ORDER : This Crl.M.C. has been filed seeking to quash the entire further proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.2143/2020 on the file of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakkudy. 2. The prosecution case is that on 30.05.2020 at 8.00 p.m., the accused peeped to the house of the defacto complainant. On seeing this, the husband (CW2) of CW1, the defacto complainant questioned the accused. Out of that enmity, accused abused them using filthy words and also assaulted and twisted the hand of CW2. On seeing the same, when CW3 tried to intervene, she was also assaulted. Thereby accused committed the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 294(b) of Indian Penal Code. 3. According to the learned counsel, this case has been registered as a counter to the case filed by petitioner against the husband of CW1, who has been cited as CW2 in the charge. According to him, the real incident is that, on 30.02.2020 at about 9.03 p.m., CW2, who is the husband of the defacto complainant and CW3 were consuming liquor in a car parked in front of the house of the petitioner. When the petitioner questioned the same, they attacked the petitioner with a wooden stick and hands and the petitioner sustained injury and was admitted in the hospital on the very same day. Crime No.826/2020 of Mala police station was registered in connection with that and copy of the final report is produced as Annexure-2. Annexure-4 is the discharge summary of the petitioner which would show that the petitioner was admitted in the hospital on 30.05.2020 at about 11.55 p.m. 4. It is further contended that as an off shoot to the registration of the above crime, the defacto complainant herein got admitted in the hospital immediately on the next day, i.e, 31.05.2020 and wound certificate of the defacto complainant and CW2 were produced as Annexure-3 which would show that they have been admitted on 31.05.2020 and on examination by the Doctor, no injuries are noted. 5. According to the petitioner, this complaint has forwarded under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’). The complaint was filed on 09.07.2020. It is after one month and according to him, the complaint was forwarded as per Section 156 (3) of the Code without complying 154(1) of the Code. 5. According to the petitioner, this complaint has forwarded under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’). The complaint was filed on 09.07.2020. It is after one month and according to him, the complaint was forwarded as per Section 156 (3) of the Code without complying 154(1) of the Code. In this context, the learned counsel drew my attention to Priyanka Srivastave and Another V. State of U.P. and Others (2015(2) KHC SN 30 : 2015 (1) KLD 699 : 2015 (4) SCALE 120 : 2015(2) KLT 451 : 2015 (2) KLJ 491 : 2015 CriLJ 2396 : AIR 2015 SC 1758 : 2015 (6) SCC 287 .) 6. According to the learned counsel, procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate in forwarding the complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code is in non-compliance of Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code and hence, the FIR is liable to be quashed. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand would content that as per Annexure 5(b), there is specific averments that the complaint was filed before the Station House Officer, Mala, but no action was taken and hence on 04.06.2020, he filed a complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chalakkudy. But no action was taken against the accused. Accordingly, complaint was filed before the learned Magistrate for forwarding under Section 156(3) of the Code. He would also contend that in Annexure 5(c) documents list, item No.1 shown as addressed to Deputy Superintendent of Police may be a mistake, actually the complaint was filed before the Station House Officer, Mala. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner in this context takes my attention to Annexure 5(b), which would show that the complaint has been filed before the Dy.S.P. on 31.05.2020 and that has been forwarded to the Station House Officer for enquiry and report by the Dy.S.P. on 05.06.2020. 9. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand relies upon Section 36 of the Code and would contend that as per Section 36, police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station can exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by the SHO within the limits of his station. But Section 36 of the Code only provides the supervisory powers of the superior officers of the police whereas sub-Section (1) of Section 154 of the Code expressly provides that the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is to be given to the officer in charge of the police station and sub-Section (3) of Section 154 of the Code would further make it clear that a person aggrieved by refusal on the part of an officer in charge of the police station to record the information referred therein may send the substance of such information in writing by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned would further emphasis that every information provided under Section 154(1) of the Code has to be given to the officer in charge of the police station for compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code. While discussing Priyanka Srivastave and Another’s case in succeeding paragraphs, this aspect would be dealt with in detail. 10. