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2022 DIGILAW 181 (KAR)

Babasaheb v. Abdul Sab Mulla

2022-02-09

S.VISHWAJITH SHETTY

body2022
JUDGMENT 1. This revision petition under Sec. 121-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act') has been filed challenging the order dtd. 24/5/1989 passed by the Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Dharward (hereinafter referred to as 'the Appellate Authority') in LRA No.783/1986, wherein the order dtd. 30/10/1980 passed by respondent no.3-Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of the petitioners has been set aside and granted in favour of respondents 1 and 2 herein. 2. Brief facts of the case that would be relevant for the purpose of disposal of this revision petition are, the petitioners and respondents 1 and 2 had filed Form-1 under Sec. 11 of the Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977 (for short, 'Act of 1977), for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the lands bearing R.S.No.137/3A and R.S.No.14/4A4B. The petitioners in their Form-1 filed on 5/12/1978 had claimed occupancy rights in respect of land bearing R.S.No.137/3A measuring 1 acre 8 guntas and R.S.No.14/4A4B measuring 3 acres 32 guntas, while respondents 1 and 2 in their Form-1 filed on 24/11/1978 had claimed occupancy rights in respect of land bearing R.S.No.137/3A measuring 24 guntas and R.S.No.14/4A4B measuring 1 acre 36 guntas. 3. Respondent no.3-Land Tribunal clubbed these two applications filed by the rival claimants and after holding an inquiry had granted occupancy rights in favour of the petitioners herein as claimed in their Form-1 and rejected the claim of respondents 1 and 2 vide order 30/10/1980. The said order was questioned by respondents 1 and 2 herein before this Court in W.P.No.9197/1984 and after establishment of the Appellate Authority, vide order dtd. 30/7/1986, the writ petition was transferred to the Appellate Authority and numbered as LRA No.783/1986. 4. The Appellate Authority thereafter, vide the order impugned herein dtd. 24/5/1989, has set aside the order passed by respondent no.3-Land Tribunal and has granted occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of respondents 1 and 2 herein as claimed in their Form-1. Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioners are before this Court in this revision petition. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that respondents 1 and 2 had not filed any application under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1977, and therefore, the Appellate Authority was not justified in granting the occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in their favour. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that respondents 1 and 2 had not filed any application under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1977, and therefore, the Appellate Authority was not justified in granting the occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in their favour. He submits that the Appellate Authority has erroneously relied upon the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in the suit O.S.No.33/1971 filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein for the relief of injunction and has come to a conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 were in possession and cultivation of the lands in dispute. He submits that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein having regard to Ss. 132 and 133 of the Act, and therefore, the Appellate Authority could not have placed reliance on the same. He submits that the Land Tribunal having appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available before it, had rightly granted the occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of the petitioners and the Appellate Authority has erred in setting aside the said order. He submits that the Appellate Authority having given a finding that the Land Tribunal had not recorded any reasons for granting occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of the petitioners, ought to have remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal and should not have proceeded to consider the matter on merits and grant occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of respondents 1 and 2. In support of his contentions, learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of RACHAGOUDA GURUSIDDAPPA PATIL VS KAMABAI and OTHERS - AIR 1963 MYSORE 21, and in the case of KORAGA MARAKALA and ANOTHER VS SMT. KAMALA and OTHERS - AIR 1988 KAR 123 . 6. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submits that the Civil Court in the suit filed by respondents 1 and 2 in O.S.No.33/1971 which was decreed on 30/11/1972 had not decided the dispute with regard to the tenancy and the said suit was decreed granting bare injunction. He submits that this Court in the case of B.V.SUBBACHARI VS B.K.JOYAPPA - ILR 1994 KAR 2505, having appreciated the effect of Ss. He submits that this Court in the case of B.V.SUBBACHARI VS B.K.JOYAPPA - ILR 1994 KAR 2505, having appreciated the effect of Ss. 132 and 133 of the Act on suits filed for bare injunction, has held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for injunction and pass appropriate interim orders. He has also contended that the Land Tribunal had failed to appreciate the document Ex.A-1 which is a Agawa Lavani deed dtd. 27/3/1964 executed by petitioner no.1 in favour of the father of respondents 1 and 2. He submits that though the execution of the said deed was disputed by the petitioners before the Land Tribunal, the same was admitted by them before the Civil Court in O.S.No.33/1971 and having regard to the same, the Appellate Authority was completely justified in relying upon the said document Ex.A-1, which