JUDGMENT : 1. This is a tenant's writ petition, challenging an order of release and eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972) (for short, ‘the Act’) passed concurrently by the two Authorities below. 2. Shyam Sundar Gupta moved an application for release and eviction under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act before the Prescribed Authority (Civil Judge, Sr. Div., Shahjahanpur), seeking release of the shop, detailed at the foot of the application and currently in the tenancy occupation of Smt. Kusum Lata, the petitioner. The application was moved by Shyam Sundar Gupta, hereinafter referred to as 'the landlord' with a case that the shop, subject matter of proceedings (for short, 'the demised shop') was exclusively owned by the landlord. The demised shop had fallen to the landlord's share in a family settlement on 24.04.1998, a fact admitted to Smt. Kusum Lata. Smt. Kusum Lata has, later on in proceedings before the Courts below, been referred to as Smt. Kusum Gupta. It is clarified that Smt. Kusum Lata and Smt. Kusum Gupta are one and the same person. For the sake of convenience, Smt. Kusum Gupta shall hereinafter be referred to as 'the tenant'. 3. It is the landlord's case that the tenant is in occupation of the demised shop at a monthly rent of Rs.800/-since 27.11.1987. The landlord's father, Radhey Shyam Gupta had executed a registered lease dated 27.11.1987 in the tenant's favour, letting out the demised shop for a term of ten years with a stipulation that at the end of every ten years, if the term of the tenancy is enlarged, there would be an escalation in rent for the next ten years by 10% automatically. The landlord's father passed away in the year 1997 and the landlord, in the events to follow, did not renew or extend the lease. In consequence, the term of the lease has not been renewed and the tenancy has outlived its life. It is no longer current. It was also pleaded by the landlord that the demised shop was constructed, admittedly prior to the year 1987 and is, accordingly, governed by the provisions of the Act. The landlord is employed with the Ordnance Factory at Shahjahanpur and scheduled to retire on 30.06.2011. He is serving on the post of Inspector (Tailoring). It is no longer current. It was also pleaded by the landlord that the demised shop was constructed, admittedly prior to the year 1987 and is, accordingly, governed by the provisions of the Act. The landlord is employed with the Ordnance Factory at Shahjahanpur and scheduled to retire on 30.06.2011. He is serving on the post of Inspector (Tailoring). The landlord asserted that post retirement, he would estimatedly draw a pension of Rs.5000/-per mensem. During service, the landlord has drawn excessively from his Provident Fund to meet contingent expenditure, according to requirements of the family. The said withdrawal has been made in advance. Likewise, the residue of the landlord's gratuity is a negligible sum. Upon his retirement, the landlord requires the demised shop to keep himself busy, augment his income to secure himself against age-related ailments, to earn money for defraying the expenses of his daughter's wedding, and above all, to settle his younger son in business, where there is tough competition to face. It is on all the above counts that the landlord needs the demised shop bona fide. 4. The landlord has, in his family, besides himself, his aged mother, his wife Smt. Vijay Laxmi, two sons Saurabh Gupta and Tushar Gupta and a daughter Km. Shweta Gupta. The landlord's wife is a teacher at the Baba Vishwanath Junior High School, Town Hall Road, Shahjahanpur on a monthly salary of Rs.5000/-. The elder son Saurabh Gupta is a Public Relations Officer with the Bajaj Allianz and posted at NOIDA. He is a married man, who receives a total monthly salary of Rs.18,000/-. He resides with his wife at NOIDA. Given the dearness in the present times, he does not extend any financial help to the landlord nor is he capable of doing that. The landlord's other son, Tushar Gupta has passed his Intermediate Examination and after retirement, the landlord would not be in a position to educate his son further. Accordingly, he needs the demised shop to enable his son to be by his side in order to establish and run a shop, dealing in cosmetics, clothes, saaris, branded shirts, trousers etc. The landlord's daughter is aged 24 years and has done her graduation. She can well take care of the household and the landlord bears the responsibility of arranging her marriage. After retirement, the landlord would be without livelihood. The landlord's daughter is aged 24 years and has done her graduation. She can well take care of the household and the landlord bears the responsibility of arranging her marriage. After retirement, the landlord would be without livelihood. He has no such member in the family domiciled at Shahjahanpur, whom the landlord may look up to in times of need and one who could provide for the landlord or his family or help them in any manner. In the circumstances, the only option available to the landlord is to seek release of the demised shop and establish his own shop therein, which would enable the landlord to stay active until he lives in the mortal world, and at the same time, marry off his daughter. It would also help him ensure that his son Tushar Gupta becomes proficient in business. It is the landlord's assertion that there is no other shop, besides the demised shop to establish himself and his son in business. 