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is with regard to the non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code since Annexure-5(a), the certified copy of the complaint and Annexure-5(b), the certified copy of the affidavit and Annexure-5(c), the document list attached to C.M.P.No.4599/2020 would make it clear that the certified copy of the complaint by the third respondent is before the Deputy Superintendent of Police and not before the Station House Officer and that according to him, is in violation of Section 154(1) of the Code. 11. Though the learned counsel for the third respondent would contend that in Annexure-5(b) affidavit, there is clear avernment that on 31.05.2020, he filed complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Mala and no steps was taken and hence on 04.06.2020, he filed complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chalakkudy, Annexure-5(c), the document list attached with Annexure-5(a) C.M.P.No.4599/2020 describes item No.1 as the copy of the complaint filed before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chalakkudy dated 31.05.2020 and item No.2 is the receipt dated 04.06.2020 issued for filing complaint before the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Chalakkudy. 12. Annexure-5(d) is the copy of the compliant. On perusing the same also, it appears that though it was originally addressed to Inspector of Police, Mala, it was subsequently, corrected as before Dy.S.P., Chalakkudy. That complaint is also dated 31.05.2020. 12. Annexure-5(d) is the copy of the compliant. On perusing the same also, it appears that though it was originally addressed to Inspector of Police, Mala, it was subsequently, corrected as before Dy.S.P., Chalakkudy. That complaint is also dated 31.05.2020. So as rightly, pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner, no complaint as such seem to have been filed before the Inspector of Police, Mala in compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code. 13. In Priyanka Srivastave and Another’s case the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down that complaint under Section 156(3) of the Code are to be supported by affidavit duly sworn in by the applicant who seeks for invocation of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate. It has also been emphasised that there has to be prior application under Section 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code while filing the petition under Section 156(3) and both aspects should be clearly spelt out in the application and necessary documents to that effect shall be filed. It is also held that safe guards have been made to make the person making the application under Section 153(3) of the Code, more conscious and responsible and so as to prevent them from casually invoking the authority of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the Code. 14. In the present case, though there is averment in the affidavit that he has filed complaint as per Section 154(1) of the Code before the Inspector of Police, Mala, the document list and the copy of the documents produced by the defacto complainant would go to show that there is non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code since the petitioner has directly approached the Dy.S.P., Chalakkudy without approaching the SHO. 15. However, in the present case, the main contention of the defacto complainant is that the irregularities so occurred in filing the complaint by itself will not vitiate the trial since final report has already been filed. It is also his contention that the petitioner/accused did not approach this Court at the right time for quashing the FIR. Hence, according to him, the petitioner has to prove that the said irregularity had resulted in failure of justice and in the absence of the same, the final report and the proceedings initiated against him on the basis of final report cannot be quashed. 16. Hence, according to him, the petitioner has to prove that the said irregularity had resulted in failure of justice and in the absence of the same, the final report and the proceedings initiated against him on the basis of final report cannot be quashed. 16. In the context, the learned counsel brought to my attention Pradeep S.Wodeyar v. The State of Karnataka. (LL 2021 SC 691). That was a case in which the appellants approached the Apex Court against the dismissal of two petitions instituted by the appellants for quashing the criminal proceedings initiated against them in special C.C.No.599/2015 (arising out of crime No.21/2014) for offences punishable under Sections 409 and 420 read with Section 120B IPC Sections 21 and 23 read with Section 4(1) and 4(1)(A) of the Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and Rule 165 read with Rule 144 of the Karnataka Forest Rules, 1969. 17. It is to be noted in this context that in Priyanka Srivastave and Another’s was a case in which the respondents filed application under Section 156(3) of the Code and the Magistrate directed the SHO to register the FIR and FIR was registered under Section 465, 467 and 471 of IPC and the appellants moved the High Court to quash the order and against which the appellants approached the Apex Court by filing Special Leave to Appeal. 18. But in the present case, after the registration of the FIR, on the basis of Annexure-5 complaint, investigation was completed and final report was filed. So at this stage, whether the irregularity occurred in non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code is a matter to be looked into for quashing the final report is the question that emerges for consideration. 19. In this Context, the learned counsel brought to my attention Section 465 of the Code and which reads as follows: “465. So at this stage, whether the irregularity occurred in non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code is a matter to be looked into for quashing the final report is the question that emerges for consideration. 