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2022 DIGILAW 1769 (ALL)

Raja Ram v. Saroj Bala

2022-11-11

J.J.MUNIR

body2022
JUDGMENT : 1. This is a tenant's petition arising out of a decree for eviction passed by the Judge, Small Cause Court in a suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent and mesne profits etc. The decree has been affirmed in revision by the Additional District Judge. 2. Saroj Bala, wife of Jai Prakash instituted S.C.C. Suit No. 30 of 2007 before the Judge, Small Cause Court, Ghaziabad on allegations that she is the owner and landlady of a house bearing premises No. 5 (presently numbered as 3), situate at Purvi Ismail Khan, Turab Nagar, Ghaziabad. Within the said premises, she has a shop, assigned private No. 8, wherein Raja Ram, the defendant, is a tenant at the rate of Rs. 30/-per month (excluding taxes -water tax, house tax and sewer tax). The tenancy is one from month to month. Raja Ram, who shall hereinafter be called 'the tenant', carries on a tailor's shop in the aforesaid tenanted premises (for short, 'the demised shop') under the name and style of ‘Samrat Tailors’. The business he keeps on changing and is currently engaging himself in the retail of shoes and other footwear. The tenancy commences on the first of every calendar month and ends on the last day. The premises, housing the demised shop, are an old construction and the provisions of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972), for short, ‘the Act’, are applicable to it. The tenant has never paid Smt. Saroj Bala (hereinafter referred to as 'the landlady') rent for the demised shop on the date that it fell due and without the service of a demand notice upon him. In this regard, the landlady served a notice upon the tenant on 17.07.2000, demanding rent for the period, then in arrears, that is to say, from 01.01.2000 to July, 2000. The notice was duly served upon the tenant. 3. It is averred that the tenant is in arrears of rent since 01.01.2002, which the landlady has, time and again, demanded of him orally. The tenant, however, did not remit all arrears of rent to the landlady. The tenant does not carry on any gainful business in the demised shop. The notice was duly served upon the tenant. 3. It is averred that the tenant is in arrears of rent since 01.01.2002, which the landlady has, time and again, demanded of him orally. The tenant, however, did not remit all arrears of rent to the landlady. The tenant does not carry on any gainful business in the demised shop. On this account, he is found, time and again, partnering or subletting the demised shop to persons, who are not members of his family, without the landlady's consent. It is averred that it had recently come to the landlady's knowledge that in the month of September, 1994, the tenant sublet the demised shop to one Neeraj Garg son of Kailash Chand Garg, a resident of Modi Nagar, Ghaziabad, inducting the subtenant aforesaid in the demised shop for a sum of Rs.1500/-per mensem. The subtenancy is for a period of five years. In this connection, the tenant and Neeraj had entered into a rent agreement in the presence of witnesses. The aforesaid act of the tenant also renders him liable for ejectment. 4. It is pleaded by the landlady specifically that the rent due to her, outstanding against the tenant, is for the period of 01.01.2002 to July, 2007. Upon this state of default, the landlady instructed her Counsel, Mr. Satyadev Verma to serve the tenant a notice of demand and quit. Accordingly, a notice of demand and quit dated 11.07.2007 was issued to him. 5. It is pleaded that after the landlady had caused the earlier notice of demand in the year 2002 to be served upon the tenant, he instituted Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30(1) of the Act before the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Ghaziabad, seeking permission of the Court to deposit rent. The case aforesaid was instituted by the tenant on incorrect facts. Upon receipt of notice of the said case, the landlady filed her written objections, stating that she had never declined to receive rent and further made a prayer in writing as well as orally, that the tenant may pay the due rent to her by hand. On the aforesaid basis, the Court, seized of the Section 30 proceedings, directed the tenant to pay all outstandings of rent due until then which the landlady demanded, but the tenant did not pay the entire rent due, despite orders of the Court. 6. On the aforesaid basis, the Court, seized of the Section 30 proceedings, directed the tenant to pay all outstandings of rent due until then which the landlady demanded, but the tenant did not pay the entire rent due, despite orders of the Court. 6. It is also the landlady’s case that the Court sought the tenant’s explanation about the basis on which the tenant deposited rent upto 31.03.2006 in Court, and further that the tenant was permitted to deposit rent by the Civil Judge in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2003 at his own risk. It is the landlady’s case that the rent deposited by the tenant is not valid tender. Despite the landlady’s demand, the tenant did not pay rent to her and, therefore, he is not entitled to the benefit of deposit made by him in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002; particularly so, as rent cannot be deposited in advance. It is also the landlady’s case that the notice to quit dated 11.07.2007 was personally served upon the tenant, but despite expiry of the period, after which the tenancy was to stand determined and the demand raised made good, the tenant did not remit the due rent to the landlady together with taxes payable. Accordingly, the tenant was liable to be evicted on the ground of actionable default. 7. It is the further case of the landlady that the demised shop displays the board of Samrat Tailors, whereas the shop is utilized by the tenant for the retail of footwear, a purpose for which the demised shop was never let out. The aforesaid change in user for the demised shop is without the landlady’s consent in writing, rendering the tenant liable to eviction. The notice to quit dated 11.07.2007, that was served upon the tenant on 15.07.2007, was answered by his Counsel, Mr. Anil Vohra, Advocate on 07.08.2007, on incorrect premises. The current rental value of the demised shop was claimed by the landlady to be Rs.5000/-per month. 8. The notice to quit dated 11.07.2007, that was served upon the tenant on 15.07.2007, was answered by his Counsel, Mr. Anil Vohra, Advocate on 07.08.2007, on incorrect premises. The current rental value of the demised shop was claimed by the landlady to be Rs.5000/-per month. 8. Accordingly, the present suit was instituted by the landlady against the tenant, after the determination of his tenancy for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent for the past three years, that is to say, from 14.08.2004 to 14.08.2007, amounting to a sum of Rs.1080/-, arrears of taxes amounting to a sum of Rs.1152/-, the expenses of notice and Counsel fee being a sum of Rs.1500/-and mesne profits from the date of determination of tenancy till delivery of actual physical possession, for which Court fee was payable in the Execution Department. 