5. By contrast, it is said for the tenant that he has two daughters, both of whom have received higher education in Ghaziabad and are in receipt of handsome emoluments. They are settled at Delhi. The tenant's son, Amit, who was married recently, owns a number of tankers that he not only leases out for transportation, but also uses them to carry his own goods for trade in those tankers. The tenant's relationship with her son is not cordial. In the event, the tenant vacates the demised shop, she would not suffer any hardship. Her husband Ashok Kumar is engaged in the business of a cloth merchant and earlier, would trade in gold biscuits that he bought in Bombay and sold off in Shahjahanpur. The balance of comparative hardship lies in favour of the landlord. It was also pleaded by the landlord that the tenant keeps indifferent schedule and opens shop once in a while during the course of a week or two. In case the tenant vacates the demised shop, she would not suffer any injury. She can easily shift business to another premises, whereas the landlord has no other alternative arrangement. It would be very inappropriate if the landlord establishes his shop taking the premises on rent though he has his own. In case the tenant vacates the demised shop, she would not suffer any injury. She can easily shift business to another premises, whereas the landlord has no other alternative arrangement. It would be very inappropriate if the landlord establishes his shop taking the premises on rent though he has his own. At a distance of 200 yards from the demised shop, which is located in the Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur, is the shop of one Krishna Gopal. The said shop is a big one and located on the roadside. It is situate in Mohalla Sadar Bazar, opposite the Arya Mahila Degree College. The said shop is available on rent and also up for sale. The entire circumstances, including how Krishna Gopal's business in the said shop has come to an end, have been pleaded by the landlord, as also the fact that the shop available on rent, and otherwise lying closed. It is on the basis of these averments that the landlord asked the demised shop to be released. 6. The tenant put in his written statement and admitted the execution of the lease deed dated 27.11.1987 and the terms thereof. The fact, that the Act applies, is also admitted to the tenant. In the additional pleas, it is the tenant's case that she entered the demised shop as a tenant on a monthly rent of Rs.800/-through the registered lease deed dated 27.11.1987, executed by Radhey Shyam Gupta. According to the covenants in the lease, the term is ten years, whereafter it is extendable by ten years, that is to say, up to the year 2007. It is also provided in the lease that after the first extension of ten years, a further extension of another ten years can be done, which would secure the lease up to the year 2017. Thereafter, the tenancy could continue by consent of parties. As such, the tenant's case is that given the terms of the lease, the landlord is not entitled to institute the present proceedings for release, which are premature and, therefore, not maintainable. The lease has not expired by efflux of time. The application for release has been instituted contrary to terms of the lease. The case is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. According to the tenant, the landlord is bent upon evicting the tenant by stating falsehood and thereby extinguish her source of livelihood. The lease has not expired by efflux of time. The application for release has been instituted contrary to terms of the lease. The case is barred by the principle of estoppel and acquiescence. According to the tenant, the landlord is bent upon evicting the tenant by stating falsehood and thereby extinguish her source of livelihood. In order to fulfill the aforesaid wish of his, the landlord served a notice dated 22.12.1997, that was replied to by the tenant. This was followed by a notice served by the landlord himself. It was absolutely baseless and demanded of the tenant to vacate the demised shop, besides raising an illegal demand of rent etc. A suit for eviction was instituted in the Court of the Judge, Small Cause being S.C.C. Suit No. 14 of 1999, seeking the tenant's eviction. The said suit was tried and dismissed by the Trial Judge vide judgment and decree dated 25.05.2011. 7. It is tenant's case that the aforesaid facts show that it is the landlord's desire to evict the tenant, which has not been fulfilled so far. The case is said to be barred by res judicata as well. The landlord draws a monthly pension of Rs.35,000/-. He has received a lavish sum of money towards Provident Fund, Gratuity and Group Insurance. The landlord's wife is a Headmistress. She draws a salary of Rs.40,000/-per month. The elder son Saurabh Gupta is employed with the Bajaj Allianz at NOIDA, drawing a monthly sum of Rs.50,000/-. His wife is also in service and earns a salary of Rs.30,000/-per month. The younger son Tushar Gupta, whose need has been pleaded by the landlord alongside his own, after doing his graduation, is preparing to write the examinations for selection to the Indian Administrative Service or the Provincial Civil Service. He has his interest in education; not in trade or business. He wants to become an Officer. The landlord's daughter is already married. The landlord is leading a luxurious life and has no need for the demised shop to establish his business. Also, the landlord is not capable of doing business, of which he has no experience. He has never been detailed by the Ordnance Factory on jobs of sale and purchase of clothes. The case that the landlord has made out is a device to evict the tenant. Also, the landlord is not capable of doing business, of which he has no experience. He has never been detailed by the Ordnance Factory on jobs of sale and purchase of clothes. The case that the landlord has made out is a device to evict the tenant. Thereafter, he would let out the shop on rent after charging a big premium. The landlord's son is not unemployed and his need neither genuine nor bona fide. In the event the demised shop is not vacated, the landlord would not face any difficulty. By contrast, if the tenant is evicted, she would suffer great hardship. The business housed in the demised shop is the only source of livelihood for the tenant and members of her family. The tenant and her family, if evicted, would be reduced to penury. They would suffer greater hardship in comparison to the landlord. 