shall not cut off the supply of the electricity.” 11. Section (1) of Section 56 enables the Distribution Licensee or generating company to disconnect the electricity supply when any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any other charge due from him. Section (1) of Section 56 enables the Distribution Licensee or generating company to disconnect the electricity supply when any person neglects to pay any charge for electricity or any other charge due from him. However, before disconnecting the supply, 15 days' clear notice in writing has to be given to such person, and such cutting off or disconnection shall be without prejudice to the rights of the Distribution Licensee to recover such charge of other sums by permissible mode of recovery. In addition, the proviso to Sub-Section (1) disentitles the Distribution Company from disconnecting the supply if such person deposits the amount claimed under protest or deposits electricity charges for each month calculated on the basis of average charge for electricity paid by him during the preceding six months, pending disposal of any dispute between him and the Licensee. 12. Section (2) uses a non-obstante clause with respect to any other law in relation to the right to recover electricity charges, including the right to disconnect. 13. The Full Bench of this Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (supra) was called upon to render its opinion on the following three questions. “(i) Whether irrespective of the provisions of Section 56(2) of the Electricity Act, 2003, Distribution Licensee can demand charges for consumption of electricity for a period of more than two years preceding the date of the first demand of such charges; (ii) Whether the charges for electricity consumed become due only after a demand bill is issued by the Distribution Licensee and whether the Distribution Licensee can issue a demand bill even for the period preceding more than two years from the date of issuance of the demand bill notwithstanding the provision of Sub-Section (2) of Section 56 of the Electricity Act, 2003; (iii) Which of the Judgments of the Division Bench, namely Awadesh S. Pandey vs. Tata Power Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 289 = AIR 2007 Bombay 52 or the Judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Rototex Polyester and another, reported in 2009 MhLJ Online 58 = 2010(4) BCR 456 have cor-rectly interpreted the provisions of section 56(2) of the Electricity Act.” 14. While answering the questions, the Full Bench of this Court, in paragraph No.79, has held as under : “79. While answering the questions, the Full Bench of this Court, in paragraph No.79, has held as under : “79. As a result of the above discussion, the issues referred for our opinion are answered as under:- (A) The issue No.(i) is answered in the negative. The Distribution Licensee cannot demand charges for consumption of electricity for a period of more than two years preceding the date of the first demand of such charges. (B) As regards issue No.(ii), in the light of the answer to Issue No.(i) above, this issue will also have to be answered accordingly. In other words, the Distribution Licensee will have to raise a demand by issuing a bill, and the bill may include the amount for the period preceding more than two years provided the condition set out in subsection (2) of Section 56 is satisfied. In this sense, the amount is carried and shown as arrears in terms of that provision. (C) The issue No.(iii) is answered in terms of our discussion in paras 77 & 78 of this Judgment.” 15. Reading of the judgment of the Full Bench makes it clear that while interpreting Sub-Section (2) of Section 56, the Full Bench had held that the Distribution Licensee could recover the Electricity charges due to the consumer only for a period of 2 years when such sum became first due. The Full Bench has held that the Distribution Licensee cannot demand charges for electricity consumption for more than two years preceding the date of first demand of such charges. 16. According to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court is no longer good law in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rahamatullah Khan and Prem Cottex (supra). 17. In the case of Rahamatullah Khan (supra), the Distribution Licensee issued a show-cause notice on 18.03.2014 by way of additional demand for electricity consumption for a period from July 2009 to September 2011. The District Consumer Forum held that the additional demand was time barred. In the context of those facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the liability to pay arises from electricity consumption. However, the obligation to pay would arise only when the Licensee Company issues the bill. Therefore, the electricity charges would become "first due” only after the bill is issued to the consumer. In the context of those facts, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that the liability to pay arises from electricity consumption. However, the obligation to pay would arise only when the Licensee Company issues the bill. Therefore, the electricity charges would become "first due” only after the bill is issued to the consumer. It must be noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of Rahamatullah Khan (supra), was dealing with a case of additional demands and not original demands as in the facts of the present case. The Hon’ble Apex Court, therefore, framed the issue for consideration, which reads as under : “7. The next issue is as to whether the period of limitation of two years provided by Section 56(2) of the Act, would be applicable to an additional or supplementary demand.” 