JUDGMENT : MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, JAYANT BANERJI, JJ. 1. Heard Shri Manoj Kumar Singh, counsel for the appellant and Shri Sujeet Kumar, counsel for the respondents. 2. The instant appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996[Act of 1996] has been filed challenging the order dated 23.11.2021 passed by the Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad, dismissing an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 in Arbitration Case No. 3 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/S Bharat Construction and another). The appeal is reported to be beyond time by 258 days. The appeal has been filed along with a delay condonation application supported by an affidavit, which application is first being taken up for consideration. Delay Condonation Application No. 1 of 2022 3. When the matter was listed on 20.10.2022, learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of N.V. International Vs. State of Assam and others, (2020) 2 SCC 109 to contend that the delay in filing the aforesaid appeal cannot be condoned. He contended that the present appellate proceeding is in continuation of the original proceeding and the delay in filing this appeal would defeat the overall statutory purpose of arbitration proceedings which require that the proceedings be decided expeditiously. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant sought time to ascertain whether the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court still holds the field or not. 4. Today, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Maharashtra Vs. M/s Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited, (2021) 6 SCC 460 to contend that the aforesaid judgment in N.V. International has been overruled. Learned counsel has referred to paragraph no. 52 of the judgment in Borse Brothers in support of his contention. 5. A perusal of judgment in Borse Brothers reveals that though the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.V. International was held to have been wrongly decided and therefore, overruled, the question further posed by the Supreme Court related to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. A perusal of judgment in Borse Brothers reveals that though the judgment of the Supreme Court in N.V. International was held to have been wrongly decided and therefore, overruled, the question further posed by the Supreme Court related to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. The Supreme Court observed that it would have to steer a middle course between the two extremes; one being the judgment in N.V. International which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and, the other, being an open-ended provision in which any amount of time can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. While referring to its judgment in CIT Vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 regarding harmonious construction of statutes, the Supreme Court, while reading Section 37 of the Act of 1996 with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act, or Section 13 (1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, observed that the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. The Supreme Court observed as follows: "55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act." 6. The Supreme Court further referred to the judgment in Ajmer Kaur Vs. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381 and Brahampal Vs. National Insurance Company, (2021) 6 SCC 512 and observed as follows: "58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. National Insurance Company, (2021) 6 SCC 512 and observed as follows: "58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81 , has held : (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15) “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land & Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee, AIR 1964 SC 1336 , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770 ], Parimal v. Veena [Parimal v. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .) 10. of Brihan Mumbai [Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24] .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 ] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 ].) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. ‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266: ‘605. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, Para 605 p. 266: ‘605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.’ An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat & Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [ (2005) 7 SCC 510 ], Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 ] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [ (2008) 17 SCC 448 ].) 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ (2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ (1992) 1 SCC 225 ]. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 7. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court also considered the submission that in cases involving Government and its instrumentalities, a liberal approach should be adopted. The delay in filing the appeal was of 131 days beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. The contention was repelled, holding that the explanation furnished is nothing but the usual ‘file-pushing and administrative exigencies’. It is held that having regard to the object of the Commercial Courts Act, any delay beyond the prescribed period can only be condoned ‘by way of exception and not by way of rule’. It is apposite to quote some more paragraphs from the judgment dealing with the issue - 59. Likewise, merely because the Government is involved, a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] [“Postmaster General”], as follows : (SCC pp. 573-74, paras 27-29) “27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.” 8. Thereafter, the Supreme Court also referred to various other judgments where the Supreme Court deprecated inordinate delay in filing appeals. The Supreme Court further held as follows: "62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361 ] as follows : (SCR p. 771 : AIR p. 365, para 12) “12. This was felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 361 ] as follows : (SCR p. 771 : AIR p. 365, para 12) “12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the Court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14.” 