8. The tenant has earned goodwill at the place, that is to say, the demised shop, where she has been doing business. Her husband has been assisting her in the venture. He has no business of his own. The landlord's assertions, to the contrary, are incorrect. There is no other shop close by or in the vicinity, that can be secured on rent by the tenant. The shop, which the landlord says belongs to Krishna Gopal and claimed to be available on rent, is not being offered for rent; or even for sale. The tenant has searched for a shop in the entire Bazar, but could find none. The landlord owns other shops that are in his possession and if he wants to set up business, he can utilize one of those shops. It is also pleaded that none of the tenant's daughters have received education in Ghaziabad. Both of them have read in Sudama Prasad Bal Vidya Mandir, Shahjahanpur and one of them has passed her Intermediate, whereas the other has appeared in the examination privately. The younger daughter of the tenant is married. The elder is yet to marry. The tenant's son is engaged in the job selling building material at Bareilly (Ret-Bajari). He does not own tankers, nor does he offer them on rent for transportation. He is financially not well off. It has been admitted that the relationship of the tenant and her son is not cordial. The elder is yet to marry. The tenant's son is engaged in the job selling building material at Bareilly (Ret-Bajari). He does not own tankers, nor does he offer them on rent for transportation. He is financially not well off. It has been admitted that the relationship of the tenant and her son is not cordial. He is not in possession of the tenant's house or any part of it, as claimed. The tenant has asked on these pleadings that the landlord's application for release be dismissed. 9. The landlord in support of his case filed by way of documentary evidence, a photostat copy of the memorandum of family settlement and photostat copy of the map annexed to the memorandum dated 24.04.1998. These bear Paper Nos. 33 and 32, respectively. Further, an affidavit was filed by the landlord, Shyam Sundar Gupta in support of his case for release bearing Paper No. 33B, another affidavit by PW-2 Manoj Kumar, Paper No. 33C, still another by Shiv Prasad Gupta PW-3, Paper No. 33D and an affidavit of PW-4 Jagdish Prasad, Paper No. 33E. Shyam Sundar Gupta also filed his counter affidavit, bearing Paper No. 92 and an affidavit of Tushar Gupta, his son, Paper No. 94. 10. The tenant filed her own affidavit, bearing Paper No. 77, besides that of Ashok Kumar Gupta, Paper No. 85 and that of Alok Kumar, Paper No. 86. In addition, affidavit of one Vinod Kumar Singh Tanwar was also filed, Paper No. 87. Ashok Kumar Gupta also filed a counter affidavit, bearing Paper No. 96. 11. The Prescribed Authority framed the followings issues (translated into English from Hindi): (1) Whether the applicant's case is premature? (2) Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between parties? (3) The issue of bona fide need. (4) The balance of comparative hardship/ if in the event of release of the demised shop (or refusal), which party would suffer greater hardship? 12. The Prescribed Authority held that the release application was not premature, because on the date it came up for determination, the period of lease that could be the maximum extension, that is to say, up to 27.11.2017, was over. About the relationship of landlord and tenant between parties, it was held in favour of the landlord on the tenant's admission. The Prescribed Authority held that the release application was not premature, because on the date it came up for determination, the period of lease that could be the maximum extension, that is to say, up to 27.11.2017, was over. About the relationship of landlord and tenant between parties, it was held in favour of the landlord on the tenant's admission. The issue of bona fide need was answered for the landlord upon evaluation of evidence led by both sides and so was the comparative hardship. The release application was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide judgment and order dated 18.04.2018, ordering the tenant to deliver possession of the demised shop to the landlord within three months, failing which the landlord would have the right to recover the same through process of Court. This order carried the usual direction to the landlord to pay two years' rent within 45 days to the tenant. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority was questioned in appeal under Section 22 of the Act, which was rather unconventionally nomenclatured as a Civil Appeal, before the Court of the District Judge, Shahjahanpur. It was assigned Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2018 and heard by the District Judge, sitting as the Appellate Authority under the Act. The District Judge, by her judgment and order impugned dated 24.12.2018, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order passed by the Prescribed Authority. 13. Dissatisfied with the orders of release passed by the two Courts below, the tenant has instituted the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. Notice pending admission was issued on 12.03.2019 and stay of eviction was granted on the condition of deposit of rent/ damages at the rate of Rs. 5000/-per month with effect from the month of March, 2019. Pending admission, parties have exchanged affidavits. Later on, the petition was formally admitted to hearing, which proceeded forthwith and judgment was reserved. 