9. A written statement was filed by the tenant, saying that he is in occupation of the demised shop as such at the rate of Rs.30/-per month, including taxes since a long time. The suit has been filed on incorrect facts. The tenant claimed that he has never been a defaulter. The landlady wants to get the demised shop vacated. The tenant is depositing the due rent in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of the Act. The tenant is not in arrears of rent. The tenant has his business under the name and style of Samrat Tailors and the footwear that he sells is with the consent of the landlady. Both the businesses are carried on in the demised shop. The tenant never sublet the demised shop to Neeraj Garg. 10. It is the tenant who is in occupation of the demised shop and carries on his own business. No cause of action has arisen to the landlady to institute the present suit. Upon service of notice issued on behalf of the landlady, the tenant has got a reply sent, mentioning correct facts. The tenant has deposited all due rent in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of the Act and is ready to further deposit it. It is quaintly pleaded in the written statement that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the demised shop. 11. The tenant has deposited all due rent in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of the Act and is ready to further deposit it. It is quaintly pleaded in the written statement that the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the demised shop. 11. It appears that going by the law relating to the trial of S.C.C. Suits, no formal issues were framed, and after the written statement was filed, the suit proceeded to final hearing, when the parties led evidence both oral and documentary. However, the Trial Court while writing the judgment, for the sake of convenience, formulated six issues on the case of parties suited. The issues are more like points of determination for the felicity of understanding and judgment. These read (translated into English from Hindi): (1) Whether any rent is due to the plaintiff from the defendant, meaning thereby whether the defendant is a defaulter? (2) Whether the defendant, without the permission of the plaintiff, has established the business of footwear in the shop in dispute? (3) Whether deposit of rent by the defendant under Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is invalid? If yes, its effect? (4) Whether the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 do not apply to the shop in dispute? (5) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? (6) Whether the defendant has inducted a subtenant in the shop in dispute? 12. The landlady, in support of her case, examined Sanjay Mangal as PW-1. In her documentary evidence, a carbon copy of the notice dated 11.07.2007, paper No. 8-Ga was filed. Likewise, the relative registered post receipt, paper No. 9-Ga, the U.P.C. in proof of Dispatch, paper No. 10-Ga, a certified copy of the order-sheet in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, paper No. 11-Ga, a carbon copy of notice dated 17.07.2000, paper No. 12-Ga, the relative registered post receipt, paper No. 13Ga, were also filed. Along with the affidavit, that was filed in lieu of the examination-in-chief of PW-1, a photostat copy of the power of attorney, paper No. 23-Ga/7 and a photostat copy of the agreement, Paper No. 23-Ga/10 were annexed. 13. On behalf of the tenant, he examined himself as DW-1. In his documentary evidence, the tenant filed, through a list of documents, paper No. 30-Ga, money order receipts and tender receipts, bearing paper Nos. 31-Ga to 47-Ga. 14. 13. On behalf of the tenant, he examined himself as DW-1. In his documentary evidence, the tenant filed, through a list of documents, paper No. 30-Ga, money order receipts and tender receipts, bearing paper Nos. 31-Ga to 47-Ga. 14. The Trial Court dealt with Issues Nos. 1 and 3 together, which are the most crucial part of the determination. The relevant findings of the Trial Court, wherever necessary, shall be referred to in the course of this judgment. It was opined by the Trial Court on Issues Nos. 1 and 3 that the deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 of the Act was not valid and the tenant was in actionable default. On Issue No. 2, it was held that the tenant by establishing a footwear retail in the demised shop, that was taken on rent for a tailor’s shop, without the written consent of the landlady, had indulged in inconsistent user, prohibited by the Statute. On Issue No.4, it was held that the provisions of the Act apply. On Issue No. 6, the Trial Court held for the tenant that no case of subletting was made out. Issue No. 5 was answered for the landlady and the suit decreed for eviction, recovery of arrears of rent, arrears of taxes, expenses of notices and Counsel fee, besides mesne profits from the date of institution of the suit till delivery of actual physical possession at the rate of Rs.5000/-per month. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court as aforesaid vide judgment and decree dated 11.01.2010. 15. Aggrieved, the tenant instituted an S.C.C. Revision before the District Judge, Ghaziabad, which was numbered on the file of the District Judge as S.C.C. Revision No. 19 of 2010. The Revision, upon assignment, came up before the Additional District Judge, Court No.14, Ghaziabad, who set aside one finding of the Trial Court, that is to say, the one relating to inconsistent user, but upheld the findings on the validity of deposit under Section 30 of the Act and actionable default. Consequently, the Court of Revision affirmed the Trial Court’s decree and dismissed the Revision. 16. Aggrieved, the tenant has instituted this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 17. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Consequently, the Court of Revision affirmed the Trial Court’s decree and dismissed the Revision. 16. Aggrieved, the tenant has instituted this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 17. Heard Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Manish Goyal, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Akanksha Sharma, Advocate appearing on behalf of heirs and LRs of the deceased landlady-respondent. 18. It may be recorded at the outset and before noticing the contention of parties that the suit was filed on three grounds, to wit, actionable default in the payment of rent, change of user without the consent in writing of the landlady and subletting. Both the Courts below have discarded the tenant’s case for eviction on the ground of subletting. The Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of change of user and actionable default. Upon revision by the tenant, the learned Additional District has set aside the finding about the change of user without permission of the landlady. Thus, the decree for eviction, that has been passed by the Courts below consistently, is one founded on the ground of actionable default alone. The period of default alleged by the landlady is 01.01.2002 to July, 2007. The notice to quit was issued on 11.07.2007 and served upon the tenant on 15.07.2007. There was an earlier notice of demand dated 17.07.2000 issued on behalf of the landlady, claiming arrears for the period 01.01.2000 to July, 2000, but about that notice or the arrears of rent for the said period, there is no issue involved in the present suit. The issue, as already noticed hereinabove, is about default for the period commencing 01.01.2002. The tenant has instituted proceedings under Section 30(1) of the Act before the Court of the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Ghaziabad, as a perusal of the relative order-sheet would show, on 01.05.2002 alleging refusal of rent by the landlady for the period commencing 01.01.2002 (the period of default). 19. It is upon this state of proceedings, of which the other relevant details shall be mentioned during the course of judgment, that the two Courts below have returned unanimous findings of actionable default against the tenant. 20. Mr. 19. It is upon this state of proceedings, of which the other relevant details shall be mentioned during the course of judgment, that the two Courts below have returned unanimous findings of actionable default against the tenant. 20. Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the tenant has submitted that no case for an actionable default within the meaning of Section 20(2)(a) of the Act is made out, because on the date of issue of the notice to quit dated 11.07.2007, claiming rent for the period 01.01.2000 to July, 2007, the entire rent stood deposited under Section 30(1) of the Act in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002. It is emphasized that prior to issue of the notice to quit, the rent for one year i.e. 11.04.2007 to April, 2008 was deposited on 11.05.2007 in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, that is to say, around two months prior to the issue of notice under reference. It is submitted that money orders were sent to the landlady prior to institution of proceedings under Section 30(1) of the Act, which were refused. It was thereafter that the last mentioned proceedings to deposit rent were instituted. The application under Section 30(1) of the Act was allowed on 06.04.2007. 21. The learned Counsel for the tenant has, particularly, criticized the finding of the Trial Court to the effect that no money order receipt could be produced by the tenant, bearing endorsement by the Postal Department that rent had been refused. He points out that the Trial Court, at Page No. 77 of the paper-book, in the second paragraph, has mentioned paper Nos. 34-Ga to 47-Ga, referring to these documents as receipts of tender. It is submitted that later on in this judgment, the Trial Court has misdirected itself in holding that the notice to quit was issued on 11.07.2007, but the amount of rent due was deposited thereafter on 29.07.2002, which the learned Counsel says is an absolutely perverse finding. It is also argued with much vehemence that the Trial Court has held that the tenant has not paid the entire rent due but that finding is perverse, inasmuch as all documents were on record before the Trial Court regarding deposit of rent, and those that were not, were there on record of Case No. 35 of 2002. The entire record of Case No. 35 of 2002 was before the Trial Court. The entire record of Case No. 35 of 2002 was before the Trial Court. There is still further criticism of the Trial Court’s findings by the learned Counsel for the tenant, saying that the Court at Page No. 78 of the paper-book has held that after 09.04.2008, no rent has been deposited in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002. This finding is said to be manifestly illegal as no rent could be deposited under Section 30(1) of the Act, after the institution of the suit. 22. Before the institution of the suit, which was done in the year 2007, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the learned Civil Judge had allowed the application under Section 30(1) of the Act, but the Trial Judge has misinterpreted the said order to hold that the Court had not allowed the application; instead, the Court merely permitted the tenant to deposit rent at his own risk. It has been inferred by the Trial Court, from the aforesaid understanding of the order passed under Section 30, that the deposit made in those proceedings cannot be taken into consideration. It is emphatically argued that after refusal of the money orders sent remitting rent, rent for each and every month was deposited and record of deposit of all due rent was available to the Trial Court. As such, the findings of the Trial Court regarding non-deposit of rent in proceedings under Section 30 for certain periods of time are perverse. 23. It is pointed out by Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh that since the Court of first instance did not consider the record and documents of Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, the tenant brought on record, through a list of documents, receipts, including refused money orders before the Revisional Court. These documents are on record of the paper-book at Page Nos. 98 to 102, bearing paper Nos. 34-Ga onwards. It is emphasized that paper No. 34-Ga, as mentioned on the face of the said document, is a paper number assigned to it before the Trial Judge. The said documents have been ignored from consideration by the Revisional Court, according to the learned Counsel for the tenant, inasmuch as there is a finding that the receipts do not disclose the period of tender, that is to say, the month for which the rent deposited relates. The said documents have been ignored from consideration by the Revisional Court, according to the learned Counsel for the tenant, inasmuch as there is a finding that the receipts do not disclose the period of tender, that is to say, the month for which the rent deposited relates. Likewise, it is emphasized that about the money orders, it is said by the Revisional Court that the period for which rent was remitted through these money orders is not disclosed. It is urged that in the money orders, that were refused and copies of which were filed before the Revisional Court, the period of rent remitted is clearly mentioned. It is submitted that the finding of the Revisional Court about non-mention of the period for which the rent was remitted is, therefore, perverse. 24. The learned Counsel for the tenant has particularly criticized that finding of the Revisional Court, where it is mentioned that rent for certain periods of time has not been deposited at all, whereas the entire rent stood deposited, regarding which the tender receipts have been brought on record through affidavit and the documents appended to the writ petition. There is a finding by the Revisional Court to the effect that rent for the period 1st June, 2003 to 31st July, 2003, being a sum of Rs.60/-, has been deposited vide tender bearing No. 43-Ga, but the stamp of receipt by the State Bank of India shows that it bears the date of deposit as 30th May, 2008. From the said fact, the Revisional Court has drawn a conclusion that if rent due in the year 2003 was deposited in the year 2008, no benefit thereof can be given to the tenant. 25. The learned Counsel for the tenant has criticized the said finding as the result of an error apparent and pointed out, from the xerox copy of the records summoned from the Courts below, that just above the stamp of receipt by the Bank, the date ‘30.05.2003’ has been mentioned. The stamp, which appears to show the date of receipt as ‘30.05.2008’, is the result of an aberration in the stamp marking. It is next submitted that the landlady has consistently refused money orders and in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, where she appeared and objected, she never showed her willingness to receive rent. The stamp, which appears to show the date of receipt as ‘30.05.2008’, is the result of an aberration in the stamp marking. It is next submitted that the landlady has consistently refused money orders and in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, where she appeared and objected, she never showed her willingness to receive rent. In fact, she has said in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act that in case the tenant would pay the entire amount of rent due, she would think of accepting it. According to the learned Counsel for the tenant, the Court hearing the case under Section 30 of the Act has clearly observed that the entire amount of rent has been deposited and the landlady is free to withdraw it. It is emphasized that the tenant never refused to pay rent. The rent has been deposited since 2002 to 2007 in proceedings under Section 30(1) of the Act, and thereafter, before the Judge, Small Cause Court, Ghaziabad in the suit. It is urged that there is no default in the payment of rent during the entire period. The findings regarding actionable default recorded by the Courts below are, therefore, perverse. 26. About the part of the findings recorded by the Courts below that the deposit made under Section 30(1) of the Act would not enure to the tenant’s benefits, because of noncompliance with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, it is submitted by the learned Counsel for the tenant that the said rule has no application in the present case, after the landlady had appeared in proceedings under Section 30 and contested the same. There is no requirement to deposit process fee and notice for communication of each deposit of rent in a case like the present one, in view of the decisions of this Court in Smt. Chameli Devi vs. VIth Addl. District Judge, Pilibhit and another, 2004 All LJ 1945 and Smt. Siddheshwari Dixit and another vs. Hasina Begum and others, 2019 (3) ALJ 725. 