ORDER : Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 16.1.2021, passed by Deputy Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh, whereby prayer made on behalf of the petitioners herein to refer the dispute to the Labour Court-cum Industrial Tribunal for adjudication, came to be declined on the ground of delay, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein following main relief(s):- “(i). Issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ, order or directions for quashing the impugned order dated 16.01.2021, 18.02.2021, 19.02.2021 and order dated 20.2.2021 (Annexure P-2 colly) for all intents and purposes. (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or directions by directing the respondent No.1 to refer the dispute to Ld. Labour Court for adjudication as done in the other similar situated person’s case”. 2. Precisely, the facts of the case as emerge from the record are that the petitioners herein had been working as resin extractor with respondents No.2 and 3 w.e.f. dates, as detailed in para-2 of the petition. Allegedly, in March 2004, the services of the petitioners came to be terminated/ disengaged by the respondents in contravention of Section 25-F and 25-G of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Though, petitioners approached the respondents for re-engagement, but since respondents failed to pay any heed to the request made on behalf of the petitioners, petitioners raised industrial dispute in the year, 2019, which was referred for conciliation proceedings. After failure of conciliation proceedings, matter was referred to Labour Commissioner for referring the dispute to Labour Court for adjudication. However, Deputy Labour Commissioner vide orders dated 16.1.2021, 18.2.2021, 19.2.2021 and 20.2.2021 refused to refer the dispute to Labour Court for adjudication on the ground that the dispute is not in existence on account of delay. In the aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein reliefs, as have been reproduced hereinabove. 3. Precise grouse of the petitioners as is highlighted in the petition and has been further canvassed by learned counsel representing the petitioners is that the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Himachal Pradesh had no occasion/ authority to decline the reference on the ground of delay and laches. Learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the delay and laches by itself cannot be a ground for refusing to make a Reference. Learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the delay and laches by itself cannot be a ground for refusing to make a Reference. He argued that if a person is guilty of delay and laches, it may be a ground for the Labour Court either to refuse to grant relief or refuse to grant relief of back wages, but definitely Government cannot take up the role of adjudicating Authority while deciding the question as to whether a Reference should be made or not. 4. Ms. Ritta Goswami, learned Additional Advocate General, while inviting attention of this Court to the judgment dated 30th March, 2022 passed by Full Bench of this Court in CWP No.2190 of 2020 alongwith other connected matters titled as Sh. Jai Singh and others versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, submitted that the issue sought to be raised in the case at hand is no more res-integra. She argued that as per aforesaid judgment, Government is well within its right to decline to refer the matter to Labour court/Industrial tribunal on the ground of delay and laches. 5. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and perused the material available on record, this Court finds that though in the case at hand, services of the petitioners herein were terminated/disengaged in March, 2004 but yet they chose to approach Labour Court with a request to refer the matter for adjudication to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal in the year, 2019 i.e. after inordinate delay of 15 years. Since, there is no explanation, worth credence, ever came to be rendered on record by the petitioners herein qua inordinate delay in approaching the competent authority, order impugned in the instant proceedings came to be passed. 6. The Division Bench of this Court in case titled Smt. Bego Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 26.10.2016, categorically held that if there is no explanation for the huge delay in raising the dispute, the appropriate Government would be justified in refusing to refer the dispute on the ground that the dispute has faded away with the efflux of time and there is no live dispute to be referred. Order impugned in the instant proceedings is based upon the aforesaid judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court, which has otherwise attained finality. 7. Order impugned in the instant proceedings is based upon the aforesaid judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court, which has otherwise attained finality. 7. Recently Full Bench of this Court having taken of divergent views expressed by different Division Benches had an occasion to deal with the issue sought to be raised in the instant proceedings at length and vide judgment dated 30.3.2022 Full Bench of this Court after relying upon various judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time has categorically held that appropriate Government before taking a decision on the question of making reference of the industrial dispute has to form a definite opinion whether or not such dispute exists or is apprehended. It has been held in the aforesaid judgment that whether or not the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act can be decided by the appropriate Government alone and not by any other authority including competent court of law. Full Bench of this Court has further held that the appropriate Government in discharging the administrative function of taking a decision to make or refuse to make, reference of the industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, has to apply its mind on relevant considerations and has not to act mechanically as a post office. That the delay by itself does not denude the appropriate Government of its power to examine advisability of making reference of the industrial dispute but the delay would certainly be relevant for deciding the basic question whether or not the industrial dispute “exists” which also includes the decision to find out whether on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or has ceased to be alive or has become stale or has faded away. 8. Mr. C.N. Singh, learned counsel representing the petitioners while referring to aforesaid judgment rendered by Full Bench of this Court, argued that in case appropriate Government while examining the question of making a reference of industrial dispute arrives at a conclusion that question that on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or alive, would require elaborate examination of the evidence, it may while making a reference of the industrial dispute, additionally formulate question on this aspect to be decided as preliminary issue while simultaneously also making a reference on the industrial dispute to be decided as secondary issue. 