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2022 DIGILAW 175 (GAU)

Prabha Surana v. State of Nagaland

2022-02-22

DEVASHIS BARUAH

body2022
JUDGMENT : Devashis Baruah, J. 1. Heard Mr. Limawapang, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2, assisted by Mr. Arenlong, learned counsel and Mr. K. Angami, learned P.P. for the State. 2. The petitioners in both the revision applications have been named in the FIR dated 15.01.2019, registered as Diphupar PS Case No. 3/2019. The contention of the petitioner in both the petitions is that the perusal of the said FIR would not disclose any offence against the petitioners and the materials on the basis on which the FIR has been registered also would not disclose that the petitioners had anything to do with the amount of Rs. 8,45,36,437/- paid by the complainant, i.e. respondent No. 2 to Shri Nitin Dani's family for acquiring a property. It is on the basis of the said contention that both the petitions have been filed for quashing of the FIR dated 15.01.2019 registered under Sections 420/406/120 B/34 IPC registered as Diphupar PS Case No. 3/2019. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it is an established principle of law that if the FIR/complaint in question does not disclose a cognizable offence or offence of any kind, this Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 would quash the said FIR. He submits that the perusal of the said FIR which have been registered under Sections 420/406/120 B/34 IPC would not disclose any commission of an offence in so far as the petitioners are concerned and as such, the said FIR is required to be quashed. In that regard he relies upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Harilal Hiralal Bhagwati vs. CBI, New Delhi, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 257 , more particularly to paragraph 40 of the said judgment. He further submits that the documents enclosed to the said FIR would show that the respondent No. 2 had dealings only with one Smti. Amita Dani and Shri Anand Dani represented by Shri Nitin Dani and it would be apparent from a perusal of the deed of agreement dated 23.12.2015 executed between the respondent No. 2 and Smti. Amita Dani and Shri Anand Dani. Amita Dani and Shri Anand Dani represented by Shri Nitin Dani and it would be apparent from a perusal of the deed of agreement dated 23.12.2015 executed between the respondent No. 2 and Smti. Amita Dani and Shri Anand Dani. He further submits that the letter dated 05.10.2018, reference to which have been made in the said FIR is a communication issued by the petitioners to Shri Nitin Dani, Smti. Amita Dani and Shri Anand Dani and that has nothing to do with the respondent No. 2 and in fact, there is not even a single reference also so far as the respondent No. 2 is concerned. He, therefore, submits that the filing of the instant FIR against the petitioners is nothing but an abuse of process of the Court for which he refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhajanlal vs. State of Haryana, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335, more particularly to paragraph 102. He submits that when a criminal proceeding is being initiated on the face of which is an abuse of the process of the Court, the Court can exercise the jurisdiction both under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of the said criminal proceedings. He further submits that the order dated 20.01.2019, issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur, whereby the warrant of arrest/production warrant/transit warrant was issued against the petitioners was done mechanically without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 41(A) of the Code. 4. Mr. Taka Masa, learned senior counsel, on the other hand submits that the perusal of the impugned FIR would show that an offence has been committed. He submits that it is not the case of the petitioners that there is no offence being committed but it is the case of the petitioners that no offence is disclosed in so far as against the petitioners and as such, the requirement for quashing of an FIR or exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 does not arise in as much as the FIR discloses the commission of an offence. He further submits that the parameters for exercise of inherent powers as regards quashing of an FIR is well settled by various judicial authorities whereby it has been held that the Court would not interfere with the investigation or during the course of an investigation, which is from the time of lodging of the FIR till the submission of the report by the in-charge of the Police Station under Section 173(2) of the Code as the said field is exclusively reserved for the Investigating Agency. He further submits that the FIR is not an encyclopedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. An informant may lodge a report of commission of an offence though he may not know the name of the victim or the assailants. The informant may not even know how the occurrence took place. As per the contention of the learned senior counsel, what is significant is that the information given must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence and the information so lodged must provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence. The learned senior counsel, in support of his submissions referred to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of M/S. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 2021 SC 192. While referring to the said judgment, the learned senior counsel submitted that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code has been laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 and he refers to sub-para (ii), (v) and (vi) of paragraph 10 to contend that the Court should not thwart any investigation into a cognizable offence and the criminal proceedings ought not be scuttled at the initial stage. The learned senior counsel submits that in the instant case, immediately upon the FIR being lodged and the order dated 20.01.2019 being passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM, in short), Diphupar, the petitioners have approached this Court and this Court, vide interim orders stayed the further proceedings of the investigation which has affected the investigation to reach its logical conclusion. 