JUDGMENT : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent at admission stage. 2. Instant second appeal has been preferred on behalf of the defendant-appellant challenging the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2018 passed by the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court, Agra in Civil Appeal No. 126 of 2017 reversing the judgment and decree dated 21.07.2017 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 3, Agra in Original Suit No. 755 of 2012, Girraj Dharam Family Trust vs. Gajendra Singh. 3. Facts culled out from the record on board are that plaintiff-opposite party no. 1, which is a trust, has instituted a suit for mandatory injunction to remove the possession of the defendant along with his belongings including cattle etc. from the property in question as well as for damages owing to use and occupation of the property in question along with future pendente lite interest at the rate of 18% p.a. and mesne profit alleging therein that the plaintiff is the owner in possession over Plot No. 1-G (Hanuman Nagar Phase-II), Maruti Estate Phase-1, Loha Mandi Ward, Agra; that in the month of May, 2002 defendant had been granted license to tether his cattle and taking care of cattle of plaintiff as well over the property in question and in lieu there of the defendant was expected to supply milk to the plaintiff; that by the passes of time dishonesty prevailed in the mind of the defendant, who has filed Original Suit No. 1069 of 2005, which is still pending; that to revoke the licence of the defendant notice dated 09.05.2012 has been sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, which was received by the defendant and he has given incorrect reply dated 21.05.2012. The defendant has filed written statement denying the allegation as made in the plaint. In paragraph no. 6 of the written statement he has stated that he is the tenant at the rate of Rs.300 per month over the property in question since 1989. The trial court has dismissed the suit on the ground that the violation of the terms of the license has not been proved by the plaintiff. The first appellate court, on appeal being filed on behalf of the plaintiff, has formulated as many as 5 points of determination and allowed the appeal decreeing the suit filed on behalf of the plaintiff. 4. The first appellate court, on appeal being filed on behalf of the plaintiff, has formulated as many as 5 points of determination and allowed the appeal decreeing the suit filed on behalf of the plaintiff. 4. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has advanced three fold submissions in assailing the judgment of reversal passed by first appellate court; first with respect to the ownership of the plaintiff over the property in question; second with respect to the maintainability of the suit and third with respect to non-appearance of Meera Khandelwal, who has filed the suit being trustee of the trust. 5. So far as the first point is concerned, qua ownership of the plaintiff over the property in question, first appellate court has given a categorical finding in deciding the point of determination no. 1 and 2 that trust was created by Rajendra Kumar Khandelwal on 14.01.1983, in which Shankar Lal Khandelwal and Meera Khandelwal were trustee of the trust. At later stage trust (plaintiff) has purchased the property in question through Meera Khandelwal being trustee from Pandey Sahakari Awas Samiti through registered sale deed dated 27.03.2002 (Paper No. 22-Ka). Considering said sale deed, learned appellate court has given a categorical finding that the property belongs to trust. Even Gajendra Singh (defendant) came with the plea that he has taken the possession of the property from Shankar Lal Khandelwal who is a trustee of the trust. In deciding point of determination no. 1 the appellate court has also discussed in detail the plaint of O.S. No. 1069 of 2005, Gajendra Singh vs. Shankar Lal Khandelwal (Paper No. 23-C/2 to 23/9), wherein Gajendra Singh (plaintiff in OS No. 1069 of 2005 but defendant in OS No. 755 of 2012) was claiming himself to be tenant of the property in question. Plea of tenancy, as taken by the defendant in the said suit (O.S. No. 1069 of 2005), has been discarded by the trial court. It is own case of the defendant that he is doing business of dairy over the property in question. At later stage, he has deposed against his claim of tenancy and came with new case claiming himself to be owner of the property, which has been discarded by the appellate court and, after considering the evidence on record, came to a conclusion that nature of the possession of the defendant over the property in question is licensee. At later stage, he has deposed against his claim of tenancy and came with new case claiming himself to be owner of the property, which has been discarded by the appellate court and, after considering the evidence on record, came to a conclusion that nature of the possession of the defendant over the property in question is licensee. The defendants-appellant has not adduced any evidence to prove his tenancy or ownership, as claimed by him at later stage, over the property in question. The sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff still exists and right and title of the plaintiff over the property in question cannot be denied on the basis of the said sale deed dated 27.03.2002. 6. Counsel for the defendant-appellant has tried to make out a case that the sale deed was executed in favour of Meera Khandelwal, therefore, suit filed on behalf of the trust is not maintainable. Perusal of the sale deed dated 27.03.2002 reveals that it has been executed in favour of Meera Khandelwal being a trustee of the trust. There is nothing on record to substantiate the submission of the counsel for the appellant that said sale deed was executed in individual capacity of Meera Khandelwal. Even in deciding issue no. 1 the trial court has not made any adverse remark against the said sale deed dated 27.03.2002. First appellate court, in deciding point of determination No. 1 & 2, has considered the sale deed (paper No. 22Ka) as well and given a finding that sale was executed in favour of Meera Khandelwal being trustee of trust. Thus, I found no force in the first submission as advanced by the counsel for the defendants-appellant qua ownership of the plaintiff over property in question. 