clearly goes to show that the lands in question were leased in favour of the father of respondents 1 and 2 and they were in possession and cultivation of the said lands which is evident from the judgment and decree passed by the jurisdictional Civil Court in O.S.No.33/1971. He submits that the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971 was questioned by the petitioners herein in R.A.No.9/1973 unsuccessfully and the filing of the appeal challenging the decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971 was disputed by them before the Appellate Authority. He also submits that the record of rights in respect of the lands in dispute admittedly stood in the name of respondents 1 and 2 and even though the petitioners herein had contended before the Civil Court that the record of rights in respect of the lands in dispute were fraudulently changed in the names of respondents 1 and 2, the same was not questioned by the petitioners before the competent authority at any point of time. He submits that the scope of interference as against the impugned order in a revision under Sec. 121-A of the Act is very limited and in this regard, he has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of HONNAMMA and OTHERS VS NANJUNDAIAH SINCE DEAD BY HIS LRS and OTHERS - (2008)12 SCC 338 . Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments addressed on both sides and also perused the material available on record. 8. Accordingly, he prays to dismiss the petition. 7. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments addressed on both sides and also perused the material available on record. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners, at the outset, has raised a preliminary objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority to grant occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of respondents 1 and 2 on the ground that respondents 1 and 2 had not filed any application either under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1977, or under any other statute. This contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners does not appear to be correct as Form-1 filed by respondents 1 and 2 on 24/11/1978 under Sec. 11 of the Act of 1977, is available in the original records. Further, in the memorandum of revision petition, the petitioners have admitted that respondents 1 and 2 have also made a claim before the Land Tribunal in respect of the lands in dispute. The Land Tribunal as well as the Appellate Authority have referred to the claim made by respondents 1 & 2 herein in the requisite form, and thereafter, have passed the orders. 9. In so far as the contention urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the Land Tribunal ought not to have placed reliance on the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court in O.S.No.33/1971 having regard to Ss. 132 and 133 of the Act is concerned, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the issue of tenancy was not at all decided by the Civil Court in O.S.No.33/1971. Though there was an issue framed in the said suit relating to tenancy, the Civil Court had refused to answer the same and has decreed the suit for permanent injunction in favour of respondents 1 and 2 herein based on the oral and documentary evidence which prima facie proved the possession of the lands in dispute by respondents 1 and 2 herein. This Court in B.V.Subbachari's case supra, after appreciating the effect of Ss. 132 and 133 of the Act, in a suit for injunction, has held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for injunction and also pass appropriate interim orders. 10. This Court in B.V.Subbachari's case supra, after appreciating the effect of Ss. 132 and 133 of the Act, in a suit for injunction, has held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit for injunction and also pass appropriate interim orders. 10. In Rachagouda Gurusiddappa Patil's case supra, the Full Bench of this Court had considered the question whether Mamlatdar (Special Tribunal) could entertain and decide an application by the landlord for declaration that his opponent who claims to be a tenant is not a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. In the said case, by a majority decision, it was held that the Mamlatdar had no jurisdiction to entertain such an application filed by the landlord having regard to the scope of Sec. 70 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. 11. In Koraga Marakala's case supra, the Full Bench of this Court had considered the question whether Sec. 133 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act No.27 of 1976 read with Sec. 3 of the Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974, is applicable to the appeals pending in Civil Courts as on the date when the Amendment Act 27 of 1976 came into force and whether the question of tenancy involved in the said appeals were required to be referred to the Land Tribunal. The Full Bench of this Court in the said case had answered the said question in the affirmative and held that the question of tenancy has to be decided by the Tribunal and till such question is decided, the proceedings in the appeals which were pending before the Civil Courts were required to be stayed. The said two judgments referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. The suit in O.S.No.33/1971 filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein against the petitioners herein has been decreed on 30/11/1972 which is much prior to the date on which the contesting parties have made a claim before the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights. Admittedly, the petitioners have filed Form-1 on 5/12/1978 and respondents 1 and 2 have filed Form-1 on 24/11/1978. The suit O.S.No.33/1971 filed by respondents 1 and 2 is one for bare injunction. Admittedly, the petitioners have filed Form-1 on 5/12/1978 and respondents 1 and 2 have filed Form-1 on 24/11/1978. The suit O.S.No.33/1971 filed by respondents 1 and 2 is one for bare injunction. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the question of tenancy has not at all been decided in the said suit. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, more so, the Agawa Lavani Deed dtd. 27/3/1964 and the record of rights which stood in the name of respondents 1 and 2 coupled with the oral evidence led in by respondents 1 and 2, the jurisdictional Civil Court had recorded a finding that respondents 1 and 2 were in possession of the lands in question. 12. Though the judgment of the Civil Court may not be binding on the Land Tribunal, it would definitely have an evidentiary value which cannot be brushed aside by the Land Tribunal. Admittedly, the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971 was questioned by the petitioners herein in R.A.No.9/1973 unsuccessfully and inspite of the same, they had denied before the Appellate Authority about the filing of regular appeal by them challenging the decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971. It is not the case of the petitioners herein that subsequent to the decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971, the possession of the lands in dispute was either surrendered by respondents 1 and 2 in favour of the petitioners or that the petitioners had legally obtained possession of the said lands from respondents 1 and 2. The execution of Ex.A-1 - Agawa Lavani Deed dtd. 27/3/1964 was denied by the petitioners before the Appellate Authority. However, before the Civil Court in O.S.No.33/1971, the execution of the very same deed was admitted by petitioner no.1 herein. The Appellate Authority having appreciated this aspect of the matter, has rightly placed reliance on Ex.A-1 - Agawa Lavani Deed and also the judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.33/1971 for arriving at a conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 were in possession and cultivation of the lands in dispute. 13. The material on record would also go to show that the record of rights of the lands in question stands in the name of respondents 1 and 2. 13. The material on record would also go to show that the record of rights of the lands in question stands in the name of respondents 1 and 2. Even at the time of filing O.S.No.33/1971, the record of rights of the lands in dispute stood in the name of respondents 1 and 2 herein and though the petitioners had contended that by fraudulent means the entries were made in the record of rights in favour of respondents 1 and 2, even thereafter, they have not taken any steps to challenge the said entry and the said entries continued to stand in the name of respondents 1 and 2 even when the matter was adjudicated before the Land Tribunal and thereafter before the Appellate Authority. It is a settled principle of law that the entries in the revenue records have a presumptive value unless rebutted, and in the case on hand, the petitioners have completely failed to rebut such a presumption which is in favour of respondents 1 and 2. 14. In addition to the aforesaid documentary evidence, the Appellate Authority has also appreciated the oral evidence led on behalf of the contesting parties and having appreciated the same, has come to a conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 were in possession and cultivation of the lands in dispute and accordingly has granted occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of respondents 1 and 2. A reading of the order passed by the Land Tribunal which has been set aside by the Appellate Authority would go to show that the Land Tribunal has not recorded any reason for granting the occupancy rights of the lands in dispute in favour of the petitioners or for rejecting the claim of respondents 1 and 2 seeking grant of occupancy rights in their favour. The Appellate Authority has recorded a finding in favour of respondents 1 and 2 based on oral and documentary evidence available on record that respondents 1 and 2 are in occupation and cultivation of the lands in dispute and has accordingly granted the occupancy rights of the lands in dispute as claimed by respondents 1 and 2 in their Form-1 and has set aside the order passed by the Land Tribunal granting occupancy rights in favour of the petitioners. In my considered view, the said order passed by the Appellate Authority does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity which calls for interference by this Court. 15. Further, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, the scope of interference in a revision petition filed under Sec. 121-A of the Act is very limited. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Honnamma's case supra, has held that interference in a revision filed under Sec. 121-A of the Act is permissible only on very limited grounds such as perversity and if the view the taken by the Appellate Authority is completely opposed to the material evidence available on record. In the case on hand, the Appellate Authority having properly appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on record, has come to a right conclusion that respondents 1 and 2 were in occupation and cultivation of the lands in question and has accordingly granted the occupancy rights of the lands claimed by them in their Form-1 and such a finding recorded by the Appellate Authority cannot be termed as perverse, and therefore, there is no scope for interference as against the order impugned herein in this revision petition. Accordingly, the revision petition has to fail, and therefore, the same is dismissed.