27. The learned Counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, has refuted the aforesaid submissions and contended that the tenant has not remitted rent to the landlady except upon the service of a demand notice. And whenever he has remitted, it has been irregular and short. 27. The learned Counsel for the landlady, on the other hand, has refuted the aforesaid submissions and contended that the tenant has not remitted rent to the landlady except upon the service of a demand notice. And whenever he has remitted, it has been irregular and short. Likewise, the deposit made in the case under Section 30 shows periods of time when the rent was not deposited. These periods of non-deposit of rent in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act have been specifically recorded in the findings returned by the Revisional Court, based upon a perusal of record. Those findings are pure findings of fact, not open to scrutiny under Article 227 of the Constitution by this Court. Learned Counsel for the landlord has also invited the attention of the Court to the order dated 10.10.2006 passed by the Court hearing the matter under Section 30(1) of the Act to submit that the said order clearly shows that the tenant, despite an offer by the landlady to accept the entire arrears of rent in lump sum, did not pay. It is also pointed out that the deposit under Section 30 has been rightly regarded as invalid, apart from the period of non-deposit, noticed by the Revisional Court due to the fact that there is no compliance with the provisions of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, which are mandatory. Both Courts below have consistently held that it is a case of non-compliance with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, rendering the deposit made under Section 30 of the Act, inconsequential. 28. The principal issues are about the actionable default under Section 20(2) (a) of the Act and whether deposits made under Section 30 of the Act are valid in law, which enure to the tenant's benefit. It is not in issue that the default alleged is for the period 01.01.2000 to July, 2000. The evidence shows that there were bickerings between parties over the tender and acceptance of rent, which led the landlady to issue a notice of demand on 17.07.2000 as well. After January, 2002 the landlady alleges complete non-payment and default, but the notice of demand and quit was issued to the tenant on 11.07.2007 and served upon him on 15.07.2007. The evidence shows that there were bickerings between parties over the tender and acceptance of rent, which led the landlady to issue a notice of demand on 17.07.2000 as well. After January, 2002 the landlady alleges complete non-payment and default, but the notice of demand and quit was issued to the tenant on 11.07.2007 and served upon him on 15.07.2007. Much before that, the tenant had taken steps to deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act by presenting an application to the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Ghaziabad on 01.05.2002 for the purpose. 29. The basis to deposit rent in Court under Section 30 of the Act is said to be the landlady's refusal to accept rent by hand in the first instance and then by money order. The Trial Court has disbelieved this part of the tenant's case with the remark that no money order receipt has been produced in evidence, bearing an endorsement by the Postal Department that the landlady has refused to accept rent, when tendered by money order. This part of the finding recorded by the Trial Court is not correct. There are on record money order receipts, numbered as paper Nos. 34-Ga, 35-Ga, 36-Ga, 37-Ga, 38-Ga and 39-Ga, which do not bear out with the Trial Court's findings, that no money order receipt has been filed on record. The money order receipts, that are on record, also bear endorsement of refusal by the Postal Department, at the instance of the landlady. But, that is not the end of the matter. The money order receipts, bearing Paper Nos. 34-Ga, 35-Ga and 36-Ga, show that rent for the same months, when refused, was sent over and over again, that is to say, for the months of January, February and March, 2002 and then January to April, 2002. Paper No. 34-Ga shows that rent for the months of January, February and March, 2002 was sent by money order on 01.04.2002 and refused by the landlady. It was then sent again on 26.04.2002 by money order, bearing paper No. 35-Ga, for four months from January, 2002 to 30th April, 2002, being a sum of Rs.120/-, which was also refused. In between, on 18.03.2002, vide Paper No. 36-Ga, rent was remitted to the landlady for the period January, February and March, 2002. This was also refused. It was then sent again on 26.04.2002 by money order, bearing paper No. 35-Ga, for four months from January, 2002 to 30th April, 2002, being a sum of Rs.120/-, which was also refused. In between, on 18.03.2002, vide Paper No. 36-Ga, rent was remitted to the landlady for the period January, February and March, 2002. This was also refused. Again, on 11.03.2002, there is another money order remittance, evidenced by Paper No. 37-Ga, which shows that on that day, rent for the months of January and February, 2002 was sent, but refused. About these money order receipts, the Revisional Court has remarked that a perusal of all these receipts show that rent for the period January, 2002 to April, 2002 was sent by the tenant time and again, which was either refused or returned, because no one was available. It is remarked by the Revisional Court that these receipts do not show that what was the outstanding rent prior to these money order receipts and how much of the rent earlier due has been paid up by the tenant. Since the position of arrears, according to the Revisional Court, prior to the money order receipts is not clear, the Revisional Court has not found justification for the tenant to deposit in Court, under Section 30 of the Act. This finding does not appear to be much justified, because there is no clear case on behalf of the landlady pleaded as to what was the precise period of arrears of rent and the amount due, when she was declining the money orders. It is also not endorsed on the money orders why these were being refused or indicating that a greater amount of rent for a longer period was due, but the money order remittance was short and, therefore, refused. Had that been the case, it might have been a good ground to refuse acceptance of a part of the rent due. 30. Nevertheless, the remittance by money order does show that it is not regular and month by month. The earliest the remittance was made was in the month of March, 2002 and it was for the months of January and February; not March. Rent is normally, and in this case also, payable on the beginning of the calendar month and not the end of it. The earliest the remittance was made was in the month of March, 2002 and it was for the months of January and February; not March. Rent is normally, and in this case also, payable on the beginning of the calendar month and not the end of it. Therefore, remittance on 11th March, 2002 ought to have included rent for the month of March; not just January and February. The next remittance was made on 18th March, 2002. This is for the months of January, February and March, which, like the earlier one, met with refusal. The third one vide paper No. 34-Ga was made on 1st April, 2002, but this again is for the months of January, February and March and does not include April, when rent for April appears to have fallen due. It is only on 26th April, 2002 and with the earlier money order refused that vide paper No. 35-Ga, rent from January to April, 2002 was remitted. Of course, as said earlier, this too was refused. This shows that the tenant is not a regular paymaster and has been paying rent accumulated for a period of three months and may be more. If the tenant had been remitting in this fashion, this Court is inclined to agree with the Revisional Court, may be for slightly different reasons, that deposit under Section 30 of the Act was not open to the tenant. The deposit, that has been made under Section 30, is also not month by month. 