ORDER : Dinesh Mehta, J. 1. By way of present writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 17.11.2021, passed by the Chief Executive officer, Zila Parishad, Banswara granting prosecution sanction for proceeding against the petitioner pursuant to FIR No. 10/2020 that was lodged against the petitioner for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1988'). 2. Narrated briefly, the facts appertain are, that the petitioner was posted as Village Development officer (Gram Vikas Adhikari) in Gram Panchayat Khajuri, District Banswara. An FIR No. 10/2020 came to be registered against the petitioner under section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1973 (for short "the Code of 1973") by the Anti-Corruption Bureau, Police Station, Banswara under section 7 of the Act of 1988 with the accusation that he had demanded a sum of Rs.7,000/- from the complainant Gautam Singh for clearing his bill for Rs.32,000/-. 3. While, the trap which was laid for catching the petitioner red-handed had failed, the allegation of demanding gratification was supported by a telephone recording. 4. In furtherance of the FIR so lodged, the respondent No. 2 sought prosecution sanction against the petitioner as required under section 19(1) of the Act of 1988. 5. The petitioner has placed on record a letter dated 03.08.2021 sent by the DIG, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Udaipur Range, Udaipur to the Chief Executive officer, Zila Parishad, Banswara which not only makes a reference but also encloses a draft order of prosecution sanction. 6. In response to the request so made, prosecution sanction has been sent by the competent authority i.e., Chief Executive officer, Zila Parishad, Banswara vide communication dated 17.11.2021. 7. Mr. Mathur, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that after the amendment in the Act of 1988 brought into effect from 26.07.2018, no police officer can conduct any enquiry/investigation in relation to an offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under the Act of 1988, without prior approval of the competent authority. 8. It is argued that before lodging of the FIR or commencing investigation, it was required of the respondent No. 2 to have taken prior approval of the competent authority as mandated under section 17A of the Act of 1988. 9. 8. It is argued that before lodging of the FIR or commencing investigation, it was required of the respondent No. 2 to have taken prior approval of the competent authority as mandated under section 17A of the Act of 1988. 9. It is also argued that the respondent No. 3 has issued prosecution sanction vide its order dated 17.11.2021, without applying his own mind, which is evident from the fact that the draft sanction order which was forwarded by the office of the DIG, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Udaipur Range, Udaipur to respondent No. 3, has been typed verbatim and sent, while simply filling his own name in the blank space of the last para. 10. Mr. Sunil Beniwal, learned AAG, argued that the petitioner is having an efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal before the Rajasthan Civil Service Tribunal. 11. So far as the facts asserted by the petitioner that no prior approval of the State Government has been obtained before the investigation commenced, the reply is silent. Therefore, petitioner's assertion about the absence of prior approval of the competent authority remains undenied and hence admitted. 12. Heard. 13. A perusal of the communication dated 03.08.2011 sent by the office of the Deputy Inspector General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Udaipur Range, Udaipur to the respondent No. 3 clearly reveals that his office had enclosed a draft of the order sanctioning prosecution, while soliciting the prosecution sanction. 14. The fact that the draft order was sent by the office of the DIG, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Udaipur Range, Udaipur has not been disputed by the State. 15. If the draft order sent by the DIG, ACB, Udaipur Range, Udaipur is kept in juxtaposition with the final order of prosecution sanction dated 17.11.2021, there can be no doubt that it is ad-verbatim the same. 16. The respondent No. 3 has simply filled in the blank space with his name:- 'Bhawani Singh Palawat', the only space left blank in the draft that was sent by the respondent Anti-Corruption Bureau. 17. It is rather shocking to learn that even the name of the petitioner; charges including details and even expressions showing application of mind and reasons have been supplied in the draft prosecution sanction order. 18. 17. It is rather shocking to learn that even the name of the petitioner; charges including details and even expressions showing application of mind and reasons have been supplied in the draft prosecution sanction order. 18. While explaining the object of section 19 of the Act of 1988 in the leading case reported in (2010) 14 SCC 527 (State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen), the Apex Court observed thus:- "12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us a sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise. 13. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course. 14. 14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the appellant that fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or for review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. As a matter of fact, from the perusal of the subsequent Order dated 15-03-2008 it is clear that on the same materials, the sanctioning authority has changed its opinion and ordered sanction to prosecute the respondent which, in our opinion, is clearly impermissible. 15. By way of footnote, we may observe that the investigating agency might have had legitimate grievance about the Order dated 27-11-2007 refusing to grant sanction, and if that were so and no fresh materials were necessary, it ought to have challenged the order of the sanctioning authority but that was not done. The power of the sanctioning authority being not of continuing character could have been exercised only once on the same materials. 16. There is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed." 19. Such being the position, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned order lacks application of mind, and the respondent No. 3 has simply signed the order on dotted line. 20. According to this Court, the order granting sanction under section 19 of the Act of 1988 may not contain detailed reasons, but it must reflect consideration of relevant material and application of mind. When the statute envisages a prior sanction before taking cognizance against a public servant then, it is enjoined upon the competent authority to apply its mind instead of towing the line with the investigating agency mechanically. Signing the draft order or copying the same under his signature is in a way frustrating the mandate of the provision. 