7. Second submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant qua maintainability of the suit is also unfounded under the law. With respect to the maintainability of the suit the trial court has framed issue no. 7, however, same has not been addressed by the trial court, being not pressed by the parties. Even this particular issue has not been raised and pressed before the first appellate court. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to submit that all the trustees should have been made party in the plaint representing the estate of the trust. 7, however, same has not been addressed by the trial court, being not pressed by the parties. Even this particular issue has not been raised and pressed before the first appellate court. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to submit that all the trustees should have been made party in the plaint representing the estate of the trust. Mere one trustee is not sufficient to represent the trust for the purposes of filing the suit. In support of his case, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the case of Duli Chand vs. Mahabir Pershad Trilok Chand Charitable Trust of Delhi High Court decided by the Division Bench, reported in 1984 AIR (Del) 145. It is apposite to mention that issue no. 8 has been framed for non-joinder of the parties, however, parties have not pressed the said issue, therefore, accordingly, same has been decided by the trial court. Finding as returned by the trial court with respect to issue no. 8 has not been assailed before the first appellate court. Accordingly, no point of determination has been framed in this regard. 8. Thirdly, learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the contents of the plaint cannot be proved without testimony of Meera Khandelwal, who is in the capacity of the plaintiff and filed the suit being a trustee of the trust. The plaint reveals that the suit has been filed on behalf of the trust through its trustee Meera Khandelwal. In deciding the point of determination no. 1 appellate court has discussed this point in detail and negated the same on two grounds i.e. first, Shankar Lal Khandelwal, who was also one of the trustees in the trust, can prove the pleading of the plaint and depose on behalf of the trust (plaintiff) and second, Shankar Lal Khandelwal (P.W.-1) is the husband of Meera Khandelwal, therefore, being spouse (husband) he has got right under the law to depose on behalf of his wife. In support of his observation the appellate court has cited the case of Rajni Shukla vs. Special Judge (E.C. Act) Banda and Ors., reported in 2007 (69) AIR 801 Alld. H.C. In the cited judgment, coordinate Bench of this Court has discussed the provisions as enunciated under Order III Rule 1 of C.P.C. and the provisions as enunciated under Section 118 and 120 of the Indian Evidence Act. H.C. In the cited judgment, coordinate Bench of this Court has discussed the provisions as enunciated under Order III Rule 1 of C.P.C. and the provisions as enunciated under Section 118 and 120 of the Indian Evidence Act. After due deliberation Hon'ble court has concluded that by virtue of Section 120 of the Indian Evidence Act husband is, even in absence of any power of attorney, quite competent to depose on behalf of his wife. For the ready reference, relevant paragraph no. 8 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein below:- "8. However, by virtue of Section 120, Evidence Act, husband was even in the absence of any power-of-attorney quite competent to depose on behalf of the wife. Moreover, in India normally properties standing in names of the ladies are managed by their husbands. If the facts which the plaintiff wants to prove are also in the knowledge of her husband, then even in the absence of any power-of-attorney, he is quite competent to depose on behalf of his wife. However, if there is any fact, which is in the exclusive knowledge of the plaintiff, then she alone can depose about that." 9. In this view of the matter, non-appearance of Meera Khandelwal, being a plaintiff witness in support of the pleading of the plaint, does not adversely affect the merits of the plaint. Her husband Shankar Lal Khandelwal (P.W.-1) is competent enough to prove the pleading of the plaint being one of the trustee of the trust (plaintiff) and also authorized to depose under the provisions of law as enunciated under Section 120 of Indian Evidence Act being husband of Meera Khandelwal, who is representing plaintiff (trust) being it's trustee. 10. All the three points as advanced by the counsel for the appellant are unfounded on the law and facts. He has failed to point out any substantial question of law for intervention by this Court in instant second appeal in exercise of it's second appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. Right, title and interest of the parties has been concluded by the findings of fact. The nature of possession of the defendant over the property in question, who has been permitted to tether the cattle and run a dairy business over there, is mere a licensee which has been revoked by the plaintiff, as observed by first appellate court in deciding point of determination No. 3. The nature of possession of the defendant over the property in question, who has been permitted to tether the cattle and run a dairy business over there, is mere a licensee which has been revoked by the plaintiff, as observed by first appellate court in deciding point of determination No. 3. Right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the property in question on the basis of the registered sale deed dated 27.03.2002 has been concurrently held by the courts below. There is no unimpeachable and credible evidence on the record to deny the right, title and interest of the plaintiff over the property in question based on the registered sale deed dated 27.03.2002. 11. This Court found no substantial question of law to entertain the instant second appeal against the judgment passed by the first appellate court. The right, title and interest of the parties are concluded by the findings of fact which does not require any interference. 12. Resultantly, the second appeal, being devoid of merits and misconceived, is dismissed with no order as to costs.