15. Heard Mr. Kshitij Shailendra, learned Counsel for the tenant and Mr. Utpal Chaterjee, Advocate along with Mr. Shireesh Gopesh, Advocate, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord. 16. Mr. Kshitij Shailendra, learned Counsel for the tenant has extensively argued on the issue that the release application was premature when made, because the term of the lease had not come to an end by that time. Utpal Chaterjee, Advocate along with Mr. Shireesh Gopesh, Advocate, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the landlord. 16. Mr. Kshitij Shailendra, learned Counsel for the tenant has extensively argued on the issue that the release application was premature when made, because the term of the lease had not come to an end by that time. He further submits that it was not stricto sensu a lease for a fixed term, since it carried an initial term of ten years, renewable for another ten years twice, at the expiration of the initial period of lease or the term first extended. This submission the learned Counsel for the tenant has come up with in the context of the provisions of Section 21(4) of the Act, which read: “Section 21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant.– (1) x x x x (2) x x x x (3) x x x x (4) An order under sub-section (1) or sub-section(1-A) or sub-section (2), may be made notwithstanding that the tenancy has not been determined: Provided that no such order shall be made in the case of a tenancy created for a fixed term by a registered lease before the expiry of such term. ……...” (Emphasis by Court) 17. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the landlord instituted proceedings for release, moving the application before the Prescribed Authority in the month of April, 2011. The registered lease was executed on 27.11.1987 with a right to the tenant to ask for extension for a period of ten years after the initial term was over and a further right to again ask for a ten years’ renewal, when the first extension was over. The lease would, thus, come to an end not before 26.11.2017. It is submitted that the Courts below have misconstrued the terms of the registered lease, particularly the Appellate Court, when it has remarked that the lease expired in the year 2007 and the release application was filed after that date. This is contrary to the terms of the lease deed as well as the admission of the landlord, where he says that the period of lease expired on 26.11.2017. This is contrary to the terms of the lease deed as well as the admission of the landlord, where he says that the period of lease expired on 26.11.2017. The attention of the Court in this connection was invited to the landlord's counter affidavit, Paper No. 92C, where in Paragraph No. 9, the landlord has averred that the lease deed dated 27.11.1987 was for a fixed period of ten years, renewable twice, each for a period of ten years, and, accordingly, on 26.11.2017, the tenancy would come to an end by efflux of time. 18. The learned Counsel for the tenant has, on this point also, criticized the judgment of the Prescribed Authority in that, that she placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Manorama Dubey vs. Dr. Santosh Kumar Khanna and others, 2017 (3) ARC 468 regarding the term of tenancy and a fortiori the prematurity of action. It is urged that the said judgment is not at all applicable here, because that was a case of subsequent purchase and the necessity of notice by the subsequent purchaser in terms of the first proviso to Section 21. 19. The learned Counsel for the landlord, on the other hand, has submitted that the period of tenancy/ lease fixed by the registered sale deed dated 27.11.1987 was a term of ten years, extendable twice for the same period, that is to say, a total period of 30 years, with the consent of the landlord alone. It is urged that Radhey Shyam Gupta, the landlord's father, who had let out the demised shop passed away on 22.12.1997. After family settlement, the demised shop fell to the landlord's share. He has been attorned as the landlord by the tenant. It is urged that right from the year 1997 till date, the landlord has never consented to the extension of the tenancy in accordance with the registered lease deed. In this connection, Mr. Utpal Chaterjee has drawn the Court's attention to Clause 2 of the lease at Page 90 of the paper-book and submits that there is no evidence about the two further renewals for ten years, in terms of the covenant for renewal carried in the registered lease deed. As such, the term of the lease expired on 26.11.1987 and the release application moved in the year 2011, is not premature at all. 20. As such, the term of the lease expired on 26.11.1987 and the release application moved in the year 2011, is not premature at all. 20. This Court has carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for both parties, perused the lease deed, in particular, and the record. 