31. In a monthly tenancy after all, rent falls due on first day of every calendar month and if the tenant pleads a case of the landlord refusing rent, and seeks to deposit in Court, he must regularly deposit on the first of each month, or may be soon thereafter. However, the tender of rent before the learned Civil Judge under Section 30 of the Act would show that the first deposit was made on 28.05.2002 vide paper No. 10-Ga, annexed as Annexure No. SA-3 to the supplementary affidavit for the period January, 2002 to June, 2002. If one were to assume that the application under Section 30 was filed in May and deposit was made for an extra month after the refusal of the four earlier money orders in the months of March and April, 2002, the subsequent deposits of rent in Court do not show any regularity. 32. If one were to assume that the application under Section 30 was filed in May and deposit was made for an extra month after the refusal of the four earlier money orders in the months of March and April, 2002, the subsequent deposits of rent in Court do not show any regularity. 32. The next deposit, that has been made vide paper No. 34Ga on 27.07.2002, is for the months of July to September, 2002. This is an advance deposit of rent made in July upto September, 2002. But the subsequent deposit that was made was in December, 2002 vide deposit challan bearing paper No. 35-Ga dated 24.12.2002 and it is for the period of October, November and December, 2002. Thus, it is a case of delay, default and irregular deposit. Again, there is an advance deposit made on 10.01.2003 for the period 1st January to 31st March, 2002 vide challan bearing Paper No. 36-Ga. The next deposit was made on 02.04.2003 for the months of April and May, 2003. This is followed by the deposit made on 8th October, 2003 and it is for the period 1st October, 2003 to 30th November, 2003. This is evidenced by the challan bearing paper No. 38Ga. Between the deposits made on 2nd April, 2003 and 8th October, 2003 vide paper No. 37-Ga and 38-Ga, there is no deposit of rent for the months of June, July, August and September. This is a clear period of default of four months, even in the deposit of rent in Court. In the following month i.e. the month of December, deposit was made by the tenant for whole of the next year and an extra month, that is to say, from December, 2003 to 31st January, 2004. 33. The next deposit of rent was made on 25th March, 2004 for the months of February, 2004 to April, 2004. This was followed by the deposit made on 1st June, 2004 for the period 1st May, 2004 to 31st July. The next deposit of rent was made on 29th September, 2004 for the period 1st August, 2004 to 30th August, 2004, followed by a further deposit on 14th December, 2004 for the period 1st November, 2004 to 31st January, 2005. The next deposit was made on 16th May, 2005 for the period 1st February to 31st May, 2005. The next deposit of rent was made on 29th September, 2004 for the period 1st August, 2004 to 30th August, 2004, followed by a further deposit on 14th December, 2004 for the period 1st November, 2004 to 31st January, 2005. The next deposit was made on 16th May, 2005 for the period 1st February to 31st May, 2005. On 27th September, 2005, the tenant made deposit of rent again for the period 1st June, 2005 to 30th September, 2005. The next deposit appears to have been made, though the acknowledgment is a bit too dim, on 22.02.2006 for the period 1st October, 2005 to 31st March, 2006, followed by the deposit made on 11th May, 2007 for the period 10th April, 2007 to 9th April, 2008. 34. The finding of the Revisional Court, therefore, that the tenant did not deposit rent for the period 01.06.2003 to 30.09.2003 in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act is correct on facts. It is also true that no rent has been deposited for the period 01.04.2006 to 09.04.2007 in proceedings under Section 30 of the Act, as held by the Revisional Court. The finding about the deposit made on 30th May, 2008 towards rent from 1st June, 2003 to 31st July, 2003 is incorrect, because that appears to be an aberration of stamping and the date is 30th May, 2003, as entries on the relative tender would elsewhere indicate. It is on this basis that the Revisional Court has concluded that the tenant has not deposited rent regularly in Court under Section 30 or paid it to the landlady, regularly. 35. It is but salutary that before deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act may enure to the benefit of the tenant in a suit for eviction based on actionable default, deposit of rent should be validly made under Section 30, covering the period of default. Here, the records of the case clearly indicate that rent deposited in proceedings under Section 30, antedating the institution of the suit and whereof the tenant seeks to claim benefit in the matter of actionable default, is neither regular deposit nor the complete deposit of rent for the entire period of time, commencing the proceedings under Section 30 and until institution of the suit. The order passed by the Court under Section 30 of the Act on 06.04.2007 permits the tenant to deposit at his own risk, after noticing the landlady's stand that she never refused to accept the entire rent due. Therefore, the order passed under Section 30 would, by itself, not save the tenant from the consequences of default in payment of rent, if established on record and actionable. In any case, the deposit under Section 30 of the Act made by the tenant is not valid, because it is not for the relative period of time the deposit of due rent, as the Revisional Court has found. There are clear shortfalls for at least two periods of time, one stretching about a year. On this ground alone, this Court is of opinion that the deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 is not a valid deposit, of which the tenant may be given benefit in the suit brought on the ground of default. 36. The other matter, which derogates from the validity of deposit made under Section 30 of the Act, are the concurrent findings of the two Courts below that the tenant has not complied with the provisions of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules. Rule 21 reads: “21. Deposit of rent.-(1) Any person desirous of depositing rent under Section 30 shall apply in Form E. The application shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are opposite- parties, and also the process fee and notices in Form F. (2) The deposit shall be made under the Head "P- Deposits and Advances II-Deposits not bearing interest-C-Other Deposit Accounts-(b) Departmental and Judicial Deposits-Civil Deposits-Civil Court's Deposits" (3) On such deposit being made, the Court shall cause notice of the deposit to be served on the opposite-party along with a copy of the application. (4) Where a notice of the deposit is returned unserved, the Court shall fix a date on or before which the applicant shall deposit fresh process fee and notice in Form F. If within the time so allowed or within such extended time, as the Court may grant, the applicant fails to take steps as above, the application shall be rejected and the amount deposited shall be refunded to the applicant. (5) In the case of continuance of deposit of rent for any subsequent period, fresh application shall not be necessary. (5) In the case of continuance of deposit of rent for any subsequent period, fresh application shall not be necessary. But process fee and the notice in Form F shall accompany every deposit.” 