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2022 DIGILAW 177 (MEG)

Anita Sharma v. State of Meghalaya

2022-07-07

W.DIENGDOH

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. The petitioner has approached this Court with a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C on an apparently technical issue, inasmuch as, it was contended that a charge sheet has been filed by the Investigating Officer (I/O) in connection with Madanrting P.S. Case No. 54 (05) of 2019 under Section 363/366(A)/370/370(A) IPC read with Section 5/5A/5B of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 and Section 17 of the POCSO Act for which cognizance has been taken by the Special POCSO Court, Shillong in Special POCSO Case No. 41 of 2021. 2. Mr. N. Syngkon, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Section 17 of the POCSO Act can be resorted to only if there is a correspondent offence made out under any other sections under the POCSO Act as Section 17 is a provision for punishment for abetment of such an act and as such, abetment has to be with regard to any other offence or offences provided under the said POCSO Act. In this case, the charge sheet did not disclose any other Act, for which punishment for abetment of that offence can be meted out to the accused. In such a situation, it is submitted that the charge sheet filed has not fulfilled the provision of law and the same is liable to be quashed, for which the petitioner has approached this Court accordingly for exercise of its inherent power. 3. Another limb of argument advanced by the learned counsel is that the relevant provision of law under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act have not been complied, inasmuch as, Section 13 of the said Act provides that a special police officer has to be appointed by the Government for dealing with offences under this Act within a particular area or jurisdiction, which includes a revenue district in a State and if the offence is made out in two or more States within India, then by virtue of sub-Section 4 of Section 13 of the said Act, the Central Government has to notify the appointment of Police Officers as Trafficking Police Officers who will then exercise all the functions of the Special Police Officers under the Act. This aspect of the matter has also been lost sight of by the Trial Court since the matter has been investigated by a local Police Officer not empowered under the Act. This aspect of the matter has also been lost sight of by the Trial Court since the matter has been investigated by a local Police Officer not empowered under the Act. It is therefore prayed that this petition may be allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner herein before the Trial Court be set aside and quashed. 4. Mr. N.D. Chullai, learned AAG appearing on behalf of the State respondents No. 1-3 has submitted that from the statement of the victim available on record, it is very clear that on being scolded by her aunt, she left the house and went to stay with her friend and thereafter, went to Delhi with some people and on reaching Delhi, she stayed in the petitioner's house. It was then that the petitioner confined her in her custody and she was forcefully made to sleep with a number of people who are the clients of the petitioner. Having been dragged into the sex trade, she finally escaped and came back to Shillong. The charges being very serious in nature, therefore this Court may be slow in exercising its inherent power, submits the learned AAG. 5. It is also submitted that the stage of the case before the Trial Court is for consideration of charges and the petitioner can make out a case for discharge, if so desired. It is therefore prayed that this petition may be dismissed. 6. On consideration of the prayer made and on perusal of the materials on record, including the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C at serial No. 11 of the Form under Clause XVI, the Sections of law said to have been violated by the petitioner herein, inter alia, includes Section 3(A)/4/17 of the POCSO Act. This fact would render the contention of the petitioner on the point that only Section 17 of the POCSO Act would by itself not be sufficient to make out a case of commission of offence under the POCSO Act and thereby, rendering the exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Special Judge, POCSO Court non est, not sustainable. This Court therefore holds that the Special Judge, POCSO Court thus has jurisdiction to take up the matter. 7. This Court therefore holds that the Special Judge, POCSO Court thus has jurisdiction to take up the matter. 7. On the technical aspect raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as far as the provisions of law under the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act is concerned, at this juncture, this Court would not intervene, but would leave it to the petitioner to agitate the matter before the Trial Court. 8. It is worth noting that for the High Court to exercise its inherent power under Section 482, the Court is to see as to whether there was any abuse of the process of any court or whether delivery of justice is prevented to otherwise enable the Court to secure the ends of justice and also to give effect to any order under the Code. 9. In the famous case of State of Haryana & Ors v. Bhajan Lal & Ors: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 at para 102, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down certain guidelines under which exercise of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 could be carried out. One of the guideline indicates that this power can be exercised where the allegations made in the first information report do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. Another guideline is where the evidence collected in support of the allegations made in the FIR do not disclose the commission of any offence and also where in a criminal proceeding, the same is attended with malafide or is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused due to private and personal grudge. 10. A cursory perusal of the materials available on record including the said report under Section 173 Cr.P.C would show that a very strong prima facie case has been established showing the involvement of the petitioner in the case and the statement of the victim who is a minor is very lucid and clear, wherein the petitioner herein was clearly implicated. 11. Following the guidelines in the Bhajan Lal's case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner has not been able to make out a case for exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, this petition is hereby dismissed as devoid of merits and the same stands disposed of.