21. In order to appreciate the contention of the parties, the terms of demise made through the registered lease deed dated 27.11.1987 and Clause 2 of the lessee's covenants, including Clause 5 of the lessor's covenants must be referred to. These read: “THIS INDENTURE made at Shahjahanpur, this 26th day of November One Thousand Nine Hundred and Eight Seven between Sri Radhey Shyam Gupta S/o Late Shyam Lal Gupta, resident of Mohalla Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur hereinafter called “The Lessor” (which expression shall shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof deemed to include his respective heirs and executors) of the FIRST PART; and Srimati Kusum Gupta W/o Sri Ashok Kumar R/o Moh. Bahadurganj, District Shahjahanpur, hereinafter called “The Lessee” (which express shall unless it be repugnant to the context or meaning thereof be deemed to include her heirs and executors) of the OTHER PART. Witnesseth that for and on the consideration of rent hereinafter reserved and of the convenant and conditions hereinafter contained and on the part of the Lessee to be paid, observed and performed the Lessor to do hereby demise and lease unto the Lessee a portion of the ground-floor of the residential building on the Eastern Side, hereinafter called “the premises” measuring 327.42 sq. ft. (15’- 10.5”x20’-5”) more or less for the purpose of shop bounded as under situated in Bazar-Sadar Bazar, Shahjahanpur and of which the Lessee will be in occupation TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said demised or expressed so to be unto the Lessor for the term of ten years YIELDING AND PAYING therefor during the said term unto the Lessee, the clear monthly rent of Rs.800/- only (Rupees Eight Hundred Only) to be paid monthly from the date of handing over possession of the premises intended to be leased to the Lessee, i.e. 27 Nov. 1987 after the execution of these presents. 1987 after the execution of these presents. THE LESSEE’S CONVENANTS 1- x x x x 2- The Lessee will have option to renew the said lease for a further period upto the extent of another ten years at the enhanced rent of 10% and upon the same terms and conditions. The Lessee may further opt to renew the lease for another period of next ten years at a further enhanced rent of 10% on the rent prevailing at the time of expiry of the schedule lease and upon the same terms and conditions, except the clause for further renewal and to this condition the Lessor will not be entitled to object in any case;” THE LESSOR’S CONVENANTS 5- The Lessor shall grant renewal of the said lease by mutual consent or otherwise for a further period of ten years and so on the terms and conditions as mentioned in para No.2 of this lease the Lessee’s convenants as aforesaid mentioned.” 22. A conjoint perusal of the terms of the demise, initially created by the registered lease deed and the relevant covenants in the deed, in this Court's opinion, make the time period of the tenancy patent. The registered lease deed creates a fixed term lease for a period of ten years w.e.f. 27.11.1987. Upon its own term, it would come to an end on 26.11.1997. Clause 2 of the lessee's covenants and the corresponding Clause 5 of the lessor's covenants, empower the lessee to demand extension of the lease twice for a period of ten years; first on the expiry of the initial term; and, second, on the expiry of the extended term of ten years. A close reading of Clause 2 of the lessee's covenant shows that the lessee has a right to seek extension, which the lessor by virtue of Clause 5 of his covenants is bound to extend, because the words ‘mutual consent’ occurring in the lessor's covenant in Clause 5 is followed by 'or otherwise' and goes on to say that the renewal is to be made on the terms and conditions as mentioned in Clause 2. Clause 2 gives an option to the lessee to ask for renewal, which does not appear upon any construction of the terms to admit of a right of refusal by the lessor. Clause 2 gives an option to the lessee to ask for renewal, which does not appear upon any construction of the terms to admit of a right of refusal by the lessor. The consequence is that the registered lease deed dated 27.11.1987 is indeed a fixed term lease, carrying a covenant for renewal in the terms indicated. 23. The legal position about a covenant for renewal, which the lessee is entitled to have as a matter of right, does not mean that on the expiry of the initial term of the lease fixed, the renewal comes by ipso facto. Even if the lessor is bound to grant renewal on the lessee's demand or option, that renewal has to be granted in accordance with law. Since it is a case of a lease for a term exceeding one year, like the lease originally made in terms of the lease deed dated 27.11.1987, the deed of renewal of lease for the next ten years also has to be one made by a registered instrument. This is the inescapable conclusion upon a reading of the terms of Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, which say: “107. Leases how made.— A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.” 24. This Court, in the view that we take, holds that a covenant in the lease deed providing for renewal does not ipso facto extend the term of the lease. This Court, in the view that we take, holds that a covenant in the lease deed providing for renewal does not ipso facto extend the term of the lease. The view that we take has the assurance of the holding of the Supreme Court in Syed Sugara Zaidi vs. Laeeq Ahmad (Dead) through LRs and others, (2018) 2 SCC 21 . In Syed Sugara Zaidi (supra), it has been held by their Lordships: “14. The term in the lease agreement for renewal of lease deed does not ipso facto extend the tenure or term of the lease. So far as the clause for renewal in the lease deed is concerned, it was held in DDA v. Durga Chand Kaushish, (1973) 2 SCC 825 that such covenant only entitled a lessee to obtain a fresh lease in accordance with and in due satisfaction of the law governing the making of leases. In the absence of renewal of rent agreement, in our considered view, the possession of the respondent-tenants in the demised premises has become unlawful and they are liable to be evicted.” 