18. In the context of the issue of additional demand, it was held in paragraph Nos. 8 and 9 as under : “8. Section 56(2), however, does not preclude the licensee company from raising a supplementary demand after the expiry of the limitation period of two years. It only restricts the right of the licensee to disconnect electricity supply due to non-payment of dues after the period of limitation of two years has expired, nor does it restrict other modes of recovery which may be initiated by the licensee company for recovery of a supplementary demand. 9. Applying the aforesaid ratio to the facts of the present case, the licensee company raised an additional demand on 18-3-2014 for the period July 2009 to September 2011. The licensee company discovered the mistake of billing under the wrong Tariff Code on 18-3-2014. The limitation period of two years under Section 56(2) had by then already expired.” 19. It needs to be noted that the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering facts in paragraph No.9, observed that the limitation period of 2 years under Section 56(2) had by then already expired. Therefore, in my opinion, since the Hon'ble Apex Court was not considering the case of original demand but was considering the case of additional demand, the judgment in the case of Rahamatullah Khan (supra) does not take away the force of ratio of the Full Bench of this Court. 20. In the case of Prem Cottex (supra) also, the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the case of supplementary demands. 20. In the case of Prem Cottex (supra) also, the Hon'ble Apex Court was considering the case of supplementary demands. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in paragraph Nos.14 and 15, held as under : “14. But a careful reading of Section 56(2) would show that the bar contained therein is not merely with respect to disconnection of supply but also with respect to recovery. If Sub-section (2) of Section 56 is dissected into two parts it will read as follows:- (i) No sum due from any consumer under this Section shall be recoverable after the period of two years from the date when such sum became first due; and (ii) the licensee shall not cut off the supply of electricity. 15. Therefore, the bar actually operates on two distinct rights of the licensee, namely, (i) the right to recover; and (ii) the right to disconnect. The bar with reference to the enforcement of the right to disconnect, is actually an exception to the law of limitation. Under the law of limitation, what is extinguished is the remedy and not the right. To be precise, what is extinguished by the law of limitation, is the remedy through a court of law and not a remedy available, if any, de hors through a court of law. However, Section 56(2) bars not merely the normal remedy of recovery but also bars the remedy of disconnection. This is why we think that the second part of Section 56(2) is an exception to the law of limitation.” 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph No.26 has observed as under : “26. The matter can be examined from another angle as well. Sub-section (1) of Section 56 as discussed above, deals with the disconnection of electric supply if any person “neglects to pay any charge for electricity”. The question of neglect to pay would arise only after a demand is raised by the licensee. If the demand is not raised, there is no occasion for a consumer to neglect to pay any charge for electricity. Su-section (2) of Section 56 has a non-obstante clause with respect to what is contained in any other law, regarding the right to recover including the right to disconnect. If the demand is not raised, there is no occasion for a consumer to neglect to pay any charge for electricity. Su-section (2) of Section 56 has a non-obstante clause with respect to what is contained in any other law, regarding the right to recover including the right to disconnect. Therefore, if the licensee has not raised any bill, there can be no negligence on the part of the consumer to pay the bill and consequently the period of limitation prescribed under Sub-section (2) will not start running. So long as limitation has not started running, the bar for recovery and disconnection will not come into effect. Hence the decision in Rahamatullah Khan and Section 56(2) will not go to the rescue of the appellant.” 22. On reading the ratio in the case of Prem Cottx (supra), in my opinion, the ratio of the Full Bench of this Court is no way affected. In my opinion, therefore, the learned Advocate for the petitioner is not right in submitting that the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court is no longer good law in view of judgments in the case of Rahamatullah Khan and Prem Cottex (supra). 23. Taking overall view of the matter and considering the view laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (supra), I am of the opinion that respondent No.2 was fully justified in restricting rights of the petitioner for issuance of demand prior to 24 months of the date of the bill. Therefore, there are no merits in the petition. 24. The petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 25. Pending Civil Application(s), if any, stand(s), disposed of.