9. There cannot be any quarrel with aforesaid proposition of law expounded by Full Bench of this Court while rendering judgment dated 30.3.2022, but same cannot be applied in the case of the petitioners, wherein no plausible explanation ever came to be rendered on record on behalf of the petitioners qua the delay of 15 years. Deputy Labour Commissioner after having conducting elaborate examination of the material available on record arrived at a specific conclusion that alleged dispute is stale, time barred and faded away with the passage of time. The relevant para No.28 of the aforesaid judgment is as under:- “28. Following principles of law can, therefore be culled out from series of the precedents discussed above, as to the effect of delay in demanding /making reference of the industrial dispute to the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal under Section 10(1) of the Act:- (i) That the function of the appropriate Government while dealing with question of making reference of industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, is an administrative function and not a judicial or quasi judicial function. (ii) That the Government before taking a decision on the question of making reference of the industrial dispute has to form a definite opinion whether or not such dispute exits or is apprehended. (iii) That whether or not the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended in the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act can be decided by the appropriate Government alone and not by any authority including by this Court. (iv) That the appropriate Government in discharging the administrative function of taking a decision to make or refuse to make, reference of the industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act, has to apply its mind on relevant considerations and has not to act mechanically as a post office. (v) That while forming an opinion as to whether the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government is not entitled to adjudicate the dispute itself on merits. (v) That while forming an opinion as to whether the industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government is not entitled to adjudicate the dispute itself on merits. (vi) That the delay by itself does not denude the appropriate Government of its power to examine advisability of making reference of the industrial dispute but the delay would certainly be relevant for deciding the basic question whether or not the industrial dispute “exists” which also includes the decision to find out whether on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or has ceased to be alive or has become stale or has faded away. (vii) That whether or not a dispute is alive or has become stale or non-existent, would always depend on the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down for the same. (viii) That even if Section 10(1) of the Act empowers the appropriate Government to form an opinion “at any time” on the question whether any “industrial dispute” “exists or is apprehended”, and there is no time limit prescribed for taking such a decision, yet such power has to be exercised by the appropriate Government within a reasonable time. (ix) That the period for making reference of industrial dispute is co-extensive with the existence of dispute because the factum of the “existence” or “apprehension of the dispute” is conditioned by the effect of the delay on the liveliness of the dispute. (x) That the appropriate Government in arriving at the decision to make a reference of industrial dispute or otherwise, in the context of delay, may examine whether the workman or the Union has been agitating the matter before the appropriate fora so as to keep the dispute alive, which however, does not necessarily mean that in a case where such action has not been initiated, the dispute has ceased to exist. (xi) That the appropriate Government can, as per Section 10(1) of the Act, take a decision on the question of making reference “at any time”, thus implying that there is no limitation in taking such decision and the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to such proceedings. (xi) That the appropriate Government can, as per Section 10(1) of the Act, take a decision on the question of making reference “at any time”, thus implying that there is no limitation in taking such decision and the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to such proceedings. (xii) That the appropriate Government while taking a decision on the question of making reference, need not provide an elaborate opportunity of hearing to the workman but it is under an obligation to consider his explanation for delay in making the demand. (xiii) That in cases where the appropriate Government while examining the question of making a reference of industrial dispute arrives at a decision that the question that on account of delay the dispute has ceased to exist or alive, would require elaborate examination of the evidence, it may while making a reference of the industrial dispute, additionally formulate question on this aspect to be decided as preliminary issue while simultaneously also making a reference on the industrial dispute to be decided as secondary issue. (xiv) That even in a case where reference has been made to the Industrial Court after prolonged delay, such Court would be entitled to mould the relief by declining whole or part of the back wages. (xv) That even when a reference is made by appropriate Government in a case after huge and enormous unexplained delay, the industrial Court would be entitled to return the reference since such Court judiciously exercises its wide jurisdiction under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act and is under obligation to consider whether in such like situation any relief at all could be granted to the workman”. 10. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned order passed by Deputy Labour Commission, Himachal Pradesh and as such, same is upheld. The present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merit alongwith pending applications, if any.