25. There is another feature about the covenant of renewal in this case. It provides for an automatic escalation of rent by 10% of the monthly rent payable on each event of renewal. There is nothing on record to show that rent was ever enhanced from that initially fixed in the sum of Rs.800/-per month; and even if it was, there is no evidence to show that there was ever executed a deed of renewal of lease for a further term of ten years in terms of the covenant for renewal. This Court is, therefore, of opinion that the term of the registered lease deed dated 27.11.1987 expired on 26.11.1997. There was no renewal of the lease made in accordance with law, even though the tenant had a right to claim it and the landlord was bound to grant it in terms of the covenants of the lessor and the lessee, carried in the registered lease deed. The term of the lease deed, thus, came to an end on 26.11.1997. Under the general law, the tenant would then continue as a tenant at sufferance and since the Act applies, she would be a statutory tenant under it. There is, thus, no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant that the release application was premature. Under the general law, the tenant would then continue as a tenant at sufferance and since the Act applies, she would be a statutory tenant under it. There is, thus, no force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenant that the release application was premature. For reasons, very different than those that have weighed with the Courts below, this Court concurs in the conclusion reached on the aforesaid issue by them. 26. The next point to be considered is whether the findings of the two Courts below on the issue of the bona fide need of the landlord is vitiated on account of perversity, manifest illegality or non-consideration of material evidence. 27. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the findings recorded by the Courts below on the issue of bona fide need are perverse and it is a case where the landlord had not approached the Prescribed Authority with clean hands. It is urged that his claim was based upon gross concealment of facts, particularly with respect to his status, availability of heavy funds with him, his monthly income, income and status of his sons and wife, as well as the existence of two shops, located to the west of his residential premises, that form part of the same building, that houses his residence. It is submitted that these shops were let out by the landlord after his retirement. Learned Counsel for the landlord has refuted the aforesaid submissions and said that it is up to the landlord to decide, which of the tenanted accommodation that he owns, he wishes to be released for the fulfillment of his bona fide need. 28. Upon hearing learned Counsel and perusing the impugned judgments as well as the records, what this Court finds is that the primary inquiry to be made on the question of bona fide need is to determine whether the need set up by the landlord is an existing need for himself or a member of his family. The need that has been set up here is for the landlord himself and his unemployed son, Tushar to set up a retail outlet dealing in clothes, cosmetics etc. The need that has been set up here is for the landlord himself and his unemployed son, Tushar to set up a retail outlet dealing in clothes, cosmetics etc. The landlord's need that has been made the basis of the case for release is that post retirement, he needs an occupation for himself to keep himself busy and further for the augmentation of his income. The coupled need for his son is to establish the young man in business, training him along the way so that it becomes an independent source of livelihood for him. Now, neither of the two needs, under the circumstances, can be said to be unreasonable or fanciful. The Courts below have found that the landlord's son, Tushar has earned his M.Com. decree, pending proceedings and what appears is that when proceedings commenced before the Prescribed Authority, Tushar had passed his intermediate. By the time, proceedings before the Authority of first instance reached terminus, Tushar had passed his M.Com. The Courts below have not found Tushar to be engaged in any gainful and stable employment. According to the tenant's case also, Tushar, after passing his M.Com., is engaged in offering tuitions and coaching, that yields him Rs. 40,000/-per month. Tuition and coaching sans evidence of proceeds from that pursuit, is the most flimsy pretext to show an educated man or woman to be gainfully employed. The Courts below have not believed this engagement of Tushar to be gainful or yielding or even existing. There is no reason for this Court to take a contrary view in the absence of some material evidence that the Courts below have omitted to consider on this point. The landlord can certainly seek release of any premises that he owns, in the occupation of a tenant, to settle an adult member of his family in business, trade, occupation or profession, utilizing the tenanted accommodation. The need for provision of occupation to an adult member of the landlord's family is a good ground to support a case of bona fide need, urged by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Dr. K. Gopal vs. Smt. Sudarshan Devi Bhatia, 2012 (92) ALR 364, where it has been held: “56. It is not possible to accept this submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Dr. K. Gopal vs. Smt. Sudarshan Devi Bhatia, 2012 (92) ALR 364, where it has been held: “56. It is not possible to accept this submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. It is no doubt true that the husband and the two sons of the landlady are engaged in the business of silver ornaments from the house situated at Kali Thatheran Chowk Bazar, Mathura, but the documents on record filed by the parties indicate that the business was being run in the name of the elder son of the landlady. The landlady had filed the application for release of the disputed shop as she wanted to establish her younger son Pankaj in independent business. It cannot be said that such a need is not a bonafide need even if Pankaj was actually assisting his father and his brother in the business from the residential house. This is what has been observed by the Supreme Court in Akhileshwar Kumar v. Mustaqim, AIR 2003 SC 532 which has been relied by the Appellate Court and the observations are:- “3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiff No. 