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2022 DIGILAW 180 (JHR)

Nagendra Singh @ Nagina Singh, S/o. Late Prithwi Nath Singh v. State of Jharkhand

2022-02-16

SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR

body2022
JUDGMENT : The complainant is aggrieved by the order dated 18th March 2015 passed in Complaint Case No. 244 of 2011. 2. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau on perusal of pre-summoning evidence produced by the complainant during inquiry under section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure came to a conclusion that a prima-facie case for summoning the accused to face the trial is not made out. 3. In the order dated 18th March 2015, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palamau has held as under : “.................................................................................................... After perusal of the entire evidences adduced on behalf of the informant during inquiry u/s 202 of Cr.P.C, no one has seen to any person, who attacked upon the informant by 'BOMB' or gun-shot. Therefore, no any prima-facie case can be made out against any of the persons for any offence. Though the informant has lodged the F.I.R for the offences u/s 307/34 of IPC, 27 of Arms Act and Sec. 3/4 of Explosive Substance Act. No any injury report has been produced on record on behalf of the informant in order to prove that any person was caused injury to the informant which was dangerous to life. For the offence u/s 27 of the Arms Act and Sec. 3/4 of Explosive Substance Act, no sanction order is available on record on behalf of informant. No one has seen that who attacked over the informant. In these facts and circumstances and also after considering the entire materials available on record, I find and hold that no prima facie case is hereby made out against any of the persons. There is no material available on record to proceed further with the case. ….................................................................................................” 4. Mr. Anand Kumar Pandey, the learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that in the protest-cum-complaint petition there are allegations against the accused of committing the offence under section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, section 27 of the Arms Act and section 3/4 of the Explosive Substance Act, still, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate declined to issue summons to the proposed accused under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and erroneously dismissed the complaint under section 203. 5. Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the procedure for commencement of proceedings before the Magistrate. The exercise of powers under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ensues serious consequences. 5. Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down the procedure for commencement of proceedings before the Magistrate. The exercise of powers under section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ensues serious consequences. No doubt issue of process against a person to face trial in a criminal case is a serious matter. That precisely is the reason the Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again said that the Magistrate must exercise the discretion judiciously. The Magistrate is not to act as a machine in taking cognizance of each and every complaint filed before him and issue process as a matter of course – he is not a post-office. As has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in “Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy” (1976) 3 SCC 252 , exercise of powers by the Magistrate under section 190/204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is discretionary and such discretion has to be exercised on satisfaction about commission of an offence on the basis of the materials brought on record and it is not that the Magistrate “must take cognizance” on each and every complaint. 6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held, thus; “13. It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence. This is clear from the use of the words ‘may take cognizance’ which in the context in which they occur cannot be equated with ‘must take cognizance’. The word ‘may’ gives a discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself.” 7. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter - the discretion has to be exercised judiciously, but if on a bare reading of the complaint it can be gathered that commission of the offence as alleged in the complaint is so inherently improbable, or that the act or omission complained of is purely civil in nature, or no offence is made out against the accused person, the complaint shall be dismissed. Therefore, if the Magistrate has taken cognizance in a case falling under the aforesaid circumstances the High Court can interfere with the order taking cognizance. 8. In “Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar” AIR 1960 SC 1113 , what has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court may usefully be quoted : “9. ………The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned.……” 9. It is also a settled proposition in law that the revisional court in exercise of powers under section 397 read with section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not interfere with the decision of the Magistrate on mere probability. 10. The powers of the Court under section 397 read with section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are limited. Limitations of the revisional jurisdiction are explained by the Supreme Court in “Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar” (1987) 1 SCC 288, thus : “88.…..Section 397 gives the High Court or the Sessions Judge jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. While considering the legality, propriety or the correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally, the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. The court in revision considers the materials only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence or order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence.” 11. The court in revision considers the materials only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence or order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence.” 11. Manatu (Tarhasi OP) PS Case No. 31 of 2004 was registered on 24th July 2004 against Sanjay Singh, Ajit Singh and Anjani Singh for the offence under section 307/34 of the Indian Penal Code, section 27 of the Arms Act and section 3/4 of the Explosive Substance Act. 12. After the investigation the police submitted final form on the ground that the occurrence as alleged by the informant was not true. The informant filed a protest petition on 13th October 2004 which was registered as Complaint Case No. 244 of 2011. He examined himself on solemn affirmation and produced three inquiry witnesses. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate examined the evidence tendered by the inquiry witnesses and held that they are hearsay witnesses who came to know about involvement of the accused through newspaper. 13. Statement of the complainant on solemn affirmation has been produced along with the present criminal revision petition vide Annexure-3. The complainant has stated that the accused persons are his relatives and an altercation took place with them on 9th July 2004. He further says that the place of occurrence was about one kilometer from his village and co-villagers, namely, Ashok Singh, Umesh Singh, Neyaj Ahmad and Binod Pandey are the persons who took him to the hospital. According to him, he was brought to the hospital around midnight and that the injury was minor (paragraph no. 5). 14. In view of the aforesaid state of pre-summoning evidence, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the order dated 18th March 2015 and, accordingly, Criminal Revision No. 925 of 2016 is dismissed. 15. I.A. No. 6475 of 2016 stands disposed of.