63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches." 9. Coming to the facts of the instant case, a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application reads as follows: "1. That, the deponent is presently posted as Senior Divisional Engineer, Head Quarter, Moradabad in the office of DRM, Moradabad and has been duly authorize by the competent authority to swear this affidavit on behalf of the Applicants in the above noted Review petition and as such the deponent is fully acquainted with the facts deposed to below. 2. That, after obtaining the certified copy of the impugned order dated 23.11.2021 passed by Presiding Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad in Arbitration Case no.03 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/s Bharat Construction and Another) same was served in the office of Senior Divisional Engineer Northern Railway, D.R.M. office, Moradabad. 3. That, thereafter after going through the impugned order dated 23.11.2021 passed by learned Prescribed Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad in Arbitration Case no.03 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/s Bharat Construction and Another) as well as the record, the matter was sent for legal opinion in respect of taking any further action in the matter. 4. That, after obtaining the legal opinion from the Railway Counsel, entire document pertaining to the aforesaid case was forwarded to the Headquarter Northern Railway, Delhi for further action. 5. That, earlier, the Railway Authorities at D.R.M. Office, Moradabad, were of opinion that the award passed by the Arbitrator award may be complied with after getting the same affirm by the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2021 of Prescribed Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad in Arbitration Case no.03 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/s Bharat Construction and Another). However considering the legal opinion of the railway counsel, the higher authorities at headquarter, N.R. Railway has decided to take another legal opinion from the Additional Solicitor General of India at Allahabad. 6. M/s Bharat Construction and Another). However considering the legal opinion of the railway counsel, the higher authorities at headquarter, N.R. Railway has decided to take another legal opinion from the Additional Solicitor General of India at Allahabad. 6. That, after taking legal opinion from Additional Solicitor General of India at Allahabad, all the documents along with legal opinion was sent to the Headquarter of Northern Railway, Delhi for taking further action. 7. That, thereafter, the competent authority after considering the facts and law, has decided to file an appeal before this Hon'ble Court as such all documents pertaining to the same was sent to the office of Additional Solicitor General of India at Allahabad with the request to entrust any Central Govt. Counsel for drafting an appeal u/s 37 Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 8. That thereafter, learned Additional Solicitor General of India at Allahabad entrusted Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, Central Govt. counsel to prepare and filed the present Appeal against the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2021 passed by learned Prescribed Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad in Arbitration Case no.03 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/s Bharat Construction and Another) and Award Dated 04.03.2020 passed by the sole Arbitrator. 9. That thereafter, relevant documents were handed over to the counsel for the appellant however, the certified copy of impugned order dated 23.11.2021 was not available as such the counsel of the appellant requested concern officer to get the same so that the appeal may be prepared and filed forthwith. 10. That thereafter, on the basis of documents provided by Department the present appeal has been drafted by counsel for the appellant and was sent for vetting to the competent authority at Headquarter Northern Railway Delhi. 11. That after taking any necessary approval from the competent authority, deponent has been authorized to swear and sign the present affidavit so that the appeal may be filed before this Hon'ble Court. 12. That on 10.10.2022 the deponent after taking necessary permission has signed the affidavit as such without any further the present appeals is being filed before this Hon'ble Court. 13. That delay in filing the present appeal is not intentional but the same is procedural, as the department has to take various sanctions at different level for filing the present appeal. 14. 13. That delay in filing the present appeal is not intentional but the same is procedural, as the department has to take various sanctions at different level for filing the present appeal. 14. That, therefore in view of the facts and reasons stated above, it would be expedient in the interest of justice that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to condone the delay, if any, in filing the present arbitration appeal filed against the impugned order dated 23.11.2021 passed by learned Prescribed Officer, Commercial Court, Moradabad in Arbitration Case no.03 of 2021 (Union of India Vs. M/s Bharat Construction and Another) and award dated 04.03.2020 passed by the sole arbitrator and treat the same as filed within time, otherwise the appellant shall be put to irreparable loss and hardship.” 10. The aforesaid explanation proffered by the applicant/ appellant to demonstrate sufficient cause for delayed filing of the appeal is no explanation in the eyes of law. The averments are vague and do not reflect any specific dates in support of the averments. The only date that has been mentioned in paragraph no. 12 which is 10.10.2022 on which date the deponent is said to have signed the affidavit after taking necessary permission. The delay seemingly occurred because the appellant could not decide whether it had to challenge the impugned order or not, despite being aware of the limitation prescribed. The appellant has miserably failed to demonstrate diligence and bonafide to make out 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay. Therefore, it is held that delay in filing this appeal has not been sufficiently explained and there exists no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the aforesaid appeal. Under the facts and circumstances, the delay condonation application is rejected. Order on Appeal 11. Since, the delay condonation application has been rejected, the present appeal also stands dismissed.