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of plaintiff No. 4, i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons.” 29. To the same effect is the holding of this Court in Kishore Kumar Chaurasia vs. Durga Devi, 2016 (2) ARC 642 and that of the Uttarakhand High Court in Gyan Prakash vs. Ram Kumar Goyal, 2017 (1) ARC 413. 30. The other limb, on which the case of bona fide need is urged by the landlord, is about his own occupation and augmentation of income. 30. The other limb, on which the case of bona fide need is urged by the landlord, is about his own occupation and augmentation of income. There is no doubt about it that the landlord is a retired government servant and merely because he is enjoying a pension or has received post-retirement funds, is no ground to deny him the benefit of seeking augmentation of his income or finding for himself an occupation to keep himself busy. The said requirement of the landlord’s is also one that validly supports a case of bona fide need. The view that the Courts have taken on the issue of bona fide need is one that is a reasonable inference on facts and evidence, bearing in mind the law applicable. 31. The other aspect emphasized by the learned Counsel for the tenant is that the the landlord has two shops to the west of his residential premises, that were not disclosed in the release application and which he let out after his retirement. The Courts below, particularly, the Appellate Court has taken note of the fact that it took the tenant a long period of time to file a written statement– a period of about four years. The Appellate Court has noticed that the tenant in her affidavit has deposed that the landlord has suppressed the fact from the Court that to the west of his house, there are two shops. It is remarked that though the tenant and her husband have said in their affidavits that the two shops to the west of the landlord's house have been recently constructed, the two photographs of these shops annexed, showing a jeweller and courier company housed there, indicate the shops to be quite small. The fact that the shops are small is a finding of fact recorded by the Appellate Court on the basis of material placed on record by the tenant. The tenant has not brought on record the precise dimensions of these shops to rebut the Court's impression about the shops being small. 32. It has also been remarked that considering that the shops have been recently constructed, the time when the landlord moved the release application, these shops would not have been in existence. The tenant has not brought on record the precise dimensions of these shops to rebut the Court's impression about the shops being small. 32. It has also been remarked that considering that the shops have been recently constructed, the time when the landlord moved the release application, these shops would not have been in existence. The precise date of construction of the shops or whether the shops were in existence at the time when the application was presented, does not appear to be there on record. The Appellate Court has concluded that when the release application was filed, the landlord had no other shop. This Court must observe that whether the shops were in existence before the release application was filed or these were subsequently constructed and let out during release proceedings, the Courts of fact below have opined that the shops to the west of the landlord's premises appear to be small. The landlord has a right to use his resources and raise constructions on his premises that might yield him rent to augment his income, particularly after retirement. It does not mean that the landlord has no need for the demised shop to house his proposed business, which he intends to establish along with his son. The two shops, already let out or subsequently constructed and let out during proceedings, in the landlord's judgment might not be suitable for him. The landlord cannot be asked or directed to satisfy his requirement, which is otherwise well established on record by utilizing a particular part of the premises, that is vacant with him or let out to another tenant. It is well settled that the landlord is the master of his requirement that he has established before the Court. The landlord led evidence and established that he does need the demised shop in order to set up business for himself and his son, retailing in clothes, cosmetics etc. The Courts below have concurrently accepted on valid premises the landlord's case of bona fide need. 33. The learned Counsel for the tenant has further submitted that the Courts below have not considered the case of partial release, that was urged before the them. In this connection, this Court has carefully looked into the impugned judgments. The Courts below have concurrently accepted on valid premises the landlord's case of bona fide need. 33. The learned Counsel for the tenant has further submitted that the Courts below have not considered the case of partial release, that was urged before the them. In this connection, this Court has carefully looked into the impugned judgments. The Appellate Court has specifically noticed the tenant's case for partial release, which is to the effect that some part of the demised shop, which admeasures 16'x21', abutting the landlord's residential premises on the western side, can be utilized by taking some area out of it and some out of the landlord's house to construct a shop for the fulfillment of the landlord's need. The Appellate Court has rejected this contention, saying that once the landlord's need is established for the demised shop, there is no reason why the landlord should be asked to take some area out of the demised shop and some from his premises or the other two shops, to construct a new one. The said finding, in the clear opinion of this Court, is not in any way vitiated by any manifest illegality. Bona fide need for the demised shop being established, equities hardly arise in this case for grant of partial release. 