5. 5. On a specific query being made by this Court as to whether the petitioners are entitled to any protection upon dismissal of the petitions, the learned senior counsel submits that providing any protection while dismissing the quashing proceedings would amount to transgressing into the field of the Investigation Agency and in that regard he referred to paragraph 16 of the judgment in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra). 6. As regards the contention that the order dated 20.01.2019, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dimapur was done mechanically without taking into consideration Section 41(A) of the Code, the learned senior counsel, referring to Section 41(1) and Section 41(A) submits that there is a difference between the provisions. While Section 41(1) applies where the Police Officer is satisfied that an arrest is necessary but Section 41(A) is applicable where the Police Officer is satisfied that the arrest of a person is not required and in that regard he refers to the prayer submitted by the Officer-in-Charge, Diphupar Police Station to the CJM, Dimapur, wherein the Investigating Officer had expressed that the arrest of the accused persons are necessary for the purpose of a thorough investigation. 7. Mr. K. Angami, learned P.P. for the respondent No. 1 has produced before this Court the Case Diary and submitted that the action of the Investigating Authority under no circumstances can be said to be an abuse of process of the Court. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the FIR. 9. A perusal of the FIR would go to show that the respondent No. 2 have alleged that an amount of Rs. 8,45,36,437/- was paid to the petitioners through Shri Nitin Dani for the purpose of purchase of a scheduled property and it was also alleged that even after the receipt of the said amount, the petitioners have failed to transfer the said property. Further, to that it has also been alleged that the petitioners have also acknowledged the receipt of Rs. 7.95 Crores, although the petitioners have duly received Rs. 8,45,36,437/-. It has also been alleged that the petitioners, inspite of receipt of the said money have not delivered the property and on the other hand, have offered to return an amount of Rs. 7.95 Crores within a period of 2 to 3 years. 7.95 Crores, although the petitioners have duly received Rs. 8,45,36,437/-. It has also been alleged that the petitioners, inspite of receipt of the said money have not delivered the property and on the other hand, have offered to return an amount of Rs. 7.95 Crores within a period of 2 to 3 years. It is the further allegation that the petitioners, with an intention to cheat/dupe the respondent No. 2 had taken the said amount on the pretext of transferring the said property. As the question of investigation of the said offence as stated in the FIR is yet to be gone ahead with by the Investigating Authority, it would not be proper and more so, for a Court in exercise of its power under Section 482 to give any opinion as regards the merits of the said FIR, however, it prima facie appears that a cognizable offence have been committed. The question whether the cognizable offence has been committed by the petitioner or the Danis is for the Investigating Officer to deal upon but this Court is only required to look into the aspect as to whether FIR discloses any commission of cognizable offence and as such, this Court is of the opinion that the said FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage, it may be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein guidelines were laid down as regards quashing of an FIR in exercise of the powers under Section 482 and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein below:- "23. Paragraph 23 of the said judgment being relevant is quoted herein below:- "23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or "no coercive steps to be adopted", during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or "no coercive steps be adopted" during the investigation or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under:- i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the 'rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure. xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or "coercive steps to be adopted" and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or "no coercive steps" either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of "no coercive steps to be adopted" within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by "no coercive steps to be adopted" can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied." 10. A perusal of the quoted paragraphs of the judgment would show that the power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspect in the rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in the context of death penalty) and what is to be looked into is as to whether the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence or offence of any kind. If it discloses the commission of cognizable offence or offence of any kind, the Court, under Section 482 should not embark on any further enquiry in as much as the said space is reserved for the Investigating Agency. As already held herein above, a perusal of the said FIR discloses the commission of an offence and as such, this Court cannot embark upon the enquiry as regards the merits of the FIR. Consequentially, the instant petition seeking the quashing of the FIR deserves to be dismissed. 