21. While dealing with application of mind in case relating to grant of sanction, Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat [ (1997) 7 SCC 622 ] in para 19 has held as under:- "19. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution." 22. Before dealing with the argument of Mr. Mathur, it would be better to go through section 17A of the Act of 1988, reproduced hereinfra:- "17A. Before dealing with the argument of Mr. Mathur, it would be better to go through section 17A of the Act of 1988, reproduced hereinfra:- "17A. Enquiry or Inquiry or investigation of offences relatable to recommendations made or decision taken by public servant in discharge of official functions or duties.--No police officer shall conduct any enquiry or inquiry or investigation into any offence alleged to have been committed by a public servant under this Act, where the alleged offence is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by such public servant in discharge of his official functions or duties, without the previous approval-- (a) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of that Government; (b) in the case of a person who is or was employed, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of that Government; (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office, at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed: Provided that no such approval shall be necessary for cases involving arrest of a person on the spot on the charge of accepting or attempting to accept any undue advantage for himself or for any other person: Provided further that the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month." 23. A bare look at section 17A reveals that no police officer can conduct any inquiry or investigation into an offence punishable under the Act of 1988 unless a prior approval of the competent authority is obtained. 24. Approval of the competent authority in terms of section 17A of the Act of 1988 is a sine-qua-non has been held by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Yashwant Sinha v. CBI (2020) 2 SCC 338 . Para 117 of the judgment reads thus:- "117. 24. Approval of the competent authority in terms of section 17A of the Act of 1988 is a sine-qua-non has been held by the Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Yashwant Sinha v. CBI (2020) 2 SCC 338 . Para 117 of the judgment reads thus:- "117. In terms of Section 17A, no Police officer is permitted to conduct any enquiry or inquiry or conduct investigation into any offence done by a public servant where the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant in discharge of his public functions without previous approval, inter alia, of the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been committed. In respect of the public servant, who is involved in this case, it is clause (c), which is applicable. Unless, therefore, there is previous approval, there could be neither inquiry or enquiry or investigation. It is in this context apposite to notice that the complaint, which has been filed by the petitioners in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 298 of 2018, moved before the first respondent-CBI, is done after Section 17A was inserted. The complaint is dated 04.10.2018. Paragraph 5 sets out the relief which is sought in the complaint which is to register an FIR under various provisions. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the complaint are relevant in the context of Section 17A, which reads as follows: "6. We are also aware that recently, Section 17(A) of the act has been brought in by way of an amendment to introduce the requirement of prior permission of the government for investigation or inquiry under the Prevention of Corruption Act. 7. We are also aware that this will place you in the peculiar situation, of having to ask the accused himself, for permission to investigate a case against him. We realise that your hands are tied in this matter, but we request you to at least take the first step, of seeking permission of the government under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act for investigating this offence and under which, "the concerned authority shall convey its decision under this section within a period of three months, which may, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, be extended by a further period of one month"." 25. Indisputably, the allegation of demanding illegal gratification relates to discharge of official duties of the petitioner and no prior approval of the competent authority has been obtained. As such, the proceedings or the very attempt to arrest the petitioner on spot on the charge of accepting the bribe (which has failed), may or may not be illegal but the proceedings thereafter, further investigation and lodging of FIR against the petitioner without the approval of the competent authority is void ab initio. 26. According to this Court both enquiry and investigation are proscribed sans prior approval of the competent authority. The embargo under section 17A operates wherever the alleged offence is claimed to have been committed in connection with the discharge of official duties. The allegation of demand of bribe definitely has a nexus with the work the petitioner was supposed to do as a public servant, hence the provision of section 17A of the Act of 1988 would create a road block in the way of the investigating officer to proceed further. 27. Be that as it may. Since lodging of FIR or commencement of investigation is not under challenge, this Court deters from pronouncing upon the State's action of lodging FIR against the petitioner. 28. Since the commencement of investigation itself is found to be suffering from inherent lacuna, the grant of prosecution sanction too falls flat on the ground. 29. Writ petition, therefore, succeeds. 30. Impugned order dated 17.11.2021, granting prosecution sanction to prosecute and take cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the petitioner is, therefore, quashed and set aside. 31. Needless to observe that the respondent No. 3 will be free to take a fresh decision on request of respondent No. 2 and pass fresh order in accordance with law. 32. Stay petition also stands disposed of accordingly.