JUDGMENT : Devashis Baruah, J. 1. Heard Mr. Sentiyanger, learned counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. K. Angami, learned P.P. for the State respondent No. 1 and Mr. Kiroba, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 2. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing of the proceedings against the accused/the petitioner in G.R. Case No. 123/2017 corresponding to Kohima North P.S. Case No. 38/2017, registered under Section 326/307 IPC. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the matter between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 have already been amicably resolved and as such, they have also entered into a compromise as could be seen from Annexure-E to the said revision application. Further to that, another deed of compromise was also entered into between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 enclosed as Annexure-G to the said revision application. On the basis of the same, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the G.R. Case No. 123/2017 corresponding to Kohima North P.S. Case No. 38/2017 ought to be quashed. 4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner refers to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Narinder Singh and Others vs. State of Punjab and Another, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 to contend that even in cases wherein 307 has been involved, this Court has an inherent jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceedings and in that regard has made reference to paragraph 29.6, 29.7 and 33 of the said judgment. The learned counsel also refers to another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 and submits that the judgment in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) was duly considered and in paragraph 15.4 similar observations have been made as was made in paragraph 29.6 of the judgment in Narinder Singh (supra) was reiterated. On the basis of the said two judgments, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case Section 307 has been unnecessarily brought in by way of the charge-sheet as well as also in the FIR in as much as a perusal of the facts in the instant case would disclose that no case under Section 307 is made out. He further submits that the documents on record would clearly show that the injuries which were caused to the victim would not come within the ambits of Section 320 of the IPC and as such, neither the FIR could have been registered nor the charge-sheet could have been filed under Section 326 of the IPC. 5. Mr. K. Angami, learned P.P., however, submits that on a perusal of the charge-sheet enclosed as Annexure-C, it would be seen that the petitioner had picked up a Naga dao and forcefully struck twice on the neck of the victim who was sitting on the floor. He further submitted that the accused has also admitted the said aspect of the matter as could be seen from the statement of the accused enclosed to the charge-sheet and as such, this is purely a case coming within the ambit of Section 307 & 326 of the IPC. 6. The learned P.P. further had drawn the attention of this Court to the judgment in the case of Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (supra) and more particularly, to paragraph 12 and 13 of the said judgment wherein the observations made in Narinder Singh (supra) was explained and distinguished by the Supreme Court. 7. Mr. Kiroba, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3 submits that they have amicably resolved their dispute and in that regard had also filed an affidavit in support of the case of the petitioner. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 9. The offence under Section 307 of the IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore, are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 9. The offence under Section 307 of the IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore, are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. If a case is made out under Section 307 of the IPC, this Court, in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot quash the said charge-sheet on the basis of a compromise entered into between the victim and the accused as it is a crime against the society. In this regard reference may made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (supra) and more particularly, paragraph 12 & 13 which are quoted herein below:- "12. Now so far as the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh is concerned, this Court in para 29.6 admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are alone. However, this Court further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision in Narinder Singh shall be of no assistance to the accused in the present case. 13. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Shiji, while quashing the FIR by observing that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court was clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. In Shiji, this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that: "19. ... that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations ... will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose." In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed "that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version," and to that this Court observed and held that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 CrPC can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in the said decision, in para 18, it is observed as under: "18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost case and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked." Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute, etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in Shiji, without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case." A perusal of the above quoted judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would show that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had categorically observed that the Court ought not to only appreciate that when the complainant had entered into a compromise with the accused there may not be any conviction, as such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that in a given case it may happen that the prosecution still can prove a guilt by leading evidence and examining other witnesses and the relevant evidences/materials, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial or civil nature or is not a private wrong. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that in a given case it may happen that the prosecution still can prove a guilt by leading evidence and examining other witnesses and the relevant evidences/materials, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial or civil nature or is not a private wrong. 10. Now coming back to the facts of the instant case it would appear that the dispute in question is not a commercial transaction or dispute of a civil nature or was in the nature of a private wrong. In the instant case, the allegation against the petitioner is that the petitioner had struck the victim on his neck twice with a Naga dao and this is a crime not only against the victim but is also a crime against the State. 11. In that view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of the compromise reached between the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. The Trial Court may proceed with the trial in accordance with law. 12. The petition accordingly stands dismissed. However, no costs.