34. So far as the question of comparative hardship is concerned, the Courts below have also found it to be established in favour of the landlord on ex facie valid grounds. The Appellate Court has noticed the landlord's contention that the alternative shops enumerated by the landlord are not feasible or viable for business. About the tenant's case that she has constantly made efforts to secure another shop on rent, but remained unsuccessful, the Appellate Court has opined that there is no evidence about these efforts being made. There is no mention of the owners whose shops she attempted to secure on rent. No material is produced to show that she made any application to the R.C. & E.O. for allotment of a vacant shop. The principle is well settled that if the tenant has not made efforts to look for alternative accommodation, the issue of comparative hardship goes against him/ her. Here, the tenant has made an assertion that she attempted to secure other shops on rent, but failed. The principle is well settled that if the tenant has not made efforts to look for alternative accommodation, the issue of comparative hardship goes against him/ her. Here, the tenant has made an assertion that she attempted to secure other shops on rent, but failed. However, as rightly remarked by the Appellate Court, there is nothing on record by way of material to show that efforts were, in fact, made to secure an alternative shop. The minimum requirement to establish her case by the tenant about making efforts to look for an alternative shop, would be to come out with the names of owners of shops, who were approached for renting their premises, or else the proof of an application made to the R.C. & E.O. for allotment of a suitable vacant shop. However, none of these facts or evidence have been pleaded or produced to establish a case of search for alternative accommodation by the tenant, even after commencement of proceedings for release before the Courts below. 35. Eviction of the tenant would certainly involve some hardship, but where the landlord's bona fide need is established, the tenant's interest has to yield, even if in the scale of comparative hardship, the two are evenly balanced. Here, it certainly appears that the case of comparative hardship is tilted clearly in favour of the landlord. One of the reasons is the landlord's supervening retirement, much after the demised shop was let out to the tenant, and the other, an adult son, a member of his family, who has earned his degrees, sitting idle without employment. The landlord cannot be deprived of the gainful use of his own premises to keep himself occupied and settle his son in business, in order to secure the tenant's ongoing business in the premises. The question of long standing goodwill was also urged as relevant to the issue of comparative hardship. It must be remarked that goodwill, as well settled by now, is something that goes with the person and not the premises. On that submission of the tenant’s, the findings on the issue of comparative hardship, cannot be held bad. 36. This Court must also take notice of the fact that the tenant has been in occupation of the demised shop for the past more than 35 years, and after ten years, without extension of lease or enhancement of rent, as contracted initially. 36. This Court must also take notice of the fact that the tenant has been in occupation of the demised shop for the past more than 35 years, and after ten years, without extension of lease or enhancement of rent, as contracted initially. No doubt, this Court, while granting interim stay of eviction, enhanced the rent to a sum of Rs.5000/-, but that was limited to the purpose of the interim order alone. It cannot be gainsaid that the tenant has been enjoying the premises in all these decades on a paltry rent of Rs.800/-. The entire conspectus of facts and the non-revision of rent also disentitle the tenant to relief, invoking the equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. That apart, the two Courts of fact below have found the case of the landlord established on issues of bona fide need and comparative hardship. It is not for this Court to interfere with those findings of fact, merely because a different view, even a better one, is possible. 37. This petition fails and is dismissed. 38. The interim order dated 12.03.2019 is hereby vacated. 39. However, considering the facts and circumstances, the tenant is allowed six months time to handover peaceful and vacant possession of the shop in dispute provided she executes an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, Shahjahanpur, embodying the following terms within one month of the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order: (1) The tenant shall handover peaceful and vacant possession of the demised shop to the landlord on or before 08.05.2023. (2) During the period of six months that the tenant remains in occupation, she will not sublet the demised shop, damage or disfigure it in any manner whatsoever. 40. In the event, an undertaking, as above directed, is not filed before the Prescribed Authority by the tenant within the time allowed or the undertaking violated, the release order shall become executable forthwith.