37. The Trial Court as well as the Revisional Court have recorded concurrent findings of fact, the Trial Court relying on the evidence of the tenant-DW-1 himself, that along with the deposit of rent, process fee and Form-F were not supplied, which the tenant is obliged to supply under sub-Rule (1) and sub-Rule (5) of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules. The aforesaid supply of process fee and notice in Form-F has to accompany each deposit made under Section 30 of the Act and both the Courts of fact below have found that none of the deposits made by the tenant have complied with the aforesaid requirement, which is mandatory in order to make valid deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act. In fact, sub-Section (4) of Section 30 of the Act makes the requirement mandatory, to which Rule 21 of the Act, being dependent upon strict compliance with sub- Rules (3) and (5) of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, fell for consideration of this Court in Shekhar Bahuguna v. Suresh Chandra Kapoor, 2010 SCC OnLine All 1891, where it was held: “42. The learned senior counsel for the tenant submits that the above order is indicative of the fact that necessary steps were taken by the tenant for issuance of notice which is being disputed by the learned counsel for the landlord. The trial Court has found that Rule 21 has not been complied with in as much as there is no material to show that various requisite steps such as filing of process fee and notice in Form F accompanying every deposit as provided by clause (5) of Rule 21, were filed. A bare perusal of the order sheet of the aforesaid misc. case no. 403 of 1990 does not show that a notice of the case was ever served or tendered or refused by the landlord. A bare perusal of the order sheet of the aforesaid misc. case no. 403 of 1990 does not show that a notice of the case was ever served or tendered or refused by the landlord. Also there is no material to show that with every deposit process fee and notice in Form F meant for service on landlord were filed by the tenant In Chhotey Lal v. 14th Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1994 (1) ARC 289 it has been held by this Court that mere deposit of amount under section 30 of the Act is not sufficient for treating the deposit as due compliance of law and availability of sum to the landlord. The provisions of sub-rules (3) and (5) of the Rule 21 of the Act have been interpreted in the following manner:— “The provision of sub-rules (3)(5) of the said Rule are important. For the first deposit under Section 30, the tenant was required to take steps so that a notice about the deposit could have been served to the landlord. In subsequent deposit for continuation of depositing the amount of rent, fresh application was not necessary but process fee and the notice in Form ‘F’ was necessary and it is a mandatory requirement. The Courts below concurrently held that petitioner had not taken steps to serve the plaintiff-landlords after the deposit under Section 30 was made by him. The finding recorded by the Courts below on this point is conclusive as finding of fact and learned Counsel for the petitioner could not assail the said finding that it suffered with any such irregularity which could have necessitated interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, this point alone is sufficient to affirm the judgment of the Courts below that the petitioner was a defaulter and failed to pay the amount due after receipt of the notice under Section 106 of T.P. Act, according to law.” 43. Pashupati Singh v. First Additional District Judge, 1981 ARC 222 is an authority for the proposition that a notice of the application filed under section 30 (1) has to be given to all the opposite parties mentioned in the application and if an application has been dismissed for default then the amount which is deposited by the applicant has to be refunded to the applicant tenant. 44. 44. In Jagat Prasad v. District Judge, Kanpur, 1995 (2) 360, relied upon by the landlord, the Apex Court has held though in a slightly different context under Order 15 Rule 5 C.P.C that the law prescribes the procedure as to deposit under the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Such a procedure if complied with alone will be valid defence to a petition for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent. The relevant portion is reproduced below:— “Law prescribes the procedure as to the deposit under U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. Such a procedure if complied with alone will be a valid defence to a petition for eviction on ultimate order of eviction passed against the tenant will have to be upheld. This means the order of eviction is sustained.” 45. The other decisions Narain Prasad v. Ixth Addl. District Judge, 2004 (2) ARC 211 and Panna Lal v. XIIIth Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 1991 (1) ARC 473, relied upon by the landlord reiterates the above views.” 38. More recently in Rani Devi v. Addl. Distt. & Sessions Judge, 2018 SCC OnLine All 6406, it has been observed in the context of the mandatory requirement of compliance with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, framed under Section 30 of the Act, thus: “25. Thus, mere deposit of the amount under section 30 is not sufficient. For treating the deposit as valid, due compliance of law and availability of the same to landlord is also necessary. The manner in which the rent is to be deposited under section 30 of the Act has been laid down in Rule 21 of the Rules. The deposit made under section 30 of the Act is deemed to be a deposit in favour of the landlord. For treating the deposit as valid, the requirements under Rule 21 of the Rules have to be complied with strictly. 26. In the case at hand, on 26.2.1981, Sri Ram Kumar Vaish deposited a sum of Rs 882/-under section 30(1) of the Act towards rent for the period 1.1.1977 to 31.1.1981. Subsequently, he deposited rent from 1.2.1981 to 31.3.1992 and after his death his wife Smt. Rani Devi, the petitioner No. 1 deposited Rs. 1,098/-towards rent for the period 1.4.1992 to 30.4.1997 and again a sum of Rs 738/-towards rent for the period 1.5.1997 to 30.4.2000. Subsequently, he deposited rent from 1.2.1981 to 31.3.1992 and after his death his wife Smt. Rani Devi, the petitioner No. 1 deposited Rs. 1,098/-towards rent for the period 1.4.1992 to 30.4.1997 and again a sum of Rs 738/-towards rent for the period 1.5.1997 to 30.4.2000. Both the Courts below have returned a concurrent finding of fact that the deposits made subsequent to the deposit made on 26.2.1981 were not accompanied by process fee and notice in Form F as required under Rule 21(5) of the Rules. This fact is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners.” 39. The learned Counsel for the tenant has submitted that compliance with the requirement of Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules becomes redundant, because the landlady appeared in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002, under Section 30 of the Act, which was allowed by the learned Civil Judge on 06.04.2007 after contest. In support of this submission of his, Mr. Ashish Kumar Singh has relied upon the decision in Siddheshwari Dixit (supra), where it has been held: “20. The revisional court also rightly observed that the plaintiff had full knowledge of pendency of Misc. Case No. 82/83 as he had been withdrawing rent deposited in the said proceeding, therefore even if notice in Form-F was not issued, it would be a mere irregularity, but would not invalidate the deposits made by the tenant. The Supreme Court in Mam Chandra Pal v. Smt. Shanti Agarwal, 2002 (1) ARC 370 has held that a very technical and pedantic view with regard to a beneficial provision should not be taken by court. The observation came to be made in context of Section 20(4) of the Act, the benefit of which was being claimed by the defendant. It has been held that:— 11. After the suit was filed the tenant was too willing and ready to clear all the dues so much so that he did it before the first