19. In this Context, the learned counsel brought to my attention Section 465 of the Code and which reads as follows: “465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission irregularity – (1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 20. So as per Section 465 of the Code, no finding, sentence of order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under the Code. Sub-Section (2) further provides that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceedings under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. So, in the present case, immediately after the registration of the crime, the petitioner could have resorted to quash the proceedings for non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code but slept over that and waited till the filing of the final report and only after that he approached this Court for quashing the final report. So, in the present case, immediately after the registration of the crime, the petitioner could have resorted to quash the proceedings for non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code but slept over that and waited till the filing of the final report and only after that he approached this Court for quashing the final report. In this context, the learned counsel relied on Pradeep S. Wodeyar’s case referred above, in paragraph No.53 of the said judgment is relevant in this context to be quoted, which reads as follows: “53. In order to prove that the irregularity vitiates the proceeding, the accused must prove a ‘failure of justice’ as prescribed under Section 465 Cr.P.C. In view of the discussion in the previous section on the applicability of Section 465 Cr.P.C (and the inability to prove failure of justice) to the cognizance order, the irregularity would not vitiate the proceedings. Moreover, bearing in mind the objective behind prescribing that cognizance has to be taken of the offence and not the offender, a mere change in the form of the cognizance order would not alter the effect of the order for any injustice to be meted out.” 21. In the present case also, the mere fact that the complaint was not filed to the SHO, but straight away it was filed before the Dy. Superintendent of Police, Chalakkudy is only an irregularity and it has not caused any failure of justice as prescribed under Section 465 of the Code. Moreover, the petitioner could have raised his objection at the inception of the registration of the crime. In the present case, the non-compliance of Section 154(1) of the Code in not filing a complaint before the SHO and forwarding the complaint by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) cannot be challenged at this stage since the petitioner could not establish that it has caused any failure of justice as provided under Section 465(2) of the Code. 22. The circumstances, in which this Court can quash the criminal proceedings is also well settled. It is relevant in this context to quote CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava [ AIR 2006 SC 2872 ], wherein it has been held that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is relevant in this context to quote CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava [ AIR 2006 SC 2872 ], wherein it has been held that the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. In State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha [ AIR 1982 SC 949 ] and also in Rupam Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [ AIR 1996 SC 309 ] it has been held that the power of quashing the criminal proceedings has to be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the extraordinary and inherent powers of Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice. It has been held in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [ AIR 1977 SC 1489 ] that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require it. In Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P [ (2008) 12 SCC 531 ] it has been held while dealing with Section 482 that if any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in the absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 23. In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner was mainly harping upon the non-compliance of Sections 154(1) and 154(3) of the Code. But the final report has already been filed and as found earlier, the irregularity of non-compliance of Sections 154(1) and 154(3) has not been challenged by the petitioner at the right time by challenging the registration of the crime and the final report has subsequently been filed. But the final report has already been filed and as found earlier, the irregularity of non-compliance of Sections 154(1) and 154(3) has not been challenged by the petitioner at the right time by challenging the registration of the crime and the final report has subsequently been filed. Hence in view of Section 465(2) of the Code, and also as per the dictum laid down in Pradeep S.Wodeyar’s case the irregularity so occurred could have been objected at an earlier stage and the petitioner could not prove the failure of justice as contemplated under Section 465(2) of the Code and hence the irregularity would not vitiate the entire proceedings and hence continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner cannot be said as an abuse of process of court. 24. In the above backdrop, the prayer of the petitioner to quash the entire proceedings in C.C.No.2143/2020 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakkudy cannot be allowed. In the result, Crl.M.C. dismissed.