11. It is also relevant to take note of another contention of the petitioner at this stage that the FIR may disclose commission of a cognizable offence or any offence against the 'Danis' but not against the petitioners and as such the said FIR should be quashed in so far as the petitioners. 11. It is also relevant to take note of another contention of the petitioner at this stage that the FIR may disclose commission of a cognizable offence or any offence against the 'Danis' but not against the petitioners and as such the said FIR should be quashed in so far as the petitioners. This contention is misconceived in as much as a FIR cannot be quashed partially and this Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code can only look as to whether the FIR discloses commission of a cognizable offence or any offence of any kind. This Court cannot even at this stage look into whether Section 406 or Section 420 of the IPC is made out. As already stated this Court is only required to see as to whether offence of any kind is made out. In this regard reference can be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq Ahmedbhai Paliwala vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 464 and more particularly to paragraphs 5 to 10 which is quoted herein below:- "5. So, the short question, which arises for consideration in this appeal, is whether the High Court was justified in allowing the petition and quashing the FIR insofar as it relates to the offences punishable under Sections 392, 395 and 397 IPC. 6. The order impugned reads as under:- "2. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having considered the materials on record, I am of the view that even if the entire case of the prosecution is believed or accepted as true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence of Sections 392, 395 or 397 are spelt out. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit dacoity. 3. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation in quashing the FIR so far as Sections 392, 395 and 397 of the Penal Code are concerned. So far as the other offences are concerned, the investigation shall proceed further in accordance with law. 4. With the above, this application is disposed of. Direct service is permitted." 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. 4. With the above, this application is disposed of. Direct service is permitted." 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order. 8. In our view, the High Court erred in entertaining the petition filed by Respondents 2 to 17 under Section 482 of the Code and further erred in allowing it in part. 9. It is not in dispute that no proper investigation could be made by the investigating officer (IO) much less concluded on the basis of the FIR lodged by the complainant and before it could be brought to its logical conclusion, the impugned order intervened resulting in quashing the FIR itself in relation to cognizable offences which were of more serious nature than the remaining one which survived for being tried. 10. The High Court, in our view, instead of quashing the FIR at such a preliminary stage should have directed the IO to make proper investigation on the basis of the FIR and then file proper charge-sheet on the basis of the material collected in the investigation accordingly. It was, however, not done. It was more so because, we find that FIR did not disclose prima facie allegations of commission of offences concerned." 12. In view of the above judgment, it would therefore be clear that this Court in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code can only look into as to whether prima facie the FIR discloses commission of offence and who has committed the offence is within the realm of the Investigating Agency to do so in exercise of the powers under the Code. Under such circumstances, it is directed that the Investigating Officer shall carry out a full and proper investigation in regard to Diphupar PS Case No. 3/2019 as per law. 13. The next question which arises is as regards the order dated 20.01.2019 as to whether the same was passed by the learned CJM mechanically without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 41(A) of the Code. 13. The next question which arises is as regards the order dated 20.01.2019 as to whether the same was passed by the learned CJM mechanically without taking into consideration the provisions of Section 41(A) of the Code. A perusal of the said order dated 20.01.2019 as well as the request made by the Investigating Officer would reveal that the Court did not take into consideration as to whether the condition precedent for satisfaction as stipulated in Section 41(1)(b) was met or the Investigating Officer could have resorted to Section 41A of the Code before passing the said order. Under such circumstances, this Court, though interferes with the order dated 20.01.2019, passed by the learned CJM, but permits the Investigating Officer to take appropriate steps as is required under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the attendance of the accused including seeking warrant of arrest/production warrant/transit warrant, if need be. 14. Before parting with the record, this Court vide orders dated 14.02.2019, had granted some interim protection to the petitioners by staying further proceedings of GR Case No. 23/2019 (Diphupar Police Station Case No. 3/2019) including the order dated 20.01.2019. In view of the dismissal of the instant proceedings, the Investigating Officer may proceed with the investigation of the said Diphupar PS Case No. 3/2019. However, no coercive steps be taken against the petitioners for a period of 15 days from today, thereby enabling the petitioners to seek such protection as envisaged under law. 15. Case Diary returned to the P.P. Registry is directed to return the LCR to the Lower Court. 16. With the above directions and observations, both petitions are disposed of.