date of hearing and made subsequent deposits as well to make it up to date. We feel that the whole purpose of enacting sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is to do substantial justice between he parties. It covers those cases alone where the ground for eviction is default in payment of rent still the Legislature intended to provide an opportunity to a tenant for payment of rent. We feel that the whole purpose of enacting sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act is to do substantial justice between he parties. It covers those cases alone where the ground for eviction is default in payment of rent still the Legislature intended to provide an opportunity to a tenant for payment of rent. On availing of such an opportunity, equities between the parties are levelled as the landlord gets the amounts of arrears of rent and damages along with legal expenses and interest on the defaulted amount and the tenant is saved of liability of being thrown out of the premises. While considering the import of such provisions, it may have to be seen that the requirement of law is substantially and virtually stands satisfied. A highly technical view of the matter will have no place in construing compliance of such a provision. We may however, hasten to add that it is not intended to lay down that non compliance of any of the requirements of the provision in question is permissible. All the dues and amounts liable to be paid have undoubtedly to be paid or deposited on the date of first hearing but within that framework virtual and substantial compliance may suffice without sticking to mere technicalities of law.” 21. This Court, does not find infraction of any provision of law or any prejudice having been caused to the plaintiff in case defendant continued to deposit rent, after refusal by the landlord, in Misc. Case No. 82/83. The revisional court was right in holding the said deposit as valid.” 40. It must be said at once that Siddheshwari Dixit does not derogate from the principle that in order to take benefit of Section 30 of the Act, the tenant has to comply with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules strictly and that with every deposit of rent made in Court, having seisin of the Section 30 proceedings, the necessary process fee and notice in Form-F have to be supplied in order to make the deposit valid. This is the principle laid down consistently in Shekhar Bahuguna (supra) and Rani Devi (supra). Siddheshwari Dixit is a case where the landlord not only had full knowledge of the case under Section 30, but also had been withdrawing rent deposited in the said proceedings. This is the principle laid down consistently in Shekhar Bahuguna (supra) and Rani Devi (supra). Siddheshwari Dixit is a case where the landlord not only had full knowledge of the case under Section 30, but also had been withdrawing rent deposited in the said proceedings. It was in that context that it was opined that compliance with the requirements of supplying Form-F with the process fee would be a merely formality and cannot derogate from the extension of benefit under the provision to the tenant. In the present case by contrast, the landlady appeared in the case under Section 30 of the Act and objected to it on the ground that she never refused to accept rent. Upon the tenant making an application in the case under Section 30 that he had deposited rent up to 31.03.2006, and ready to deposit further rent up to 31.10.2006, and that the landlady may be directed to accept the said rent before the Court due until 31.10.2006, amounting to Rs.240/-, the landlady responded by saying that if the tenant pays the entire rent due up-to-date in cash, she would consider accepting it. The Court, seized of the Section 30 proceedings, opined that rent under Section 30 is deposited to be paid to the landlord, which the landlord has a right to withdraw. It was remarked that since the landlady does not want to withdraw the rent, the Court cannot compel her to do so. In this connection, the order dated 23.02.2007 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) in Misc. It was remarked that since the landlady does not want to withdraw the rent, the Court cannot compel her to do so. In this connection, the order dated 23.02.2007 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) in Misc. Case No. 35 of 2002 may be quoted: ^^23-2-2007 izkŒ i= 24x dk fuLrkj.k izkFkhZ dh vksj ls izkFkZuk i= 24x bl vk’k; dk izLrqr gqvk fd mlus fnukad 31-3-06 rd dk fdjk;k pkyku ls U;k;ky; ds vkns’k ij tek fd;k gS vkSj 31-10-06 rd dk fdjk;k tek djus dks rS;kj gS vkSj blh vk/kkj ij foi{kh dks fnukad 31-10-06 rd dk fdjk;k 240 :i;s U;k;ky; ds le{k ysus ds fy, vkns’k ikfjr djus dh izkFkZuk dh x;h gSA ftl ij foi{kh }kjk ;g vafdr fd;k x;k fd ;fn fiNyk leLr fdjk;k ,d eq’r uxn nsrk gs rHkh fopkj fd;k tk ldrk gSA vFkkZr foi{kh fd vuqlkj ;fn izkFkhZ mls fiNyk leLr fdjk;k ,d eq’r uxn nsrk rHkh og bl ij fopkj djsxkA mYYks[kuh; gS fd /kkjk&30 fdjk;k vf/kŒ ds rgr izkFkhZ dks U;k;ky; esa fdjk;k tek djus dh vuqefr rc nh tkrh gS] tc mlds vuqlkj Hkou Lokeh@yS.MyksMZ fdjk;k ysus ls badkj djrk gS vkSj gLrxr okn esa izkFkhZ }kjk tks fdjk;k tek fd;k x;k gS og foi{kh ds fy, gh gS] ftls mBkus dk vf/kdkj foi{kh dk gSA ;fn foi{kh mls ugha mBkuk pkgrk rks mlds fy, ck/; ugha fd;k tk ldrk gSA bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa izkFkZuk i= Lohdkj fd;s tkus ;ksX; ugha gSA vkns’k izkFkZuk i= 24x fujLr fd;k tkrk gSA i=koyh okLrs fuLrkj.k 4x fnukad 23-3-2007 dks is’k gksA** 41. The aforesaid stand of the landlady before the Court hearing the Section 30 matter makes it evident that this is not a case where the landlady, after knowledge of the proceedings, had accepted the position or acquiesced to it that she did not accept rent and further that it was being deposited by the tenant in Court, which she was minded to withdraw. The landlady never accepted the position that she refused to receive rent ever. Rather, she took a specific stand that she was willing to accept the entire rent due up to time in lump sum, in cash. The landlady never accepted the position that she refused to receive rent ever. Rather, she took a specific stand that she was willing to accept the entire rent due up to time in lump sum, in cash. It is also not in dispute on facts that the tenant has not complied with each deposit made with the provisions of Rule 21, supplying the requisite process fee and the notice in Form-F. Therefore, the decision in Siddheshwari Dixit is of no assistance to the tenant and it is a case where the tenant, who desired to take benefit of the provision of the provisions of Section 30, had to punctiliously comply with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules. But, he did not. 42. This brings us to fore the other question relating to the validity of deposit under Section 30 of the Act, to wit, if the grant of an application under Section 30 by the Court permitting the tenant to deposit at his own risk, would lead to the deposited rent ipso facto enuring to the tenant's benefit? The Courts below have held otherwise on facts and law. This Court is in agreement with the above opinion. 43. The essence of a valid deposit under Section 30(1) of the Act is based on a case of tender of rent by the tenant of a building to the landlord governed by the Act and refusal by the landlord. Unless the refusal is proved or a supervening willingness of the landlord dispelled, the right to deposit under Section 30 would either not be there in the absence of established refusal, or in the face of a supervening acceptance from the point of time that the landlord is willing to accept the rent, the right to deposit would cease. If the refusal is there and so long that it continues, the deposit has to be made strictly in accordance with the provisions of Section 30 of the Act read with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules, in order to make the deposit valid in the sense that it may be taken to be deposited with the Court, acting on the landlord's behalf. It is only in that situation that the deposit made would enure to the tenant's benefits; not otherwise. 44. It is only in that situation that the deposit made would enure to the tenant's benefits; not otherwise. 44. It is also of utmost importance to acknowledge the legal position that whether deposit of rent under Section 30 has been validly made or not, is not decided by the Court seized of the Section 30 proceedings. It is to be decided by the Court that subsequently hears the landlord's action for ejectment etc. Therefore, the submission of the learned Counsel for the tenant that the application under Section 30 being allowed by the learned Civil Judge, permitting him to deposit at his own risk, has to be considered as valid deposit of rent, cannot be accepted. Whether the deposit was validly made under Section 30 or not, is to be decided by the Courts of competent jurisdiction trying the suit. Both the Courts, on a correct deposit was not validly made. The deposit has been held to be invalid, because it was short, irregular and for certain periods of time, not made at all. It has also been held to be invalid, because there was no compliance of the provisions of Section 30 of the Act read with Rule 21 of the U.P. U.B. Rules. 45. There are again some pertinent observations of this Court to be found in Shekhar Bahuguna (supra), where it was observed: “37. Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides for deposit of rent in Court in certain circumstances. If any person claiming to be tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its landlord and the landlord refused to accept the rent the same may be deposited in Court in the prescribed manner and the tenant shall continue to deposit the rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent period until the landlord, in the meantime, signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it, vide sub section (1) of section 30 of the Act. Interpreting the said provision, it has been held, time and again, by this Court that there should be a refusal by the landlord to accept the rent which is the sine qua non for a valid deposit under section 30 (1) of the Act. Interpreting the said provision, it has been held, time and again, by this Court that there should be a refusal by the landlord to accept the rent which is the sine qua non for a valid deposit under section 30 (1) of the Act. The said legal proposition was not disputed by the learned senior counsel for the tenant and the arguments proceeding on that footing. On the facts situation as existed in the case and discussed above, it has been found that as a matter of fact, the alleged two money orders were not even tendered to the landlord and therefore, the question of their refusal does not arise. This being so, the very foundation of making the deposit under sub-section (1) of section 30 of the Act goes. It is unthinkable that in absence of any refusal by the landlord as the present case is, a tenant could make a valid deposit under section 30 (1) of the Act. This is one aspect of the case but the matter does not end here.” 46. It must be added here that on the facts of the case in Shekhar Bahuguna, the remarks of the Court in Paragraph No.53 of the report, almost bring the law laid down there to bear on all fours on the case here, which read: “53. The upshot of the above discussion is that the deposit made by the tenant under section 30 of the Act is not a valid deposit. Firstly, there was no refusal by the landlord to accept the rent allegedly tendered through money order, secondly the provisions of Rule 21 have not been complied with as notice was never tendered or served or refused by the landlord and thirdly that no rent was deposited for the month of March, 1989.” 47. This Court is, therefore, in agreement with the Courts below that the deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 is not valid and cannot enure to the tenant's benefit while judging the plea of default. 48. It cannot be gainsaid that when the notice of demand for arrears of rent and to quit dated 11.07.2007 was served, there were arrears of rent far beyond four months, outstanding against the tenant. 48. It cannot be gainsaid that when the notice of demand for arrears of rent and to quit dated 11.07.2007 was served, there were arrears of rent far beyond four months, outstanding against the tenant. There are short deposits of rent by much more than four months made by the tenant in Section 30 proceedings, as already recorded hereinabove, and which he has not otherwise tendered to the landlady. It is also not in dispute that upon receipt of the notice of demand and quit, the tenant did not remit the entire outstandings of rent to the landlady. Thus, on the date of institution of the suit, there being arrears of rent exceeding four months, that were not paid by the tenant within 30 days of the service of the notice of demand, a case of actionable default under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act is clearly made out. This is what the two Courts of fact below have consistently concluded. Upon institution of the suit, it is not in dispute that on the date of first hearing, the tenant has not unconditionally paid, tendered to the landlord or deposited in Court the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation for the demised shop, together with interest at the specified rate and the landlord's costs of the suit. The tenant did not deposit on the date of first hearing, believing perhaps that he had deposited the entire rent validly under Section 30(1) of the Act, which he is entitled to deduct/ set off effacing all the outstandings. The tenant’s belief is not vindicated, and, therefore, irrelevant. This being the undisputed position, which has also been specifically held by the Trial Court on its findings on Issue No. 4, the tenant cannot claim any relief from his liability for eviction. 49. In all fairness, the learned Counsel for the tenant has not raised an issue about benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. The conclusion, therefore, would be that the tenant has committed actionable default under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act and the deposit of rent made by him under Section 30(1), does not enure to his benefit. 49. In all fairness, the learned Counsel for the tenant has not raised an issue about benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. The conclusion, therefore, would be that the tenant has committed actionable default under Section 20(2)(a) of the Act and the deposit of rent made by him under Section 30(1), does not enure to his benefit. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the two Courts below, except to the extent of there being a few inconsequential infirmities noticed in this judgment, do not suffer from any such fallacy as may warrant interference in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 50. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. 51. The interim order granted in this case is hereby vacated. 52. However, considering the facts and circumstances, the tenant is allowed six months time to handover peaceful and vacant possession of the shop in dispute provided he execute an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, Ghaziabad, embodying the following terms within one month of the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment by either party and its production before the Trial Court: (1) The tenant shall handover peaceful and vacant possession of the demised shop to the landlord on or before 10.05.2023. (2) During the period of six months that the tenant remains in occupation, he will not sublet the shop, damage or disfigure it in any manner whatsoever. 53. In the event, an undertaking, as above directed, is not filed before the Prescribed Authority by the tenant within the time allowed or the undertaking violated, the release order shall become executable forthwith.